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Oi S' avTOv Trept rei^o^ 
OrJKas 'lAiaSos yas 

Beside the ruins of Troy they lie buried, 
those men so beautiful ; there they have their 
burial-place, hidden in an enemy's land. 

T^e Agamemnon, 453-455. 

'AvSpwj/ eTTK^avwv Tracra yrj rdcfios, koI ov 
(TTrjXuiv fiovov iv rfj oiKua. (ny/xatvet iTnypa(f>y], 
aXXa KOI iv rfj fir] rrpoa-rjKOva-r] aypa<^os fxvrjfJi-q 
Trap cKao-Tw ti}s yvw/^T^S p.a.X\.ov yj tov epyov 

Of conspicuous men the whole world is the 
tomb, and it is not only inscriptions on 
tablets in their own country which chronicle 
their fame, but rather, even in distant lands, 
unwritten memorials living for ever, not upon 
visible monuments, but in the hearts of 

Pericles' Funeral Speech ; 

Thucydides, ii. 43. 


FROM the outset the Dardanelles Campaign 
attracted me with peculiar interest. The 
shores of the Straits were the scene of 
the Trojan epics and dramas. They were explored 
and partly inhabited by a race whose legends and 
history had been more familiar to me from boy- 
hood than my own country's, and more inspiring. 
They belonged to that beautiful part of the world 
with which I had become personally intimate during 
the wars, rebellions, and other disturbances of the 
previous twenty years. But, above all, I was 
attracted to the Campaign because I regarded it as 
a strategic conception surpassing others in promise. 
My reasons are referred to in various chapters of 
this book, and indeed they were obvious. The 
occupation of Constantinople would have paralysed 
Turkey as an ally of the Central Powers ; it would 
have blocked their path to the Middle East, and 
averted danger from Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and 
India ; it would have released the Russian forces 
in the Caucasus for action elsewhere ; it would have 


secured the neutrality, if not the active co-operation, 
of the Balkan States, and especially of Bulgaria, 
not only the most resolute and effective of them, 
but a State well disposed to ourselves and the 
Russian people by history and sentiment ; by secur- 
ing Bulgaria's friendship, it would have delivered 
Serbia from fear of attack upon her eastern frontier, 
and have relieved Roumania from similar appre- 
hensions along the Danube and in the Dobrudja ; 
it would have confirmed the influence of Venizelos 
in Greece, and saved King Constantine from military, 
financial, and domestic temptations to Germanise ; 
above all, it would thus have secured Russia's left 
flank, so enabling her to concentrate her entire 
forces upon the Lithuanian, Polish, and Galician 
frontiers from the Memel to the Dniester. 

The worst apprehensions of the Central Powers 
would then have been fulfilled. Blockaded by the 
Allied fleets in the Adriatic, and by the British 
fleet in the Channel and the North Sea, they would 
have found themselves indeed surrounded by an iron 
ring, and, so far as prophecy was possible, it seemed 
likely that the terms which our Alliance openly 
professed as our objects in the war might have been 
obtained in the spring of 191 6. The subsidiary and 
more immediate consequences of success in the 
Dardanelles, such as the supply of munitions to 
Russia, and of Ukrainian wheat to our Alliance, 
were also to be considered. The saying of Napoleon, 


in May, 1808, still held good: "At bottom the great 
question is — Who shall have Constantinople ? " 

Under the prevailing influence of "Westerners" 
upon French and British strategy, these probable 
advantages were either disregarded or dismissed, 
and to dwell upon them now is a useless speculation. 
The hopes suggested by the conception in 1915 
have faded like a dream. The dominant minds in 
our Alliance either failed to imagine their siofnificance, 
or were incapable of supplying the power required 
for their realisation while at the same time pressing 
forward the proposed offensive in France. The 
international situation of Europe, and indeed of the 
world, is now changed, and the strategic map has 
been completely altered. Early belligerents have 
disappeared from the field, and new belligerents have 
entered the shifting scene. Already, in 19 18, the 
Dardanelles Expedition has passed into history, and 
may be counted among the ghosts which history 
tries in vain to summon up. It is as an episode of 
a vanished past that I have attempted to represent 
it — a tragic episode enacted in the space of eleven 
months, but marked by every attribute of noble 
tragedy, whether we consider the grandeur of theme 
and personality, or the sympathy aroused by the 
spectacle of heroic figures struggling against the 
unconscious adversity of fate and the malign in- 
fluences of hostile or deceptive power. 

In treatment, I have made no attempt to rival 


my friend John Masefield's GalHpoli — that excellent 
piece of work, at once so accurate and so brilliantly 
illuminated by poetic vision. Mine has been the 
humbler task of simply recording the events as they 
occurred, with such detail as seemed essential to 
complete the history, or was accessible to myself. 
In this endeavour, I have trusted partly to the 
books and documents mentioned below, partly to 
information generously supplied to me by many of 
the principal actors upon the scene ; also to my 
own notes, writings, and memory, especially with 
regard to the nature of the country and the events 
of which I was a witness. Accuracy and justice 
have been my only aims, but in a work involving 
so much detail and so many controverted questions 
mistakes in accuracy and justice are scarcely to be 
avoided. I know the confusion of mind and the 
distorted vision so frequent in all great crises of 
war, and I know from long experience how ignorant 
may be the criticism applied to any soldier from the 
Commander-in-Chief down to the private with a 

The mention of the private with a rifle suggests 
my chief regret. The method I have followed, in 
treating divisions or brigades or, at the lowest, 
battalions as the units of action, almost obliterates 
the individual soldier from consideration. Divisions, 
brigades, and battalions are moved like pieces on 
a board, and Commanding Officers must regard 


each of them only as a certain quantity of force 
acting under the laws of time and space. Yet each 
of the so-called units is made up of living men 
— men of distinctive personality and incalculably 
varying nature. Men are the actual units in war 
as in the State, and I do not forget the "common 
soldiers." I do not overlook either their natural 
failures or their astonishing performance. In various 
campaigns and in many countries I have shared 
their apprehensions, their hardships, their brief 
intervals of respite, and their laborious triumphs. 
They, like the rest of mankind, have always filled 
me with surprised admiration or poignant sympathy. 
Among the soldiers of many races, but especially 
among the natives of these islands, whom I could 
best understand, I have always found the fine 
qualities which distinguish the majority of hard- 
working people, all of whom live perpetually in 
perilous hardship. I have found a freedom from 
rhetoric and vanity, a simple-hearted acceptance of 
hfe " in the first intention," taking life and death 
without much criticism as they come, and concealing 
kindliness and the longing for happiness under a 
veil of silence or protective irony. But a book of 
this kind has little place for the mention of them, 
and that is my regret. Like a general, I have 
been obliged to consider forces mainly in the mass, 
and must leave to readers the duty of remembering, 
as I never cease to remember, that all divisions 


and all platoons upon the Peninsula were composed 
of ordinary men like ourselves — individual per- 
sonalities subject to the common sufferings of hunger, 
thirst, sickness, and pain ; filled also with the 
common delight in life, the common horror of death, 
and the desire for peace and home. As in the case 
of general mankind, it was their endurance, their 
courage, self-sacrifice, and all that is implied in 
the ancient meanings of "virtue," which excited my 

Among those who have given me very kind 
assistance either on the Dardanelles Peninsula or 
in London, I may mention with gratitude General 
Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., etc. ; General Sir William 
R. Birdwood, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., etc. ; Major-General 
Sir Alexander Godley, K.C.B., etc. ; Major-General 
Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.M.G., etc. ; the late Lieut- 
General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, K.C.B. ; 
Major-General Sir W. R. Marshall, K.C.B. ; Major- 
General H. B. Walker, C.B. ; Major-General Sir 
William Douglas, K.C.M.G. ; Major-General F. H. 
Sykes, C.M.G. ; Major-General Sir D. Mercer, K.C. B. ; 
Brigadier-General Freyberg, V.C. ; Colonel Leslie 
Wilson, D.S.O., M.P. ; and Lieut. Douglas Jerrold, 
R.N.V.D. ; Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, K.C.B., 
etc.; Rear- Admiral Heathcote Grant, C.B., etc.; 
Captain A. P. Davidson, R.N. ; Captain the Hon. 
Algernon Boyle, R.N. ; Staff-Surgeon Levick, R.N. ; 
and the Rev. C. J. C. Peshall, R.N. It would indeed 


be difficult to draw up a complete list of the Naval 
and Military officers to whom I owe my thanks. 

Having taken many photographs on the Peninsula, 
I posted them, as I was directed, to the War Office, 
and never saw them again. I can only hope that 
any one into whose possession they may happen to 
have come upon the route, may find them as useful 
as I should have found them in illustrating this book. 
My friend. Captain C. E. W. Bean, has generously 
supplied me with some of his own photographs in 
their place. For the rest I am permitted to use 
official pictures, taken by my friend, Mr. Brooks. 
They are of course far superior to any I could 
have taken, but some are already familiar. 

The maps are for the most part constructed 
from the Staff Maps (nominally Turkish, but mainly 
Austrian I believe) used by the G.H.Q. upon the 
Peninsula. Some also are derived from drawings by 
Generals and Staff Officers. For the larger maps 
of Anzac and Suvla I am indebted to the assist- 
ance of Captain Treloar and the Australian Staff 
in London, with permission of Sir Alexander Godley, 
and Brigadier-General Richardson (formerly of the 
Royal Naval Division). 

The following is a list of the chief books and 
documents which I have found useful : — 

Sir Ian Hamilton's Dispatches. 

Sir Charles Monro's Dispatch on the Evacuation. 

The Dardanelles Commission Report, Part I. 


With the Twenty-ninth Division in Gallipoli, 

by the Rev. O. Creighton, Chaplain to the 

86th Brigade (killed in France, April 1918). 
The Tenth [Irish) Division in Gallipoliy by 

Major Bryan Cooper, 5th Connaught Rangers. 
With the Zionists in Gallipoli, by Lieut. -Colonel 

J. S. Patterson. 
The Immortal Gamble, by A. J. Stewart, Acting 

Commander, R.N., and the Rev. C. J. E. 

Peshall, Chaplain, R.N. 
Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles, by a 

French Medical Officer. 
Australia in Arms, by Phillip F. E. Schuler. 
The Story of the Anzacs. (Messrs. Ingram & 

Sons, Melbourne.) 
Mr. Ashmead Bartlett's Dispatches from the 

What of the Dardanelles ? by Granville Fortescue. 
Two Years in Constantinople, by Dr. Harry 

Inside Constantinople, by Lewis Einstein. 
Nelsons History of the War, by Colonel John 

The " Times'' History of the War. 
The ''Manchester Guardian'' History of the 


H. W. N. 

London, 1918. 




Naval Bombardment, November 1914— Causes of German-Turkish Alliance 
— Germany's Eastern aims — Mistakes of British diplomacy— The 
Goeben and Breslan — The position of Greece — Turkey declares war i 


Mr. Churchill first suggests attack on Gallipoli — Russia's appeal for aid — 
A demonstration decided upon— The War Council — Lord Kitchener 
— Mr. Asquith — Mr. Churchill— Objects of his scheme— Lord 
Kitchener's objections — Admirals Fisher and Arthur Wilson — 
— Their duty as advisers — Lord Fisher's opinion — Admiral Jackson's 
view— Admiral Garden on the scheme — War Council orders a naval 
attack — Lord Fisher's opposition — He gives reluctant assent — 
Decision for a solely naval expedition . . . .12 



Council's hesitation renewed — A military force prepared — The 29th Division 
detained — Description of the Dardanelles — Mudros and the islands 
— Formation of the fleet— Bombardment of February 19 — Renewed 
on February 25 — Further attacks in early March — Effect on Balkan 
States— Mr. Churchill urges greater vigour— Admiral de Robeck 
succeeds to command— The naval attack of March 18 — Losses and 
comparative failure — Purely naval attacks abandoned . . 40 



Sir Ian Hamilton's appointment— His qualifications— Misfortune of delay 
— Transports returned for reloading— Sir Ian in Egypt— The forces 
there— The '* Anzacs"— Possible lines of attack considered— The 
selected scheme— Chief members of Sir lan's staff— Available forces 
—Sir lan's address— Rupert Brooke's death . , .64 




The Start from Mudros— Landing at De Tott's Battery— Seddel Bahr and 
V Beach— The River C/j/^^— Landing at V Beach— Night there— 
W Beach or Lancashire Landing— Landing at X Beach— Y2 and Y 
Beaches— Landing at Y Beach— Its failure— Landing at Anzac— 
The positions won there— Feint off Bulair— Captain Freyberg's 
exploit — French feint at Kum Kali . . . . .88 



Sir lan's decision to hold Anzac — Advance from V Beach — Death of 
Doughty-Wylie— The French at V Beach— Position of Krithia— 
Advance of April 28— Turkish attack of May i— Reinforcements 
arrive — Position at Anzac — Casualties — Underestimate of wounded 
— Unhappy results . . . . • • .123 



State of Constantinople — Our submarines — Sir fan's reduced forces — The 
guns — May 6 at Helles — May 7— May 8 — The Australian charge— 
The 29th Division — Trench warfare — Death of General Bridges at 
Anzac — May 19 at Anzac — Armistice at Anzac — Loss |by hostile 
submarines — G.H.Q. at Imbros — Hope of Russian aid abandoned 
— Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher resign . . . -144 



Situation on Peninsula — ^June 4 at Helles — French Colonial troops — 
Arrival of General De Lisle — ^June 6 to 8 at Helles — Losses — Want 
of guns — ^June 28 at Helles — The Gully Ravine — Turkish proclama- 
tions — Position at Anzac — June 29 at Anzac — Discouragement — 
General Gouraud wounded — The war in Poland and^Italy . • 171 


Local Turkish attacks — Turkish reinforcements — Our attacks of July 12 
and 13 at Helles — General Hunter- Weston invalided — General 
Stopford's arrival — Description of Helles — Rations — Description of 
Anzac — The Aragon at Mudros — Arrival of General Altham — The 
Saturnia — Arrival of Colonel Hankey — The 'monitors, "blister- 
ships," and "beetles" — The loth, nth, and 13th Divisions — The 
53rd and S4th Divisions — Total forces in August — New scheme of 
attack considered . . . . . , .19' 




Feints and arrangement of forces — August 6 at Helles — August 7 to 13 — 
Fight for the Vineyard — Leane's trenches at Anzac — Lone Pine — 
Assault of August 6— Continuous fighting till August 12 — Assault 
on German officers' trenches — Assault on the Nek, August 7 . 224 



Description of the range — Nature of the approaches — General Godley's 
force — His dispositions— Evening August 6 to evening August 7 — 
Capture of Old No. 3 Post — Capture of Big Table Top — Capture of 
Bauchop's Hill — Ascent of Rhododendron Ridge — General Monash 
on Aghyl Dere — Evening August 7 to evening August 8 — Fresh 
dispositions — Summit of Chunuk Ridge reached — Death of Colonel 
Malone — Attempt at Abdel Rahman — Evening August 8 to evening 
August 9 — Error of Baldwin's column — Major Allanson on Hill Q 
— View of the Dardanelles — Party driven off by shells — Turks regain 
the summit — Baldwin at the Farm — Party on Chunuk Ridge relieved 
— Evening August 9 to evening August 10 — Fresh party on Chunuk 
Ridge destroyed — Turks swarm over summit — Fighting at the Farm 
— Death of General Baldwin — Turks driven back to summit — 
Causes of comparative failure ..... 247 


Description of the bay and surrounding country — General Stopford and IXth 
Corps — Divisional Generals — Evening August 6 to evening August 
7 — The embarkation — Work of the Navy — The landing beaches — 
Capture of Lala Baba — Ill-luck of 34th Brigade — Delay and con- 
fusion of Brigades and Divisions — Hill's Brigade (31st) — Its advance 
round Salt Lake— Capture of Chocolate Hill — General Mahon on 
Kiretch Tepe Sirt — Evening August 7 to evening August 8 — 
— Silence at Suvla — Failure of water distribution — Sir Ian visits 
Suvla — His orders to General Hammersley — Scimitar Hill aban- 
doned by mistake — Evening August 8 to evening August 9 — Turks 
reinforced return to positions — Failure of our attack on Scimitar 
Hill — Sir Ian proposes occupation of Kavak and Tekke Tepes — He 
sends his last reserve to Suvla — Evening August 9 to evening August 
10 — Renewed attack on Scimitar Hill — Its failure — General Stopford 
ordered to consolidate line — Evening August 10 to evening August 
II — Landing of 54th Division — Confusion of front Hnes — Battalions 
reorganised — Evening August 11 to evening August 12 — Sir Ian 
again urges occupation of Kavak and Tekke Tepes — Disappearance 




of 5th Norfolks— General Stopford's objections— The loth Division 
on Kiretch Tepe Sirt (August 15) — Faihire to maintain advance — 
General De Lisle succeeds General Stopford temporarily in com- 
mand of IXth Corps — Other changes in command . . . 286 



Causes of the failure in August— Advantages gained— Approximate losses 
— Adequate reinforcements refused — Arrival of Peyton's mounted 
Division— Renewed attempt against Scimitar Hill (August 21)— 
Mistakes in the advance on right — The 29th Division in centre- 
Advance of the Yeomanry — Failure to occupy the hill — Attack on 
Hill 60 from Anzac— Kabak Kuyu (August 21)— Connaught Rangers 
— Slov/ progress of attack— Second attack (August 27)— Third 
attack (August 29) — Last battle on the Peninsula . . . 333 



Sickness increases during September — Monotonous food — Regret for dead 
and wounded— New drafts — Fears of winter — Sir Julian Byng com- 
mands IXth Corps — Events in France, Poland, and the Balkans — 
Attitude of Bulgaria and Greece — The loth Division and one French 
sent to Salonika — Bulgaria declares war — Venizelos resigns — Serbia 
invaded — Salonika expedition too late, but destroys hope of 
Dardanelles — Lord Kitchener inquires about evacuation — Sir lan's 
reply — He is recalled ...... 35^ 



Sir Charles Monro arrives — His report — The advocates of evacuation — 
Lord Kitchener visits the Peninsula — General Birdwood appointed 
to command — Storm and blizzard of November — General Birdwood 
ordered to evacuate Suvla and Anzac — Estimate of Turkish forces 
— Our ruses — Arrangements at Suvla — Risks of the final nights — 
Embarkation at Suvla — Problem at Anzac — Final arrangements — 
Evacuation of Anzac — Uncertainty about Helles — Evacuation 
ordered— Turkish attacks— Final withdrawal (January 8, 19 16) — 
Recapitulation of causes of failure — Concluding observations — The 
end .......•■ 374 

INDEX ......... 413 


General Sir Ian Hamilton 

From a portrait by John S. Sargent, R.A. 


Service on Board the Queen Elizabeth . 

General Sir William Birdwood 

The R/yEJi Clyde, "V" Beach, and Seddel Bahr 

LiEUT.-CoL. C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie . 

Anzac Cove ....... 

French Dug-out at Helles .... 

General Gouraud standing with General Bailloud 

Water-Carriers at Anzac 

A " Beetle " . 

General Sir Ian Hamilton (igiS) 

Monash Gully .... 

Major-General Sir Alexander Godley 
Big Table Top .... 

Ocean Beach .... 

Anzac in Snow .... 

Scene on Suvla Point . 

. 24 








Helles and the Straits. 
Positions at Anzac 
SuvLA Landing 
32ND Brigade, August 8 
iith Division, August 21 



At End of Book 

1. The Peninsula, the Straits, and Constantinople. 

2. British and French Trenches at Helles. 

3. Positions at Anzac (end of August). 

4. Positions at Suvla (end of August). 

As this Book is in g^rcat demand, it 

is respectfully requested that it may be 

^ returned to the Library as soon as read 

in oi'dcr to facilitate other Subscribers 

getting it without undue delay. 


N November 3, 19 14, the silence of the 
Dardanelles was suddenly broken by an 
Anglo-French naval squadron, which opened 
I fire upon the forts at the entrance of that historic 
strait. The bombardment lasted only ten minutes, 
its object being merely to test the range of the 
Turkish guns, and no damage seems to have been 
inflicted on either side. The ships belonged to the 
Eastern Mediterranean Allied Squadrons, commanded 
by Vice- Admiral Sackville Garden, and the order 
to bombard was given by the Admiralty, Mr. Winston 
Ghurchill being First Lord. The War Council was 
not consulted, and Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, 
Gommander-in-Ghief in the Mediterranean, in his 
evidence before the Dardanelles Commission described 
the bombardment as a mistake, because it was likely 
to put the Turks on the alert. Commodore de 
Bartolom^, Naval Secretary to the First Lord, also 
said he considered it unfortunate, presumably for the 
same reason.^ Even Turks, unaided by Germans, 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 46. 


might have foreseen the ultimate necessity of 
strengthening the fortification of the Straits, but at 
the beginning they would naturally trust to the long- 
recognised difficulty of forcing a passage up the 
swift and devious channel which protects the entrance 
to the Imperial City more securely than a mountain 

War between the Allies and Turkey became 
certain only three days before (October 31), but from 
the first the temptation of the Turkish Government 
to throw in their lot with " Central Europe " was 
powerful. It is true that, during three or four 
decades of last century, Turkey counted upon 
England for protection, and that by the Crimean 
War and the Treaty of Berlin England had pro- 
tected her, with interested generosity, as a serviceable 
though frail barrier against Russian designs. But 
the British occupation of Egypt, the British inter- 
vention in Crete and Macedonia, and perhaps also 
the knowledge that a body of Englishmen fought for 
Greece in her disastrous campaign of 1897, shook 
Turkish confidence in the supposed protection ; 
while, on the other hand, Abdul Hamid's atrocious 
persecution of his subject races proved to the British 
middle classes that, though the Turk was described 
as "the gentleman of the Near East," he still 
possessed qualities undesirable in an ally of pro- 
fessing Christians. Besides, within the last eight 
years (since 1906), the understanding between 
England and Russia had continually grown more 
definite, until it resulted in open alliance at the out- 
break of the war ; and Russia had long been Turkey's 
relentless and insatiable foe. For she had her mind 


steadily set upon Constantinople, partly because, by 
a convenient and semi-religious myth, the Tsars re- 
garded themselves as the natural heirs of the Byzan- 
tine Emperors, and partly in the knowledge that the 
possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was 
essential for the development of Russia's naval power. 

Germany was not slow in taking up the part of 
Turkey's friend as bit by bit it fell from England's 
hand. If, in Lord Salisbury's phrase, England found 
in the 'nineties that at the time of the Crimean War 
she had put her money on the wrong horse, Germany 
continued to back the weak-kneed and discarded out- 
sider. Germany's voice was never heard in the wide- 
spread outcry against "the Red Sultan." German 
diplomacy regarded all Balkan races and Armenians 
with indifferent scorn. It called them " sheepstealers " 
[Hammeldiebe), and if Abdul Hamid chose to stamp 
upon troublesome subjects, that was his own affair. 
With that keen eye to his country's material interest 
which, before the war, made him the most enterprise 
ing and successful of commercial travellers, Kaiser 
Wilhelm 11., repeating the earlier visit of 1889, visited 
the Sultan in state at the height of his unpopularity 
(1898), commemorated the favour by the gift of a 
deplorable fountain to the city, and proceeded upon a 
speculative pilgrimage to Jerusalem, which holy city 
German or Turkish antiquarians patched with the 
lath and plaster restorations befitting so curious an 

The prolonged negotiations over the concession 
of the Bagdad railway ensued, the interests of Turkey 
and Germany alike being repeatedly thwarted by 
England's opposition, up to the very eve of the 


present war, when Sir Edward Grey withdrew our 
objection, providing only for our interests on the 
section between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf/ 
During the Young Turk revolution of 1908- 1909, 
English Liberal opinion was enthusiastic in support 
of the movement and in the expectation of reform. 
But our diplomacy, always irritated at new situations 
and suspicious of extended liberties, eyed the change 
with a chilling scepticism which threw all the advan- 
tage into the hands of Baron Marschall von Biberstein, 
the German Ambassador in Constantinople. His 
natural politeness and open-hearted industry con- 
trasted favourably with the habitual aloofness or 
leisured indifference of British Embassies ; and so it 
came about that Enver Pasha, the military leader of 
Young Turkey, was welcomed indeed by the oppo- 
nents of Abdul Hamid's tyranny at a public dinner 
in London, but went to reside in Berlin as military 

Germany's object in this astute benevolence was 
not concealed. With her rapidly increasing popula- 
tion, laborious, enterprising, and better trained than 
other races for the pursuit of commerce and technical 
industries, she naturally sought outlets to vast spaces 
of the world, such as Great Britain, France, and 
Russia had already absorbed. The immense growth 
of her wealth, combined with formidable naval and 
military power, encouraged the belief that such expan- 
sion was as practicable as necessary. But the best places 
in the sun were now occupied. She had secured pretty 

* Speech in Foreign Office Debate. July lo, 1914. The whole ques- 
tion of Germany's relations to Turkey is discussed with his usual 
ktiowledge by Mr. H. N. Brailsford in A League of Nations, chap, v. 


fair portions in Africa, but France, England, and 
Belgium had better. Brazil was tempting, but the 
United States proclaimed the Monroe doctrine as a 
bar to the New World. Portugal might sell Angola 
under paternal compulsion, but its provinces were 
rotten with slavery, and its climate poisonous. 
Looking round the world, Germany found in the 
Turkish Empire alone a sufficiently salubrious and 
comparatively vacant sphere for her development ; 
and it is difficult to say what more suitable sphere we 
could have chosen to allot for her satisfaction, without 
encroaching upon our own preserves. Even the 
patch remaining to Turkey in Europe is a fine 
market-place ; with industry and capital most of Asia 
Minor would again flourish as "the bright cities of 
Asia " have flourished before ; there is no reason but 
the Ottoman curse why the sites of Nineveh and 
Babylon should remain uninhabited, or the Garden of 
Eden lie desolate as a wilderness of alternate dust and 

But to reach this land of hope and commerce the 
route by sea was long, and exposed to naval attack 
throughout its length till the Dardanelles were 
reached. The overland route must, therefore, be 
kept open, and three points of difficulty intervened, 
even if the alliance with Austria- Hungary perma- 
nently held good. The overland route passed 
through Serbia (by the so-called "corridor"), and 
behind Serbia stood the jealous and watchful 
power of the Tsars ; it passed through Bulgaria, 
which would have to be persuaded by solid argu- 
ments on which side her material interests lay ; and it 
passed through Constantinople, ultimately destined to 


become the bridgehead of the Bagdad railway — the 
point from which trains might cross a Bosphorus 
suspension bridge without unloading. There the 
German enterprise came clashing up against Russia's 
naval ambition and Russia's rooted sentiment. There 
the Kaiser, imitating the well-known epigram of 
Charles v., might have said : " My cousin the Tsar 
and I desire the same object — namely, Constanti- 
nople." There lay the explanation of Professor 
Mitrofanoff's terrible sentence in the Preussische 
Jahrbiicher of June 1914 : " Russians now see plainly 
that the road to Constantinople lies through Berlin." 
The Serajevo murders on the 28th of the same month 
were but the occasion of the Great War. The corridor 
through Serbia, and the bridgehead of the Bosphorus, 
ranked among the ultimate causes. 

The appearance of a German General, Liman von 
Sanders, in Constantinople shortly after the second 
Balkan War in 19 13, if it did not make the Great War 
inevitable, drove the Turkish alliance in case of war 
inevitably to the German side. He succeeded to 
more than the position of General Colman von der 
Goltz, appointed to reorganise the Turkish army in 
1882. Accompanied by a German staff, the Kaiser's 
delegate began at once to act as a kind of Inspector- 
General of the Turkish forces, and when war broke 
out they fell naturally under his control or command. 
The Turkish Government appeared to hesitate nearly 
three months before definitely adopting a side. The 
uneasy Sultan, decrepit with forty years of palatial 
imprisonment under a brother who, upon those terms 
only, had borne his existence near the throne, still re- 
tained the Turk's traditional respect for England and 


France. So did his Grand Vizier, Said Halim, So 
did a large number of his subjects, among whom 
tradition dies slowly. With tact and a reasonable 
expenditure of financial persuasion, the ancient sym- 
pathy might have been revived when all had given 
it over ; and such a revival would have saved us 
millions of money and thousands of young and noble 
lives, beyond all calculation of value. 

But, most disastrously for our cause, the tact and 
financial persuasion were all on the other side. The 
Allies, it is true, gave the Porte "definite assurances 
that, if Turkey remained neutral, her independence 
and integrity would be respected during the war and 
in the terms of peace." ^ But similar and stronger 
assurances had been given both at the Treaty of 
Berlin and at the outbreak of the first Balkan War in 
191 2. Unfortunately for our peace, Turkey had dis- 
covered that at the Powers' perjuries Time laughs, 
nor had Time long to wait for laughter. Following 
upon successive jiltings, protestations of future affec- 
tion are cautiously regarded unless backed by solid 
evidences of good faith ; but the Allies, having pre- 
viously refused loans which Berlin hastened to 
advance, had further revealed the frivolity of their 
intentions the very day before war with Germany was 
declared, by seizing the two Dreadnought battleships. 
Sultan Os7nan and Reskadie, then building for the 
Turkish service in British dockyards. Upon these 

^ Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, October 14, 191 5 ; 
Foreign Office Statement, November i, 1914. On the authority of the 
Kaiser, in conversation with M. Theotokis, Greek Minister in Berlin, it 
now appears that Germany had already concluded an alliance with 
Turkey on August 4, 191 4. (See Greek White Book, published August 
24, 1917.) 


two battleships the Turks had set high, perhaps 
exaggerated, hopes, and Turkish peasants had con- 
tributed to their purchase ; for they regarded them 
as insurance against further Greek aggression among 
the islands of the Asiatic coast. Coming on the top 
of the Egyptian occupation, the philanthropic inter- 
ference with sovereign atrocity, the Russian alliance, 
and the refusal of loans, their seizure overthrew the 
shaken credit of England's honesty, and one might 
almost say that for a couple of Dreadnoughts we lost 
Constantinople and the Straits/ 

With lightning rapidity, Germany seized the 
advantage of our blunder. At the declaration of war, 
the Goeben, one of her finest battle-cruisers, a ship of 
22,625 tons, capable of 28 knots, and armed with ten 
1 1 -inch guns, twelve 5*9-inch, and twelve lesser 
guns, was stationed off Algeria, accompanied by the 
fast light cruiser Breslau (4478 tons, twelve 4*1 -inch 
guns), which had formed part of the international 
force at Durazzo during the farcical rule of Prince von 
Wied in Albania. After bombarding two Algerian 
towns, they coaled at Messina, and, escaping thence 
with melodramatic success, eluded the Allied Mediter- 
ranean command, and reached Constantinople through 
the Dardanelles, though suffering slight damage from 
the light cruiser Gloucester (August 8 or 9). When 
Sir Louis Mallet and the other Allied Ambassadors 
demanded their dismantlement, the Kaiser, with con- 
strained but calculated charity, nominally sold or 
presented them to Turkey as a gift, crews, guns, and 
all. Here, then, were two fine ships, not merely 

^ See Turkey, Greece, and the Great Poiuers, by G. F. Abbott (191 7), 
pp. 167-200. 


building, but solidly afloat and ready to hand. The 
gift was worth an overwhelming victory to the fore- 
seeing donor. ^ 

Germany's representatives pressed this enormous 
advantage by inducing the Turkish Government to 
appoint General Liman Commander-in-Chief, and to 
abrogate the Capitulations. They advanced fresh 
loans, and fomented the Pan-Islamic movement in 
Asia Minor, Egypt, Persia, and perhaps in Northern 
India. They even disseminated the peculiar rumour 
that the Kaiser, in addition to his material activities, 
had adopted the Moslem faith. The dangerous 
tendency was so obvious that, after three weeks' war, 
Mr. Winston Churchill concluded that Turkey might 
join the Central Powers and declare war at any 
moment. On September i he wrote privately to 
General Douglas, Chief of the Imperial General 

" I arranged with Lord Kitchener yesterday that 
two officers from the Admiralty should meet two 
officers from the D.M.O.'s (Director of Military 
Operations) Department of the War Office to-day 
to examine and work out a plan for the seizure, by 
means of a Greek army of adequate strength, of the 
Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British 
Fleet to the Sea of Marmora." 

Two days later. General Callwell, the D.M.O., 

^ Changing their religion with their sky, the Goeben and Breslau 
became the Jawuz Sultan Selim and the Midilli in the Turkish Navy. 
See Two War Years in Constantinople, by Dr. Harry Stiirmer, p. 113. 
In an action at the entrance to the Dardanelles, January 20, 1918, the 
Breslau was sunk, and the Goeben had to be beached at Nagara Point. 
We lost the monitor Lord Raglan. 


wrote a memorandum upon the subject, in which he 
said : 

"It ought to be clearly understood that an attack 
upon the Gallipoli Peninsula from the sea side 
(outside the Straits) is likely to prove an extremely 
difficult operation of war." 

He added that it would not be justifiable to under- 
take this operation with an army of less than 60,000 

Here, then, we have the first mention of the 
Dardanelles Expedition. It will be noticed that the 
idea was Mr. Churchill's, that he depended upon a 
Greek army to carry it out, and that General Callwell, 
the official adviser upon such subjects, considered it 
extremely difficult, and not to be attempted with a 
landing force of less than 60,000 men. 

In mentioning a Greek army, Mr. Churchill justly 
relied upon M. Venizelos, at that time by far the 
ablest personality in the Near East, entirely friendly 
to ourselves, and Premier of Greece, which he had 
saved from chaos and greatly extended in territory by 
his policy of the preceding five or six years. But 
Mr. Churchill forgot to take account of two important 
factors. After the Balkan Wars of 191 2 and 191 3, 
King Constantine's imaginative but unwarlike people 
had acclaimed him both as the Napoleon of the Near 
East and as the " Bulgar-slayer," a title borrowed 
from Byzantine history. Priding himself upon these 
insignia of a military fame little justified by his mili- 
tary achievements from 1897 onward, the King of 
Greece posed as the plain, straightforward soldier, 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 45 (omitted in first 
publication, but inserted shortly afterwards). 


and, perhaps to his credit, from the first refused 
approval of a Dardanelles campaign, though he pro- 
fessed himself willing to lead his whole army along 
the coast through Thrace to the City. The profession 
was made the more easily through his consciousness 
that the offer would not be accepted/ For the other 
factor forgotten by Mr. Churchill was the certain 
refusal of the Tsar to allow a single Greek soldier to 
advance a yard towards the long-cherished prize of 
Constantinople and the Straits. 

Turkish hesitation continued up to the end of 
October, when the war party under Enver Pasha, 
Minister of War, gained a dubious predominance 
by sending out the Turkish fleet, which rapidly 
returned, asserting that the ships had been fired upon 
by Russians (Oct. 28) — an assertion believed by few. 
On the 29th, Turkish torpedo boats (at first reported 
as the Goeben and Breslau) bombarded Odessa and 
Theodosia, and a swarm of Bedouins invaded the 
Sinai Peninsula. Turkey declared war on the 31st. 
Sir Louis Mallet left Constantinople on November i, 
and on the 5th England formally declared war upon 

^ The subject was fully discussed with the present writer by M. 
Skouloudis, at that time Premier in Athens (November 9, 191 5). That 
veteran statesman was apparently honest in his belief both in the King's 
military genius and in the King's good faith towards the Allies — a belief 
unfounded in both cases. 



"^HE break with Turkey, so pregnant with 
evil destiny, did not attract much attention 
in England at the moment. All thoughts 
were then fixed upon the struggle of our thin and 
almost exhausted line to hold Ypres and check the 
enemy's straining endeavour to command the Channel 
coast by occupying Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. 
The Turk's military reputation had fallen low in the 
Balkan War of 191 2, and few realised how greatly 
his power had been re-established under Enver and 
the German military mission. Egypt was the only 
obvious point of danger, and the desert of Sinai ap- 
peared a sufficient protection against an unscientific 
and poverty-stricken foe ; or, if the desert were pene- 
trated, the Canal, though itself the point to be pro- 
tected, was trusted to protect itself. On November 8, 
however, some troops from India seized Fao, at the 
mouth of the Tigris- Euphrates, and, with reinforce- 
ments, occupied Basrah on the 23rd, thus inaugurat- 
ing that Mesopotamian expedition which, after terrible 
vicissitudes, reached Bagdad early in March 1917. 

These measures, however, did not satisfy Mr. 
Churchill. At a meeting of the War Council on 
November 25, he returned to his idea of striking at 
the Gallipoli Peninsula, if only as a feint. Lord 


Kitchener considered the moment had not yet arrived, 
and regarded a suggestion to collect transport in 
Egypt for 40,000 men as unnecessary at present. In 
his own words, Mr. Churchill ** put the project on one 
side, and thought no more of it for the time," although 
horse-boats continued to be sent to Alexandria "in 
case the War Office should, at a later stage, wish to 
undertake a joint naval and military operation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean." ^ 

On January 2, 191 5, a telegram from our Ambas- 
sador at Petrograd completely altered the situation. 
Russia, hard pressed in the Caucasus, called for a 
demonstration against the Turks in some other 
quarter. Certainly, at that moment, Russia had 
little margin of force. She was gasping from the 
effort to resist Hindenburg's frontal attack upon 
Warsaw across the Bzura, and the contest had barely 
turned in her favour during Christmas week. In the 
Caucasus the situation had become serious, since 
Enver, by clever strategy, attempted to strike at 
Kars round the rear of a Russian army which was 
crossing the frontier in the direction of Erzeroum. On 
the day upon which the telegram was sent, the worst 
danger had already been averted, for in the neigh- 
bourhood of Sarikamish the Russians had destroyed 
Enver's 9th Corps, and seriously defeated the loth 
and nth. But this fortunate and unexpected result 
was probably still unknown in Petrograd when our 
Ambassador telegraphed his appeal. 

On the following day (January 3, 19 15) an 
answer, drafted in the War Office, but sent through 
the Foreign Office, was returned, promising a demon- 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, pars. 47,' 48, 


stration against the Turks, but fearing that it would 
be unlikely to effect any serious withdrawal of 
Turkish troops in the Caucasus. Sir Edward Grey 
considered that "when our Ally appealed for assist- 
ance we were bound to do what we could." But 
Lord Kitchener was far from hopeful. He informed 
Mr. Churchill that the only place where a demonstra- 
tion might have some effect in stopping reinforce- 
ments going East would be the Dardanelles. But he 
thought we could not do much to help the Russians 
in the Caucasus ; "we had no troops to land any- 
where " ; "we should not be ready for anything big 
for some months."^ 

So, by January 3, we were bound to some sort 
of a demonstration in the Dardanelles, but Lord 
Kitchener regarded it as a mere feint in the hope 
of withholding or recalling Turkish troops from the 
Caucasus, and he evidently contemplated a purely 
or mainly naval demonstration which we could easily 
withdraw without landing troops, and without loss of 
prestige. In sending this answer to Petrograd, he 
does not appear to have consulted the War Council 
as a whole. His decision, though not very enthusi- 
astic, was sufficient ; for in the conduct of the war he 
dominated the War Council, as he dominated the 

The War Council had taken the place of the old 
Committee of Imperial Defence (instituted in 1901, 
and reconstructed in 1904). The change was made 
towards the end of November 19 14, but, except in 
one important particular, it was little more than a 
change in name. Like the old Committee, the 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, pars. 50-52, 


Council were merely a Committee of the Cabinet, 
with naval and military experts added to give advice. 
The main difference was that the War Council, in- 
stead of laying its decisions before the Cabinet for 
approval or discussion, gave effect even to the most 
vital of them upon its own responsibility, and thus 
Sfathered into its own hands all deliberative and exe- 
cutive powers regarding military and naval move- 
ments. Sir Edward Grey, as Foreign Secretary, 
Mr. Lloyd George, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and Lord Crewe, as Secretary for India, occasionally 
attended the meetings, and Mr. Balfour was invited 
to attend. But the real power remained with Mr. 
Asquith, the Prime Minister, Lord Kitchener, the 
Secretary for War, and Mr. Winston Churchill, First 
Lord of the Admiralty. In Mr. Asquith's own words : 
"The daily conduct of the operations of the war was 
in the hands of the Ministers responsible for the 
Army and Navy in constant consultation with the 
Prime Minister."^ 

This inner trinity of Ministers was dominated, as 
we said, by Lord Kitchener's massive personality. 
In his evidence before the Dardanelles Comm^ission, 
Mr. Churchill thus described the effect of that re- 
markable man upon the other members : 

" Lord Kitchener's personal qualities and position 
played at this time a very great part in the decision 
of events. His prestige and authority were immense. 
He was the sole mouthpiece of War Office opinion in 
the War Council. Every one had the greatest ad- 
miration for his character, and every one felt fortified, 

^ Speech in the House of Commons upon the Dardanelles Commis- 
sion s First Report, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1743). 


amid the terrible and incalculable events of the open- 
ing months of the war, by his commanding presence. 
When he gave a decision, it was invariably ac- 
cepted as final. He was never, to my belief, over- 
ruled by the War Council or the Cabinet in any 
military matter, great or small. No single unit was 
ever sent or withheld contrary, not merely to his 
agreement, but to his advice. Scarcely any one ever 
ventured to argue with him in Council. Respect for 
the man, sympathy for him in his immense labours, 
confidence in his professional judgment, and the belief 
that he had plans deeper and wider than any we could 
see, silenced misgivings and disputes, whether in 
the Council or at the War Of^ce. All-powerful, im- 
perturbable, reserved, he dominated absolutely our 
counsels at this time." ^ 

These sentences accurately express the ideal of 
Lord Kitchener as conceived by the public mind. 
His large but still active frame, his striking appear- 
ance, and his reputation for powerful reserve, in them- 
selves inspired confidence. His patient and ultimately 
successful services in Egypt, the Soudan, South 
Africa, and India were famed throughout the country, 
which discovered in him the very embodiment of the 
silent strength and tenacity, piously believed to distin- 
guish the British nature. Shortly before the outbreak 
of war, Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister had taken the 
charge of the War Of^ce upon himself, owing to 
Presbyterian Ulster's threat of civil war, and the 
possibility of mutiny among the British garrison in 
Ireland, if commanded to proceed against that rather 
self-righteous population. When war with Germany 
was declared, it so happened that Lord Kitchener 
was in England, on the point of returning to Egypt, 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. q. 


and Mr. Asquith handed over to him his own office 
as Secretary for War. The Cabinet, and especially 
Lord Haldane (then Lord Chancellor, but Minister 
of War from 1905 to 191 2), the most able of army 
organisers, urged him to this step. But he needed 
no persuasion. He never thought of any other 
successor as possible. As he has said himself: 

" Lord Kitchener's appointment was received 
with universal acclamation, so much so indeed that 
it was represented as having been forced upon a 
reluctant Cabinet by the overwhelming pressure of an 
intelligent and prescient Press." ^ 

By the consent of all. Lord Kitchener was the one 
man capable of conducting the war, and by the con- 
sent of most he remained the one man, though he 
conducted it. Yet it might well be argued that the 
public mind, incapable of perceiving complexity, 
accepted a simple ideal of their hero which he himself 
had deliberately created. A hint of the mistake may 
be found in Mr. Asquith's speech.^ He admitted 
that Lord Kitchener was a masterful man ; that he 
had been endowed with a formidable personality, and 
was by nature rather disposed to keep his own 
counsel. But he maintained that he " was by no 
means the solitary and taciturn autocrat in the way 
he had been depicted." One may describe him as 
shy rather than aggressive, genial rather than relent- 
less, a reasonable peacemaker rather than a man of 
iron. Under that unbending manner, he studiously 
concealed a love of beauty, both human and artistic. 
Under a rapt appearance of far-reaching designs, his 

^ Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1746). 
2 Ibid. 



mind was much occupied with inappropriate detail, 
and could relax into trivialities. He was distin- 
guished rather for sudden flashes of intuition than for 
reasoned and elaborated plans. During the first year 
of the war, his natural temptation to occupy himself 
in matters better delegated to subordinates was in- 
creased by the absence in France of experienced 
officers whom he could have trusted for staff work. 
He became his own Chief of Staff,^ and diverted 
much of his energy to minor services. At the War 
Council he acted as his own expert, and Sir James 
Murray, who always attended the meetings as Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, was never even asked 
to express an opinion. The labours thus thrown 
upon Lord Kitchener, or mistakenly assumed, when 
he was engaged upon the task of creating new 
armies out of volunteers, and organising an unmilitary 
nation for war while the war thundered across the 
Channel, were too vast and multifarious for a single 
brain, however resolute. It is possible also that the 
course of years had slightly softened the personal will 
which had withstood Lord Milner in carrying through 
the peace negotiations at Pretoria, and Lord Curzon 
in reforming the Viceroy's Council at Simla. Never- 
theless, when all is said, all-powerful, imperturbable, 
reserved. Lord Kitchener dominated absolutely the 
counsels of the war's first year, and his service to 
the country was beyond all estimate. It raises his 
memory far above the reach of the malignant detrac- 
tion attempted after his death by certain organs of 

^ Mr. Asquith, Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917. 
Cf. Sir James Wolfe Murray : " Lord Kitchener acted very much as his 
own Chief of the Staff." Dardanelles Commission j First Report, par. 18. 


that " intelligent and prescient Press " which had 
shrieked for his appointment.^ 

Second in authority upon the War Council and 
with the nation, but only second, stood Mr. Asquith. 
For six years he had been Prime Minister — years 
marked by the restlessness and turbulence of expand- 
ing liberty at home, and abroad by ever-increasing 
apprehension. Yet his authority was derived less 
from his office than from personal qualities which, as 
in Lord Kitchener's case, the English people like to 
believe peculiarly their own. He was incorruptible, 
above suspicion. His mind appeared to move in a cold 
but pellucid atmosphere, free alike from the generous 
enthusiasm and the falsehood of extremes. Sprung 
from the intellectual middle-class, he conciliated by 
his origin, and encouraged by his eminence. His 
eloquence was unsurpassed in the power of simple 
statement, in a lucidity more than legal, and, above 
all, in brevity. The absence of emotional appeal, and, 
even more, the absence of humour, promoted con- 
fidence, while it disappointed. Here, people thought, 
was a personality rather wooden and unimaginative, 
but trustworthy as one who is not passion's slave. 
No one, except rivals or journalistic wreckers, ever 

^ " I suppose that upon no man in our history has a heavier burden 
fallen than fell upon him, and nothing in connection with this Report — 
it may be no imputation upon anybody connected with the Report itself 
— has filled me with more indignation and disgust than that the pub- 
lication of the criticisms made in it of Lord Kitchener's conduct and 
capacity should have been taken advantage of by those who only two 
years ago were in a posture of almost slavish adulation to belittle his 
character, and, so far as they can, to defile his memory. Lord Kitchener's 
memory is in no danger. It lives, and will live, in the gratitude and 
admiration of the British people and of the whole Empire." — Mr. Asquith, 
Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1748). 


questioned his devotion to the country's highest 
interests as he conceived them, and, as statesmen go, 
he appeared almost uninfluenced by vanity. 

Balliol and the Law had rendered him too fastidi- 
ous and precise for exuberant popularity, but under 
an apparent immobility and educated restraint he 
concealed, like Lord Kitchener, qualities more attrac- 
tive and humane. Although conspicuous for cautious 
moderation, he was not obdurate against reason, but 
could sing a palinode upon changed convictions.^ 
Unwavering fidelity to his colleagues, and a mag- 
nanimity like Caesar's in combating the assaults of 
political opponents, and disregarding the treachery of 
most intimate enemies, surrounded him with a personal 
affection which surprised external observers ; while 
his restrained and unexpressive demeanour covered an 
unsuspected kindliness of heart. In spite of his lapses 
into fashionable reaction, most supporters of the 
Gladstonian tradition still looked to him for guidance 
along the lines of peaceful and gradual reform, when 
suddenly the war-cloud burst, obliterating in one deluge 
all the outlines of peace and progress and law. The 
Tsar who, with assumed philanthropy, had proposed 
the Peace Conferences at The Hague ; the ruler to 
whom the ambition of retaining the title of " Friedens- 
kaiser " was, perhaps honestly, attributed ; the Presi- 
dent who had known how passionately France clung 
to peace ; the Belgian King who foresaw the devasta- 
tion of his wealthy country ; the stricken Emperor 
who, through long years of disaster following disaster, 
had hoped his distracted heritage might somehow 

^ See his speech in the House of Commons on Woman Sufifrage, 
March 28, 191 7. 


hang together still — all must have suffered a torture 
of anxiety and indecision during those fateful days of 
July and August 19 14. But upon none can the 
decision have inflicted deeper suffering than upon a 
Prime Minister naturally peaceful, naturally kindly, 
naturally indisposed to haste, plagued with the 
scholar's and the barrister's torturing ability to per- 
ceive many sides to every question, and hoping to 
crown a laborious life by the accomplishment of 
political and domestic projects which, at the first 
breath of war, must wither away. Yet he decided. 

Third in influence upon the War Council (that is 
to say, upon the direction of all naval and military 
affairs) stood Mr. Winston Churchill. In his evidence 
before the Commission, Mr. Churchill stated : 

** I was on a rather different plane. I had not 
the same weight or authority as those two Ministers, 
nor the same power, and if they said. This is to be 
done or not to be done, that settled it."^ 

The Commissioners add in comment that Mr. 
Churchill here " probably assigned to himself a more 
unobtrusive part than that which he actually played." 
The comment is justified in relation to the Dardan- 
elles, not merely because it is difficult to imagine 
Mr. Churchill playing an unobtrusive part upon any 
occasion, but because, as we have seen, the idea of 
a Dardanelles Expedition was specially his own. It 
was one of those ideas for which we are sometimes 
indebted to the inspired amateur. For the amateur, 
untrammelled by habitual routine, and not easily 
appalled by obstacles which he cannot realise, allows 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 16. 


his imagination the freer scope, and contemplates his 
own particular vision under a light that never was in 
office or in training-school. In Mr. Churchill's case, 
the vision of the Dardanelles was, in truth, beatific. 
His strategic conception, if carried out, would have 
implied, not merely victory, but peace. Success 
would at once have secured the defence of Egypt, but 
far more besides. It would have opened a high road, 
winter and summer, for the supply of munitions and 
equipment to Russia, and a high road for returning 
ships laden with the harvests of the Black Earth. It 
would have severed the German communication with 
the Middle East, and rendered our Mesopotamian 
campaign either unnecessary or far more speedily 
fortunate. On the political side, it would have held 
Bulgaria steady in neutrality or brought her into our 
alliance. It might have saved Serbia without even 
an effort at Salonika, and certainly it would have 
averted all the subsequent entanglements with Greece. 
Throughout the whole Balkans, the Allies would at 
once have obtained the position which the enemy 
afterwards held, and have surrounded the Central 
Powers with an iron circle complete at every point 
except upon the Baltic coast, the frontiers of Den- 
mark, Holland, and Switzerland, and a strip of the 
Adriatic. Under those conditions, it is hardly pos- 
sible that the war could have continued after 19 16. 
In a speech made during the summer of the year 
before that (after his resignation as First Lord), Mr. 
Churchill was justified in saying : 

** The struggle will be heavy, the risks numerous, 
the losses cruel ; but victory, when it comes, will make 
amends for all. There never was a great subsidiary 



operation of war in which a more complete harmony 
of strategic, political, and economic advantages has 
combined, or which stood in truer relation to the main 
decision which is in the central theatre. Through the 
Narrows of the Dardanelles and across the ridges of 
the Gallipoli Peninsula lie some of the shortest paths 
to a triumphant peace." ^ 

The strategic design, though not above criticism 
(for many critics advised leaving the Near East alone, 
and concentrating all our force upon the Western 
front) — the design in itself was brilliant. All de- 
pended upon success, and success depended upon the 
method of execution. Like every sane man, pro- 
fessional or lay, Mr. Churchill favoured a joint naval 
and military attack. The trouble — the fatal trouble 
— was that in January 19 15 Lord Kitchener could 
not spare the men. He was anxious about home 
defence, anxious about Egypt (always his special 
care), and most anxious not to diminish the fighting 
strength in France, where the army was concentrat- 
ing for an offensive which was subsequently aban- 
doned, except for the attack at Neuve Chapelle (in 
March). He estimated the troops required for a 
Dardanelles landing at 150,000, and at this time 
he appears hardly to have considered the suggested 
scheme except as a demonstration from which the 
navy could easily withdraw. 

Mr. Churchill's object was already far more exten- 
sive. Like the rest of the world, he had marvelled 
at the power of the German big guns — guns of unsus- 
pected calibre — in destroying the forts of Lidge and 
Namur. In his quixotic attempt to save Antwerp 

^ Speech at Dundee, June 5, 191 5. 


(an attempt justly conceived but revealing the 
amateur in execution) by stiffening the Belgian 
troops with a detachment of British marines and the 
unorganised and ill-equipped Royal Naval Division 
under General Paris, he had himself witnessed 
another proof of such power. For he was present 
in the doomed city from October 4 to 7, two days 
before it fell. Misled by a false analogy between 
land and sea warfare, he asked himself why the guns 
of super- Dreadnoughts like the Queen Elizabeth 
should not have a similarly overwhelming effect 
upon the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles ; especially 
since, under the new conditions of war, their fire 
could be directed and controlled by aeroplane obser- 
vation, while the ships themselves remained out of 
sight upon the sea side of the Peninsula. It was this 
argument which ultimately induced Lord Kitchener 
to assent, though reluctantly, to a purely naval at- 
tempt to force the Straits, for he admitted that "as to 
the power of the Queen Elizabeth he had no means of 

But, for the moment, Mr. Churchill contented 
himself with telegraphing to Vice-Admiral Garden 
(January 3) : 

" Do you think that it is a practicable operation to 
force the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone ? . . . 
The importance of the results would justify severe 

At the same time he stated that it was assumed 
that " older battleships " would be employed, furnished 
with mine-sweepers, and preceded by colliers or other 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 53. 

'14-^.M : ^ 


merchant vessels as sweepers and bumpers. On 
January 5 Garden replied : 

" I do not think that the Dardanelles can be 
rushed, but they might be forced by extended opera- 
tions with a large number of ships." 

Next day Mr. Churchill telegraphed : " High 
authorities here concur in your opinion." He further 
asked for detailed particulars showing what force 
would be required for extended operations.^ 

Among the "high authorities," Garden naturally 
supposed that one or more of the naval experts who 
attended the War Gouncil were included. These 
naval experts were, in the first place, Lord Fisher 
(First Sea Lord) and Sir Arthur Wilson, Admirals 
of long and distinguished service. Both were over 
seventy years of age, and both were regarded by the 
navy and the whole country with the highest respect, 
though for distinct and even opposite qualities. 
Lord Fisher had been exposed to the criticism 
merited by all reformers, or bestowed upon them. 
Especially it was argued that his insistence upon the 
Dreadnought type, by rendering the former fleet ob- 
solete, had given our hostile rival upon the seas the 
opportunity of starting a new naval construction on 
almost equal terms with our own. But, none the less, 
Lord Fisher was recognised as the man to command 
the fleet by the right of genius, and his authority 
at sea was hardly surpassed by Lord Kitchener's on 
land. The causes of the confidence and respect in- 
spired by Sir Arthur Wilson are sufficiently suggested 
by his invariable nickname of "Tug." Both Ad- 

^ Ibid.^ pars. 54, 55. 


mirals were members of the War Staff Group, in- 
stituted by Prince Louis of Battenberg in the 
previous November/ and both attended the War 
Council as the principal naval experts. Admiral 
Sir Henry Jackson and Vice-Admiral Sir Henry 
Oliver (Chief of the Staff) were also present on 

The expert's duty in such a position has been 
much disputed. The question, in brief, is whether 
he acts as adviser to his Minister only (in this case, 
Mr. Churchill), or to the Council as a whole. Lord 
Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson, supported by Sir 
James Wolfe Murray, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff under Lord Kitchener (who was always his own 
expert), maintained they were right in acting solely 
as Mr. Churchill's advisers. Though they sat at the 
same table, they did not consider themselves members 
of the War Council. It was not for them to speak, 
unless spoken to. They were to be seen and not 
heard. The object of their presence was to help the 
First Lord, if their help was asked, as it never was. 
In case of disagreement with their chief, there could 
be "no altercation." They must be silent or resign. 
Their office doomed them, as they considered, to the 
old Persian's deplorable fate of having many thoughts, 

^ This War Staff Group took the place of the Board of Admiralty in 
strategical matters, the Second, Third, and Fourth Sea Lords being 
thus released for their special functions of manning, shipbuilding, and 
transport. Its other members were the First Lord, the Chief of the 
Staff (Sir Henry Oliver), the Secretary of the Board (Sir Graham 
Greene), and the Naval Secretary (Commodore de Bartolome).— See 
"The Dardanelles Report," by Mr. Archibald Hurd {Fortnightly 
Review^ April 191 7), where the whole subject is discussed with the 
writer's well-known knowledge of naval affairs. 


but no power/ In this view of their duties, they 
were strongly supported among the Dardanelles 
Commissioners by Mr. Andrew Fisher (representing 
Australia) and Sir Thomas Mackenzie (representing 
New Zealand). Following official etiquette, they 
were, it seems, justified in holding themselves bound 
by official rules to acquiesce in anything short of 
certain disaster rather than serve the country by an 
undisciplined word.^ 

If this attitude was technically correct, it is the 
more unfortunate that the Ministers most directly 
concerned, as being members of the War Council, 
should have taken exactly the opposite view, though 
masters of parliamentary technique. In his evidence 
before the Commission, Mr. Churchill, the man most 
closely concerned, protested : 

" Whenever I went to the War Council I always 
insisted on being accompanied by the First Sea Lord 
and Sir Arthur Wilson, and when, at the War 
Council, I spoke in the name of the Admiralty, I was 
not expressing simply my own views, but I was ex- 
pressing to the best of my ability the opinions we had 
agreed upon at our daily group meetings ; and I was 
expressing these opinions in the presence of two 
naval colleagues and friends who had the right, the 
knowledge, and the power at any moment to correct 
me or dissent from what I said, and who were fully 
cognizant of their rights."^ 

Mr. Asquith said "he should have expected any 

ExoiaTT) Se 68vvr] earl rav iv avOpairoicri avrt], TroXKa (ppoveovra 
^ri8fv6s Kpareeiv. — HerodotUS, ix. l6. 

2 Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, pars. 19, 87 ; minutes i 
and 2. 

^ 3icl., par. 20. 


of the experts there, if they entertained a strong 
personal view on their own expert authority, to ex- 
press it."^ Lord Grey, Lord Haldane, Lord Crewe, 
Mr. Lloyd George, and Colonel Maurice Hankey, 
the very able Secretary to the War Council, gave 
similar evidence. Mr. Balfour said : " I do not be- 
lieve it is any use having in experts unless you try 
and get at their inner thoughts on the technical 
questions before the Council."^ In the House of 
Commons, at a later date, Mr. Asquith maintained : 

"They (the experts) were there — that was the 
reason, and the only reason, for their being there — to 
give the lay members the benefit of their advice. . . . 
To suppose that these experts were tongue-tied or 
paralysed by a nervous regard for the possible opinion 
of their political superiors is to suppose that they had 
really abdicated the functions which they were in- 
tended to discharge."^ 

These views appear so reasonable that we might 
suppose them unofficial, had not the speakers occu- 
pied the highest official positions themselves. The 
result of this difference of opinion regarding the duty 
of expert advisers was disastrous. The War Council 
assumed the silence of the experts to imply acquies- 
cence, whereas it sprang from obedience to etiquette. 
Before the Commission, Lord Fisher stated that from 
the first he was "instinctively against it" {i.e. against 
Admiral Garden's plan) ;^ that he " was dead against 
the naval operation alone because he knew it must be 
a failure " ; and he added, "I must reiterate that as 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 26. ^ /^/^.^ par. 22. 

^ Speech of March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1744). 

* Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 16. 


a purely naval operation I think it was doomed to 
failure."^ It may be supposed that these statements 
were prophecies after the event, and the Commis- 
sioners observe that Lord Fisher did not at the time 
record any such strongly adverse opinions. Never- 
theless, on the very day when a demonstration was 
first discussed, he wrote privately to Mr. Churchill : 

" I consider the attack on Turkey holds the field, 
but only if it is immediate ; however, it won't be. 
We shall decide on a futile bombardment of the Dar- 
danelles, which wears out the invaluable guns of the 
Indefatigable^ which probably will require replacement. 
What good resulted from the last bombardment ? 
Did it move a single Turk from the Caucasus ? " ^ 

Two days later he sent Mr. Churchill a formal 
minute, saying that our policy must not jeopardise 
our naval superiority, but the advantages of possess- 
ing Constantinople and getting wheat through the 
Black Sea were so overwhelming that he considered 
Colonel Hankey's plans for Turkish operations vital 
and imperative, and very pressing. The object of 
these plans (circulated to the Wq,r Council on 
December 28, 19 14) was to strike at Germany 
through her allies, particularly by weaving a web 
around Turkey ; and for this purpose Lord Fisher 
sketched a much wider policy requiring the co-opera- 
tion of Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia.^ 
The scheme was not identical with another design 
of naval strategy which was already occupying Lord 

^ Ibid.^ Majority Report, par. 68. 

^ Ibid.., Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 11. The reference is to the brief 
bombardment of November 3. 
^ Ibid.., pars. 7-12. 


Fisher's mind, and the frustration of which by the 
Dardanelles Expedition ultimately caused his resigna- 
tion (in May). But the evidence here quoted shows 
that Lord Fisher could not be included among the 
"high authorities" referred to by Mr. Churchill as 
concurring with Admiral Garden's opinion. Mr. 
Churchill said in his evidence that he did not wish to 
include either Lord Fisher or Sir Arthur Wilson (who 
throughout agreed with Lord Fisher in the main). 
He was thinking of Admirals Jackson and Oliver. 
Yet to Admiral Garden's mind Lord Fisher would 
naturally be suggested as one of the high authorities ; 
and was suggested.^ 

So soon as a demonstration of some sort was 
decided upon, Mr. Churchill asked Admiral Jackson 
to prepare a memorandum, which the Admiral de- 
scribed as a " Note on forcing the passages of the 
Dardanelles and Bosphorus by the Allied fleets in 
order to destroy the Turko-German squadron and 
threaten Constantinople without military co-opera- 
tion," The last three words are important, for it is 
evident that, though Admiral Jackson expressed no 
resolute opposition at the time, he was strongly 
opposed to the idea of a merely naval attack. In 
this memorandum he pointed out facts which even a 
layman might have discerned : that the ships, even if 
they destroyed the enemy squadron, would be ex- 
posed to torpedo at night, to say nothing of field-guns 
and rifles in the Straits, and would hold no line of 
retreat unless the shore batteries had been destroyed ; 
that, though they might dominate the city, their posi- 
tion would not be enviable without a large military 
^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 56. 


force to occupy it ; that the bombardment alone would 
not be worth the considerable loss involved ; that the 
city could not be occupied without troops, and there 
was a risk of indiscriminate massacre.^ 

The dangers of an unsupported naval attack were 
so obvious that Admiral Jackson can have needed no 
further authority in urging them. Yet he may have 
recalled a memorandum drawn up by the General 
Staff (December 19, 1906), stating that "military 
opinion, looking at the question from the point of 
view of coast defence, would be in entire agreement 
with the naval view that unaided action by the Fleet, 
bearing in mind the risks involved, was much to be 

Admiral Jackson's discouraging memorandum of 
January 5 was not shown to the War Council. Yet 
it was of vital importance. In his evidence, Admiral 
Jackson insisted that he had always stuck to this 
memorandum : 

** It would be a very mad thing," he said, "to try 
and get into the Sea of Marmora without having the 
Gallipoli Peninsula held by our own troops or every 
gun on both sides of the Straits destroyed. He had 
never changed that opinion, and he had never given 
any one any reason to think he had." 

Long afterwards, Mr. Churchill suggested that 

^ Ibid., Majority Report, par. 57 ; Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 14. 
Admiral Jackson's view as to the unenviable position of a fleet bottled 
up off Constantinople without commanding the line of retreat was prob- 
ably influenced by the record of Admiral Duckworth's risk when in a 
similar position (1807), and Admiral Hornby's hesitation about entering 
the Straits in 1877. — See Nelson's History of the IVar, by John Buchan, 
vol. vi. pp. 130-36. 

2 Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 43. 


what Admiral Jackson meant by a mad thing was an 
attempt to rush the Straits without having strong 
landing-parties available, and transports ready to 
enter when the batteries were seen to be silent.^ It 
is just possible to put that interpretation on the words, 
but both they and the memorandum itself appear 
naturally to imply a far larger military force than 
landing-parties as essential. 

On January ii Vice-Admiral Garden telegraphed 
a detailed scheme for gradually forcing the Dar- 
danelles by four successive stages, the operations to 
cover about a month. The plan was considered by 
the War Staff Group at the Admiralty, and in sub- 
sequent evidence all agreed that they were very 
dubious, if not hostile. Lord Fisher said he was 
instinctively against it. Sir Arthur Wilson said he 
never recommended it. Admiral Oliver and Gom- 
modore Bartolome said they were definitely opposed 
to a purely naval attempt. But all agreed that the 
operations could not lead to disaster, as they might 
be broken off at any moment.^ Admiral Jackson 
(not a member of the Group) also drew up a detailed 
memorandum upon all stages of the plan, " concurring 
generally," and suggesting that the first stage should 
be approved at once, as the experience gained might be 
useful. He insisted in evidence that he recommended 
only an attack on the outer forts. He accepted the 
policy of a purely naval attack solely on the ground 
that it was not for him to decide. His responsibility 
was limited to his staff work, which he performed.^ 

^ Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1780). 
" Dardanelles Commission ; Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 16. 
2 Ibid.^ par. 20 ; Majority Report, pars. 60-62. 


The two decisive meetings of the War Council on 
January 13 and January 28 followed. At the former 
meeting Mr. Churchill explained the details of 
Admiral Carden's plan, adding that, besides certain 
older ships, two new battle-cruisers, one being the 
Queen Elizabeth, could be employed.^ He thus re- 
vived his Antwerp experience of big-gun power 
against fortresses. When the exposition of the whole 
design was completed. Lord Kitchener gave it as his 
opinion that "the plan was worth trying. We could 
leave off the bombardment if it did not prove effec- 
tive." In this delusive belief the War Council 
arrived at the momentous decision : 

" The Admiralty should prepare for a naval ex- 
pedition in February to bombard and take the Galli- 
poli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective."^ 

Although the word " take " is used, the Council had 
no intention at this time of employing a military force. 
It was assumed that none was available. The same 
meeting sanctioned Sir John French's plan for an 
offensive in France (the offensive which degenerated 
into the attack on Neuve Chapelle in March). In 
case of a naval failure, the ships could be withdrawn ; 
in case of success, there was talk of a revolution in 
Constantinople, and upon that hope the Council 

During this meeting Lord Fisher, together with 
Admiral Wilson and Sir James Murray, sat dumb as 

^ Lord Fisher had himself suggested the use of the Queen Elizabeth 
to Admiral Oliver the day before. Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 17. 
2 Majority Report, par. 69. Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 18. 
^ Majority Report, par. 94. 


usual, and his silence was as usual taken for assent. 
When the Council had arrived at their resolution, he 
considered his sole duty was to assist in carrying it 
out. The very next day he signed a memorandum 
from Mr. Churchill strongly advising that we should 
devote ourselves to " the methodical forcing of the 
Dardanelles,"^ and he added the two powerful battle- 
ships Lord Nelson and Agamemnon to the fleet allotted 
for this operation. But his underlying difference 
of opinion became steadily stronger. In evidence, 
Mr. Churchill said he " could see that Lord Fisher was 
increasinelv worried about the Dardanelles situation. 
He reproached himself for having agreed to begin 
the operation. ... His great wish was to put a 
stop to the whole thing. ... I knew he wanted to 
break off the whole operation and come away."^ On 
January 25 Lord Fisher took the unusual course of 
writing to Mr. Asquith and stating his objections. 
He considered the Dardanelles would divert from 
another large plan of naval policy which he had in 
mind ; further, that it was calculated to dissipate our 
naval strength, and to risk the older ships (besides 
the invaluable men) which formed our only reserve 
behind the Grand Fleet.^ 

Mr. Churchill replied in a similar memorandum 
to the Prime Minister, defending his Dardanelles 
plan on the plea of its value, even at a cost which, 
after all, would be relatively small. In hope of 
obtaining some agreement, Mr. Asquith invited Lord 
Fisher and Mr. Churchill to his room just before 
the meeting of the War Council on January 28 — the 

1 Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 68. 

2 Ibid.^ par. 83. ^ Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 22. 


second decisive meeting. After discussion, the Prime 
Minister expressed his satisfaction with Mr. Church- 
ill's view, and all three proceeded to the Council. 
It was a fairly full meeting, Sir Edward Grey and 
Mr. Balfour being present, besides the three dominat- 
ing members and the experts. Mr. Churchill pressed 
his plan with eloquent enthusiasm. "He was very 
keen on his own views," said Sir Arthur Wilson in 
evidence ; "he kept on saying he could do it without 
the army ; he only wanted the army to come in and 
reap the fruits . . . and I think he generally mini- 
mised the risks from mobile guns, and treated it as 
if the armoured ships were immune altogether from 
injury." ^ Mr. Churchill re-stated the political and 
strategic advantages of success. He said that the 
Grand Duke Nicholas had replied with enthusiasm, 
and that the French Admiralty had promised co- 
operation.^ He said the Commander-in-Chief in 
the Mediterranean believed it could be done in three 
weeks or a month. The necessary ships were already 
on their way. 

All the members of the War Council were won 
by these persuasive arguments. They needed little 
persuasion, and no persuasion is so strong as an 
enterprise begun. But Lord Fisher for once broke 
silence. He said he had not supposed the matter 
would be raised that day, and that the Prime Minister 
was well aware of his views. When he found that a 
final decision was to be taken, he got up to leave the 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 88. 

2 M. Augagneur, Minister of Marine, had visited London after the 
decision of January 13. He approved the subsequent plan, pronouncing 
it "prudent et prevoyant." Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 29. 


room, intending to resign. But Lord Kitchener 
intercepted him, and taking him to the window 
strongly urged him to remain, pointing out that he 
was the only dissentient and it was his duty to carry 
on the work of his office as First Sea Lord. Where- 
upon Lord Fisher reluctantly yielded to the entreaty 
and returned to his seat.^ 

It is remarkable that at a meeting of such decisive 
moment no mention was made of Lord Fisher's 
memorandum, nor of Mr. Churchill's reply, nor of 
their conference with the Prime Minister an hour 
before. None the less, not only Mr. Asquith and 
Mr. Churchill knew of Lord Fisher's opposition. 
Lord Kitchener knew of it ; so did Sir Edward Grey. 
Yet the opinion of the chief naval authority in Eng- 
land was overruled. Mr. Asquith subsequently stated 
that "the whole naval expert opinion available to us 
(the War Council), whether our own or the French, 
was unanimously and consentiently in favour of this 
as a practical naval operation. There was not one 
dissentient voice." As to Lord Fisher, he continued, 
it was quite true that he expressed on the morning 
of that day an adverse, or at least an unfavourable 
opinion, but not upon the ground of its merits or 
demerits from a technical naval point of view : 

" Lord Fisher's opinion and advice were not 
founded upon the naval technical merits or demerits 
of this operation, but upon his avowed preference 
for a wholly different objective in a totally different 

No doubt Lord Fisher insisted mainly upon that 
different objective as being the more important cause 

^ Majority Report, pars. 86, 87 ; Mr. Roch's Minute, pars. 25, 26. 


of his opposition. But it seems evident that from 
the first he was also opposed to a merely naval attack 
and bombardment. His letter to Mr. Churchill on 
January 2 (quoted above) proves this. And so does 
the following clause in his memorandum to the Prime 
Minister on January 25 : 

"The sole justification of coastal bombardments 
and attacks by the fleet on fortified places, such as the 
contemplated prolonged bombardment of the Dar- 
danelles forts by our fleet, is to force a decision at sea, 
and so far and no further can they be justified."^ 

Yet, in this case, there was no suggestion or possibility 
of forcing a decision at sea. 

In the afternoon of the same day (January 28) 
Mr. Churchill had a private interview with Lord 
Fisher, and " strongly urged him to undertake the 
operation." Lord Fisher definitely consented. Mr. 
Churchill says that if he had failed to persuade him, 
there would have been no need to altercate, or to 
resign, or even to argue. He would have gone back 
to the War Council and told them they must either 
appoint a new Board of Admiralty or abandon the 
project. " For the First Sea Lord has to order the 
fleets to steam and the guns to fire."^ Lord Fisher, 
on the other hand, insisted in evidence that he had 
taken every step, short of resignation, to show his 
dislike of the proposed operations ; that the chief 
technical advisers of the Government ought not to 
resign because their advice is not accepted, unless 
they think the operations proposed must lead to 

^ Mr. Roch's Minute, pars. 11 and 22. 

2 Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1783, 


disastrous results ; and that the attempt to force the 
Dardanelles as a purely naval operation would not 
have been disastrous so long as the ships employed 
could be withdrawn at any moment, and only such 
vessels were employed as could be spared without 
detriment to the general service of the fleet.^ 

The divergence of opinion here is not so complete 
as it seems ; for by admitting that the War Council 
could have appointed a new Board of Admiralty if 
Lord Fisher had refused to carry out their decision, 
Mr. Churchill showed that, though the First Sea 
Lord could order the fleets to steam and the guns to 
fire, the ultimate control did not lie with him. The 
ultimate control lay with the Government (in this 
case the War Council), and Lord Fisher was un- 
doubtedly right in thinking his constitutional duty 
consisted in carrying out the Council's decisions or 
resigning his office. He did not resign at this time, 
because he thought the naval attack did not necessarily 
imply disaster. He agreed to undertake the charge. 
He considered it his duty simply to carry out the 
Council's decision as best he could. With Mr. 
Churchill he attended another Council meeting later 
in the afternoon, and there the fateful, if not fatal, 
step was taken. It was decided that an attack should 
be made by the fleet alone, with Constantinople as its 

Though Lord Fisher agreed to do his best, and 
though the members of the War Council accepted 
the plan with more or less enthusiasm, the ultimate 
decision was arrived at owing to Mr. Churchill's 

^ Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 28. 

2 Majority Report, pars. 89-93 ; Mr. Roch's Minute, pars. 28, 29. 


insistence upon his own brilliant idea, and his resolve 
to attempt it even without military aid. The Com- 
missioners remark that in this resolve he was carried 
away by his sanguine temperament and his firm 
belief in the success of the undertaking which he 
advocated/ They were probably right. But as 
evidence of the complexity in all natures — even in 
a character apparently so self-confident, impetuous, 
and sanguine — we may recall the passage in Mr. 
Churchill's speech upon these events, where, after 
referrino- to "the doubts and the misg-ivings which 
arise in every breast when these great hazards of 
war are decided," he went on to say : 

" No one who has not had to take these decisions 
can know how serious and painful are the stresses 
which search every man's heart when he knows that 
an order is going to be given as a result of which 
great ships may be lost, great interests may be 
permanently ruined, and hundreds or even thousands 
of men may be sent to their last account."^ 

If ever the heart of man was searched by serious 
and painful stress, it may well have been in that 
Council chamber of January 28, 191 5. For then a 
decision was taken, and an order given, as a result 
of which great ships were lost, great interests 
permanently ruined, and thousands of men sent to 
their last account. 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 92. 
^ Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917. 




T the War Council meetings of January 28 
a demonstration extending to the possible 
capture of Constantinople was thus decided 
upon, and the demonstration was to be purely naval. 
All the members of the Council would have agreed 
that a joint naval and military (or "amphibious") 
attack would have made success surer ; but Lord 
Kitchener declared the necessary troops could not 
be supplied, and his decision was accepted without 
question. The evidence shows that when first 
Admiral Carden was commanded to attack, no hint 
of military support was given him. He was expected 
to depend entirely upon small landing-parties of his 
own marines to demolish the forts/ Mr. Churchill 
has himself told us that, if an amphibious attack 
had then been thought essential or seriously con- 
templated, nothing at all would have been done. 
Nothing less than 100,000 or 150,000 men could 
have been asked for, together with large supplies 
of high explosives and artillery. Whereupon, "all 
the military experts " {i.e. Lord Kitchener, with the 

1 Mr. Archibald Hurd ("The Dardanelles Report," 7^<7r/«z^/^//)//?e- 
vtew, April 1917, pp. 587, 591) considers that a military force "was 
apparently a part of the original scheme." But the whole evidence of 
the Report and of Mr. Churchill's speech of March 20, 1917, appears 
to be against him. 


possible addition of Lord French) " unanimously 
would have said that the men were not available, 
and the ammunition could not be spared from the 
French front." ^ Whether it would not have been 
well, even at this last moment, to abandon the 
whole scheme rather than act contrary to the best 
judgment of experts and laymen alike, has now, 
unfortunately, become a matter of vain speculation. 

Hardly had the naval orders been given, and 
the ships dispatched, when the Council began to 
waver. It is impossible to fix a day for this change, 
for the change itself wavered. In his evidence, 
General Callwell (the D.M.O.) said: "We drifted 
into the big military attack " ; ^ and " drift " is the 
precise word for the Council's uncertain course. 
By the middle of February the feeling had evidently 
set towards an amphibious movement ; but up to the 
middle of March they hoped that the need of landing 
troops upon a large scale might be avoided by purely 
naval success. It appears that early in February 
Lord Kitchener began to yield. Probably his former 
decision was shaken by the abandonment of a large- 
scale offensive in France, and by the failure of the 
Turkish attack upon the Suez Canal (February 3 
and 4). Though the Turkish force was allowed to 
retreat without the destruction which greater energy 
in the Egyptian Command might have brought upon 
it, the troops then in Egypt had proved more than 
sufficient for defence ; and Egypt, as we have noticed, 
was always Lord Kitchener's peculiar care. On 

^ Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1789). 
Cf. Majority Report, par. 94, and Mr. Roch's Minute, pars . 29, 32. 
2 Majority Report, par. 95. 


February 9 he remarked in the War Council that 
"if the Navy required the assistance of the land 
forces at a later stage, that assistance would be 

But, by the majority of the Council, the claim 
for assistance was not postponed to a later stage. 
On February 15 Sir Henry Jackson sent a long 
memorandum of "suggestions" to Admiral Carden 
in regard to the approaching naval attack. Not 
only did this memorandum speak of strong military 
landing-parties with strong covering forces as neces- 
sary, but it added that "full advantage of the 
undertaking would only be obtained by the occupation 
of the Peninsula by a military force acting in con- 
junction with the naval operations." The very 
next day (February 16) the War Council decided 
to send the 29th Division (hitherto destined for 
France) at the earliest possible date to Lemnos ; 
to arrange for a force from Egypt, if required ; and 
to order the Admiralty to prepare transport for the 
conveyance and landing of 50,000 men.^ The navy 
and army were thus at last committed to an am- 
phibious enterprise ; but nineteen days had been lost. 
What was worse : the 29th Division was to have 
started on February 22, but on the 20th Lord 
Kitchener, on his own initiative, without consulting 
the First Lord or the Admirals, told the Director 
of Naval Transport to stop the preparation of 
transport, as the Division was not to go. In spite 
of Mr, Churchill's vehement protests (for even his 
confidence in a purely naval attack was now shaking), 
Lord Kitchener stood by his decision till March 10, 

^ Majority Report, par. 96 ; Mr. Roch's Minute, pars. 32, 33. 

THE 29th division DETAINED 43 

and the Division did not begin to start till March 16. 
Twenty-two more days lost ! Add the nineteen of 
the Council's hesitation, and forty-one days were 
lost in all. Forty-one days in an enterprise which 
depended upon speed and secrecy ! 

Undoubtedly Lord Kitchener had sufficient 
reason for delay. The Russian armies were hard 
pressed on their right or northern flank, and in the 
centre Hindenburg was pushing his third attempt 
upon Warsaw. If the Germans were successful at 
either point, it was probable that they would transfer 
laree forces to their Western front, with which the 
French were then heavily engaged in Champagne 
and between the Moselle and Meuse, while the 
British were preparing and executing the assault 
at Neuve Chapelle (March 10 to 14).^ There may 
have been other reasons, but those were enough to 
justify caution in allowing a splendid Regular Division 
like the 29th to be diverted from the critical strategic 
lines in France. Its retention, without due notice 
to the War Council, was sudden and arbitrary. 
That was Lord Kitchener's way, and no more could 
be said. Perhaps the Division should not have 
been offered, and the Secretary for War, who also 
held supreme military command, could not be blamed 
for retaining it under his hand. Nevertheless, its 
retention stands high among the causes of ultimate 

By the middle of February the War Council had 
tacitly abandoned the idea of a mere demonstration 
from which the ships could be at any moment with- 

^ Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, March 20, 191 7 (Hansard, 



drawn. But both Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill 
still thought that troops, if used at all, would be 
wanted only for "minor operations," such as the final 
destruction of batteries, and both clung to this idea 
for about four weeks longer. Yet, in the first week 
of March, General Birdwood, who had been sent 
from Egypt to report upon this very question, tele- 
graphed to Lord Kitchener that he was doubtful if 
the navy could force a passage unassisted, and that 
Admiral Garden's forecast was too sanguine.^ 

By that time General Birdwood had definite 
experience to guide him ; for, in obedience to 
Mr. Churchill's orders, Admiral Garden had on 
February 19 begun to execute his detailed plan for 
forcing the Straits by naval power alone. The 
scene of our narrative accordingly shifts from the 
Council Chambers of Whitehall to that famous 
channel which, like a broad, deep river, divides 
the European from the Asiatic coast. Celebrated 
beyond all other waters of the world by legend and 
history, and by one of mankind's noblest poems, 
it is haunted by almost overwhelming memories, to 
which the great tragedy here described has added 
new. At the very entrance, where the passage 
is three miles broad, you see upon your right hand 
the Hat and gently curving beach upon which 
Agamemnon tied his ships for the prolonged siege 
of a low hill, formed even in his time of ruined and 
piled-up cities. It rises, still quite visible from the 
opposite shore, above the marshes where Simois and 
Scamander unite their small and immortal streams. 

Steering north-east, a vessel beats up against the 

^ Majority Report, pars. 100-103 ; Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 38. 



swirling eddies of a tideless current, always pouring 
down against her bows, with a force that varies 
from three knots to four, and even to five in the 
centre when the wind drives it on. Sailors have 
told me that they believe an undercurrent passes the 
water back ; else, they think, it could not perpetually 
run so strong. What was the experience of sub- 
marine officers like Lieutenant Holbrook, who, on 
December 13, 19 14, groped his way below the 
surface and through the mines till he emerged near 
the entrance to the Sea of Marmora, and destroyed 
the Turkish warship Messoudiek, I do not know. 
But it seems probable that enough water is poured 
into the Black Sea by the Dnieper, Dniester, and 
Don, rivers of the Steppes, to account for a rapid 
current, not to speak of the glacier streams issuing 
from the snows of the Caucasus beyond the magic 
Phasis. All the more likely is the current to be 
swift since the waters from the shores of Azoff, the 
Euxine, and Marmora are discharged down a con- 
stricted funnel, which at the narrowest point, between 
Chanak and Kilid Bahr, is hardly more than three- 
quarters of a mile across. At Chanak, as a ship 
makes its way against the stream, the strait turns 
north from north-east for about four miles, and at 
the point of Nagara (the old Abydos) the channel 
becomes again almost as narrow as at Chanak. 
That part of the strait between Chanak and Nagara 
(both on the Asiatic side) is called especially 
"The Narrows," and it forms, as it were, "The 
Gut " of the whole salt river. Here Xerxes stretched 
his bridge of boats, having chained and flogged the 
turbulent waters. Here Alexander crossed upon 


his way to India. Seven hundred years later the 
Goths crossed here, and the Turks here entered 
Europe, a century before they stormed the city of 
Constantine, which still retained the traditions of 
the classic world. Beyond the Narrows the strait 
runs north-east again with a channel about two 
miles broad for some twenty miles, until between 
Gallipoli and Chardak it begins to widen gradually 
into the Sea of Marmora. The total length of the 
strait from Cape Helles to Gallipoli is between thirty- 
five and forty miles. The Asiatic side is the coast 
of the ancient Troad, rising to high hills when the 
plain of Troy is passed. On the European side the 
long promontory or peninsula of Gallipoli precludes 
the channel from issuing into the Gulf of Xeros at 
the neck of Bulair, or lower down into the ^gean 
Sea. It is the south-western third of that peninsula 
which is the scene of the present tragic episode in 
history. There is no railway on either side of the 
strait. A coast road is marked from Kum Kali (at 
the entrance on the Asiatic side) up to Chanak ; 
but it is probably of the usual Turkish quality, as 
were all roads upon the peninsula. Along both 
coasts the inhabitants in peace - time communicate 
chiefly by water, in spite of the current. 

The small island of Tenedos lies about fifteen miles 
south-west from Kum Kali, and the domed hill at 
the farther end of the island stands up like a large 
haycock, visible not only from the Trojan plain, but 
from all the surrounding seas and islands. The 
town is a pleasant and well-built place, serviceable 
to the French for the purchase of extra luxuries in 
the months following ; and as Turkey had refused 


to yield the island to Greece at the end of the Balkan 
Wars of 19 1 2-1 913, it had been seized by the Allies 
as a station for watching the mouth of the strait. 
From epic times, however, it was known as an 
untrustworthy anchorage, and for a naval base the 
Allies occupied the great harbour of Mudros upon 
the island of Lemnos, sixty miles from the scene 
of action. The greater part of this island is bare 
of trees, and barren but for patches of cultivation 
around the scattered villages. In summer the low 
hills are scorched to a pale brown, and, for an 
JEgean island, the country possesses little beauty 
or interest apart from the hot springs for which it 
was consecrated to the god of fire.^ But into the 
centre of the southern coast runs a deep and broad 
inlet, protected at its entrance by two small islands, 
and affording space and anchorage enough for a vast 
navy. Its size is indeed excessive ; for when the 
wind sweeps down from the north-east across the 
dismal and dusty town of Mudros, it can raise such 
a storm in the harbour that pinnaces and smaller 
boats have trouble in lying alongside the ships, and 
in loading up or unloading. There are, of course, 
no docks or wharves, though our sailors subsequently 
constructed a few small piers and landing-stages. 

^ " Nor was his name unheard or unadored 
In ancient Greece ; and in Ausonian land 
Men call'd him Mulciber ; and how he fell 
From heaven they fabled, thrown by angry Jove 
Sheer o'er the crystal battlements : from morn 
To noon he fell, from noon to dewy eve, 
A summer's day ; and with the setting sun 
Dropt from the zenith like a falling star, 
On Lemnos, the ^gean isle." 

Paradise Lost, Book I. 


All supplies, including most of the water, had to be 
brought from the remote base at Alexandria; but 
the harbour became, none the less, invaluable as a 
secure port for our navy and transports, a forwarding 
station for supply and ammunition, the headquarters 
of the Communication and Transport departments, 
and an advanced hospital base. The use of it was 
granted by the Greek Government under Venizelos ; 
for the island had fallen into Greek possession in 
consequence of the Balkan Wars ; and King Con- 
stantine appears to have acquiesced graciously in a 
concession which could not be refused. 

In this vast harbour, and upon the open road- 
stead of Tenedos, Admiral Garden had gathered 
a large fleet by the middle of February. Ships 
were collected from various parts of the world (the 
Triumph had lately come from Ghina) ; ^ but 
Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt supplied most of them. 
At Lord Fisher's own suggestion the super- 
Dreadnought Queen Elizabeth had been added to 
the pre-Dreadnought ships upon which Mr. Churchill 
had originally depended. The Inflexible was also 
a " Dreadnought " battle - cruiser (she had shared 
in the Falkland Islands battle of December 8, 
19 14), and the sister ships Agamemnon and Lord 
Nelson, which Lord Fisher also added a little later 
than the rest of the fleet, were generally regarded 
as fit to fight in line with " Dreadnoughts." The 
French Admiralty, at our request, also supplied 
a few ships, though of old types, which have an 
overhampered and top-heavy appearance. The most 

1 With the Fleet in the Dardanelles, by William Harold Price, 
sometime Chaplain of the Triumph. 



important units in the fleet as concentrated at that 
time may be tabulated thus : 





Queen Elizabeth 



8 15-in. 

12 6-in. 




8 i2-in. 

16 4-in 

Agamemnon . 



4 i2-in. 

10 9'2-in. 

Lord Nelson . 



4 i2-in. 

10 9-2-in. 


1 901 

1 5,000 

4 i2-in. 

12 6-in. 

Majestic . 



4 i2-in. 

12 6-in. 

Prince George 



4 i2-in. 

12 6-in. 




4 i2-in. 

12 6-in. 


1 901 


4 i2-in. 

12 6-in. 

Albion . 



4 l2-in. 

12 6-in. 




4 i2-in. 

12 6-in. 

Canopus . 



4 i2-in. 

12 6-in. 




4 lo-in. 

14 7-5-in. 




4 10- in. 

14 7-5-m. 



Sujff^ren .... 



4 i2-in. 

10 6'4-in. 

Botivet .... 



2 i2-in. 

(2 io8-in. 
\8 5-5-in. 

Gaulois .... 



4 i2-in. 

10 5'5-in. 

Charlemagne . 



4 i2-in. 

10 5 5-in.i 

To these main fighting ships were added four 
light cruisers (the Amethyst, Sapphh^e, Dublin^ and 
Doris), two destroyer depots, sixteen destroyers, six 
submarines, twenty-one mine-sweeping trawlers, and 
a seaplane ship (the Ark Royal) accommodating six 
seaplanes ; besides from the French navy six torpedo- 
boats and fourteen mine-sweepers. 

Out of this fleet, Admiral Garden selected the 
British ships Inflexible, Agamemnon, Cornwallis, 
Triumph, and Vengeance, together with the French 

^ ^'■Manchester Guardian'''' History of the War. 


ships (under Admiral Guepratte) Sitffren, Bouvet, and 
Gaulois, covered by a large number of destroyers, 
for the first attack upon the outer forts. Orders for 
washing and clean clothes (to avoid septic wounds) 
were issued on February i8, and next morning, in 
clear and calm weather, "General Quarters" was 
sounded. The firing began at eight, and the first 
scene in the drama of the Dardanelles Expedition was 

The main forts to be destroyed were four in 
number ; two on either side the entrance. One 
stood on the cliff of Cape Helles, just to the left or 
south-west of the shelving amphitheatre afterwards 
celebrated as V Beach. Another lay low down, on 
the right of the same beach, close in front of the 
medieval castle of Seddel Bahr, where still one sees 
lying in heaps or scattered over the ground huge 
cannon-balls of stone, such as were hurled at Duck- 
worth's fleet more than a century before. Upon the 
Asiatic side stood the fort of Kum Kali, at the very 
mouth of the strait, not far from the cliff village of 
Yenishehr, and separated from the plain of Troy by 
the river Mendere, near neighbour to the Simois and 
Scamander conjoined. About a mile down the coast, 
close beside Yenishehr village, is the remaining fort 
of Orkhanieh. None of these forts was heavily 
armed. The largest guns appear to have been 
io'2 inch (six on Seddel Bahr, and four on Kum 
Kali), and when our squadron drew their fire, as 
before narrated, on November 3, 19 14, their extreme 
range was found to be 12,500 yards. 

^ The Immortal Gamble, by A. T. Stewart and C. J. E. Peshall of the 
Cornwallis, p. 10. 


Throughout the morning Admiral Garden con- 
centrated his bombardment upon these forts at long 
range, and they made no reply. Hoping that he 
had silenced or utterly destroyed them, he advanced 
six ships to closer range in the afternoon, and then 
the reply came in earnest, though the shooting was 
poor. At sunset he withdrew the ships, though 
Kum Kali was still firing. In evidence, he admitted 
that " the result of the day's action showed apparently 
that the effect of long range bombardment by direct 
fire on modern earthwork forts is slight."^ It was a 
lesson repeated time after time throughout the cam- 
paign. The big naval shells threw up stones and 
earth as from volcanoes, and caused great alarm. 
But the alarm was temporary, and the effect, whether 
on earthworks or trenches, usually disappointing. For 
naval guns, constructed to strike visible objects at 
long range with marvellous accuracy, have too flat a 
trajectory for the plunging fire (as of howitzers) which 
devastates earthworks and trenches. It was with heavy 
howitzers that the Germans destroyed the forts of 
Li^ge,Namur, and Antwerp, and, owing to this obvious 
difference in the weapons employed, Mr. Churchill's 
expectation of crushing the Dardanelles defences by 
the big guns of the Queen Elizabeth and the Inflexible 
was frustrated.^ 

Nevertheless, after a few days of driving rain and 
heavy sea (a common event at this season, which 
might have been anticipated), Admiral Garden re- 
newed the bombardment on February 25, employing 
the Queen Elizabeth, Irresistible, Agamemnon, and 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; Majority Report, par. 97. 
' Ibid.^ pars. 78-82. 


Gaulois. The Queen Elizabeth, firing beyond the 
enemy's range, assisted in silencing the powerful 
batteries on Cape Helles, and though the Agamemnon 
was severely struck at about ii,ooo yards range, the 
subsidiary ships Coi^nwallis, Vengeance, Triumph, 
Albion, Suffren, and Charlemagne stood in closer, 
and by the evening compelled all the outer forts to 
cease fire. Next day landing-parties of marines 
were put ashore to complete their destruction ; which 
they did, though at Kum Kali they were driven back 
to their boats with some loss. The story that 
marines had tea at Krithia and climbed Achi Baba 
for the view- — places soon to acquire such ill-omened 
fame — is mythical. But certainly they met with no 
opposition on the Peninsula, and if a large military 
force had then been available, the gallant but appal- 
ling events of the landing two months later would 
never have occurred. Had not the War Council 
persisted in the design of a solely naval attack, even 
after their resolve had begun to waver, a large 
military force might have been available, either then, 
or to co-operate with a similar naval movement only 
a week or two later. 

Stormy weather delayed further attack till March 4, 
when a squadron, including the Triumph, Albion, 
Lord Nelson, and Ocean, passed up the strait to a 
position beyond the village of Erenkeui, conspicuous 
upon a mountain-side of the Asiatic coast, and bom- 
barded Fort Dardanus. The fort stands upon 
Kephez Point, which projects as though to defend 
the very entrance of the Narrows. Over the top of 
the promontory the houses and mosques of Chanak 
and Kilid Bahr could be plainly seen, where those 


towns face each other across the narrowest part of the 
passage. Of the eight hnes of mine-field drawn 
across the strait, five lay between Kephez Point and 
Chanak. Day and night our mine-sweeping trawlers 
were engaged upon them, and considerable praise 
must be given to the courage and endurance of 
their crews, who for the most part had been North 
Sea fishermen before the expedition. Their service 
throughout, whether for mine-sweeping or transport, 
was of very high value. It almost justified the 
remark made to me by a skipper whom I had met 
before on the Dogger Bank : "If the Kayser had 
knowed as we'd got trawlers, he would never have 
declared war ! " 

A similar advance to engage the forts at Dardanus, 
and, after those were thought to be silenced, the forts 
at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, was made next day, and 
again, in stronger force, on March 6} The Prince 
Geo7^ge, Albion, Vengeance, Majestic, and Suffj'en 
were employed, and suffered damage, though without 
loss of life. At the same time, on the 6th, the Queen 
Elizabeth, stationed off Gaba Tepe on the outer 
coast, flung her vast shells clear over the Peninsula 
into the Chanak forts, her fire being directed by 
aeroplanes. She was supported by the Agamemnon 
and Ocean, and there were high hopes of thus crushing 
out the big guns defending the Narrows, some of 
which were believed to be 14-inch. Nevertheless, 
when the four French battleships advanced up the 
strait on the following day (March 7), supported at 
long range by the Agamemnon and her sister ship 
Lord Nelson, the Chanak forts replied with an 

^ With the Fleet in the Dardanelles, pp. 38-40. 


effective and damaging fire. It was impossible to say 
when a fort was really out of action. After long 
silence, the Turkish and German gunners frequently 
returned and reopened fire, as though nothing had 
happened. In his evidence, Admiral Garden stated 
that when the demolition parties landed after the 
bombardment of the outer forts, they found 70 per 
cent, of the guns apparently intact upon their mount- 
ings, although their magazines were blown up and 
their electrical or other communications destroyed.^ 
Still worse than these disappointing results was the 
opportunity left to the enemy of moving, not only 
bodies of men, but field-guns and heavy howitzers 
from one point of the Peninsula and Asiatic coast 
to another, and opening fire upon the ships from 
concealed and unexpected positions. Our landing- 
parties of marines also suffered considerably from the 
advantage thus given to the enemy, as happened to a 
body which landed at Kum Kali for the second time 
on March 4. All such dangers and hindrances would 
have been removed if the navy had been supported by 
sufficient military force to occupy the ground behind 
the ships as they advanced. 

A bombardment of the Smyrna forts farther down 
the coast of Asia was carried out on March 5 and 7 
by a detachment under Vice- Admiral Peirse. It was 
hoped that the Vali of Smyrna might come over to 
us, and that in any case the attack would detain a 
Turkish force there by means of a rather obvious 
feint.^ Nothing of vital importance was as yet 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, par. 97. 
^ With the Fleet in the Dardanelles, p. 66 ; the Triumph was one of 
the ships detailed for this operation. 


accomplished there or in the Straits, but up to about 
March 10 the Admiralty at home remained sanguine, 
in spite of General Birdwood's rather discouraging 
telegram of March 5, mentioned above. They had 
a right to consider that the attack upon the Dar- 
danelles had produced a stirring effect in the Near 
East. The Turks withdrew large forces from the 
Caucasus, greatly easing the situation for the Russian 
Grand Duke. They concentrated more troops round 
Adrianople, fearing that Bulgaria might clutch this 
opportunity for retrieving her loss of that city in 19 13. 
Bitter as was the Bulgarian hatred of Serbia and 
Greece for their reversal of the Balkan League policy 
in that year, and for their breach of treaties and 
territorial arrangements, it now seemed certain that 
if Bulgaria departed from neutrality at all, she would 
stand among our Allies. Only a few days later 
(March 17) General Paget, then engaged on a special 
mission to the Balkans, telegraphed to Lord 
Kitchener : 

" The operations in the Dardanelles have made a 
deep impression ; all possibility of Bulgaria attacking 
any Balkan State that might side with the Entente 
is now over, and there is some reason to think that 
shortly the Bulgarian army will move against Turkey 
to co-operate in the Dardanelles operations." ^ 

That was a high hope, for the attitude of Bulgaria 
was then, as it became still more definitely later on, 
the key of the Near Eastern situation. But for the 
moment, the effect upon Greece appeared even more 
propitious. M. Venizelos had in the previous month 
refused to allow Greece to be drawn into a war for 

' Dardanelles Commission ; Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 43. 


the defence of Serbia, though England and France 
promised a Division each at Salonika, and it was 
believed that this strategy was specially favoured by 
Mr. Lloyd George. Now, however (March i), he 
voluntarily offered our Minister in Athens three 
Greek Divisions for Gallipoli on condition that Greece 
received the vilayet of Smyrna ; and next day our 
Minister telegraphed that the King had been sounded 
and "wanted war."^ The proposal was abruptly 
checked by the jealousy of the Tsar's Government, 
which refused to allow a Greek soldier to approach 
the long-desired prize of Constantinople. But to 
make Constantine "want war" must have required 
a miraculous interposition, and the effect of three 
Divisions — even Greek Divisions — landing upon the 
Peninsula at that moment might have been more 
miraculous still. ^ Of even greater ultimate importance 
was the influence upon Italy ; for it was now that, 
under the guidance of Baron Sonnino, and the strong 
encouragement of Mr. Asquith, she entered upon the 
devious negotiations which led to her declaration of 
war against Austria on May 23. 

But valuable as were these political results, the 
naval attack itself was going slow, and Mr. Churchill 
read the daily telegrams with increasing impatience. 
The fact was that the enemy, having the free run of 

^ It appears to have been on this occasion that the King, yielding to 
the representations of M. Venizelos in favour of actively sharing in the 
Dardanelles enterprise, exclaimed, " So be it then, for the love of God ! " 
See M. Venizelos' speech to the Chamber in Athens, August 26, 1917 
{The Times, August 31). 

^ Mr. Roch's Minute, par. 43 ; Mr. Churchill's speech on March 20, 
191 7 (Hansard, 1793). Unhappily, M. Venizelos resigned on March 6, 
191 5, owing to Constantine's renewed opposition to a combination with 
the Allies. 


the Peninsula as well as of the Asiatic coast, could 
plant and conceal his movable howitzers and other 
armaments where he pleased, and it was becoming 
increasingly evident that, unless the Peninsula was 
occupied by our military forces, the passage of the 
Narrows would mean extreme risk for our ships, and, 
even if they got through, the channel would not be 
cleared for transports following them. Now was the 
moment when a permanent landing would be of the 
highest service, and on March 10 Mr. Churchill 
evidently realised the need of troops acutely. But 
it was only on that very day that Lord Kitchener 
finally decided to allow the 29th Division to start 
from England, and they did not leave port till the 
1 6th. Regarding the other detailed troops as less 
trained and experienced than they really were, Lord 
Kitchener refused to allow a landing till the Regular 
Division arrived. And, indeed, he still clung to the 
idea that no landing would be necessary. 

Accordingly, Mr. Churchill, though striving to 
restrain his impatience, strongly urged Admiral 
Carden to press forward the naval attack with the 
utmost vigour. In a telegram of March 11 he 
wrote : 

" If success cannot be obtained without loss of 
ships and men, results to be gained are important 
enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation 
may be decided, and consequences of a decisive 
character upon the war may be produced by the turn- 
ing of the corner Chanak. . . . We have no wish to 
hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we 
recognise clearly that at a certain period in your opera- 
tions you will have to press hard for a decision ; and 
we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that 


period has now arrived. Every well-conceived 
action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable 
losses be entailed, will receive our support," 

To this Admiral Garden replied that he considered 
the stage for vigorous action had now been reached, 
but that, when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmora, 
military operations on a large scale should be opened 
at once, so as to secure communications. On March 
15 Mr. Churchill, still anxious not to allow his im- 
patience to drive him into rashness, telegraphed again 
that, though no time was to be lost, there should be 
no undue haste. An attempt to rush the passage 
without having cleared a channel through the mines 
and destroyed the primary armament of the forts was 
not contemplated. The close co-operation of army 
and navy must be carefully studied, and it might be 
found that a naval rush would be costly without 
military occupation of the Kilid Bahr plateau. On 
these points the Admiral was to consult with the 
General who was being sent out to take command of 
the troops. To all of this Admiral Garden agreed. 
He proposed to begin vigorous operations on March 
1 7, but did not intend to rush the passage before a 
channel was cleared. This answer was telegraphed 
on March 16. But on the same day the Admiral 
resigned his command owing to serious ill-health.^ 

Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, second in 
command, was next day appointed his successor. He 
was five years younger, was, of course, fully cognizant 
of the plans, and expressed his entire approval of 
them. Yet it appears from his evidence that though 
strongly urged by Mr. Ghurchill to act on " his in- 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; Majority Report, par. 109. 


dependent and separate judgment," and not to 
hesitate to state objections, his real motive in carrying 
on the pre-arranged scheme was not so much his con- 
fidence in success as his fear lest a withdrawal might 
injure our prestige in the Near East ; and, secondly, 
his desire to make the best he could of an idea which 
he regarded as an order. " The order was to carry 
out a certain operation," he said, " or try to do it, and 
we had to do the best we could." If the ships got 
through, he, like many others, expected a revolution 
or other political change in Turkey. Otherwise, he 
saw that transports could not come up, and that the 
ships could not remain in the Sea of Marmora for more 
than a fortnight or three weeks, but would have to run 
the gauntlet coming down again, just as Admiral 
Duckworth did in 1807.^ In his telegram accepting 
the command, however, he made no mention of these 
considerations, but only said that success depended 
upon clearing the mine-fields after silencing the forts. 
Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. 
For on the very first day after receiving his command 
(March 18) he undertook the main attempt to force 
the Narrows. The weather was favourable — no mist 
and little wind. The scheme was to attack in three 
squadrons successively. The first blow was given 
by the four most powerful ships — Queen Elizabeth, 
Inflexible, Lord Nelson, and Agamemnon — which 
poured heavy shell at long range into the forts at 
Chanak and Kilid Bahr, while the Triumph and 
Prince George bombarded Fort Dardanus on the 
Asiatic coast, and Fort Soghandere, opposite to it 
upon the Peninsula. This bombardment lasted from 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; Majority Report, par. iii. 


about II a.m. till 12.30 p.m., and all six ships found 
themselves exposed to heavy fire from the forts, and 
from hidden howitzers and field-guns in varied 
positions upon both shores. At about 12.30 the 
second squadron, consisting of the four French ships, 
came up into action, advancing beyond the former 
line in the direction of Kephez Point. Though 
suffering considerably (chiefly owing to their inability 
to manoeuvre in such narrow waters, thus presenting 
very visible and almost fixed targets to the enemy's 
guns), the ten ships maintained the bombardment 
for about an hour (till nearly 1.30). The enemy's 
forts then fell silent, and it was hoped that many of 
them, at all events, had been destroyed. 

Accordingly, the third squadron, consisting of six 
British ships {^Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swift- 
sure, Majestic, and Albion), were brought up, with 
the design of advancing first through the Narrows, 
so as to ensure a clear passage for the greater ships 
which made the first attack. At the same time the 
four French ships, together with the Triumph and 
Prince George, were ordered to withdraw, so as to 
leave more room for the rest. During this manoeuvre, 
all or nearly all the guns in the forts opened fire 
again, their silence having been due, not to destruc- 
tion, but to the absence of the gunners, driven away 
by the gases or terror of our shells. Most of the 
ships suffered, and as the Bouvet moved down 
channel with her companion ships, she was struck 
by three big shells in quick succession. The blows 
were immediately followed by a vast explosion. It 
is disputed whether this was due to a shell bursting 
in her magazine, or to a torpedo fired from the 


Asiatic coast, or, as the Admiralty report said, to a 
mine drifting down the current. In two or three 
minutes she sank in deep water just north of Erenkeui, 
carrying nearly the whole of her crew to the bottom. 
The cries of the men dragged down with her, or 
struggling in the water as they were swept down- 
stream, sounded over the strait. 

At 2,30 the bombardment of all the forts was 
renewed, but they were not silenced. At 4 o'clock 
the Irresistible drew away with a heavy list. Ap- 
parently she also was struck by a mine adrift ; but 
she remained afloat for nearly two hours, and nearly 
all her crew were saved by destroyers, which swarmed 
round her at great risk to themselves, since they 
offered a crowded target. A quarter of an hour after 
she sank, the Ocean was struck in a similar manner 
(6.5 p.m.) and sank with great rapidity. Most of 
her crew, however, were also saved by destroyers 
near at hand. Many of the other ships were 
struck by shell. The InHexible and Gaulois suffered 
especially, and only just crawled back to be beached, 
the one at Tenedos, the other at Rabbit Island. At 
sunset the fleet was withdrawn. It had been proved 
once more that, in an attack upon land forts, ships 
lie at a great disadvantage. In this case the dis- 
advantage was much increased by the narrowness of 
the waters, which brought the ships within range of 
howitzer and other batteries hidden upon both shores, 
and also gave special opportunity for the use of 
mines drifting on the rapid current, or anchored 
right across the channel in successive rows. The 
mines of the second row were opposite the intervals 
in the first, and so on, until the passage was covered 


as with a net, each row containing twenty-six mines. 
Whether shore-torpedoes were also used is still un- 
certain. But, without them, the fleet suffered under 
sufficient disadvantages to explain the failure. The 
first serious attempt to force the Straits was the last.^ 
Mr. Churchill wished to renew the attempt at 
once. Perhaps he thought that English people are 
given to exaggerate the loss of a battleship. After 
all, the loss of even three battleships is far surpassed 
by the loss of lives and calculable wealth in one day's 
ordinary fighting in France, and the objective in the 
Dardanelles was at least as vital. ^ Lord Fisher and 
Sir Arthur Wilson agreed that the action should be 
continued, and the London and Prince of Wales, in 
addition to the Queen and Implacable, were actually 
sent to reinforce. The French also sent an old 
battleship (the Henri IV.^ to replace the Bouvet. 
At first Admiral de Robeck shared this view. It 
was suspected at the Admiralty that the ammunition 
in the forts was running short, and, at a much later 
date, Enver Pasha is reported to have said : 

** If the English had only had the courage to rush 
more ships through the Dardanelles, they could have 
got to Constantinople ; but their delay enabled us 
thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six weeks' 
time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian 
Skoda guns."^ 

^ In What of the Dardanelles? Mr, Martin Fortescue, an American 
correspondent, gives a brief but interesting criticism of this unfortunate 
action from the Turkish-German point of view (pp. 27-47). As seen 
from the Cornwallis the action is described in The Immortal Gamble^ 

PP- 45-53- 

^ The total British casualties during the whole naval enterprise were 
350 ; on March 18 they were 61. 

^Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 119. Speaking o 


That delay of six weeks was fatal, but the navy- 
was not to blame. On March 22 Admiral de Robeck 
and Admiral Wemyss consulted with Sir Ian Hamilton 
(who on the very day before the engagement had 
arrived at Tenedos to take command of the land 
forces) and with General Birdwood ; and as their 
decision to await the concentration of the army was 
accepted by Lord Fisher and the other Admiralty 
advisers, Mr. Churchill reluctantly yielded. General 
Birdwood, it is true, wished to land at once, even 
with such troops as were at hand. Sir Ian " thought 
there was a good deal to be said for it," and as to 
the fleet, he urged the Admiral to keep on hammer- 
ing the forts. But his orders from Lord Kitchener 
were "not to land if he could avoid it," and in any 
case to await the arrival of the 29th Division.^ 

And where was the 29th Division ? On March 
23 its first transport was just reaching Malta, where 
nearly all the officers attended a special performance 
of Faust} 

this naval attack, Dr. Stiirmer writes : " To their great astonishment 
the gallant defenders of the coast forts found that the attack had 
suddenly ceased. Dozens of the German naval gunners who were 
manning the batteries of Chanak on that memorable day told me later 
that they had quite made up their minds the fleet would ultimately win, 
and that they themselves could not have held out much longer." — Two 
War Years in Constantinople, p. 84. 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, pars. 115, 119. 

^ With the Twenty-ninth Division in Gallipoli, by Chaplain D. 
Creighton, p. 23. 




S was mentioned, Sir Ian Hamilton reached 
Tenedos on March 17, the day before the 
naval engagement. The appointment to 
command the military forces had come to him un- 
expectedly but five days earlier, and on March 13 he 
started from London. He had received only slight 
and vague instructions from Lord Kitchener, but on 
certain limitations the Secretary for War insisted, and 
all of them strongly influenced Sir lan's subsequent 
action. If possible a landing was to be avoided ; 
none was to be attempted until the fleet had made 
every effort to penetrate the Straits and had failed ; 
if a landing became unavoidable, none should be 
made until the full force available had assembled ; 
and no adventurous operations were to be undertaken 
on the Asiatic side. All these instructions were 

But they revealed the hesitating reluctance with 
which the Dardanelles campaign was regarded, not 
only by Lord Kitchener himself, but by his sub- 
ordinate generals at home and in France. The 
" Westerners " were, naturally, in the ascendant. 
The danger to the Allied cause lay close at hand. It 
had only recently been averted from the Channel 

^ Dardanelles Commission ; First Report, pars. 107, 108. 


and from Paris. The British Staff, equally with the 
French, represented that not a man could be spared 
from France, and that the only assured road to 
victory lay straight through the German lines. The 
opposition to any " side-show," especially if it diverted 
a Regular Division such as the 29th, was expressed 
with the emphasis of jealous alarm. 

Even the appointment of Sir Ian Hamilton to 
the distant enterprise was likely to be received with 
mingled sentiments. He counted forty-two years of 
service in the army. Since the days of the Afghan 
War and Majuba Hill (where his left hand was 
shattered), he had risen step by step to all but the 
highest commands. The Nile, Burma, Chitral, and 
Tirah had known him. He commanded the infantry 
in the rapid but vital engagement at Elandslaagte, 
and during the siege of Ladysmith had charge of the 
extensive and dangerous sector known as Csesar's 
Camp and Wagon Hill. In the final months of the 
Boer War he was Lord Kitchener's Chief of Staff, 
and commanded mobile columns in the Western 
Transvaal, greatly contributing to the conclusion of 
the war. Since then he had served at home as 
Quartermaster-General, as G.O.C. -in-Chief of the 
Southern Command, and as Adjutant - General. 
Abroad he had served as Military Representative of 
India with the Japanese army in Manchuria (1904- 
1905, when, in A Staff Officer s Sa^ap-Book, he fore- 
told the disappearance of cavalry and the preval- 
ence of the trench in future warfare), as General 
Officer-Commanding-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, 
and Inspector-General of the Overseas Forces 
(1910-1915). Except that he had never yet held 


supreme command in any considerable campaign, 
his experience in military affairs and in almost 
every phase of our army's activity was hardly to 
be surpassed. 

On the other hand, he was sixty-two ; and, 
though he was a year younger than Lord French, and 
retained a slim and active figure such as enabled Lord 
Roberts to take command in South Africa at seventy, 
sixty-two was regarded as a full age for any officer 
in so difficult a campaign upon a desert promontory. 
From a mingled Highland and Irish descent he had 
inherited the so-called Celtic qualities which are 
regarded by thorough Englishmen with varying 
admiration and dislike. His blood gave him so 
conspicuous a physical courage that, after the battles 
of Caesar's Camp and Diamond Hill, the present 
writer, who knew him there, regarded him as an 
example of the rare type which not merely conceals 
fear with success, but does not feel it. Undoubtedly 
he was deeply tinged with the " Celtic charm" — that 
glamour of mind and courtesy of behaviour which 
create suspicion among people endowed with neither. 
Through his nature ran a strain of the idealistic spirit 
which some despise as quixotic, and others salute as 
chivalrous, while, with cautious solicitude, they avoid 
it in themselves. It was known also that Sir Ian 
was susceptible to the influence of beauty in other 
forms than those usually conceded to military men. 
He was an acknowledged master of English prose, 
and though our people read more in quantity than 
any other nation, the literary gift is regarded among 
us as a sign of incapacity, and is not, as in France and 
ancient Greece, accepted as assurance of far-reaching 


powers. What was worse, he was known to have 
written poetry. 

Before the war, his opposition to the introduction 
of conscription in the United Kingdom had roused 
the animosity of all who aimed at establishing militar- 
ism as a permanent system in this country. Thus 
political animosity was added to the official prejudice 
against a buoyant and liberal temperament, conjoined 
with a politeness and an open-hearted manner start- 
lingly at variance with official usage. One must 
acknowledge that, in choosing the man for command, 
Lord Kitchener hardly took sufficient account of 
qualities likely to arouse antipathy among certain 
influential classes and the newspapers which represent 
their opinions. But careless of such prudent con- 
siderations, as his manner was, he allowed his decision 
to be guided by the General's long experience of war- 
fare, and designedly selected an eager temperament, 
liable to incautious impetuosity, but suited, as might 
be supposed, to an undertaking which demanded 
impetuous action. It was, however, probably in fear 
lest natural impulse should be given too loose a rein 
that the instructions mentioned above impressed only 
caution upon the appointed commander. In view 
of the strong opposition to the whole enterprise, it 
was also assumed that no reinforcements could be 
promised, and none should be asked for. Even the 
allotted Divisions were not allowed the ten per cent, 
extra men usually granted to fill up the gaps of 
immediate loss. 

After that conference in the Queen Elizabeth on 
March 22 (when Sir Ian left the final decision to the 
naval authorities), it was evident that a military 


landing could not be avoided, unless the whole expedi- 
tion were abandoned. It is easy now for belated 
prudence to maintain that Sir Ian should then have 
abandoned it, secured (if he could) the acquiescence 
of the navy in defeat, counter-ordered the assembling 
troops, and returned to London. Prudence could 
have said much for such a retirement. Small pre- 
paration had been made ; the strongest part of the 
striking force was still distant ; the number of the 
enemy (though roughly estimated at 40,000 on the 
Peninsula, and 30,000 in reserve beyond Bulair) was 
quite unknown ; ever since the appearance of our 
fleet, Turks had been digging like beavers every night 
at most of the possible points of our offence ; and it 
had been proved that the cross-fire of naval guns 
could not dislodge them even from the toe of the 
Peninsula, where, for about five miles up to the rising 
ground in front of Achi Baba, the surface appeared 
comparatively level. All these objections could have 
been urged, and, indeed, were urged at the time by 
Generals to whom, as to the German commanders of 
the Turkish defence, a landing appeared impossible. 
But if any one believes that a high-spirited and opti- 
mistic officer was likely to consider a retirement to be 
his duty just when he had received a command which 
he regarded as the surest means of terminating the 
war, he errs like a German psychologist in his judg- 
ment of mankind. 

So, in the face of all objections, the preparations 
for an assault upon the Peninsula began. The imme- 
diate difficulty was a question of transport. Besides 
5000 Australians from Egypt, the Royal Naval 
Division (less three battalions) had already arrived at 


Mudros, and their twelve transports were anchored in 
the great harbour. But it was found that the ships 
were indeed well enough packed for peace conditions, 
but the freight had not been arranged with a view to 
launching separate units complete upon the field of 
action. Men were divided from their ammunition, 
guns from their carriages, carts from their horses. 
Perhaps, for a long voyage, it is impossible to load 
transports so as to make each unit self-supporting. 
At all events, it was not done, and on the desert 
shores of the Mudros inlet it was impossible to unload 
and sort out and repack. Unless incalculable time 
was to be lost, such a confused piece of work could 
not be undertaken apart from wharves and cranes 
and docks. Wharves and cranes and docks were 
to be found at Alexandria, but no nearer ; and to 
Alexandria the transports were ordered to return. 
That historic city thus became the main base — 
Mudros harbour, which had previously been selected, 
now serving as intermediate or advanced base.^ 
Lord Kitchener approved the return and repacking 
of the transports, and certain advantages in the 
matter of drill and organisation were gained by the 
delay, to say nothing of the inestimable advantage of 
more settled weather. But the enemy also gained 
advantages, and in the extra month allowed them 
they increased their defensive works with laborious 

On March 25 (a calendar month before the great 
landing) Sir Ian Hamilton followed the transports to 
Egypt and remained there till April 7. While he 
was there his Administrative Staff arrived (April i). 

^ See Sir Ian Hamilton's first dispatch. 


It had been appointed after he left England, and 
until its arrival the administrative work had been, 
with much extra exertion, carried on by his Chief of 
Staff, General Braithwaite, and the rest of the 
General Staff. Sir Ian took the opportunity of his 
presence in Egypt to inspect the 29th Division 
(under Major-General Hunter-Weston), which began 
to arrive in Alexandria on March 28 and was 
encamped at Mex outside the city while its 
transports were being reloaded for the landing. He 
also inspected the Royal Naval Division (under 
Major-General Paris) at Port Said, and the French 
Division (under General d'Amade) near Alexandria, 
where their transports also were being reloaded. At 
least equally significant, when viewed from what was 
then the future, was his inspection of the Australian 
and New Zealand Army Corps, or " Anzacs," as they 
came to be called. The corps was commanded by 
Lieut. -General Sir W. R. Bird wood : the Australian 
Division under Major-General W. T. Bridges, the 
mixed New Zealand and Australian Division under 
Major-General Sir Alexander Godley. The Australian 
Division was encamped at Mena, near the Pyramids ; 
the mixed Division at Heliopolis on the other side 
of Cairo. Sir Ian also inspected the 42nd (East 
Lancashire) Division (under Major - General W. 
Douglas, the first Territorials to volunteer for 
foreign service), although they were not as yet part 
of his own force, but stood under command of 
Major-General Sir John Maxwell for the defence 
of Egypt. Beside these fighting Divisions, since 
so renowned, there remained the Assyrian Jewish 
Refugee Mule Corps (better known as "the Zionists "), 


organised only a few days before out of Jewish 
refugees from Syria and Palestine, chiefly Russian 
subjects, who had sought safety in Egypt. Colonel 
J. H. Patterson had been commissioned to select a 
body of about 500, with 750 transport mules. Orders 
were given in Hebrew and partly in English ; the 
men were armed with rifles taken from the Turks in 
the battle of the Canal ; and the regimental badge 
was the Shield of David. Probably this was the first 
purely Jewish fighting corps that went into action since 
Jerusalem fell to the Roman armies under Titus.^ 

The fortunate presence of the " Anzacs " in Egypt 
was due to Lord Kitchener's constant apprehension 
of a Turkish attack upon the Suez Canal and the 
main country, in which it was natural to suppose that 
a nationalist and religious feeling would rally a large 
part of the inhabitants to the enemy's side. At the 
outbreak of war with Germany thousands of the 
youth in Australia and New Zealand (including large 
numbers of Maoris) had eagerly volunteered, moved 
by love of adventure and a racial affection for the 
mother-country. After nearly three months' prepara- 
tion — a difficult task, persistently effected in Australia 
by Major-General Bridges, who for three years had 
been commandant of Duntroon Military College — 
the whole force assembled at King George Sound on 
October 31, 19 14, and set sail next day (the day of 
Turkey's entrance into the war as the Central Powers' 
Ally). Thirty-eight transports carried the army corps, 
and they were convoyed by cruisers, one of which 

1 The formation and subsequent exploits of this peculiar body are 
described by Colonel Patterson himself in With the Zionists in 


(the Sydney, under Captain Glossop) gained the 
distinction upon the route of destroying the active 
raider Emden at Cocos Island, and taking her gallant 
and resourceful captain, Karl von Miiller, prisoner 
(November 9). Having reached Egypt on December 
3, the " Anzacs " went into camps at points near Cairo 
for further training, and some selected battalions took 
part in the repulse of Djemal Pasha's attack upon the 
Canal near Ismailia in the first week of February 19 15. 
A finer set of men than the "Anzacs" after their 
three months' training upon the desert sands could 
hardly be found in any country. With the aid of 
open-air life, sufficient food, and freedom from 
grinding poverty, Australia and New Zealand had 
bred them as though to display the physical excellence 
of which the British type is capable when released 
from manufacturing squalor or agricultural subjection. 
Equally distinguished in feature and in figure — the 
eyes rather deep-set and looking level to the front, 
the nose straight and rather prominent, shoulders 
loose and broad, moving easily above the slim waist 
and lengthy thighs, the chest, it is true, rather broad 
than deep, owing to Australia's clear and sunny air — 
they walked the earth with careless and dare-devil self- 
confidence. Gifted with the intellig-ence that comes 
of freedom and healthy physique, they were educated 
rather to resourceful energy in the face of nature than 
to scientific knowledge and the arts. Since they 
sprang from every Colonial class, and had grown 
up accustomed to natural equality, military discipline 
at first appeared to them an irritating and absurd 
superfluity, and they could be counted upon to face 
death but hardly to salute an officer. Indeed, their 


general conception of discipline was rather reasonable 
than regular, and their language, habitually violent, 
continued unrestrained in the presence of superiors ; 
so to the natural irony of our race was added a 
Colonial independence. 

Except in action, the control of such men was 
inevitably difficult. Released from a long voyage, 
exposed to the unnatural conditions of warfare, and 
beguiled by the curious amenities of an Oriental city, 
now for the first time experienced, many availed 
themselves of Cairo's opportunity for enjoyment 
beyond the strict limit of regulations. The most 
demure of English tourists upon the Continent, 
having escaped from the trammels of identity, have 
been known in former times to behave as they would 
not behave in their own provincial towns ; much 
more might unrestrained behaviour be expected in 
men whose sense of personal responsibility in a 
foreign city had been further reduced by uniform, and 
who were encouraged to excess by the easy standard 
of military tradition, and by the foreknowledge that, 
to get beforehand with death, the interval for pleasure 
might be short. It was no wonder, therefore, that, 
while twenty per cent, of the Colonial forces (later ten 
per cent.) poured into Cairo daily upon any animal 
or conveyance which could move, the beautiful city 
became a scene of frequent turmoil.^ 

^ For the history of the Austrahans in Egypt and Gallipoli, see 
Australia in Arms, by Phillip Schuler, the fine young correspondent 
of The Age, Melbourne. To the deep regret of all who knew him, he 
was afterwards killed by a chance shell while teaching cookery to some 
men in France. Everything written by Captain Bean and Mr. Malcolm 
Ross, the authorised correspondents for Australia and New Zealand 
respectively, is also invaluable for history. 


Upon his journey back to the advanced base, 
there were many thoughts to divide and even oppress 
the mind of the most sanguine Commander-in-Chief. 
The fateful decision had now to be made — a decision 
upon which the future destiny of the war, and, indeed, 
of his country, so largely depended. The burden of 
responsibility lay upon his head alone. To his single 
judgment were entrusted, not only the lives of many 
thousand devoted men, but the highest interests of 
an Alliance in the justice of whose cause he whole- 
heartedly believed. As the inevitable hour approached, 
the difficulties of the appointed task were recognised 
as greater even than foreseen. The strongest nerve 
might well hesitate to confront them. Even at this 
crisis of decision, the chief among his commanding 
Generals were inclined to turn aside from the 
Peninsula as from impossibility. One advocated an 
attack upon Asia Minor, with a view to diverting the 
enemy's main force, and so clearing a passage for the 
fleet. Another favoured further delay and continuous 
training, in hope of some more propitious opportunity. 
A third, while offering no alternative, considered the 
attempt too desperate to be tried. Upon a sensitive 
and imaginative nature the risk, the sacrifice of lives, 
the difficulties of a small force too rapidly organised, 
insufficiently equipped with modern ammunition, and 
unsupported by reinforcements, weighed heavily. To 
these were added the discouraging representations 
of friendly, trusted, and experienced officers, upon 
whose diligent co-operation the success of the whole 
design entirely depended. In such hours as those, 
deep searchings of mind and heart are the unenviable 
lot of the man whose word decides. 


But Sir lan's decision was already taken, and 
subsequent conference witli the Admirals de Robeck 
and Wemyss only confirmed it. On their arrival at 
Mudros, his Generals also agreed, and the General 
whose objections to landing on any condition had 
been the most serious, became enthusiastic for the 
scheme, if landing was attempted. Various lines of 
attack were possible, and each was carefully con- 
sidered. To the lay mind, an assault upon the neck 
of the Peninsula at Bulair appeared so obvious that, 
from the very outset of operations, Sir Ian was blamed 
for not attempting it. The neck is narrow — not more 
than three miles across. If it were cut, the enemy on 
the main Peninsula might be expected to surrender 
for want of supplies ; the Straits would then be free 
from obstacle on the European side, and the Asiatic 
side could be commanded by big guns on Achi Baba 
and the Kilid Bahr plateau opposite Chanak. The 
main objection to this obvious strategy was the dis- 
concerting truth that the enemy's chief line of com- 
munication did not run through Bulair, but across the 
strait itself, chiefly from the Asiatic coast to the town 
of Gallipoli, and even if Bulair were occupied, the 
supply of the Turkish army on the Peninsula could 
be maintained ; while an Allied force advancing from 
Bulair towards the Narrows (which was the objective 
of the whole expedition) would be perpetually 
threatened from the rear, Bulair itself was also a 
formidable obstacle. The famous lines, originally 
fortified by the Allies in the Crimean War, and re- 
newed to resist Russian, Bulgarian, and Greek attacks 
from the north, had been incalculably strengthened in 
the preceding weeks under German direction. On 


his first survey (March i8) Sir Ian had observed the 
labyrinth of white Hnes marking the newly-con- 
structed trenches upon which thousands of Turks had 
already been long at work. The gleam of wire was 
apparent around the only two possible points of land- 
ing, both difficult, and unsuited for naval co-operation. 
An assault upon Bulair would have involved immense 
losses, and, even if successful, could not have ad- 
vanced the solution of the problem — the problem of 
the Narrows — without further dubious and specula- 
tive fighting, front and rear. 

Another proposal, which found favour with some, 
was a landing at Enos, on the mouth of the Thracian 
river Maritza (the ancient Hebrus). Except that the 
actual landing upon the level coast might have been 
easier, the same objections held, but in exaggerated 
form. The distance from the Narrows was more 
than twice as long. An army on the march round 
the head of the Gulf of Xeros would have had its left 
flank exposed the whole way to the large Turkish 
reserves known to be stationed at Rodosto and 
Adrianople. The two main roads from those import- 
ant towns meet at Keshan, about fifteen miles from 
the Xeros coast, and from that base fairly good roads 
extend to Enos on the one side, and to Kavak, at the 
head of the Bulair neck, on the other. The Turkish 
armies could thus concentrate as at the handle of a 
fan, ready to strike at any point along the edge where 
the British were moving within reach of the coast. 
Nor could the navy have afforded much protection 
to our troops upon the march, the head-waters of the 
gulf being shallow far out from shore. Had Sir Ian 
attempted, as others have suggested, to turn inland 


and fight his way towards Constantinople, disregard- 
ing his appointed task at the Straits, he would, of 
course, have lost the assistance of the navy alto- 
gether, except as defence to his precarious base and 
lines of communication along the bit of coast ; and, 
apart from the navy, he had no transport available 
for a long march. 

Between Bulair and the sharp northern point of 
Suvla Bay, steep cliffs and the absence of beach, 
except in tiny inlets, prevent the possibility of land- 
ing. But inland from Suvla Bay itself there is open 
ground, and a practicable beach extends south as far 
as the cliff promontory of Gaba Tepe, although the 
main m.ass of the Sari Bair mountain rises close 
behind the southern part of the beach in a series of 
broken precipices and ravines. From Suvla Point to 
Gaba Tepe it would certainly have been possible to 
put the whole united force ashore, and, to judge from 
subsequent events, this might have been the wisest 
course. On the other hand, Suvla is far removed 
from the Narrows ; a straight line thence to Maidos 
measures nearly fifteen miles ; it passes over the top 
of Sari Bair, a formidable barrier ; while, upon the 
long and devious route alone possible for a movement 
of troops, the army would have had both flanks ex- 
posed, on the right to the strong Turkish position of 
Kilid Bahr plateau, and on the left to large forces 
available to the enemy from Rodosto and Gallipoli. 
It is probable that Sir Ian s troops were not then 
numerous enough to hold so long a line of com- 
munications and at the same time resist flank attacks, 
especially the strong attack to be anticipated from the 


A landing at Gaba Tepe itself, where north and 
south the ground is open, and a fairly level gap 
between the Sari Bair range and the Kilid Bahr 
plateau allows the long and wandering road from 
Krithia to cross the Peninsula to Maidos, would have 
exposed the army to similar flank attacks ; but the 
distance is short (not much over five miles), and in all 
probability a landing in full force might have been 
attempted here had not the fortification and armament 
on the promontory itself, and on the gradually slop- 
ing land upon both sides of it, appeared too powerful 
for assault. The barbed-wire entanglements ex- 
tended into the sea, and the country formed the most 
dangerous of all approaches — a glacis with no dead 
ground and little cover. South of this position the 
cliffs rise abruptly again, and along all the coast 
round Cape Helles to Morto Bay (which was com- 
manded by guns from the Asiatic side) a survey 
showed no beach or opening, except at a few small 
gaps and gullies, so soon to be celebrated. 

As he rejected the coast between Suvla and Gaba 
Tepe, Sir Ian was compelled to disregard Napoleon's 
maxim of war and divide his forces. His object was 
to shake the enemy's moral, and puzzle the command 
by several simultaneous attacks, threatening front 
and rear, and keeping the Turkish Staff in flustered 
uncertainty where the main defence should be con- 
centrated. Accordingly, a few of those small but 
practicable landing-places round the extremity of the 
Peninsula were selected. Here the assault upon the 
Turkish defences was to be made chiefly by units of 
the 29th Division. The chosen points were S Beach, 
or De Tott's Battery, on the farther side of Morto 

^ yyuUs 


To face /. 78 

W - i 


Bay, where only a small force was to attempt holding 
on so as to protect our right flank ; V Beach, just 
below the larg-e villaafe and ancient castle of Seddel 
Bahr, where a main attack was to be made and the 
ground permanently occupied ; W Beach, where a 
similar force was to land, and link up with V Beach, 
having the same object in view ; X Beach (round the 
point of Cape Tekke, looking out towards the Gulf of 
Xeros), where a force was to work up the face of a 
cliff and attempt to join hands with W Beach ; and 
Y Beach, about three and a half miles north along the 
cliffs, where a small body was to scramble up a pre- 
cipitous ravine and make a feint upon Krithia. Both 
flanks of the main attack were further protected by 
the sea and the naval guns. 

Such was the task of the 29th Division, their 
general objective being the low but formidable posi- 
tion of Achi Baba, a hill sitting asquat almost across 
the Peninsula about five miles from Cape Helles, and 
rising by gradual and bare slopes to a truncated 
pyramid, some 600 to 700 feet high. About nine 
miles along the coast beyond Y Beach, between a 
point north of Gaba Tepe and a slight projection then 
called Fisherman's Hut, three miles farther up the 
coast from Gaba Tepe, the Anzacs were to land on 
Z Beach, and work their way into the defiles and up 
the heights of Sari Bair. Their main purpose was 
to distract the enemy forces south of Achi Baba by 
threatening their rear and communications. With a 
similar object the greater part of the Royal Naval 
Division, which had no guns, and for which no small 
boats could be supplied, was to make a feint near the 
Bulair lines at the head of the Gulf. Further to dis- 


tract the enemy's attention, one infantry regiment and 
one battery from the French mixed Division were 
instructed to land on the Asiatic shore near Kum 
Kali ; but not to remain there, nor advance beyond 
the river Mendere. Such, in brief, was the general 
design for attacking the Peninsula position, con- 
fidently described by German authorities as im- 

By the middle of April the force appointed to ac- 
complish this overwhelming task had assembled in the 
Mudros harbour or loch. Large as that inlet is, the 
surface was so crowded with ships that the naval 
authorities, among whom Commodore Roger Keyes 
was Chief of Staff to Admiral de Robeck, had 
difficulty in finding anchorage for all. Beside the 
ships of war, places had to be fixed for io8 transports 
and other vessels. The 29th Division had arrived in 
twenty transports ; ^ the Anzacs in forty ; the Royal 
Naval Division in twelve ; the French Division in 
twenty-three ; the Supply and Store Ships numbered 
twelve, and the Arcadian was detailed for General 

The names of the officers appointed to the 
most important positions upon Sir lan's Staff 
may here be mentioned, his personal Aides being 

^ One of these transports, the Manito7(, had a narrow escape upon 
the voyage from Egypt. She was attacked by a Turkish destroyer, 
whose captain courteously gave an opportunity for removing the men in 
their boats. In the hurry two of the boats were overturned and fifty-one 
men drowned. The enemy destroyer, apprehending the approach of 
British ships, then drew in close, and fired three torpedoes, all of which 
passed under the transport, the range being too short to allow a torpedo 
to rise after its plunge. The destroyer was afterwards driven ashore in 
Asia by two of our destroyers and broken up.^ — See The Immortal 
Gamble, p. 67. 


Captain S. H. Pollen and Lieutenant G. St. John 
Brodrick : 

Chief of the General Staff, Major-General W. F. Braithwaite ; 
other members of the General Staff, Lieut.-Colonel M. C. 
P. Ward, R.A. ; Lieut.-Colonel Doughty-Wylie (Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers) ; Captain C. F. Aspinall (Royal Munster 
Fusiliers) ; Captain G. P. Dawnay (Reserve of Ofificers) ; 
Captain W. H. Deedes (King's Royal Rifles). 

Deputy Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General E. M. Woodward. 

Deputy Quartermaster-General, Brigadier-General S. H. Winter. 

Liaison Officers, with the British, Commandant de Cavalerie Brevete 
Berthier de Sauvigny, Lieut. Pelliot, and Lieut, de 

With the French, Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Farquharson, 
and Captain C. de Putron. 

Camp Commandant, Major J. S. S. Churchill (Oxfordshire Fusiliers). 

Censor, Captain William Maxwell (the well-known war corre- 
spondent in former campaigns). 

Principal Chaplain, The Rev. A. C. Hordern. 

Headquarters of Base. 
Base Commattdant, Brigadier-General C. R. M'Grigor, C.B. 
General Staff Officer, Major E. A. Plunkett (Lincolnshire Regiment). 
Assistaftt Quartermaster-General, Lieut.-Colonel P. C. J. Scott 

Assistant Director of Medical Services, Major M. J. Sexton 


Headquarters of Administrative Services. 

Director of Army Signals, Lieut.-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman- 
Manifold (R.E.). 

Director of Supplies and Transport, Colonel F. W. B. Koe, C.B. 

Assistant Director of Transport, Major O. Striedinger (A.S.C.). 

Director of Ordnance Services, Colonel R. W. M. Jackson, C.B., 

Director of Works, Brigadier-General G. S. M'D. EUiot. 

Director of Medical Services, Surgeon-General W. E. Birrell. 

Pay master-in- Chief, Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Armstrong (A.P.D.). 

The total number of the Staff at the beginning 
of the great enterprise was eighty-four. Brigadier- 
General Woodward and Surgeon-General Birrell did 
not arrive till April 19, having remained in Egypt 


under orders to organise the hospitals. In their 
absence the general scheme for the evacuation of the 
wounded was drawn up by Lieut. -Colonel A. E. C. 
Keble, R.A.M.C. 

The military force under Sir Jan's command at 
the beginning of the campaign was composed as 
follows : 

The 29TH Division. 
Commander, Major-General A. G. Hunter- Weston, C.B., D.S.O. 
Divisional Artillery Commander, Brigadier-General R. W. Breeks. 
Division Engineers Commander, Lieut. -Colonel C. B. Kingston 

86//i! Infantry Brigade. 

Cotnmander, Brigadier-General S. W. Hare. 
(i) 2nd Royal Fusiliers. 

(2) I St Lancashire Fusiliers. 

(3) 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers. 

(4) 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 

87//? Infantry Brigade. 

Comma7ider, Brigadier-General W. R. Marshall. 
(i) 2nd South Wales Borderers. 

(2) 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers. 

(3) 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 

(4) 1st Border Regiment. 

88/-^ Infantry Brigade. 

Commander, Brigadier-General H. E. Napier. 
(i) 4th Worcester Regiment. 

(2) 2nd Hampshire Regiment. 

(3) 1st Essex Regiment. 

(4) 5th Royal Scots (Territorials). 

The Anzac Army Corps. 
General Officer Conunanding, Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, 

K.C.S.L, C.B., CLE., D.S.O. 
Brigadier-General, General Staff, Brigadier-General H. B. Walker, 

General Staff Officer, Lieut.-Colonel A. Skeen (24th Punjabis). 
Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, Brigadier-General 

R. A. Carruthers, C.B. 
Medical Officer, Colonel C. S. Ryan, V.D. (A.A.M.C). 
Attached as Specialist on Water Supply, Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Joly 

de Lotbini^re, C.S.I., CLE. 


Australian Division. 
Commander^ Major-General W. T. Bridges, C.M.G. 
General Sta^ff Officer, Lieut.-Colonel C. B. B. White (R.A.A.). 
Commanding Divisional Artillery, Colonel J. J. T. Hobbs, V.D. 
Commanding Divisional Engineers, Lieut.-Colonel G. C. E. Elliott 

1st {New South Wales) Infantry Brigade. 

Commander, Colonel H. N. M'Laurin. (ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 
4th Battalions, New South Wales.) 

ind ( Victoria) Infantry Brigade. 

Commander, Colonel the Hon. J. W. M'Cay, V.D. (5th, 6th, 
7th, and 8th BattaHons, Victoria.) 

"^rd {Australia) Infantry Brigade. 

Commander, Colonel E. G. Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O. (York- 
shire Regiment). (9th Queensland, loth South Australian, 
nth West Australian, 12th South Australian, West 
Australian, and Tasmania.) 

Divisional. 4th (Victoria) Light Horse. 

New Zealand and Australian Division. 
General Officer Cofumanding, Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, 

K.C.M.G., C.B. 
Chief Staff Officer, Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Braithwaite, D.S.O. 

(Royal Welsh Fusiliers). 
Commanding Divisional Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel G. N. Johnston 

Commanding Divisional Engineers, Lieut.-Colonel G. R. Pridham 


New Zealand Moutited Rifle Brigade. 

Commander, Brigadier-General A. H. Russell, A.D.C. (Auck- 
land, Canterbury, and Wellington Mounted Rifles.) 

\st Australian Light Horse Brigade. 

Commander, Colonel H. G. Chauvel, C.M.G. (ist New South 
Wales, 2nd Queensland, 3rd South Australian, and 
Tasmania Regiments.) 

New Zealand Infantry Brigade. 

Commander, Colonel F. C. Johnston (North Staffordshire 
Regiment). (Auckland, Canterbury, Otago, and Wellington 
4/A Australian Infantry Brigade. 

Commander, Colonel J. Monash. (13th New South Wales, 
14th Victoria, isth Queensland and Tasmania, and i6th 
South and West Australia Battalions.) 

Divisional. Otago Mounted Rifles. 


Corps Troops. 
ind Australian Light Horse Brigade. (5tli, 6th, and 7th Regiments.) 
Commander, Colonel G. de L. Ryrie. 

^rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. (8th, 9th, and lolh Regiments.) 
Commander, Colonel F. G. Hughes, V.D. 

The Mounted Units had left their horses behind 
them in Egypt, and the popular pictures represent- 
ing cavalry charging over broken ground upon the 
Peninsula are imaginative. 

Royal Naval Division. 
General Officer Commanding, Major-General A. Paris, C.B. 
General Staff Officer, Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Ollivant (R.A.). 

(The Division had no guns.) 
Commanding Divisional Engineers, Lieut.-Colonel A. B, Carey 


First Naval Brigade. 

Commander, Brigadier-General D. Mercer (R.M.L. I.). (Drake, 
Nelson, Hawke, and CoUingwood Battalions.) 

Second Naval Brigade. 

Commander, Commodore O. Backhouse (R.N.). (Howe, Hood, 
Anson, and Benbow Battalions.) 

Third Naval Brigade. (Marine.) 

Co!n7?iander, Brigadier-General C. N. Trotman (R.M.L.I.). 
(Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Deal Battalions.) 

French Expeditionary Force. 
GdnSral Commandant le Corps Expeditiofinaire Franqais d'' Orient, 

General de Division d'Amade. 
Chef d'Etat- Major, Lieut.-Colonel Descoins. 
Commandant d'Armes de la Base, General Baumann. 

Ghiiral Comma7idant, General Masnou. 
Chef d^Etat-Major, Commandant Romieux. 
Colonel Commandant VArtillerie, Lieut.-Colonel Branet. 
Commandant du Genie, Capitaine Bouyssou. 

\lre Brigade Metropolitaine. 

General de Brigade, General Vandenberg. Comprising i75^me 
Regiment d'Infanterie Metropolitaine (Lieut.-Colonel 
Philippe), and a Regiment de marche d'Afrique (Lieut.- 
Colonel Desruelles), mixed Zouaves and Foreign Legion. 


Brigade Coloniale. 

General de Brigade^ Colonel Ruef. Comprising 4eme Regi- 
ment mixte Colonial (Lieut.-Colonel Vacher), and 6^me 
Regiment mixte Colonial (Lieut-Colonel Nogu^s). The 
Division had six batteries of "75's," and three of "65" 
mountain guns ; four guns to each battery. 

Most unfortunately, the Indian Brigade, under 
General Cox, was for the present left in Egypt, 
though its service there was no longer required, 
and Sir Ian had appealed to Lord Kitchener 
for it. Ultimately it arrived, just too late, on 
May I. 

The total number of the force was under 70,000 ; 
of these certainly not more than 60,000 could be used 
for action, even including the necessary reserves. 

Landing was intended on April 23, but on the 
20th a heavy wind arose, and blew for forty-eight 
hours, rendering the movement of small boats difficult 
even in Mudros harbour. On the 21st the Com- 
mander-in-Chief issued the following address to his 
forces : 

'* Soldiers of France and of the King : 

" Before us lies an adventure unprecedented in 
modern war. Together with our comrades of the 
Fleet, we are about to force a landing upon an open 
beach in face of positions which have been vaunted 
by our enemies as impregnable. 

" The landing will be made good, by the help of 
God and the Navy ; the positions will be stormed, 
and the War brought one step nearer to a glorious 

" ' Remember,' said Lord Kitchener, when bidding 
adieu to your Commander, ' Remember, once you set 
foot upon the Gallipoli Peninsula, you must fight the 
thing through to a finish.' 


" The whole world will be watching your progress. 
Let us prove ourselves worthy of the great feat of 
arms entrusted to us. 

" Ian Hamilton, 

A few further points remain to be mentioned. 
On April 17, one of our submarines, E15, ran 
aground off Kephez Point, and by a very gallant 
action was destroyed by the two picket-boats of the 
Triumph and Majestic (ships afterwards sent to the 
bottom by submarines). Lieut. -Commander Eric 
Robinson was in command, and, though coming 
under heavy fire, he succeeded in torpedoing the 
submarine and rendering it useless to the enemy. 

On the 23rd, just after the transports had started, 
news came from the rugged island of Skyros, eighty 
miles south-west of Lemnos, that Rupert Brooke, the 
poet, had died there of blood-poisoning that evening. 
During his visit to the Royal Naval Division at Port 
Said, Sir Ian had seen him in his tent upon the sand, 
prostrate with fever, and had offered him a place on 
his Staff. With fine resolution, and a modesty equally 
characteristic, Brooke refused, being determined to 
abide by the Royal Naval Division, which he had 
joined before the quixotic fiasco at Antwerp. On 
April 20 he took part in a field-day on Skyros, and 
in an olive grove there, high up on the mountain 
Pephko, looking over Trebaki Bay, he was buried at 
midnight of the 23rd, his own petty officers carrying 
his body over the rocks and prickly bushes. A 
wooden cross, surrounded by lumps of marble, marks 
the spot. His colonel in the Hood Battalion, 
Arnold Quilter, Grenadier Guards, who was killed 


a fortnight later, wrote to his mother : "His men were 
devoted to him, and he had all the makings of a first- 
rate officer." Alas ! his friends know that he had all 
the makings of so much beside, and for them the 
world was darkened by the loss of so singularly 
beautiful a character, a personality so fine and full of 
the noblest promise/ 

Upon other fronts of the war, the chief events of 
the weeks following the costly and inconclusive move- 
ment at Neuve Chapelle (March 10) were the capture 
of Przemysl by the Russians (March 22), followed by 
heavy fighting in the Carpathian passes, and the 
second battle of Ypres, inaugurated (April 22) on the 
German side by the earliest use of poison gas. 

1 See also Charles Lister^ by Lord Ribblesdale, p. 164. Charles 
Lister himself was one of the young men of brilliant promise whose 
death was due to the Gallipoli campaign. After gallant service in the 
Hood Battalion of the Royal Naval Division at Helles, he died of his 
third wound, August 28, 191 5. 


THE wind, which had continued to blow hard 
on April 22, abated next day, and in the 
afternoon the transports bearing the cover- 
ing force of the 29th Division began very slowly to 
move out from Mudros harbour. In that land-locked 
inlet, the water was now still, and singularly blue. 
"The black ships," as the navy called the transports 
owing to their fresh coat of black paint, wound their 
way in and out among others still lying at anchor. 
They passed the battleships and cruisers of our own 
fleet ; they passed the Anzac transports, which were 
to follow them next day ; they passed the battleships 
and transports of the French contingents, and the 
five-funnelled Russian cruiser Askold, lying nearer 
the little islands which protect the entrance of the far- 
extended haven ; and as they passed, the pellucid air 
which still illuminates the realms of ancient Greece 
rang with the cheers of races whose habitation the 
Greeks had not imagined. Perhaps it is in Greek 
history that we find the nearest parallel to such a 
scene of heroic joy, the preface to heroic disaster. 
For when the bright troops of Athenians started for 
the conquest of Sicily, we read that nearly the whole 
population of the city accompanied their five-mile 
march down the Pirceus ; that there, in sacred 


silence, libation to the gods was made ; and issuing 
in line ahead from the harbour, the transport galleys 
raced, in pure exhilaration of heart, to the pointed 
island of ^gina, fifteen miles away, while far in the 
air bystanders heard the cries of invisible spirits, like 
the wailings of women upon the Phoenician shore 
lamenting the beauty of Adonis yearly wounded/ 

The British covering force consisted mainly of 
the 86th Brigade (29th Division), under Brigadier- 
General S. W. Hare, but two battalions of the 
87th Brigade and half a battalion of the 88th were 
attached to it, beside the Plymouth Battalion of the 
Royal Naval Division, as the General's own reserve, 
and the Anson Battalion, detailed for beach duties. 
Their three transports were escorted by the Euryalus 
(flagship of Admiral Wemyss, commanding the first 
and fourth of the seven squadrons into which the fleet 
was divided), the hnplacable, and the Coi^nwallis, 
and their station was Tenedos. The next afternoon 
(Saturday, April 24) they were followed from 
Mudros harbour by the Queen Elizabeth (flagship 
of Admiral de Robeck), with Sir Ian Hamilton and 
the General Headquarter Staff on board, leading the 
other battleships in line ahead. After them went the 
Anzac covering force, consisting of the 3rd Brigade 
under Colonel Sinclair Maclagan (the Queensland, 
South Australian, West Australian, and a mixed 
Australian and Tasmanian battalion). The re- 
mainder of the Anzac army corps followed, escorted 

1 Thucydides, vi. 32 ; Diodorus, xiii. 3. From Athens herself only 
about 3000 of the troops for the Sicilian expedition started. It is curious 
to remember that Plato was a boy in yEgina at the time, and probably 
watched the race. 


by the Queen (flagship of Admiral Thursby, com- 
manding the second squadron), the London, and the 
Prince of Wales. Their destination was a point off 
Imbros, near Cape Kephalos, where they were to 
wait during the night till the moon went dow^n. The 
covering force occupied four transports, beside the 
1500 men of the brigade placed upon the Queen. 
General Birdwood's headquarters were on the 
Minnewaska, and about thirty transports carried 
the remainder of his corps. As they passed out 
of harbour, leaving the Lemnian shore with which 
many, by practised landings, had become familiar, 
they too were greeted with tumultuous cheering by 
the ships which had not started yet, and tumultuously 
they replied. Moved onward irresistibly into immi- 
nent death, knowing that by the morrow's afternoon 
at least one in ten of their numbers would have fallen 
in all the splendour of youthful vitality, still they 
cheered like schoolboys bound for a football match or 
a holiday by the sea. Excitement, comradeship, the 
infectious joy of confronting a dangerous enterprise 
side by side, made them cheer. Never before had 
those men known what battle means, but the sinking 
dread of the unknown, which all men feel as the 
shadow of extreme peril approaches, was allayed by 
the renunciation of self, and the clear belief that, 
whoever else was wrong in the world, it was not 

The night was very still. The three-quarter 
moon set soon after 3 a.m., and there was total 
darkness over sea and mountains until a cold and 
windless dawn gradually appeared. The water was 
smooth as a mirror, and a thin veil of mist covered 


the shore. Just before the sun rose in a blaze of 
gold, four of the battleships and four cruisers opened 
fire upon the defences at the main landing-places 
round Cape Helles, and continued a heavy bombard- 
ment. At the same time, the landing of the covering 
parties at the five selected points around the end 
of the Peninsula began, and account of them may 
here be given in succession from the extreme right 
flank at S to the extreme left at Y. 

On the evening of the 24th, about 750 of the 
2nd South Wales Borderers under Colonel Casson 
had come on board the Cornwallis in four trawlers 
from their transport. Just before sunrise they put 
off in the trawlers again, each trawler towing six 
boats, and proceeded up the strait for about 2\ miles 
to the point called Eski Hissarlik or De Tott's Battery, 
on the north-east end of Morto Bay. The Cornwallis 
followed, with the Lord Nelson as covering ship, 
but, being delayed by the Agamemnon and some 
French mine-sweepers coming across her course, she 
did not reach the point till the men had approached 
the shore, rowing the boats as best they could, 
though unaccustomed to the water, and encumbered 
with their packs, rifles, and trenching tools. Almost 
before the boats grounded, they leapt into the sea, 
and struggled to shore, under a heavy rifle fire which 
immediately opened from the Turkish trenches. 

In perfect order, but at great speed, these veteran 
troops made for the height, some scrambling up the 
cliff, some approaching by a gradual slope on the 
west side. They were already nearing the summit 
when a mixed naval party of about 100 marines 
and sailors put to shore, and were of great assistance 


in taking two lines of trenches and working side by 
side with the South Wales Borderers, who were 
already driving the Turks down the farther slope 
of the ridge. Guns from the Asiatic side opened 
fire upon the beach, but most of the shells, striking 
the mud at the water's edge, did not burst, and the 
Comwallis, firing by signal from shore, silenced the 
battery about lo a.m. Being urgently summoned 
from W Beach, and seeing that the soldiers now 
held the position firmly, Captain Davidson then 
withdrew the naval party, and steamed to his second 
position down the strait.^ Colonel Casson's battalion 
clung to the point they had gained for the critical 
forty-eight hours of the landing, thus preventing 
Turkish reinforcements from coming down to Seddel 
Bahr, and protecting the right flank of our possible 
advance. The post was then taken over by the 
French, who held it throughout the campaign, though 
much exposed to the Asiatic guns. This successful 
enterprise cost about sixty casualties, including Major 
Margesson, who was killed. 

Walking along the coast south-west from De 
Tott's Battery, one rounds the two-mile arc of Morto 
Bay, near the middle of which the combined " Deres " 
or watercourses of the Krithia region run out into 
the strait. Across the valley, nearly a mile inland, 
a few lofty piles of an ancient, perhaps Byzantine, 
aqueduct then stood, probably at one time carrying 
water to a more ancient town than Seddel Bahr. 
Later in the campaign they were destroyed, but for 
some months they formed a conspicuous landmark. 

^ The Iimnortal Gamble, pp. 72-82 and 98-104 (account by Captain 
Davidson, who went ashore himself). 


Along the rest of the bay the land slopes gently- 
down to the beach, and had been laid out in gardens 
cypress-fringed, such as Islam loves. The gardens 
were now entrenched and thickly netted with barbed 
wire ; but the bay would have afforded the finest 
landing-place upon the southern Peninsula, had it 
not been fully commanded by guns across the strait. 
Upon the south-west point of the bay, the old 
Turkish castle and fortress of Seddel Bahr, pro- 
jecting boldly into the sea, guards the entrance to 
the strait, and, as already described, at the foot of 
its towers and curtain-walls are still heaped the huge 
round stones which the Turks once deemed sufficient 
to hurl at intruders beating up against the current. 
Behind the castle was huddled a grey stone village 
or small town, of the usual Turkish character, with 
narrow and winding alleys between secretive houses, 
and just beyond the point there projected a low reef 
of rocks round which the deep-blue water, hurrying 
out to the open sea, perpetually eddied. 

From the Seddel Bahr point the coast falls back 
a little into the shallow arc of a bay barely over a 
quarter of a mile long if one follows the sandy beach. 
Around the curve, the ground rises rather steeply, 
almost exactly in the form of a classic theatre, to 
which the beach would serve as orchestra and the 
sea as stage. This little bay, to be renowned as 
V Beach, ends on the western side in precipitous 
cliff's, round the foot of which it is possible to clamber 
over masses of fallen rocks, but no path leads. On 
the top of the cliff stood one of the most powerful 
of the entrance forts destroyed by the naval attack 
on February 19. The beach itself is narrow — about 


lo yards across — and was edged by a small but 
perpendicular bank, not over 4 or 5 feet in height. 
The slopes of the theatre were at that time covered 
with grass, to be changed later on for dust and heavy 
sand. The slope measures about 200 yards from 
beach to summit. Along the edge of the beach ran 
an entanglement of the peculiarly strong barbed wire 
used by the Turks ; a second entanglement ran round 
the curving slope two-thirds of the way up, and a 
third joined the two at right angles at the eastern 
end of the bay. The upper part of the semicircle 
was strongly entrenched and armed with pom-poms, 
while in the ruins of the old fortress, in the village, 
and in a shattered barrack on the top of the western 
summit, machine-guns and a multitude of snipers 
were concealed. Nature and man's invention had 
converted the little bay into a defensive engine of 
manifold destruction. 

At daybreak the Albion opened a heavy bombard- 
ment. There was no answer. The little semicircle 
remained still as an empty theatre, and sanguine 
spirits hoped that defence had been abandoned. 
Transhipping rapidly from a fleet-sweeper, three 
companies of the ist Dublin Fusiliers and a party 
of the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division, arranged 
themselves in six tows, each made up of a pinnace 
and four cutters, and carrying 125 men apiece. 
In line abreast the tows started for the shore over 
the glassy water, pale with morning. Except for 
the continuous crash of our bursting shells, not a 
sound came from the shore. On the right of the 
main party of tows loomed a large collier, called 
the River Clyde, but known to the classical as the 


"Trojan Horse," and to the unlearned as the "Dun 
Cow." She carried the ist Munster FusiHers, half 
the 2nd Hampshire Regiment, one company of the 
Dublin Fusiliers, and details of sappers, signallers, 
field ambulance, and an Anson beach-party. Com- 
mander Edward Unwin, R.N., was in charge of 
her, a man of eagle features and impetuous but 
noble personality, inclined to pour imprecations 
upon "the Army" while he assisted them with 
untiring ingenuity and a courage conspicuous even 
on that heroic day. His orders were to run his 
ship hard aground after the tows had landed their 
first party. A hopper alongside the collier was then 
to proceed under her own steam and momentum, 
towing a string of lighters so as to form a pontoon 
for the troops, who were to issue from square iron 
doors opening close up to the ship's bow on the port 
and starboard sides. Either the tows were delayed, 
or, with characteristic enthusiasm, Commander Unwin 
drove the collier too fast. For the tows and the 
ship touched ground almost at the same moment. 
The hopper ran forward with the lighters, which 
were secured after a short delay. The gangways 
dropped. Shoving each other eagerly forward, the 
Munster Fusiliers rushed from the opened ports. 

Hardly had the first man set foot on the gang- 
ways, when the invisible enemy broke the silence 
with an overwhelming outburst of rifle fire, pom-poms, 
and machine-guns. The Munster Fusiliers of the 
first company fell so thick that many were suffocated 
or crushed by the sheer weight of the dead dropping 
upon them. Few if any of those eager Irishmen 
struggled across the lighters to the beach unwounded. 


In the tows, the boats were riddled with holes, and 
the greater number destroyed. The Dublin Fusiliers 
and the crews supplied by the navy were shot down 
either in the boats or as they leapt into the shallow 
water and attempted to rush across the narrow beach. 
A few succeeded in reaching the low and perpen- 
dicular bank of sand, and lay under its uncertain 
cover, unable to show a head above the top without 
death. The Turks had carefully marked the ranges 
of every point along the shore with stakes, and they 
fired in security from dug-outs and deep trenches, 
against which no naval bombardment availed. 

Inspired by a courage which baffles reason with 
amazement (for what reasonable motive had these 
men — these Irishmen — to spring into the face of 
instant death?), the second company of Munster 
Fusiliers crowded upon the gangway, and rushed 
along- the lighters over the dead bodies of their 
friends. As they ran, the end of the pontoon nearest 
the shore was torn loose by the rip of the current, 
and drifted off into deep water. The men fell in 
masses, and many, either to escape the torrent of 
bullets or in passionate eagerness to reach the shore, 
attempted to swim to land, but were dragged down 
by the weight of their equipment, and lay visible 
upon the sand below. With unwavering decision, 
the sailors laboured to restore the pontoon. 
Commander Unwin ran down the gangway and, 
plunging into the sea, worked beside the men. 
Midshipman Malleson and Midshipman Drewry (in 
honour of whom the French afterwards named the 
jetty which they built on the spot) swam out, carrying 
ropes to and from the drifting lighters under the 


ceaseless splash of bullets and shells. The names of 
all these have become celebrated, and they won the 
most envied of all our country's distinctions, but it is 
almost invidious to select even such names as theirs 
among the men and boys of every rank, and of both 
services, whose self-devotion made that day and place 
so memorable.^ 

By such devoted efforts, a reserve lighter 
was brought into position, and the pontoon again 
completed. A third company of the Munster Fusiliers 
dashed along it, with similar heroism, towards the 
shore, suffering terrible loss from accurate and low- 
firing shrapnel, now added to the other missiles of 
death. The survivors joined the survivors under 
shelter of the low bank of sand. There was a brief 
pause in the attempt to land, but when it began 
again, the pontoon was again carried adrift by the 
current, bearing upon it a number of Hampshire men, 
together with Brigadier-General Napier, commanding 
the 88th Brigade, and his Brigade-Major, Captain 
Costeker. They lay down fiat upon the lighters, but 
nearly all were killed as they lay, including these two 
officers of distinguished military name. Connection 
with the shore was thus severed. Nearly all the 
boats in the tows had been destroyed, and some were 
idly drifting, manned only by the dead. The dead 
lay upon the lighters, and below the water, and 
awash upon the edge of the beach. The ripple of 
the tormented sea broke red against the sand. 

^ Besides the names here mentioned, Vice-Admiral de Robeck in his 
dispatch especially noticed Able Seaman William Williams (killed), 
Seaman George M'Kenzie Samson (dangerously wounded), Lieutenant 
John A. V. Morse, R.N., and Surgeon P. B. Kelly, R.N., as rendering 
great and perilous service at this landing. 


One of the tows had taken half a company of the 
DubHn Fusiliers to a point called the " Camber 
Beach," just north-east of the Seddel Bahr castle. 
Perhaps they were intended to threaten the enemy's 
position from his left flank by creeping round the 
castle and attacking the village streets. This they 
proceeded to do, and, as the Turks had not entrenched 
this position, the Irishmen with great skill crawled 
from cover to cover till they reached the village 
windmills and the entrance to the houses. There 
they were overwhelmed by the crowd of snipers. 
Many were killed, some cut off, only twenty-five 
returned. The wounded had to be left. It is said 
that they were slaughtered with great atrocity 
and the dead mutilated by order of the Germans. 
Throughout the whole of this campaign, few such 
charges were brought against the Turks themselves.^ 

Before noon, any further attempt to effect a 
landing was abandoned, and the main body of troops 
which was to have followed close upon the covering 
party was diverted to W Beach. The mixed 
survivors of Dublin and Munster Fusiliers, and of 
the Hampshire companies, remained crouching behind 
the low parapet of the bank, with no food or water 
beyond such small quantities as they had brought 
with them. There they lay, exposed to the full blaze 
of sun, and only just sheltered from the incessant rain 
of bullets and shells. But for some machine-guns 
mounted on the bows of the River Clyde and 
protected by sandbags, the Turks would have found 

^ For this incident and others at V Beach, see The Immortal 
Gainble, pp. 81-92, besides Sir Ian Hamilton's and Admiral de Robeck's 


little difficulty in exterminating their whole number. 
With them were two officers of the General Staff — 
Colonel Doughty-Wylie, our humane and gallant 
military consul at Konia during the Adana massacres 
in 1909, and Colonel W. de L. Williams (Hampshire 
Regiment), who did their utmost to hearten the men 
during the remaining hours of that terrible day and 
through the night. As the Turks had no big guns 
on the spot, and the fire of the Asiatic guns was to 
some extent checked by the fleet, the remainder of 
the party on board the River Clyde were comparatively 
secure. The heavy loss in officers included the 
General of the 88th Brigade, as we have seen, 
and Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding that 
brigade's Hampshire Regiment, both killed. During 
the afternoon and evening the naval boats were 
constantly engaged in removing the wounded from 
the River Clyde and other points where they could 
be reached. In this duty Commander Unwin again 
distinguished himself, going along the shore in a 
lifeboat and rescuing the wounded lying in shallow 
water, under persistent fire from the semicircular 
heights. Throughout the day and far into the 
moonlit night the Qtieen Elizabeth, Cornwallis, and 
Albion and other ships maintained a heavy bombard- 
ment, which restrained the furious Turkish attempts 
at counter-attack, and assisted the remainder of the 
covering party in landing from the River Clyde 
under the comparative darkness. But later in the 
night the noise of battle was renewed. The rattle of 
machine-guns and rifies spitting out flashes of fire, 
the vibrating boom of enormous guns, the whirling 
roar of shells, like trains rushing headlong down a 


tunnel to the crash of collision, allowed no rest to the 
wearied men. 

At V Beach, in spite of the incalculable courage 
and skill of the Irish Regulars and the sailors com- 
bined, the landing on the 25th had failed. At 
W Beach, not much more than half a mile north- 
west, over the cliff of Cape Helles where the light- 
house and Fort I had stood, the English covering 
party displayed equal heroism and gained greater 
success. W Beach is a shallower but lono^er arc of 
sandy shore, curving between Cape Helles and Cape 
Tekke, the two extreme points of the Peninsula. 
Between the two inaccessible cliffs and the fallen 
rocks which the sea washes, a gully has been cut by 
a short watercourse, draining the extremity of the 
high and slightly undulating plateau in which the 
Peninsula ends. Except after heavy rains, the gully 
is dry, but its occasional stream, working upon the 
sandstone formation, and aided by the north-east 
wind blowing dust over the plateau's surface, has 
piled up low heaps of sand dune, at that time covered 
with bent-grass, spring flowers, and the aromatic 
herbs which flourish upon the dry seacoasts of the 
Near East. Along its gentle curve the actual beach 
is rather more than a quarter of a mile in length, 
and its broadest part, where the gully runs out, is 
some 40 yards across. Hidden in the shallows a 
strong wire entanglement had been laid, and another 
protected the whole length of the beach from end to 
end at the water's edge. To check communication 
with V Beach, two redoubts had been constructed 
upon the plateau south-east, and from them thick 
entanglements ran down to the cliffs edge at Cape 


Helles. Other entanglements on the north-west cut 
off communication with the more distant X Beach. 
The top rows, as it were, of the theatre, broken near 
the centre of the gully, were strongly entrenched ; 
machine-guns, commanding the beach by converging 
fire, were lodged in caves upon the cliffs on both 
sides ; and the land and sea were planted with mines. 
In his dispatch, Sir Ian Hamilton justly says : 

" So strong, in fact, were the defences of 
W Beach that the Turks may well have considered 
them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that 
no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by 
the British soldier — or any other soldier — than the 
storming of these trenches from open boats." ^ 

These unsurpassed soldiers were men of the ist 
Lancashire Fusiliers (86th Brigade), and, in their 
honour, W Beach was afterwards generally known 
as " Lancashire Landing." The Euryalus was the 
guardian ship of this covering party, and after half 
an hour's naval bombardment, to which no answer 
came, eight picket boats in line abreast, towing four 
cutters apiece, steamed toward the shore till they 
reached the shallows, and the tows were cast off to 
row to land. As at V Beach, the Turks maintained 
their silence till the boats grated. Then, in an in- 
stant, a storm of lead and iron swept down upon 
the Lancashire men. Some leapt into the water, 
and were caught by the hidden entanglement there. 
The foremost hurled themselves ashore, and struggled 
with the terrible wire, compared with which our 
British barbed wire is as cotton to rope. In vain 
the first line hacked and tore. Machines and rifles 

^ Sir Ian Hamilton's first dispatch, "The Gallipoli Landing." 


mowed them flat as with a scythe. Witnesses eagerly 
watching from the distant ships asked each other, 
" What are they resting for ? " But they were dead. 

Fortunately two of the tows, carrying a company, 
with which was General S. W. Hare, CO. of this 
86th Brigade, put to shore a little to the left of the 
central beach, and found shelter under a ledge of 
rock at the foot of Cape Tekke cliff. Here they 
escaped the cross-fire, and were able partly to en- 
filade the enemy's trenches. The Brigadier-General 
was severely wounded, either at this time or a little 
later, but part of the company succeeded in scrambling 
up the rocks in front of them to the summit, and 
a party from three tows to the right of the beach 
were equally successful upon the Cape Helles side.^ 
Meanwhile the covering warships had moved close 
in to bombard the trenches along the edge of the 
summit, and the beach entanglements were at last 
broken. The companies, re-formed under cover of 
the cliffs on both sides of the beach, chiefly to the 
left, and supported by the arrival of further tows, 
began the assault on the highest point of the 
plateau above the bay (known as Hill 138, about 
the spot where the military cemetery was after- 
wards laid out). In the centre the assault was made 
with bayonets only, the rifles being clogged with 
sand. By 11.30 three trenches had been taken — 
in spite of the explosion of many land mines — the 
point was occupied, and communication established 

^ See Mr. Ashmead Bartlett's dispatches, " Seddel Balir Landing," 
p. 92. Mr. Bartlett was not present, being at the Anzac landing, and 
Sir lan's dispatch mentions only the company at the foot of Cape 
Tekke on the left. 


with the landing-party at X Beach, to be afterwards 

Similarly, a small party of Lancashire Fusiliers 
succeeded in scrambling to the summit on the right 
(Hill 141), above Cape Helles, but were there held 
up by the redoubts and entanglements, and there 
they lost Major Frankland, Brigade-Major of the 
86th. No further advance could be made till 
2 p.m., when, owing to the positions held by the 
companies on the left, the landing had become fairly 
secure. Colonel Woolly-Dod, of the Divisional 
General Staff, then took the place of General Hare 
in command, and the Worcester and Essex Regi- 

^ Excellent personal accounts of W Beach landing by three ist 
Lancashire officers are given in With the Twenty-ninth Division, 
pp. 57-63. It is hard to choose between the three ; but I give some 
sentences from Major Adams, who had been twenty-five years in the 
regiment, and was killed a few days later, as were the other two : " As 
the boats touched the shore a very heavy and brisk fire was poured 
into us, several officers and men being killed and wounded in the 
entanglements, through which we were trying to cut a way. Several 
of my company were with me under the wire, one of my subalterns was 
killed next to me, and also the wire-cutter who was lying the other side 
of me. I seized his cutter and cut a small lane myself, through which 
a few of us broke and lined up under the only available cover pro- 
curable — a small sand ridge covered with bluffs of grass. I then 
ordered fire to be opened on the crests ; but owing to submersion in 
the water and dragging rifles through the sand, the breech mechanism 
was clogged, thereby rendering the rifles ineffective. The only thing 
left to do was to fix bayonets and charge up the crests, which was done 
in a very gallant manner, though we suffered greatly in doing so. 
However, this had the effect of driving the enemy from his trenches, 
which we immediately occupied. ... In my company alone I had 
95 casualties out of 205 men." 

A still more detailed account of the Lancashire landing, specially 
describing the services of Major Frankland (killed while trying to take 
assistance to V Beach about 8.30 a.m.) and of Captains Willis, Shaw, 
Cunliffe, and Haworth, is given in an additional chapter by Major 
Farmar (Lancashire Fusiliers) at the end of the same book, pp. 175-191. 


ments (88th Brigade) were sent to reinforce the 
covering party. Following a heavy naval bombard- 
ment the Worcesters advanced, cut passages through 
the entanglements, and after two hours' contest 
captured the redoubt, though with heavy loss. 

An attempt was then made to relieve the terrible 
situation at V Beach by advancing along the top 
of the headland north-east. Lancashire and Royal 
Fusiliers from W and X Beaches came over in 
small parties to assist the Worcesters. The dis- 
tance to V Beach was not great — barely half a 
mile — and if it could have been covered, the enemy 
must have abandoned their V Beach trenches. Wire- 
cutters fearlessly advanced. From headquarters on 
the Queen Elizabeth they could be watched, clipping 
the powerful entanglements as though pruning a 
garden at home. But the rows of wire were too 
thick, the fire from the ruins of No. i Fort too 
deadly. Exhausted by a sleepless night and the 
hot day's fighting, these bravest of men abandoned 
the attempt, and sought rest in the trenches along 
the summit of the cliffs now deserted by the enemy. 
Violent counter-attacks were repeated through the 
night. Except the Anson Battalion beach-party 
and a company of sappers, there were no available 
reserves. But the lines defendingr W Beach were 
held, and the landing of stores, rations, and water 
in kerosine tins (for the Divisional supply of which 
General Hunter- Weston's Staff had provided) began 
without interruption. Part of the remainder of the 
division also disembarked, and the sappers set to 
work at constructing the road which afterwards wound 
up the dusty ascent from the beach to the plateau. 


If one could scramble round the foot of Cape 
Tekke till the face of the cliff looking westward 
towards the ^gean and Gulf of Xeros was reached, 
rather over half a mile along the sea-washed rocks, 
one would come to a narrow strip of sand about 
200 yards long. The cliff above it is lower and 
less steep, the surface soft and crumbling. This is 
X Beach, to be known afterwards as " Implacable 
Landing," owing to the fine service of the guardian 
battleship Implacable (15,000 tons, 1901 ; Captain 
Lockyer). Here half the battalion of the 2nd Royal 
Fusiliers was disembarked from the Implacable in 
four tows of six boats each, the battleship advancing 
in the centre of them with anchor hanging over the 
bows to six fathoms, when it dragged. Captain 
Lockyer opened fire upon the slope and summit of 
the cliffs at very short range with every available 
gun, and under this protection the half-battalion 
landed with small loss. Using the same tows 
as they returned empty, the second half-battalion 
followed from two mine-sweepers. But the advanced 
party were already swarming up the face of the cliffs 
under Lieut.-Colonel Newenham (CO. 2nd Royal 
Fusiliers). At the summit the fire from rifies, 
machine-guns, and shrapnel was very heavy. Se- 
curing his left with one company, and the front with 
part of another, and leaving one company to bring 
up ammunition and water. Colonel Newenham pro- 
ceeded to effect communication with the Lancashire 
Fusiliers on W Beach. This was accomplished by 
a violent bayonet attack up the height on the top 
of Cape Tekke (Hill 114). In this attack the re- 
mainder of the battalion was engaged, encouraged 


by cheers from the Implacable^ so close to shore had 
the ship put in. After heavy loss, the summit was 
taken about noon, and Royal Fusiliers shared with 
the W Beach troops in the endeavour to relieve 
\' Beach. But meantime the centre above X Beach 
was severely threatened ; Colonel Xewenham was 
wounded : and the situation was onh* saved by the 
arrival of the ist Borderers and the ist Inniskilling 
Fusiliers of the 8 7th Brigade, whose Brigadier, 
General Marshall, had also been w^ounded.^ 

Rather less than a mile farther up the coast from 
X Beach one comes to a wide opening in the cliffs, 
known at that time as Y2, and later as Gully Beach. 
Along the shore it could be reached by climbing 
over rocks, but there was then no path. Along the 
summit it was easily reached by the usual Turkish 
tracks from the high ground at Cape Helles and Cape 
Tekke. but these tracks, like the rest of the Peninsula 
inland, were hidden from the sea by the slope of the 
ground from the edge towards the centre. The 
opening is caused partly by a short gully running 
from the summit almost at right angles to the beach, 
but especially by a long, deep gully, or "canon," 
coming down from the Krithia direction, and running 
for about three miles almost parallel with the sea. 
from which its existence is entirely concealed. In 
dry weather it shows a trickle of .water in some 
places ; after rain it becomes the bed of a torrent 
or a channel of liquid mud. Owing to our want of 
trustworthy maps, its course was at that time un- 
known, but it came to be called the Gully Ravine, or 

* Beside Sir lan's dispatch, see Colonel Nevrenham's own account 
in With tJu Twenty-ninth Division^ pp. 55-57. 


the Gully simply (in Turkish, Saghir Dere). Its 
depth might conceal an army in ambush, and its issue 
upon the shore forms a broad, fiat beach, commanded 
by heights in a semicircle fronting the sea. Here the 
Turks had massed large forces of infantry, deeply 
entrenched, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss 
guns. Formidable as the position was, it could 
hardly have been stronger than V or W Beach, and 
one may conclude it was refused by the General in 
command mainly for want of men to storm another 
point at which the enemy would naturally expect 
attack. Perhaps also he considered the position not 
far enough removed from Helles to turn the defences 
there and threaten the line of retreat. 

About two miles farther up the coast there is 
another beach known to the end of the campaign as 
Y. The navy put it at 7000 yards from Cape Tekke. 
So small is it, and the cleft or dry waterfall which 
forms it so steep and narrow, that the Turks had 
neglected the position as unassailable. Nevertheless, 
lying south-west from Krithia village, and about four 
miles from Cape Helles, it was chosen as a protection 
to our left flank and a threat to the enemy's line 
of communication, or of retreat in the event of his 
withdrawal from the end of the Peninsula. It was 
intended to serve the same purpose as De Tott's 
Battery (Eski Hissarlik) upon our extreme right, and, 
if it were securely held, its value was obvious. 

The 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers and one 
company of the South Wales Borderers had been 
detailed for this service, but the Commander-in-Chief 
added the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, R.N.D., on 
account of the importance of the position, or because 


the landing-party was beyond reach of reinforcement. 
The Goliath^ Sapphire, and Amethyst were the con- 
ducting ships, and at the first Hght the troops were 
put ashore by trawlers with four tows. They had to 
leap out into deep water owing to reefs, but reached 
the shore without opposition, and at once climbed the 
precipitous watercourse and cliffs on each side. The 
battleship Goliath shelled the summit, perhaps un- 
fortunately, for the party's presence was thus disclosed. 
Turkish snipers immediately set to work, and the fire 
became more and more searching as the day went on. 
Still there was no organised attack, and the men dug 
shallow and far-extended trenches along the summit 
on both sides of the deep ravine, the Marine Battalion 
on the left, the K.O.S.B. in the centre, the S.W. 
Borderers on the right. Colonel Matthews of the 
Plymouth Battalion was in command throughout, but 
his second in command. Colonel Koe (K.O.S.B.), was 
mortally wounded early in the day. It was impossible 
to fulfil Staff orders by gaining touch with X Beach, 
because communication was shut off by the powerful 
Turkish force at Y2 — a misfortune which might have 
been foreseen. During the afternoon, the sniping 
developed into assault. Turks were seen swarming 
out from Krithia, and others probably came up from 
Y2 along the Gully Ravine (Saghir Dere), which at 
this point is only a short distance away, and was 
hitherto unknown to our men. 

At twilight the repeated assaults increased in 
violence. Under the rising moon, line after line of 
Turks advanced, at some points reaching the trenches 
before they were cut down. Sir Ian mentions 
a pony led right through the trenches with a 


machine-gun on his back, and an eye-witness saw a 
German officer killed by a blow from a shovel as, 
with grenade in hand, he called upon a trench to 
surrender. All night the savage conflict continued, 
the Turks charging with religious courage, our men 
driving them back with the bayonet when the rifles 
became foul and choked with dirt. But just before 
daylight the shrapnel terrifically increased, the Turks 
swarmed round in irresistible crowds, the centre of 
the K.O.S.B. trenches was rushed, and the men 
driven headlong down the gorge. Only those who 
know the nature of the ground, the cliffs some 200 
feet high, and the depth of the ravine, half hidden by 
thick and prickly scrub, can realise the horror of that 
scene, or the superb devotion of those who still 
remained to hold the summit while the wounded were 
being carried on waterproof sheets (without stretchers) 
down to the beach. More than half the officers and 
nearly half the men were killed or wounded. By 
morning it had become impossible to cling any longer 
to the position. Protected by a small and heroic 
rearguard, and by the heavy fire of the ships Goliath, 
Talbot, Dublin, Sapphire, and Amethyst, the wounded, 
the stores, and the survivors of the two battalions and 
the S.W. Borderers ; company were taken off by the 
boats and returned in the early afternoon on the war- 
ships to the southern end of the Peninsula. In spite 
of the heroism displayed, and in spite of the service 
in holding up a large Turkish force for the critical 
twenty-four hours, the effort at Y Beach failed, and 
the failure was serious. 

About nine miles from Y Beach farther north 
along the coast, the snub-nosed promontory of Gaba 


Tepe suddenly projects. It is of no great height — 
just under loo feet — but deep water washes the foot 
of the steep and rugged cliffs, its caves and artificial 
tunnels concealed guns which no shell could touch, 
and from those caves and tunnels nearly the whole 
coast north and south could be enfiladed. North, the 
coast falls into an open, gently sloping shore of quiet 
meadows and scattered olive groves, crossed by a 
track to the Old Village (Eski Keui) in the centre of 
the Peninsula, and so to Maidos on the strait. Next 
to Bulair, this is the shortest way over, for it 
measures less than five miles in a straight line. But 
on the right stands the threatening plateau of Kilid 
Bahr, strongly held, and forming a central base for 
the enemy's army, and on the left rise the heights of 
Sari Bair, intersected by inextricable entanglements 
of gully and ravine. At the northern end of that 
gentle slope, rising like the fields around a Lowland 
loch, just where the cliffs begin again, the main land- 
ing of the Anzac corps was intended. Remembering 
the V and W Beaches, no one can call any position 
impregnable to such men as ours ; but the spot was 
thickly wired from the water's edge ; it was fully 
exposed to the guns hidden on Gaba Tepe, in an 
olive grove farther inland, and on Kilid Bahr plateau 
itself; to advance over the gradual slope would have 
meant advancing up an unsheltered glacis crossed 
by almost impenetrable obstacles, in the face of 
entrenched and invisible machine-guns and rifles. It 
was fortunate that man's proposals here went astray. 

The object of the Anzac landing was to detain the 
Turkish forces on Kilid Bahr plateau, to check the 
reinforcement of the southern Peninsula by them or 


by other troops from the Bulair district, and to 
threaten the Turkish Hne of retreat. The enemy's 
forces in these central regions were vaguely estimated at 
about 20,000 ; but reconnaissance had been impossible, 
the country was unknown, except in so far as it can 
be surveyed from the sea, and hitherto the Staff had 
no maps even fairly trustworthy, as the maps after- 
wards found on the bodies of Turkish officers were. 
The landing was officially called Z Beach, but was 
always known as " Anzac," and so history will know it. 
As already stated, the covering force consisted of the 3rd 
Australian Brig-ade under Colonel Sinclair Maclaoran. 
It was conveyed in four transports, but the first 
landing-party (about 1500 men) had been transferred 
at Mudros to the warships Q^ieen (Admiral Thursby's 
flagship), the London, and the Prince of Wales. 
Twelve tows were provided, each consisting of a 
steam pinnace and a trail of four cutters or "life- 
boats," and carrying about 125 men,^ As soon as 
the first party had started in the tows, the remainder 
of the covering party was to tranship from the trans- 
ports into eight destroyers, and to follow slowly 
towards shore until taken off by the returning tows, 
three tows being allotted to each pair of destroyers. 
When the coverings brig"ade had made sure of the 
landing, the transports of the whole army corps were 
to close in to shore and disembark. The Triumph, the 
Majestic, and the cruiser Bacchante were to cover the 
landing by gun-fire. As throughout the expedition, 
the entire organisation on the water was directed by 
the navy, and the boats were commanded by boy 

^ Authorities differ widely as to the number of boats to each tow, 
but four appears to be right, though six was more usual. 


midshipmen, whose imperturbable calm in moments 
of extreme peril was, from beginning to end, and at 
every crisis, only rivalled by the dogged heroism of 
their crews. 

The whole force assembled at a point about half- 
way between Imbros and the intended landing. It 
was 1.30 a.m. of the 25th. The smoke rising against 
the westering moon probably betrayed their presence, 
but they waited till the moon set behind the jagged 
mountains of Imbros soon after three. As directed, 
the first tows were then manned, and the three war- 
ships moved abreast slowly towards the shore, 
followed by the trailing boats. At 4.10 a.m. they 
stopped, within about one and a quarter mile of shore, 
and the tows moved slowly forward, the destroyers 
following them at about half an hour's interval. 
Probably it was in that interval that the salutary 
mistake occurred. Whether misled by ignorance of 
the coast and by the starlit darkness, or carried 
unconsciously by a current which sets along shore 
towards the Gulf of Xeros, the tows approached land 
rather more than a mile north of the appointed land- 
ing. The beach to which they made is a shallow 
arc of sand stretching for about half a mile between 
two small projections in the coast-line — Ari Burnu 
to the north, and what the Australians called Hell 
Spit to the south. One deep ravine, starting from 
an almost precipitous cliff (to be known as *' Plugge's 
Plateau") divides the arc near the northern extremity 
at right angles to the shore ; but confusedly broken 
and steep, though not absolutely precipitous, ground 
rises all around the cove — " Anzac Cove " — to a 
general height of over 200 feet. Wherever the 




3^x >^ ' 





Baby JOO 


^J^ Bloody An^k 

^^ ^Qcunai Poit 
^^Ojus<j\£ys Past 
^SUela Post 



Boituns Hili 

IGaha. lipc 

Araac positwns Soon. oAcr 
Landma are 

Scale oj yards 


To face p. 112 


ground — a mixture of soft sandstone and marl — was 
not too steep for vegetation, it was then covered 
with thick green or blackish scrub, chiefly prickly oak, 
difficult to penetrate, and in places six feet high. In 
later months the scrub served as a danger signal, for 
the spots where it remained were exposed to rifle or 
shell-fire. Everywhere else it disappeared, leaving 
the yellow surface bare. 

The tows approached the beach in absolute 
silence. Trusting to the cliffs, the Turks had 
neglected defence at this point, but for two slight 
trenches — one close to the water's edge, the second 
a little up the height. Even these seem to have been 
left unmanned, for about a battalion of Turks was 
dimly perceived running along the shore, no doubt 
hurried up from the open ground where our landing 
had been intended. Just before 5 a.m. they opened 
fire, and many of the soldiers and crews were struck 
in the boats. The Australians made no answer, but 
before the keels grated, leapt into water up to their 
chests, and surged ashore. Throwing off their packs, 
they dashed straight with the bayonet upon the enemy 
wherever they could see him. The two trenches 
were carried with a rush, and still the men charged 
on. They began to struggle up the gully and the 
steep ascent on its right (afterwards called Maclagan's 
Ridge). The tows returned for the remainder of the 
brigade on the destroyers, and these men joined in the 
rush and scramble. Some of the tows crossed each 
other, and added to the excited confusion. Some, 
either for want of space or yielding to the current, 
passed north of Ari Burnu and attempted a landing 
on the broad and open beach beside fishermen's 


huts, standing almost in front of the perpendicular 
and strangely shaped cliff afterwards called "The 
Sphinx." Here they suffered terrible loss from rifles 
and machine-guns ; for this beach, gradually broaden- 
ing out till it merges into the open, marshy plain 
at the mouth of Anafarta Biyuk valley, extends 
to Suvla and the Salt Lake, and the Turks were 
here prepared to oppose a landing, A few of the 
boats went adrift, having no men left to control them. 
One at least swayed with the current, full of dead. 
Several had to be left for some days aground against 
the beach, full also of dead. 

Crossing the top of Maclagan's Ridge, the scattered 
groups of the 3rd Brigade suddenly looked down 
into a deep valley running right across their advance. 
It was the hidden valley afterwards known as 
Shrapnel Gully. From its issue upon the beach just 
south of Hell Spit, it runs up north-east for some- 
thing over a mile through the very heart of the 
subsequent position. Many gullies and small water- 
courses (all dry except after heavy rain) lead into it, 
and it afterwards became the chief means of com- 
munication with the outposts along the centre of the 
Anzac lines. Down into this valley the 3rd Brigade 
plunged. The thick bushes and devious watercourses 
split them up. Battalions and companies lost touch 
in haphazard advance. Shrapnel from the opposite 
height and both flanks swept the valley in bursting 
storms. From the rear and every side, hidden 
snipers picked the isolated men off" as they struggled 
forward. Officers fell. Orders ceased. In separate 
knots, without leading or control, the men ran, and 
leapt, and stumbled on. Right across the valley they 


struggled, shouting their battle-song, " Australia will 
be there," bayoneting all Turks they caught, and 
cursing as they fell. Up the opposing heights they 
climbed — heights so steep on the face that, later in 
the campaign, steps had to be cut for paths, and 
supplies were hauled up by pullies. Over the top of 
that steep ridge the groups charged on. Many got 
farther than Anzacs were ever to go again. Some 
looked down into the valleys where the nearest 
Turkish camps of Koja Dere and Boghali stood. 
Many disappeared for ever into the unknown 
wilderness. " They refused to surrender," the Turks 
said at the armistice of a month later — "they refused 
to surrender, so we had to kill them all." 

In a contest of such confusion, the thought of time 
is lost, and it becomes impossible to trace the course 
of consecutive events. But early in the morning — 
some say at 5.30, others about 9.30 — there was a 
pause in the firing for about an hour. The Turks 
appear to have been overwhelmed by the dash and 
violence of an assault such as that leisurely and 
dreamy race had never imagined. It seems to have 
been about this time that Major Brand (Brigade- 
Major of the 3rd Brigade) with a party of the 9th 
(Queensland) and loth (South Australian) battalions, 
standing on one of the sharp crests, and seeing a 
redoubt and earthworks upon a hillside below, 
charged down the valley and captured a battery of 
three Krupp guns. The Turks, after the pause, were 
then advancing to their first counter-attack, and the 
Australians were compelled to spike and destroy the 
guns instead of getting them away. But it was a 
serviceable deed. 


So soon as it was light, the guns hidden on Gaba 
Tepe and hidden guns on some hill to the north 
poured converging shrapnel upon the boats coming 
to shore, and upon the beach itself, although it was 
to some extent protected by Hell Spit and Ari Burnu. 
The Triumph and Bacchaitte succeeded in keeping 
down the fire from Gaba Tepe at intervals, but it 
repeatedly burst out again with fury. Under this 
recurrent storm of shell, the ist (New South Wales) 
and the 2nd (Victoria) Brigades, closely followed by 
two brigades of the New Zealand and Australian 
Division (the New Zealand and the 4th Australian), 
put to shore. All had landed soon after midday, and 
two batteries of Indian mountain guns came into 
action. But the losses were severe, and the shelling 
so heavy that the remaining artillery could not be 
landed. In the extremity of peril and excitement, 
battalions and brigades became hopelessly mixed up, 
and many groups lost touch with units and officers. 
But for the most part, the 2nd Brigade appears to 
have climbed to the right of the 3rd or covering 
brigade, to have crossed the long (Shrapnel) gully 
nearer its mouth, and to have advanced up the con- 
tinuation of the farther ridge towards the point 
afterwards called M'Laurin Hill (Colonel M'Laurin 
being CO. of the Victorians). The ist Brigade 
appears to have supported the 3rd, and held a position 
on its left, probably near " Pope's Hill." The ex- 
treme left of the whole position, which gradually took 
the shape of an irregular semicircle or triangle, was 
later occupied and held by the joint Division of 
New Zealanders and Australians. Near the centre 
the Auckland Battalion under Colonel Plugge held 


" Plugge's Plateau," overlooking the beach. To the 
left, the New Zealanders stormed the steep ridge 
afterwards known as " Walker's," from Brigadier- 
General H. B. Walker, of the General Staff. Just 
beyond " The Sphinx " it rises steeply from the beach 
to a height which faces the sea in a sheer precipice of 
150 feet, and its long summit became the main line 
of defence on the north and north-east. Moving still 
farther left, over a broad beach ("Ocean Beach") 
and fairly open ground, afterwards crossed by the 
"Great Sap," Captain Cribb with a party of New 
Zealanders rushed a strong redoubt and store at the 
"Fishermen's Huts" and established the outlying 
position of " No. i Post." 

In the afternoon and early evening, the 4th 
Australian Brigade (2nd Division) under Colonel 
Monash, apparently advancing from the beach straight 
across the central ridge, filled in the dangerous gaps 
between the Australian brigades on the right and 
the New Zealanders on the left. The upper end of 
"Shrapnel Gully," leading up to "Pope's Hill" 
between " Walker's Ridge " and the steep farthest 
line of defence afterwards held by " Quinn's Post," 
"Courtney's" and "Steel's," was accordingly known 
as " Monash Gully." 

By the evening the Anzac position, which varied 
little for the next three months, was thus roughly 
drawn, and the names of the officers who had seized 
the various points were vaguely attached to them. 
The whole position was hardly more than three- 
quarters of a mile deep by a mile and a half long, not 
counting the outpost by Fishermen's Huts. In fact, 
on the first day hardly more than a mile in length 


was gained. But to the end it was almost impossible 
to realise how small the area was, so steep are its 
heights and so entangling its valleys and ravines. 
Entangled in those ravines, exhausted by scaling the 
heights, and lost in the deep scrub of that unknown 
country, the Anzacs fought till dark to maintain their 
plot of ground against repeated counter-attacks. 
There was no time to dig in. From Koja Dere, 
Boghali, and Kilid Bahr plateau, the Turks rolled up 
waves of reinforcement. It was estimated that 20,000 
came clashing against the 3rd Brigade and the left 
of the 2nd in the middle morning. The attack 
was renewed at 3 p.m. and again at 5. Groups of 
Australians were driven back from the most advanced 
positions ; many were cut off and shot down. Only 
along the edge of the heights beyond Shrapnel Valley 
a thin line held, growing hourly thinner. 

In the afternoon. General Birdwood came ashore 
with the Divisional Generals. The beach was a 
scene of wild and perilous confusion. Men, stores, 
ammunition, and watercans were being dumped on 
the sand as the boats brought them in. Parties 
loaded up with rations, water, and cartridges were 
climbing out to supply the firing lines. In long 
streams the wounded were staaorerinCT or beinCT carried 

000 o 

down to lie on the beach till boats could take them 
off, at first to hospital ships, and afterwards to any 
kind of ship which the navy could allot. For here, 
as elsewhere, the casualties had been greatly under- 
estimated. Originally only two hospital ships had 
been provided for the whole attack, and though the 
navy lent two more, the supply was not nearly ade- 
quate. On the small beach, Colonel N. R. Howse 


(Assistant Director of Medical Service to the Corps) 
hurriedly erected a dressing-station ; but the wounded, 
however heroic in their suffering, suffered much. 
And over the whole scene, shrapnel crashed and 
shrieked perpetually, while the air was filled with the 
tearing wail of bullets passing in thousands across the 
beach from the cliffs above, and dropping like hail- 
stones upon the boats and sea. At nightfall the 
Turks, shouting their batde-cry of " Allah, Allah 
Din ! " renewed the attack with intensified violence. 
Appeals for reinforcement came pouring in. It 
seemed impossible to hold on. Orders to prepare for 
evacuation were whispered from group to group. ^ 

Still farther up the coast, at the head of the Gulf 
of Xeros, the Royal Naval Division (less the Ply- 
mouth Battalion detailed for Y Beach) was engaged 
upon a feint, as though a landing were intended 
either north of the Bulair lines, or at Karachali on 
the opposite coast. Accompanied by destroyers and 
the battleship Canopus (Captain Grant) of Admiral 
Thursby's squadron, the division proceeded in its 
own transports. The destroyers opened fire at 
Karachali and other points along the shore. Towards 
nightfall the Canoptis bombarded the Bulair lines, and 
preparations as though for a landing were ostensibly 
made. There was no answer from the enemy, but 

^ During the Anzac landing, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett was in the 
London, and his account was unusually brilliant, even for that brilliant 
writer. Besides that and Sirlan's dispatch, the best published account 
is in Australia in Arms, pp. 94-114. Mr. Schuler was not present, but 
he had the advantage of going over the ground and discussing the 
action thoroughly. I had the same advantages, especially owing to 
the generous assistance of the Anzac correspondents. Captain Bean and 
Mr, Malcolm Ross. 


silence never proved that their trenches were not 
manned, and their guns ready. Later in the campaign 
one heard rumours of a landing having been effected 
here without opposition by a party of Marines, but 
the only man who went ashore was Lieut. -Commander 
Bernard Freyberg of the Hood Battalion. Painted 
brown and thickly oiled, he was dropped from a 
destroyer into a boat at lo p.m. on the 24th and from 
the boat swam ashore, about two miles, carrying four 
Homi flares and three oil flares. Landing at mid- 
night, he crawled 400 yards up to a trench, and there 
heard talking, which proved that the trenches were 
occupied. Crawling back, he lit three lots of flares a 
quarter of a mile apart, along the shore in the direction 
of Bulair. Two of the destroyers at once opened fire, 
and the Turks fired back. Lieut.-Commander Frey- 
berg then swam out, and was picked up an hour later. 

During the night the Canopus was recalled to 
Anzac to support the dubious contest there. 

Another feint, on a much larger scale, was made 
by the French Division upon the Asiatic entrance to 
the Straits. The object was partly to hold a Turkish 
force, partly to check the fire from the Asiatic side 
upon the S and V landings. For this purpose, 
General D'Amade selected the 6th Regiment (Lieut.- 
Colonel Nogues), mixed Senegalese and Lyons men, 
of the Brigade Coloniale, supported by the Jeanne 
d' Arc and the Russian cruiser Askold (called the 
" Woodbines," because she has five thin funnels close 
together, like the five cigarettes in a penny " Wood- 
bine " packet). At the same time, the remainder of 
the French squadron was ordered to Besika Bay, five 
or six miles south of the point. Landing from the 


boats of their own transports, the infantry captured 
Kum Kali and Yenishehr villages after severe fiohtinof, 
taking about 600 prisoners. I n spite of violent counter- 
attacks, they held on through that night and the 
following day, not advancing farther along the coast 
than the mouth of the Mendere, but drawing the fire 
of the Asiatic guns, and thus defending both our 
transports and landings. The action was in every 
respect successful, but the regiment was re-embarked 
after nightfall on the 26th in accordance with pre- 
arranged plans, since Lord Kitchener had forbidden 
Asiatic adventures. The French lost 167 killed, 
459 wounded, and 116 missing. They put the 
Turkish casualties at 2000, apart from prisoners.-^ 

When night came, the small force at De Tott's 
Battery (E ski Hissarlik) was fairly secure ; the land- 
ing at V Beach had failed, and the few survivors 
ashore were barely sheltered from extreme peril by 
the low bank of sand ; W Beach was held, but the 
partially entrenched troops on the plateau which pro- 
tected it were exposed to repeated attack ; X Beach 
was comparatively safe, owing to dead ground and 
the Implacable s guns, and connection with W had 
been established ; in shallow trenches above the 
ravine on Y Beach the diminishing companies des- 
perately clung to the ground, but were exposed to 
irresistible numbers ; at Z Beach (Anzac) the cove 
and a rough triangle of unexplored cliffs and ravines 
were barely held against persistent onsets ; near 
Bulair the feint was probably successful in holding a 
certain number of Turkish troops, and Captain Frey- 

^ Uncensored Letter from the Dardanelles, by a French Medical 
Officer, pp. 44-74. 


berg was lighting his flares, a daring and lonely 
figure ; at Kum Kali the French were fulfilling their 
task, but under orders to withdraw. Of the three 
Brigadier-Generals in the 29th Division, one had 
been killed and the other two wounded. Upon those 
scenes of anguish and death, of scarcely endurable 
anxiety and a self-devotion unsurpassed in any 
annals, the Sabbath evening closed, but scarcely for 
one moment did the tumult of battle cease. 


THROUGHOUT the long and anxious hours 
of the 25th, while the fate of his army hung 
uncertain, the Commander-in-Chief was 
compelled to remain on board the Queen Elizabeth 
with his Headquarter Staff. There was no place for 
him ashore. In modern warfare a commanding 
General cannot allow himself to become entangled in 
one part of the widely-extended front or in another. 
When once his dispositions have been made and his 
orders issued, the control passes out of his hands ; and 
the more complete his dispositions and orders have 
been, the less is the part he is justified in taking upon 
himself. He can but await the result, listening 
anxiously to reports as they come. The wretched- 
ness of such a position, for a soldier born to lead 
forlorn hopes or to command the rush of onset, was 
here increased by the sea. At no point was it pos- 
sible even to remain on land without losing touch 
with all the other points. Only at sea could com- 
munication be maintained and reports delivered. 
The Commander-in-Chief was reduced to a position 
of inactive but resdess security, all the more pitiable 
because, from the shelter of the great battleship, 
telescopes revealed incidents of heroic resolution in 
which it was impossible to share. 


The day passed. In the evening the Queen 
Elizabeth flung a violent bombardment upon the de- 
fences of V Beach, bringing renewed courage to the 
line of survivors still crouching under the bank. At 
midnight, Sir Ian was called upon to take a decision 
as rapid as vital. It has been already mentioned 
that rumours of evacuation went round Anzac cove 
at sunset. The men were much exhausted by pro- 
longed fighting, extreme danger, and heavy loss ; the 
battalions were mixed ; ammunition was running 
short ; water, though brought ashore in boats, and 
already found by digging in one or two places, was 
scarce, and had to be carried up the cliffs on men's 
backs ; the wounded — over 2000 in number — though 
energetically tended, as already mentioned, and 
taken off rapidly to any available ship, still lay 
thick on the beach, or came dribbling back from 
the heights ; along the bit of coast, over sea and 
shore, the shrapnel crashed and whirled perpetually ; 
brave as the Anzacs had proved themselves, they 
were new to battle. If evacuation was unavoidable, 
now, at night, was the only possible time. 

Sir lan's decision was unhesitating. The Turks 
were actually pressing upon the Anzac lines. Evacu- 
ation could not remain secret, and would take many 
hours. It would involve incalculable slauohter on 
the shore and in the boats. It meant defeat. It 
meant withdrawal such as Lord Kitchener had speci- 
ally ordered him never to consider. It meant a breach 
in any high-spirited soldier's instinct. The command 
was quick. Let them dig for their lives. Let them 
cling on like tigers. Help would come in the morning. 

And in the morning help came. Just after day- 


light the Queen Elizabeth herself appeared off Anzac 
cove. For three hours she threw her huge shrapnel 
from 15-in. guns, each shell flinging out a cone of 
some 13,000 bullets far to both sides and front.^ The 
Triumph and Bacchante supported her. The Anzacs, 
outworn by the night struggle against repeated 
charges, stood their ground with courage renewed. 
Along the very edge of the steep cliff or ridge on the 
farther side of Shrapnel Gully they furiously dug. 
Battalions and brigades remained still confused. 
Men and groups fought or dug where they were 
wanted at the nearest line. By extreme effort thus 
was gradually formed . that famous arc, or more pro- 
perly triangle, which contained the Anzac of the next 
three months. It had the beach as base, Pope's Hill 
near the apex (where a dangerous gap remained), 
Walker's Ridge as one irregular side, and the long 
and devious line through Quinn's Post, M'Laurin's 
Hill, and Bolton's Hill to the coast as the other side, 
more irregular still. 

The trenches began to afford some cover from 
shrapnel. A few i8-pounder guns were dragged up 
hastily constructed paths, and placed right in the 
firing line. But so continuous were the Turkish 
counter-attacks throughout the whole of Monday and 
the greater part of Tuesday the 27th that little 
attempt at reorganising the brigades was possible, 
the only recognisable distribution being that as a 
whole the Australians held the right side of the tri- 
angle, and the New Zealanders the left. Even within 
our lines many Turkish snipers continued for some 
days hidden in the scrub, maintained there by bags of 

^ The Immortal Gamble, p. 147. 


provisions and cartridges brought with them to the 
lairs. The main or Shrapnel Gully was especially 
exposed to snipers of this kind and to more regular 
fire from the Nek, a narrow connecting link between 
the chief Anzac ridges and the main range of Sari 
Bair. To the last the southern end of the gully on 
its right side was so harassed by rifle fire that it 
retained its thick coating of scrub, as being too 
dangerous for dug-outs or any movement of men. 
For this reason the gully was sometimes called by 
the longer name of the Valley of the Shadow of 
Death, and it appears to have been while recon- 
noitring here that Colonel M'Laurin, Brigadier of the 
ist Brigade, and Major Irvine, his Brigade- Major, 
were killed side by side.^ 

The more regular attacks were chiefly aimed at 
the apex, near the top of the gully, between Pope's 
Hill and Ouinn's Post. The dominating position of 
Pope's Hill had been stormed early on Sunday by a 
party of the ist Battalion, and was taken over that 
evening by Colonel Pope with a mixed force of 400 
men, who proceeded to entrench it as the valuable 
fortress which it remained. Quinn's Post, always a 
point of danger, being within a few yards of the 
enemy's line, was gallantly held for the first three 
days by a party of the 14th Battalion, and on 
Wednesday (28th) was taken over by Major Quinn 
(15th Battalion).^ 

On Wednesday (April 28) the general reorganisa- 

^ Australia in Arms, p. 122. 

^ Having held it with skill and resolution for a month, Major Quinn 
was himself killed there in a furious attempt which the Turks made to 
mine and break through the position (May 29). 


tion and sifting out of Anzac could begin, but no 
attempt to reach the objective of Koja Chemen 
Tepe (Hill 971, the highest point of the Sari Bair 
range) or to cross the Peninsula to Maidos could then 
be made. In the fighting of Sunday and Monday- 
alone, the three Australian brigades had lost 4500 
killed and wounded. By Wednesday, at least one- 
fifth of the total force was out of action. Fortunately 
for General Birdwood, the Anzacs could fill up many 
gaps by the ten per cent, margin usually allotted to 
divisions on active service, but refused to Sir lan's 
troops from home. Hardly any amount of untried 
formations can reinforce an army in action so service- 
ably as drafts added to divisions which have proved 
their quality on the field, as the 29th had proved 

By early afternoon of Monday the 26th, the posi- 
tion at the south end of the Peninsula had greatly 
improved. After dark on the previous evening, the 
remainder of the landing force on V Beach had come 
ashore, as already narrated, and though exposed to 
a violent outbreak of fire under the clear moonlight 
about 1,30 a,m,, they had found better cover among 
the rocks at the foot of old Seddel Bahr castle. At 
daylight. Admiral Wemyss opened a heavy bombard- 
ment upon the castle, village, and slopes of the semi- 
circular theatre. Thus encouraged, the wearied relics 
of the Hampshires and Dublin and Munster Fusiliers 
prepared for advance. To such an advance they 
were largely inspired by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty- 
Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams of the 
Headquarter Staff, who, as narrated, had remained 
under the parapet of sand all night to keep the men 


in good heart. Only magic personality can organise 
a fresh assault out of hungry and thirsty men, who 
have for the most part been lying under almost con- 
tinuous fire for twenty-four hours, and who leave 
more than half of their friends lying dead or wounded 
behind them. Yet it was done. Led by Doughty- 
Wylie and Captain Walford (Brigade-Major, 29th 
Divisional Artillery), the men fought their way up 
into the village under a stream of rifle and machine- 
gun fire, and from the village advanced to the attack 
of the plateau above it. On the slope Captain 
Walford was killed. Between the village and the 
summit, fearlessly leading the men forward, Doughty- 
Wylie, a noble type of English soldier and adminis- 
trator, was killed in like manner.^ Irreparable as 
was the loss of that knightly figure, the attack pushed 
onward. By 2 p.m. Hill 141, the old castle, and the 
battered village were securely gained. On the south- 
west side of the theatre, connection with W Beach 

^ From an account privately written by a friend who knew Doughty- 
Wylie intimately, I may quote the following sentences : " As the 
result of many wounds, he had suffered in health and had transferred 
from the army to the Consular Service, and had spent some years in 
Asia Minor. I arrived in Adana after the massacres in 1909, just before 
he left for Abyssinia, and stayed at the Consulate, learning much from 
him about those terrible days of the preceding April. My memories are 
permeated with a sense of his oneness with all the warring sects in that 
fanatical province. He was the emblem of what they needed ; unity — 
greatness of heart and mind — an entire absence of self-seeking or 
pride. . . . An Armenian girl described the scene to me : ' We were all 
in a church, hundreds of us huddled together, and the Turks set light 
to it. But he came, the Consul Anglais. He forced his way through 
the mob, and we saw his face. " Come, my children," he called to us, 
and we followed him out. Like frightened sheep we were, but he calmed 
us and led us to safety.' . . . ' The oppressor is often in the right, and the 
oppressed always,' he used playfully to quote to me." A permanent 
monument to Doughty- Wylie and Walford was erected in Seddel Bahr. 




was confirmed, and V Beach became a fairly safe 
landing-place at last. 

That evening and next day the French Corps 
began to disembark upon that scene of death and 
persistent courage. To the end of the campaign, V 
Beach remained the French landing-place and depot 
for stores. The French constructed a solid pier out 
to the bow of the River Clyde, and kept also a gang- 
way of lighters for approach to the floating platforms 
under shelter of her port side. A British naval and a 
military officer remained on board to direct the land- 
ing of troops or stores and the embarkation of the 
wounded. The ship's bridge was fortified with sand- 
bags, and as forming a north-east breakwater to the 
small harbour the old collier performed useful service. 
Though fully exposed to the Asiatic guns, she was 
rarely shelled, perhaps because her funnel served as a 
guide to the gunners for dropping over the headland 
heavy shells which burst upon W Beach. This they 
sometimes did with deadly success. The remainder 
of V Beach and the sandy theatre above it the 
French organised with characteristic exactness and 
practical skill. Stores were arranged in faultless 
piles, and a light railway for bringing up stone was 
laid along the shore to the cliff of Cape Helles. 
The old castle served as a depot for ammunition. 
Compressed forage was piled up to limit the effect 
of shell-fire. In everything except " sanitation " the 
arrangement of the French lines surpassed ours. 
They were forbidden to our officers and men, but 
between adjacent battalions friendly communication 
was frequent, and by simple barter our tedious 
ration of apricot jam was frequently exchanged for 


the French ration of a light red wine, though these 
articles of exchange were received with scornful hilarity 
by each side. 

On the 27th, two days after the landing, the whole 
line was able to advance without opposition so as to 
cover all the landing beaches except Y, which had so 
unfortunately been abandoned under extreme pressure 
of numbers. The strong Turkish position at the 
mouth of the Gully Ravine (" Gully Beach," or " Y2 ") 
was found deserted. The Turks had withdrawn 
farther up the ravine, their flanks being now exposed 
to an advance of the Royal Fusiliers from X or " Im- 
placable Landing." At Gully Beach the left or western 
end of our line was accordingly fixed, and the line 
extended for about three miles to the right, across the 
Peninsula to the point S, or Eski Hissarlik. This 
point was soon afterwards taken over by the French, 
who now put four battalions on their front. The 
expansion of ground left room for a landing of 
stores and guns upon the beaches, and also slightly 
increased the water supply, a few old wells being 
discovered within the area, and new wells dug. But, 
owing to the heavy losses, the men holding the front 
made but a thin line of defence, and the want of 
water, here as at all points throughout the campaign, 
remained a perpetual anxiety. 

Worn out as his men were by Wednesday (the 
28th) morning, almost deprived of sleep since the 
Saturday before, reduced by heavy loss, especially 
in officers, and calling in vain for reinforcements to 
fill up their ranks. Sir Ian resolved to press forward 
upon the Turks while they were still disorganised. 
At 8 a.m. a general advance was ordered, the 29th 


Division moving forward on the left and centre, with 
the deserted village of Krithia as objective, the 
French on the right aiming to reach the western 
or right slope of Kereves Dere, a broad and deep 
valley which runs down from the foot of Achi Baba 
and issues into the strait about a mile above De 
Tott's Battery (Eski Hissarlik). Next to Seddel 
Bahr, the village of Krithia was the largest collection 
of houses upon the end of the Peninsula. It stands 
on the gradual slope leading up to Achi Baba, about 
four and a half miles from Cape Helles, whence its 
grey walls and squat windmills are distinctly visible. 
The land between the high plateau at Helles and the 
approaches to Achi Baba falls from both ends into a 
long and shallow scoop, like the inside of a flattish 
spoon. On the ^gean, or Xeros side, the rim of 
the spoon looks fairly complete, though in fact it 
is broken at the Gully Beach by the mouth of that 
long and hidden valley of Saghir Dere or Gully 
Ravine. On the side of the strait the rim is much 
less obvious, being broken at Morto Bay by the 
combined watercourses which drain the western and 
central slopes of Achi Baba, and farther north by the 
Kereves Dere. At the time of landing, the centre, 
or scoop of the spoon, was still bright with grass and 
aromatic plants. Olive trees were scattered over it, 
and here and there thin woods of stunted fir. At one 
spot, near the bottom of the curve, rose large trees 
like elms, which afforded a welcome grove of shade 
to the Royal Naval Division's headquarters during 
the greater part of the campaign. On the whole, the 
French lines on our right were rather more thickly 
wooded than ours. At rare intervals stood the ruins 


of some isolated cottage, surrounded by a patch of 
cultivation for maize or vines. 

Almost exactly down the centre ran the Krithia 
road from Seddel Bahr, having the " Achi Baba 
nullah," which runs into Morto Bay, close on the 
right. Almost parallel to the road, at an average 
distance of 300 yards to the left or west side, runs 
the main or "Krithia" gully, which drains the 
greater part of the central scoop, and also issues 
into Morto Bay. A track, which became a road, ran 
beside this gully as far as a dividing-point, called 
"Clapham Junction," where the trickle of water 
branched into East Krithia and West Krithia nullahs. 
Almost every yard of this wide scoop of land was 
fully exposed to the guns on Achi Baba, and some of 
it to the Asiatic guns as well. In consequence, as 
the campaign continued, it rapidly became covered 
with a network of trenches and dug-outs, looking like 
a vast graveyard, and terminating in an almost in- 
extricable maze at the front, where it was checked 
by the Turkish system, equally elaborated. Except 
close to the front, however, transport and other 
communications were always carried on above ground ; 
the grass was turned into sandy waste, and the 
paths into roads thick with dust. About half-way 
between Cape Helles and Krithia, the Peninsula 
was cut right across from sea to strait by the 
Eski or Old Line, which crossed the Gully Ravine 
near Gully Farm, and the Krithia nullah about 
250 yards north of Clapham Junction, and ended 
about a third of a mile below the mouth of Kereves 

Over this slightly hollow plain, and these roads 


and gullies then unnamed, the advance of April 28 
was made. The 87th Brigade led upon the left or 
seacoast flank, and penetrated rapidly over the open 
ground almost parallel to the Gully Ravine for nearly 
two miles. As the K.O.S.B. and S.W. Borderers 
had been separately engaged at Y and S Beaches, 
the Drake Battalion, R. N.D., took their place, the 
remainder of the brigade consisting only of the 
ist Border Regiment and ist Inniskillings. The 
88th Brigade was on their right ; the 86th, which 
had covered the first landings, was held in reserve 
under Colonel Casson (S.W. Borderers). In spite 
of weariness and the prolonged shock of battle, the 
relics of this unsurpassed Division advanced sturdily 
against increasing opposition ; but by midday their 
progress was stopped. Small parties came within a 
short distance of Krithia, but the 86th Brigade 
reinforced them in vain. There is a human limit 
even for the bravest ; ammunition ran short, and 
could not be brought up ; and only a few guns had 
yet been landed. The brigades, accordingly, made 
a rough line conforming with the 88th in the centre, 
and the hope of reaching Achi Baba faded, though 
near fulfilment. The French on our right had 
reached the approaches to Kereves Dere, but an 
attempt to advance towards Krithia failed. In the 
afternoon the Turks counter-attacked with the bayonet, 
and the French line shook. A rapid retirement 
exposed the Worcesters to heavy loss on their right 
flank, and a line had to be rapidly secured from a 
point about three miles up the coast from Tekke 
Bornu to a point about a mile farther up the strait 
than De Tott's Battery. Here it rested, and two 


days were spent in strengthening the defences and 
sorting out the confused battaHons. 

In order to encourage the worn-out divisions (for 
it was impossible for any soldiers to maintain the 
spirit of the first landing without flagging), Sir Ian 
issued ^'the following order on April 29 : 

" I rely on all officers and men to stand firm and 
steadfastly to resist the attempts of the enemy to 
drive us back from our present position which has 
been so gallantly won. 

" The enemy is evidently trying to obtain a local 
success before reinforcements can reach us ; but the 
first portion of these arrive to-morrow, and will be 
followed by a fresh Division from Egypt. 

" It behoves us all, French and British, to stand 
fast, hold what we have gained, wear down the 
enemy, and thus prepare for a decisive victory." 

The enemy was not long in taking up the 
challenge. On the 29th, Sir Ian visited the front 
lines at Helles and Anzac with his personal staff 
Next day he visited the British position at Helles 
again, and on May i the French lines in the same 
manner. There he found the trenches in the firing 
line incomplete compared with ours, but the celebrated 
"75's" were already in action, and from that time 
onwards the French gunners, never being stinted in 
shells, were the envy as well as the admiration of our 
artillery. On May i also the promised reinforcements 
began to arrive, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade 
from Egypt, under Major-General Sir Herbert Cox, 
being the first comers. Hardly had they taken their 
position as reserve, with some battalions of the R. N. D., 
when, in the darkness before the waning moon had 


risen, the Turks began a furious attack upon the 
whole French and British front. The Turks' 
enthusiasm in defence of their splendid city (for 
the fate of Constantinople was involved) had been 
further stimulated by the following proclamation over 
the signature of their German commandant, General 
von Lowenstern : 

" Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly 
destroy him ! 

"We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our 
religion, our country, and our nation will perish 1 

" Soldiers ! The world is looking at you ! Your 
only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a 
successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in 
the attempt." 

The Turks responded to this appeal with unusual 
hardihood in attack, and it was evident that the best 
Nizam troops were now on the Peninsula. For this 
attack 16,000 were employed, with 2000 in reserve.^ 
They came on in three solid lines. All crawled on 
hands and knees till the word was given, and the 
front was allowed no cartridges, but bayonets only. 
Their first charge aimed in the centre at the 86th 
Brigade, so much shaken by loss of men and officers. 
Here they forced a gap, dangerous had not the 5th 
Royal Scots at once filled it. This battalion (88th 
Brigade), under Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. R. Wilson, 
was the only Territorial unit in the 29th Division. It 
was anxious to prove itself worthy of that unequalled 
corps, and now it proved itself. Facing to their right 
flank, the men charged with the bayonet, the Essex 
(of the same brigade) supporting them. The next 

^ With the Twenty-ninth Division, p. 191. 


attack fell heavily upon the Senegalese, immediately 
on our right. Two battalions of the Worcesters 
(also 88th Brigade) were sent to strengthen the line, 
and later in the night one R.N.D. battalion reinforced 
the extreme right of the French. 

Between ii p.m. and 2 a.m., the conflict appeared 
strangely terrific. The boom and flash of guns, the 
ceaseless repetition of machine-guns and rifles, the 
shouts of "Allah! Allah!" answered by British 
cheers and the yells of savage Africans, the liquid 
brilliance of star shells, the Bengal lights, red, white, 
and green, fired by Turkish officers from their pistols 
as signals to their gunners to lengthen range, or to 
avoid firing on taken trenches and main positions — 
all produced the din and spectacle of some battle in 
hell, lit by infernal fireworks. To spectators on the 
ships or the high ground in our rear, the scene 
was the more terrible as the bursting shells and 
variegated lights came farther and farther into the 
hollow land, down the centre of which the Allies 
were being forced. 

But with approaching light the worst was over, 
and at dawn the whole of the Allied line advanced to 
counter-attack. The British forced their way onward 
for about a quarter of a mile. But the French made 
no progress. Machine-guns and barbed wire were 
used by the Turkish defence with deadly result, and 
before noon the whole of our line was withdrawn to 
its former position. It had been an appalling night 
for both forces, and the Turks spent the next day 
burying their dead under the Red Crescent. That 
night and the next (May 2 and 3) violent attacks 
were repeated, especially upon the French front, and 


terrifying rumours of disaster flew. On May 4 the 
2nd Naval Brigade, R.N.D. (under Commodore 
Backhouse, R.N.), took over part of the French Hne, 
and the whole position was reorganised. Next day 
the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade (East Lancashire 
Division) disembarked as welcome reinforcement. 
While Sir Ian was in Egypt he had watched this 
Division (the 42nd) with admiration, and now, by 
order from Lord Kitchener, General Maxwell sent it 
in his support. Barely in time they began to arrive. 
The Division was under command of Major-General 
Sir William Douglas, and consisted of the Lancashire 
Fusiliers (125th Brigade), the East Lancashire (126th), 
and the Manchester (127th). All were Territorials.^ 
While the British and French were thus strength- 
ening their hold upon the southern end of the Penin- 
sula, the Anzacs clung desperately to the rugged 
triangle which was to be " a thorn in the enemy's 
side." By Friday, the 30th, units had been sorted 
out, the firing line was reinforced by the ist Light 
Horse Brigade (Brigadier-General Chauvel) and by 
four battalions of the R.N.D. Part of the orio-inal 
fighting line, worn out by continuous firing, digging, 
sleeplessness, and want of warm food, was withdrawn 
into sheltered gullies to cook and rest. For the 
next day (May i) a general advance was ordered. 
The Australian Division on the right was to make 
for the villages Koja Dere and Boghali, the mixed 
Australian and New Zealand Division on the left 

^ The battalions in the brigades were : 125th Brigade, the 5th, 6th, 
7th, and 8th Lancashire Fusiliers ; 126th Brigade, the 4th and 5th East 
Lancashire, and the 9th and loth Manchester; the 127th Brigade, the 
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Manchester. 


to attempt the main Sari Bair ridge, leading up to 
the dominating heights of Chunuk and Koja Tepe. 
On the previous evening, however. General Monash, 
commanding the 4th Brigade, and defending the 
serious gap in the lines at the top of Shrapnel Gully, 
protested that such a movement would only extend 
the gap still more dangerously. As it was, the 
R.N.D. battalions, which had been thrust in to hold 
this gap at the triangle's apex, were at that moment 
very hard pressed, and after further reconnoitring 
both General Godley and General Bridges appear 
to have agreed that the contemplated advance was 
impracticable. At all events it was not attempted.^ 

To close that gap at the apex was obviously the 
first essential move, and on Sunday, May 2 (a week 
after the landing), a determined effort was made. 
The objective was a round knoll, known as Baby 
700, on the slope of Sari Bair. It stood about three 
hundred yards beyond the lines on Pope's Hill, and 
its possession would have blocked the entrance from 
which the enemy commanded large sections of 
Monash Gully and Shrapnel Gully. The attempt 
began at early morning with a rapid bombard- 
ment, and throughout the day Australians and New 
Zealanders fought with their accustomed self-confi- 
dence. The Nelson and Portsmouth Battalions, 
R.N.D., supported them, and some trenches along 
the edge of the plateau extending left from Quinn's 
Post to the Bloody Angle were gained. But the 
plateau had by now been carefully fortified by 
trenches, wire, and machine-guns. It was impossible 

^ In Australia in Arms, pp. 136-139, Phillip Schuler gives a detailed 
account, obviously derived from officers who were present. 


for our destroyers, firing up the length of Shrapnel 
Gully, to distinguish friend from foe, so closely were 
they intermixed. At nightfall much confusion arose, 
and the Portsmouth Battalion men are said to have 
yielded to the terror of the scene and spread con- 
fusion further. Parties of the Otago Battalion and 
the 13th and i6th Battalions clung to the positions 
till far into the following day. But in the end, all 
survivors returned to the original lines. The attempt 
failed, and it cost 800 men.^ On the following day 
(May 4) an effort to seize Gaba Tepe and end the 
continuous loss inflicted by its shrapnel upon the 
beach and upon bathers in Anzac Cove also failed, 
owing to the mass and strength of wire along the 
edge of the sea. Meantime, the warships had been 
continuously assisting all troops on sea and land. 
On the 27th the Queen Elizabeth, hearing from a 
seaplane that the Goeben had ventured down the 
strait, apparently with the object of firing over the 
Peninsula, forestalled that intention by dropping one 
of her largest shells from near Gaba Tepe into the 
strait. Narrowly missed, the Goeben retired under 
shelter of the steep shore, but the Qzieen Elizabeth's 
second shell sank a transport in the middle of the 

By May 5 the phase of the landing was completed. 
A firm hold had been gained upon the end of the 
Peninsula and at Anzac. The world's history had 
been enriched by hardly credible examples of 
courage, dan, and the fortitude of endurance which 
Napoleon accounted a more valuable quality in 
soldiers than courage and dlan. But the objects 

^ Sir lan's dispatch ; and Australia in Arms, pp. 139-142. 


specified in the scheme of attack had not been gained. 
The Turks were still at Krithia. They still held 
the lines drawn across the slopes of Achi Baba. 
Koja Dere and Boghali were still far from the eager 
youths clinging like flies to the Anzac cliffs. Maidos 
was farther beyond, nor was the fleet a cable's length 
nearer to the Narrows than before. It was evident 
to all that the campaign, deprived of the incalculable 
advantage of surprise by the hesitation, delay, and 
disapproval or indifference at home, would now be 
long and costly in life. Already in ten days the losses 
were officially reckoned : 





. 177 



Men . 

. 1990 



These figures give a total casualty list of 13,979. 
The loss may be realised by another table. On 
April 30 the Fusilier Brigade (86th) of the 29th 
Division, out of a normal strength of 104 officers 
and about 4000 men, mustered as follows : 



2nd Royal Fusiliers . 

. 12 


1st Lancashire Fusiliers 

. II 


1st Royal Munster Fusiliers 

. 12 


1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers . 



36 1850 1 

For no such numbers of casualties had estimate 
or preparation been made. The casualties, in fact, 
amounted to something like three times the estimate, 
and the treatment of the wounded became a serious, 

^ With the Tiventy-ninth Division, p. 189. The one surviving officer 
of the Dublin Fusiliers was Lieutenant O'Hara, afterwards mortally 
wounded at Suvla Bay. 


if not insoluble, difficulty. In his dispatch, Sir 
Ian notices that his "Administrative Staff had not 
reached Mudros by the time when the landings were 
finally arranged." We have seen that they did not 
reach Alexandria from home till April i ; that they 
were left there to embark the remaining troops and 
complete the base hospital arrangements, and did 
not reach Mudros till April 18. The Administrative 
Staff included Brigadier-General E. M. Woodward, 
who, as Deputy Adjutant-General, was ultimately re- 
sponsible for all questions of personnel and casualties. 
And it included Surgeon-General W. E. Birrell, who, 
as Director of Military Services, was immediately 
responsible for the treatment of the wounded. In 
the absence of these officers, Sir Ian says "all the 
highly elaborate work involved by these landings 
was put through by my General Staff working in 
collaboration with Commodore Roger Keyes," who 
was Chief of the Staff to Admiral de Robeck. But 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. C. Keble, R.A.M.C, Assist- 
ant Director of Medical Services, reached Mudros 
before the chief officers of the Administrative Staff, 
and to him, as above noticed, the scheme for dealing 
with the wounded was due. Merely owing to a 
mistaken estimate of the enemy's opposition, the 
means provided were inadequate for the actual 
numbers. As we have seen, only two hospital ships, 
each accommodating about 500 cases, had been 
allotted for the army. - Tne navy lent two more, 
and supplied such transport as could now be spared, 
but these were not fitted with hospital necessities. 
Doctors, nurses, and orderlies, all were short. Army 
surgeons and stretcher-bearers displayed their fine 



devotion in bringing the wounded to the beaches 
both at Helles and Anzac ; but in spite of the navy's 
energy and fearlessness in control of the boats, many 
of the wounded remained waiting long for treatment ; 
in one case a fleet-sweeper crowded with Australian 
wounded went wandering from ship to ship in vain, 
and at last tied up against the General Headquarters 
ship (at that time, May 9, the Arcadian, to which 
Sir Ian had transferred) ; and upon the transports 
taking them to Alexandria — a voyage of two to 
three days and nights — the wounded suffered much. 
Many were unable to move without help, and no 
help was there. Most had been treated only with 
first dressings. In some cases the wounds corrupted. 
Many died. Warships, like the Cornwallis, afforded 
as much room as they could, acting as clearing- 
stations for the wounded, and transmittino- the dead 
to a trawler which daily went round the fleet to 
collect them.^ The efforts of the fleet surgeons were 
untiring. But no scheme and no effort could avail 
against a false estimate of the enemy's strength and 
defensive power. Rightly or wrongly, the campaign 
had from the first b^'en regarded in London as of 
secondary importance, and secondary provision had 
been made for an estimate of secondary loss. 

My main authorities for this chapter, as for the 
last, have been the Dispatches of Sir Ian Hamilton 
and Admiral de Robeck, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett's 
Dispatches fro7n the Dardanelles, the late Phillip 
Schuler's Australia in Arpts, the Rev. D. Creighton's 
With the Twenty-ninth Division in Gallipoli, The 

^ The Immortal Gamble, p. 145. 


Immortal Gamble, by Commander A.T. Stewart, R.N., 
and the Rev. C. J. E, Peshall, With Machine- 
guns in Gallipoli, by Lieutenant-Commander Josiah 
Wedgwood, M.P., and my own observation of the 
ground and conversations with eye-witnesses on the 


IN Constantinople the naval attacks of February 
had created the dismay natural to a crowded 
population threatened with destruction. Pre- 
parations were hurriedly made for removing the 
Government to Eski Chehir in Asia, or even to 
Konia. In spite of Enver's dominance, the Com- 
mittee was charged with bringing ruin on the land, 
and the German Ambassador, Baron von Wangen- 
heim, feared a separate peace. Ahmed Riza, the 
honourable visionary, aging survivor of the Parisian 
Young Turks whose revolution seven years before 
inspired all Europeans but the Governments with 
enthusiasm, now stole about the streets honoured but 
shunned. In his palace on the Bosphorus, the Sultan, 
Mehmed v., for some inscrutable reason called El 
Ghazi (the Hero), maundered with imbecility. Re- 
moved in March from his palace-prison of Beyler-bey 
on the Bosphorus to the ancient city of Magnesia, 
near Smyrna, the " Red Sultan," Abdul Hamid, sur- 
rounded by ministering daughters, beguiled an ab- 
stemious and peaceful old age by watching the 
progress of Christianity with sardonic appreciation.^ 

The failure of the naval attempt to force the 
Narrows in March restored the city's confidence. 

1 Abdul Hamid died at last in Constantinople, February 1918. 



People felt that, since the British Navy failed, the 
Dardanelles indeed formed an impregnable pass. 
Enver and Liman von Sanders regained power, if 
not popularity. The German bureaucracy, organis- 
ing every department with efficient despotism, justi- 
fied the satiric compliment which cried, " Deutschland, 
Deutschland liber Allah ! " During the subsequent 
five weeks of our silence it was believed that the 
British Government admitted failure and had aban- 
doned the campaign. The distant sound of Russian 
ships bombarding the Black Sea forts at the entrance 
to the Bosphorus was listened to periodically with the 
indifference of custom. When news of the landings 
began to filter through, decisive Turkish victories 
over France and England were proclaimed. In Asia 
and on the Peninsula the enemy, it was said, had 
been repulsed with incredible loss. If any still clung 
to the shores of Islam, in a day or two they would be 
driven into the water. The anxious citizens had 
Enver's word for that. 

Enver himself was hurrying reinforcements to the 
front. Some went by the Bulair road, though it was 
exposed to possible fire from British warships in the 
Gulf of Xeros. The majority were transported down 
the Sea of Marmora to Gallipoli or Maidos. But 
within a few days of the landings, this route was 
rendered equally dangerous by the skill and gallantry 
of our submarines, two of which — E14 under Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Edward Courtney Boyle and 
Eii under Lieutenant-Commander Eric Naismith — 
explored their way under the minefields of the strait, 
entered the Marmora and played havoc among 
Turkish transports and gunboats. E14 sank two 


gunboats and one transport with troops. Eii was 
even more successful, sinking two transports, one gun- 
boat, one communication ship, and three store ships, 
and driving another store ship ashore. It created 
alarm in the city by emerging close to the quays, and 
on its return down the strait it stopped and backed to 
torpedo another transport.^ After this, most rein- 
forcements were sent either through Muradhi (the 
nearest station to Rodosto), risking the Bulair road, 
or by ships hugging the Asiatic coast by night to the 
ferry at the Narrows, both routes long and arduous. 
Some also went by rail to Smyrna and thence 
by rail to Panderma on the Marmora before being 

In early May, Enver admitted that the Turkish 
losses already amounted to 45,000, and all Turkish 
towns, even to the distance of Kirk Kilisse, were 
crammed with wounded. Liman, in command at the 
front, called for 50,000 reinforcements, and about 
30,000, chiefly brought in from Adrianople and 
Smyrna, were actually sent. Within a few weeks, 
divisions were also withdrawn from Syria for the 
same destination. For Turkish troops, the equip- 
ment was unusually good — arms, guns, and other 
stores passing freely through Bulgaria, or coming 
from the Roumanian port of Constanza down the 
Black Sea, where the Russian patrols remained torpid 
or unfortunate. For Turkish troops, the commissariat 
was also sufficient, the disaster of Lula Burgas having 

^ The submarine campaign began with E2, 11, 14, and 15 ; four or 
five were subsequently added. Some were lost. On May 25 the En 
also torpedoed the transport Statnboul inside the Golden Horn, causing 
great panic. On April 30 the Australian AE2 had been lost at the 
entrance of Marmora. Her crew were taken prisoner. 


taught the authorities that even Turks cannot fight 
beyond a certain degree of starvation.^ 

Before the Turkish reinforcements could consoli- 
date a new position across the southern slopes of 
Achi Baba, and convert it into an impenetrable maze 
of trench and wire, it was essential for Sir Ian to 
continue striking at their front. Only so could the 
pressure upon the beaches be relieved, and the con- 
tinuous danger from dropping shells to some small 
extent be reduced ; and only so could the Turks be 
interrupted in their schemes for driving us into the 
sea. So heavy had been the losses of the 29th Divi- 
sion that the new Lancashire Fusilier Territorials and 
the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade were added to the 
87th and 88th Brigades so as to make up the Division, 
the 86th being now so much reduced in numbers that 
it was temporarily divided between the other two 
brigades. Two brigades (the 2nd Australian (Victoria) 
and the New Zealand Infantry) were withdrawn from 
Anzac and formed into a composite division in reserve 
with the Drake and Plymouth Battalions, R.N.D. 
Two battalions of the 2nd Naval Brigade, R.N.D. 
(Howe and Hood), were sent to reinforce the French 
Division on the right. 

On May 6, when the attempt to push forward 
began. Sir Ian could count only on about SSy'^^o 
rifles, of which only 5000 were British and Irish 
Regulars. This total included about 8000 French 
troops ; but of these at least 5000 were Africans. 

^ For the state of Constantinople at this time, see Inside Constanti- 
nople^ by Lewis Einstein, special agent at the American Embassy, and 
Tivo War Years in Constantinople, by Dr. Harry Stiirmer, correspon- 
dent of the Kolnische Zeitung, but a writer of decidedly pro-Entente 


The remainder of his army consisted, as we have 
seen, of Lancashire Territorials, Anzacs (both ex- 
cellent), and the Royal Naval Division, that finely 
tempered, though partially trained, body, made up 
partly of public-school men, but chiefly of northern 
and west of England miners, R.F.R, stokers and 
marines, whose heavy losses were due rather to 
devotion and courage than to lack of skill. Against 
them were arrayed at least 40,000 regular Turkish 
troops (Nizam), skilfully disposed in a system of 
trenches and redoubts designed by German officers 
and held with Turkish tenacity. As to guns, the 
French at this time had twenty-four of their "75's," 
together with five or six howitzers, and they never ran 
short of ammunition. The British had somethino- 
over fifty 18-pounders, a few old and inaccurate 
howitzers, very few H.E. shells, and other ammu- 
nition always so short that a bombardment in pre- 
paration for attack had to be rigorously limited for 
fear of drawing on the small reserve. The Turkish 
guns in concealed positions on Achi Baba and its 
slopes, or behind its shelter, were estimated at about 
a hundred. In addition, the Turks had large guns and 
howitzers on the Asiatic side, the most dangerous 
being hidden between the Trojan plain and Erenkeui 
village. From time to time they exploded "Black 
Marias," as the soldiers called the 9-2 and ii-inch 
shells, among the French depots on V Beach and 
among the British signalling stations and stores on 
Lancashire Landing. Except beneath the cliffs on 
the Xeros coast, no point upon the southern Peninsula 
was secure from fire. 

The battle lasted three days (May 6 to 8 inclusive). 


The reorganised 29th Division began the attack on 
the left, the French being on the right, the Plymouth 
and Drake Battalions keeping the two sections in 
touch from the centre. At 11 a.m. the advance was 
prepared by a brief bombardment, the French batteries 
as usual expending far the greater number of shells, 
and firing with their customary method and precision. 
The 87th Brigade and Lancashire Fusiliers (Terri- 
torials) on the British left then moved along the 
flat and open ground between the Gully Ravine 
(Saghir Dere) and the sea. Part also penetrated up 
the gully itself, which swarmed with Turkish snipers, 
and at the farther end was commanded by machine- 
guns. On their right, the 88th Brigade with the 
Indians attempted to conform to the advance, fighting 
for every yard over ground affording cover to the 
enemy in unsuspected pits and dry ravines, but 
especially in a scattered wood of firs, which grew 
along the edge of a downward slope near the centre. 
Against this wood, company after company of the 
88th Brigade was led in vain. Hidden machine- 
guns also checked the progress of the R.N.D. 
battalions. On the right the French threw forward a 
swarm of Senegalese in open order. They struggled 
almost to the crest overlooking Kereves Dere, but 
were there encountered by a strong redoubt. The 
French troops advanced through the Senegalese 
as they came back, but made no further progress. 
All the R.N.D. battalions suffered heavy loss.^ 
The fighting developed into a struggle of scattered 

^ In this attack Mr. Asquith's son Arthur (Hood Battahon), and 
Lieutenant-Commander Josiah Wedgwood, M.P., who had come out 
with the machine-gun section, were wounded. 


groups to push forward. The naval guns continued a 
heavy bombardment, but so deep and narrow were the 
Turkish trenches that naval shells had little but moral 
effect, and moral effect rapidly diminishes. By middle 
afternoon (4.30) it became evident that the wearied 
and harassed men could go no farther, and the order 
was given to dig in, keeping a fairly connected line. 
By sheer hard "hammering," between 200 and 300 
yards had been gained, but no more, and the main 
Turkish defences were still far ahead. 

In the night, the Turks rushed upon the French 
lines with the bayonet, but the French lines held. 
Next morning at ten o'clock our attack was resumed. 
After a short but violent bombardment, the Lanca- 
shire Fusiliers attempted to push forward again upon 
the extreme left so as to clear the Gully Ravine, 
about half-way between Gully Beach and Y Beach, 
but were stopped by a redoubt and machine-guns 
upon the ridge overlooking the sea. On their right, 
in the difficult ground of scrub and donga between 
the Gully Ravine and the Krithia Nullah, the 
88th Brigade struggled to advance the line, and for 
a time the 5th Royal Scots obtained a footing in the 
savagely disputed fir wood. Here they discovered 
snipers perched on wooden platforms among the 
branches ; and here, as in other places during the 
campaign, Turks had cleverly "camouflaged" them- 
selves with green paint and boughs of trees till they 
looked like moving or stationary bushes, though 
hitherto the process of " camouflage " had not been 
generally practised. The Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 
87th Brigade came up to the support of the Scots, 
but soon after i p.m. a violent Turkish counter- 


attack recaptured the firs. The French and Naval 
Brigade had made Httle progress, and in the early- 
afternoon the battle paused. But it was impossible 
to lose the advantage of attack and leave the initiative 
to an enemy only eager to rush forward and chase the 
Allies back to slaughter upon the beaches. Accord- 
ingly, just before five o'clock, after another violent 
bombardment, especially from the French guns, Sir 
Ian ordered a general advance of the whole line. 
French, British, and Irish (the Dublins and Munsters 
having been united into the " Dubsters ") all rose 
visibly together, and charged forward with the 
bayonet. The firs were again taken and held. The 
line swept over the first Turkish trenches ; consider- 
able ground was gained, in places as much as 400 
yards. The success was general, except on the ex- 
treme left. Here the original failure to hold Y Beach 
at the first landing was now bitterly felt, for in that 
direction the Lancashire Fusiliers found it impossible 
to advance, and the call to attack with the bayonet 
an entrenched redoubt defended by hidden machine- 
guns was a stern order for Territorials inexperienced 
in war. For a time, on the right also, the situation 
was serious. Such a storm of shrapnel met the 
French advance that African fugitives in great 
numbers came sweeping down through the Naval 
Brigade, and spread a confusion only checked by the 
advance of the French reserves.^ 

The battle had now lasted without intermission 
for two days, and the nights brought little rest. The 
Regular troops had been fighting close upon a fort- 

^ Compare Ashmead Bartlett's Dispatches from the Dardanelles^ 
p. 118, 

ifr THE Battles of may 

nigiil nidwct relieL '. ' :~ : 
were kiEed, woimde:: : : ^ - 

tbe£r o^^cers rr^e.. Tze :- :- .' .- 

1 rj- were 

. - __- T iL-t :: .:e5 znztr.-i-F:. - Mr 


was in command, a bald-headed veieran of severxty, 
ven^ small, active, and alert, endowed with an irre- 
pressible sense of comedy, which he gaily diffused 
among men and officers alike. One of his brigades 
was at once sent forward to strengthen the French 
position. On the British section, the Lancashire 
Fusiliers and the Indian Brigade were withdrawn 
into reserve ; the 87th Brigade was left to struggle 
on the terribly exposed and narrow height between 
the Gully Ravine and the sea ; the New Zealanders 
were ordered to pass through the 88th Brigade and 
advance directly upon Krithia ; the Austra. 1^:^.5 re- 
mained temporarily on their right in reser\*e, and, as 
before, R,X.D. battalions formed the connecting link 
with the French on both sides of the main Krithia road. 
Sir Ian and the Headquarter Staff had pitched 
camp in a depression of the ground above Cape 
Tekke, too close to the Divisional Headquarters, but 
the limited space allowed no choice. Before the 
neigrhbourinor hiorh around above \V Beach, beside 
the cemetery, the scene of battle lay openly extended, 
and the movements of each section could be watched 
from hour to hour, except when advancing lines dis- 
appeared for a while into dongas, or when the smoke 
and upheaval of bursting shells obscured the view with 
black or yellow clouds. Otherwise, ail was \*isible 
except the enemy, and, from the vacant appearance 

comprising the 7eme Regiment Colonial (Li«iL-C<^<Hiel BordeanxX 
partly Senegalese, and the Seme Regimoit Colosiial (LioiL-CfdcMid 
d'Adhemar), also partly Senegalese. The Dryisjao had ax battoies of 
" 75''s " and two of momitain guns. The Corps of die two DhrisitHis had 
two regiments of Chasseurs d'Afriqne, fom- 120 mm. gmis, foor 155 mm. 
gmis (long), six 155 nmi. gtms (short\ besides detachments of engine^s, 
supply, aimy service, and ambolance. 


of the ground before them, it would have seemed 
possible for the army to advance in uninterrupted 
lines across the gently rising slopes to Krithia or the 
truncated pyramid of Achi Baba itself. 

At 10.15 on May 8, the customary bombardment 
from sea and land began, and was received with the 
customary silence. At 10.30 the infantry moved, 
and at once the roar of rifles and machine-guns 
arose from the Turkish trenches, while overhead 
the Turkish shrapnel burst incessantly. The 87th 
Brigade attempted to push forward, but could hardly 
advance a hundred yards, the South Wales Borderers 
losing heavily. Among the scattered trees and 
rugged ravines on the right of the gully, the New 
Zealanders, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, 
advanced by short rushes for nearly 300 yards, but, 
exposed to machine-guns on both flanks, were forced 
to dig in soon after midday.^ Shortly before. General 
Paris, R.N.D., commanding the composite division, 
ordered the Australians to advance into the centre of 
the attacking line upon the New Zealanders' right.^ 
They were under command of Brigadier-General J. 
W. M'Cay, who, with his Brigade-Major, Major Cass, 
went up into the firing line with his battalions, reck- 
lessly exposing himself to the heaviest fire until even- 
ing, when he was wounded, as Major Cass had twice 
been at an earlier stage. 

^ The brigade consisted of the WelUngton Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel 
W. G. Malone, a splendid soldier and man, afterwards killed at Anzac), 
the Auckland (Lieut.-Colonel A. Plugge), the Canterbury (Lieut.-Colonel 
D. M. Stewart), and the Otago (Lieut.-Colonel T. W. M'Donald). 

2 The 2nd Australian Brigade consisted of the 5th Victoria Battalion 
(Lieut.-Colonel Wanliss), the 6th (Lieut.-Colonel M'Nicol), the 7th 
(Lieut.-Colonel Garside), and the 8th (Lieut.-Colonel Bolton). 


The Australians advanced to a slight hollow in 
the ground, giving some amount of cover. Here it 
seemed likely they would bivouac, for during the 
early afternoon an ominous pause ensued. But Sir 
Ian had determined upon one more effort to secure 
victory by movement. At 5.15 all the battleships 
and cruisers, all the French " 75's," and such heavy 
guns as we possessed, opened a tremendous bom- 
bardment. The bursting shells concealed the slopes of 
Achi Baba on both sides. Sudden volcanoes spouted 
rock and earth in dark cones. The orange of the 
lyddite curled over the enemy's trenches. It seemed 
impossible for human beings to survive that quarter 
of an hour. At 5.30 all guns ceased like one, and 
with bayonets fixed and rifles at the slope, the whole 
line again moved forward. The brunt of the fighting 
now fell to the Australians. Two battalions in front 
and two in support, they walked or ran in " rushes " 
of 50 or 60 yards on about 1000 yards of front to 
the left of the Krithia road. The ground was open, 
and their appearance was at once greeted by the roar 
of rifles, machine-guns and field-guns, which the bom- 
bardment had again utterly failed to silence. The 
Australians, though heavily laden with packs, shovels, 
picks, and entrenching tools, and exposed to intense 
fire, pressed on, rush after rush, their Brigadier 
directing and encouraging by waving a stick in front. 
Without a sight of their deadly enemy, they advanced 
over 800 yards, the support battalions joining up into 
the bayonet line. They swept across a long Turkish 
trench. They shot those who ran, and bayoneted 
those who stayed. They came within half a mile of 
the eastern approaches to Krithia itself. Seldom in 




this war has so reckless and irresistible an advance 
been recorded. None the less, after an addition of a 
quarter of a mile beyond our original lines, it was 
checked. Suddenly upon the right Major Cass, 
wounded in both shoulders, had discovered a yawning 
gap of 300 yards, into which groups of Turks were 
pouring down a gully to harass the Australian line on 
flank and rear.^ 

The French, though late, had advanced gallantly 
to the attack, drums beating, bugles blowing, as in a 
Napoleonic battle. The French white troops in good 
order fought their way about 300 yards farther along 
the Kereves Ridge, capturing the much-disputed 
redoubt. But the gap was left. The Naval Brigade 
were delayed in filling it, and in the falling darkness 
the whole line, exhausted and reduced, had barely 
life left in them to dig trenches for the night. An 
average advance of 500 yards had been accomplished. 

Next day (May 9) Sir Ian issued the following 
special order to the Australians and to theBritish troops, 
which had now become the VII Ith Army Corps : 

" Sir Ian Hamilton wishes the troops of the 
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to be informed 
that in all his past experiences, which include the 
hard struggle of the Russo-Japanese campaign, he 
has never seen more devoted gallantry displayed than 
that which has characterised their efforts during the 
past three days. He has informed Lord Kitchener 
by cable of the bravery and endurance displayed by 
all ranks here, and has asked that the necessary 
reinforcements be forthwith dispatched. Meanwhile, 
the remainder of the East Lancashire Division is 
disembarking, and will henceforth be available to 

^ See Australia in Arms, pp. 143-156. 

THE 29th division PRAISED 157 

help us to make good and improve upon the positions 
we have so hardly won." 

In spite of a heavy counter-attack against the 
French position on the night of the Qth-ioth, compara- 
tive quiet prevailed during the next two or three days. 
But at Helles, even on the quietest days, shell-fire 
never ceased, and, to say nothing of the V and W 
Beaches, the troops withdrawn from the firing line to 
rest were continually exposed to danger. For such 
rest, it was time to withdraw the 29th Division, now 
that the East Lancashires (42nd) could take its place. 
The Division had lost about 11,000 men and 400 
officers. The relics of those unyielding battalions 
began to come back on the i ith. That night and next 
day it rained heavily for the first time, but the over- 
wearied men sank down into mud or pools of water, 
indifferent to everything but sleep. In their honour, 
so well deserved, Sir Ian issued a second special 
order, dated May 12 : 

" For the first time for eighteen days and nights 
it has been found possible to withdraw the 29th 
Division from the fire fight. During the whole of 
that long period of unprecedented strain the Division 
has held ground or gained it, against the bullets 
and bayonets of the constantly renewed forces of 
the foe. 

" During the whole of that long period they have 
been illuminating the pages of military history with 
their blood. The losses have been terrible, but 
mingling with the deep sorrow for fallen comrades 
arises a feeling of pride in the invincible spirit which 
has enabled the survivors to triumph where ordinary 
troops must inevitably have failed. 

" I tender to Major-General Hunter-Weston and 


to his Division at the same time my profoundest 
sympathy with their losses and my warmest con- 
gratulations on their achievement." ^ 

Only five days' rest could be allowed. Immedi- 
ately before the withdrawal began, the 29th Indian 
Brigade, as though to prove themselves worthy of the 
Division to which they were now attached, carried 
through a dashing adventure, suitable to the 
character of the men. The design was due to Sir 
Herbert Cox, commanding the brigade, and the 
object was to capture the high cliff or "bluff" over- 
looking the ravine of Y Beach on the farther side. 
It has been seen how greatly the failure to hold this 
position at the first landing had impeded the advance 
of our left wing. Upon the bluff, the Turks had 
constructed a formidable redoubt, whence machine- 
guns and rifles rendered movement along the west 
side of the Gully Ravine impossible. On the night 
of the loth-i ith, the scouts of the 6th Gurkhas (Lieut.- 
Colonel the Honourable C. G. Bruce) scrambled along 
the shore to the foot of the cliff, and climbed right up 
the precipitous face. On the summit they were met 
by heavy fire, and as a surprise the attempt failed. 
But on the evening of the next day but one (the 12th), 
the Manchester Brigade (one of those Territorial 
Corps fit to rank with veteran Regulars) made a feint 
upon the position from our right, assisted by the 29th 
Division's artillery and the guns of the Dublin and 
Talbot from the sea. While the attention of the 
Turks was thus occupied, a double-company of 
Gurkhas again crawled up the cliff, and rushed the 
redoubt with a sudden charge. During the night and 

' With the Twenty-ninth Division, p. 94. 


at early morning, they were supported by three 
Gurkha reinforcements of double-companies, the 
entrenchment was rapidly completed, and the position 
permanendy held. It was afterwards always known 
as " Gurkha Bluff," and its value for the protection of 
our extreme left was incalculable. 

It had now become evident that victory by open 
movement upon the surface could scarcely be hoped 
for. As in France and Flanders, the two modern 
instruments of barbed wire and machine-guns had so 
strengthened the power of defence that open assault 
would always cost many lives, and was rendered im- 
possible without a "barrage" of shells such as the 
Dardanelles force was incapable of affording. Indeed, 
the very word "barrage" was then hardly known to 
British troops. The opposing lines were brought 
almost to a standstill, and advance became possible 
only by trench and sap, as in an old-fashioned siege, 
varied by almost continuous attacks and Separate 
exploits, designed partly to save our own men from 
the rot of inactivity, but chiefly to prevent the enemy 
from concentrating his efforts to drive us off the land. 
The line was, accordingly, organised into four 
permanent sections from left to right — the 29th 
Division (with the Indian Brigade), the 42nd Division 
(one brigade of which, the East Lancashire, was 
split up to gain experience with the 29th Division),^ 
the Royal Naval Division, and the French Expedi- 
tionary Corps, now counting two divisions. In the 
middle of May (the 14th) the French Commandant, 
General d'Amade, a soldier with unusual knowledge 
of foreign affairs, who knew the Far East well, 

^ Ibid., p. 112. 


was French Attach^ in the South African War, and 
served with distinction in Morocco, retired from the 
Peninsula, having found the prolonged strain too great 
for nerves impoverished by illness. He was sent on 
a special mission to Russia, and was succeeded by 
General Gouraud, a cool, solid, and imperturbable 
soldier of the best French type, who had won high 
reputation in the Argonne. 

At Anzac, although deprived for a few days (till 
May 15) of the two brigades withdrawn to Helles, 
the Australasians continued to strengthen their hold 
upon the perilous edges of their rough triangle. But 
in the middle of the month (May 15), just as the two 
brigades were returning, General Bridges, command- 
ing the ist Australian Division, was mortally wounded. 
In crossing the mouth of Shrapnel Valley, where the 
protecting parapets had not yet been completed, he 
was struck in the thigh by a sniper hidden somewhere 
in the bushes beyond Pope's Hill. His last words 
on leaving Anzac in a hospital ship were, "Anyhow, 
I have commanded an Australian Division for nine 
months."^ Before Alexandria was reached, he died : 
a stern, outwardly cold, and lonely man, pitiless to 
apathy, capable of organisation, and inspiring the 
confidence always felt in unyielding and unselfish 
capacity. The command of the ist Division was at 
once taken over by Major-General H. B. Walker, a 
resolute and gallant leader, who had served in the 
British Army in the Soudan campaigns, the N.-W. 
Frontier, and South Africa. He was among the 
most determined opponents of evacuation on the 
night after the Anzac landing. His headquarters 

^ Australia in Anns, p. 158. 

MAY 19 AT ANZAC i6i 

were fixed at the top of the "White Valley," close 
to the region afterwards famous as Lone Pine. 

On May 19, three days after the loss of their own 
General, the Australians, together with the rest of 
Anzac, were called upon to resist the most violent 
attempt that the Turks ever made to drive them off 
the cliffs. The enemy had now largely increased 
their artillery, which included at least one 11 -inch 
gun, some 8-inch, and several 47-inch, all well posted 
and concealed. Liman von Sanders had also brought 
up forces amounting to 30,000 men, believed to 
include five fresh regiments, and he took command 
in person. Directly the moon set on the night of 
the i8th-i9th, a tremendous fire of guns and rifles 
burst from the surrounding Turkish lines. This 
often happened at Anzac, and now, as usual, the 
noise died down after about an hour. But at 3.30, 
crowds of silent figures were detected in the darkness 
creeping close up to the centre of the Australian 
trenches. Directly the sentries fired, masses of the 
enemy in thick lines came rushing forward, yelling 
their battle-cry to the Prophet's God. Though 
most severe along the ridge between Quinn's and 
Courtney's Posts, the assault extended over the 
whole front, with great violence at the dangerously 
exposed apex of the triangle. The assailants came 
on so thick, the ground to be covered was so narrow 
— in places only a few yards across between the 
confronting trenches — that the Anzacs had but to 
fire point-blank into the half-visible darkness before 
them, and at every shot an enemy fell. Many 
Australians mounted the parapet, and, sitting astride 
upon it, fired continuously, as in an enormous drive 


of game. Morning broke, the sun rose behind the 
teaming assailants, machine-guns and rifles mowed 
them down in rows, and piled them up into barriers 
and parapets of the dead and scarcely living. Still 
the peasants of Islam, summoned from quiet villages 
of Thrace and Asia, unconscious of the cause for 
which they died, except that it was the cause of 
Islam — still they came on, shouting their battle-cry. 
Emptying their rifles into trenches manned with 
equal constancy, rushing wildly up to the sandbag 
lines, they scrambled over them, only to die of rifles 
which scorched their skin, or of bayonets dripping 

From 3.30 till nearly 11 the conflict raged; but 
before the sun was at its height the noise and shouting 
gradually died away. The great assault was finished, 
and had failed. In heaps and lines, more than 3000 
Turks lay dying or already dead. The defence lost 
only 100 killed, and about 500 wounded. Not 
a yard of Anzac had been yielded up. The enemy 
never again attempted an attack upon that scale. 

So appalling had the thin strip of neutral ground 
now become owing to the ghastly heaps of swollen 
or shrinking bodies piled upon it, so overpowering 
was the stink of rotting men, that the Turks, waving 
white flags and red crescents, requested an armistice 
for burial. After some naturally suspicious hesitation 
(for the enemy mustered in thick lines, and fighting 
was frequently renewed) a Turkish officer was 
brought blindfold into Anzac Cove, four Australian 
officers carrying him through the sea round the end 
of the entanglement beyond Hell Spit. Major- 
General Braithwaite, Chief of Sir lan's Stafl", met 


him at General Birdwood's headquarters, close beside 
the beach opposite the chief landing-place, called 
"Watson's Pier," because built by Anzac signallers 
under Captain Watson. An armistice for May 24 
was arranged, and duly carried out. It lasted from 
early morning till late afternoon, and was attended 
with the usual ironic circumstances. Within certain 
limits marked by white flags, Australians freely 
conversed with Turkish officers who spoke faultless 
English, and were lavish in politeness and cigarettes. 
It is said that General Liman von Sanders himself, 
disguised as a Red Crescent sergeant, mixed unde- 
tected with the crowd upon that wet and misty 

It may have been so, nor was there cause for 
disguise. It was by his authority as Commandant 
of the 5th Ottoman Army that Lieutenant-Colonel 
Fahreddin concluded the armistice, as narrated. The 
note in which Sir Ian was informed of this authorisa- 
tion concluded with the words : " J'ai I'honneur d'etre 
avec I'assurance de ma plus haute consideration, 
Liman von Sanders." So the courteous amenities 
of slaughter were maintained, and the Turks buried 
3000 corpses, all killed since May 18. 

Formidable as the Turkish onset had been, a 
still more serious peril now threatened the expedi- 
tion. For some days past, rumours of two hostile 
submarines had reached the Staff Since all com- 
munication was by sea, since the guns were largely 
furnished by the fleet, and even General Head- 
quarters were afloat, no news more ominous could 
have arrived. A foretaste of danger was given on 

^ Australia in Arms, p. 166. 


May 13, when, in the darkness, a Turkish destroyer 
slid silently down the strait and torpedoed the battle- 
ship Goliath, lying at anchor off Morto Bay to 
support the French flank. She was a fifteen-year- 
old ship (12,950 tons), and she sank at once, carrying 
down her captain, Thomas Shelford, 19 officers, and 
over 500 men. As they drowned, they were swept by 
the current past the Cornwallis, lying nearly a mile 
astern, and their cries for help were pitiful. The Corn- 
wallis boats saved 56, but only 183 were saved in all.^ 
Nearly a fortnight later (May 25 and 27), a 
large German submarine, U51, which had come 
round by Gibraltar (others perhaps hailed from the 
Austrian naval base at Pola), struck two heavy 
blows in succession. Off Anzac, the Triumph 
(11,800 tons, completed 1904) lay at anchor, with nets 
out. Suddenly she was struck by a torpedo, which 
cut through her nets like thread. In ten minutes she 
sank, carrying down three officers and sixty-eight 
men, within sight of the Anzac forces, which she had 
so finely served. All of the Anzacs volunteered a 
month's pay toward the expense of salving her, but 
that was impossible. The next morning but one, 
the Majestic (Captain Talbot), 1895, i4>900 tons, 
Rear-Admiral Stuart Nicholson's flagship, lying at 
anchor close off Helles, her nets out, and surrounded 

1 The Imtnortal Gamble, pp. 167-174. Lieutenant Gather, R.N., 
went down with the Goliath, but was kept afloat by a safety waistcoat. 
This he gave to a sailor much exhausted. Ultimately he was himself 
rescued, and for some months commanded on the River Clyde. It is 
impossible to mention all such heroic actions, but hard to omit the deeds 
of personal friends. One midshipman, also protected by a safety waist- 
coat, was found floating about two days and nights after the disaster, 
but was too exhausted to live. 


by small craft of all kinds, met the same fate. The 
submarine picked her out as a good sportsman picks 
out the king of a herd. Fortunately, she was pre- 
pared for the stroke, and only forty-eight men were 
lost. She sank in six fathoms, listing heavily to 
starboard, and then turning completely over, so that 
her keel remained visible, like the back of a huge 
whale, above the surface till near the end of the 
campaign, when she was blown up as an obstruction. 
On the same day as the disaster to the Triumph, 
a submarine also aimed at the Vengeance, the Lord 
Nelson (Admiral de Robeck's flagship), and three 
of the French battleships. It was evident that the 
whole system of naval action, anchorage, and supply 
must be changed. 

Warships and transports were rapidly withdrawn, 
for the most part to Mudros harbour. The Queen 
Elizabeth had been sent home at the first rumour of 
the peril, as being too valuable to risk upon a distant 
and secondary purpose. For the rest, the neighbour- 
ing island of Imbros, lying only from ten to twelve 
miles west and south-west from the landing-places on 
the Peninsula, afforded an open bay as roadstead, 
sandy, shallow, and fully exposed to the north wind. 
On the east side, the bay or inlet is protected by a 
long promontory of sand dunes and sandstone cliff, 
known as Cape Kephalos. On the west rise the 
mountains of Imbros, perhaps the most beautiful 
even of y^gean islands. On this part of the island 
only three small hamlets stand, squalid with poverty. 
But a mountain track over a pass in the central range 
leads to the chief village of Panaghia, and two other 
large villages, rich, as Greek islands go, in maize. 


vines, fig trees, and olives. About two^miles" beyond 
Panaghia lies the crumbling little port of Kastro, 
dominated by an ancient ruined castle, Byzantine, 
Venetian, or Turkish, into which slabs of white 
marble have been built, remnants of some Greek 
temple. The island appears to have small place in 
Greek history and literature, though an unknown 
staff officer, meeting me in one of the valleys, un- 
expectedly quoted perhaps from Sappho a passage 
about it or Lemnos. And, indeed, it is a haunt fit 
for rugged and pastoral gods rather than for polite 
literature, civilisation, and war. From the top of the 
pass the whole of the Peninsula is seen ; the Straits 
and the plain of Troy beyond ; and far in the distance 
the grey heights of Ida, and dim mountains of 
Mitylene. Looking west across a narrow water, 
one sees near at hand the vast red peaks of Samo- 
thrace, a natural home of savage mysteries. 

The arrival of hostile submarines caused the dis- 
persal of the fleet and transports, leaving the main 
supply of the army to indefatigable trawlers, fleet- 
sweepers, and other small craft, and involving the 
removal of General Headquarters from sea to land. 
For some days the Arcadian had a merchant ship 
lashed each side of her for protection, but the navy 
refused further responsibility, and at the end of May 
Sir Ian and his Staff put ashore on Imbros. There 
was no choice, for Tenedos was largely occupied by 
the French ; Mudros was too distant ; and on the 
Peninsula no place could be found for General Head- 
quarters without entanglement in the headquarters 
of divisions or the Anzac Corps. Kephalos Bay 
was nearly equidistant from both landings (about 


twelve miles from Anzac, and ten from Helles), with 
both of which it was rapidly connected by telephone 
and telegraph. Accordingly, the camp was pitched 
among the sand dunes at the base of the Kephalos 
promontory, looking over the bay to jagged mount- 
ains beyond. A small stone pier was built, for 
Headquarter use only, whence Sir Ian visited the 
Peninsula on a torpedo boat three or four times every 
week. On the opposite side of the bay the navy 
constructed a similar but longer pier, and sank a 
collier and two smaller Italian vessels to form a 
breakwater against the north. Thus a fairly 
sheltered port was made for the trawlers running 
daily to the Peninsula with drafts and supplies, and 
for those which returned to Mudros for more. Level 
ground, stretching over a mile south-west, was used 
as a store-depot, a rest-camp, and a training-place for 
reinforcements. Up in the hills a camp was laid out 
for Turkish prisoners, who worked at road-making. 
Two or three miles away, above a salt marsh, and 
upon the south coast, were stations for R.N.A.S. 
aeroplanes, which numbered about 60 in all, but 
never counted more than 25 or 30 in action. In the 
later months of the expedition. General Headquarters 
were removed to the entrance of the deep valley lead- 
ing up to the pass, because gales, dust storms, hostile 
aeroplanes, and want of water and shade upon the 
sand dunes added, as might have been foreseen, to 
the inevitable discomforts of war. 

On May 25 (one month after the landing) Sir Ian 
issued a special order "to explain to officers, non- 
commissioned officers, and men the real significance 
of the calls made upon them to risk their lives, 


apparently for nothing better than to gain a few 
yards of uncultivated land." He pointed out that 
" a comparatively small body of the finest troops in 
the world, French and British, had effected a lodg- 
ment close to the heart of a great Continental 
Empire, still formidable even in its decadence." 
Owing to their attacks, the Government at Constan- 
tinople was gradually wearing itself out. Under- 
stating the estimates received from the agents of 
neutral Powers, he showed that, at the beginning, the 
Peninsula had been defended by 34,000 Nizam (first 
line) troops and 100 guns, with 41,000 half-Nizam, 
half-Redif (second line) on the Asiatic side. By 
May 12 these had been reinforced by 20,000 infantry 
and 2 1 batteries of field artillery. Since then at least 
24,000 had been added from Constantinople and 
Smyrna. Our small expeditionary force, though so 
much reduced,^ had during the month held in check 
nearly 130,000 of the enemy, and, at a low estimate, 
had inflicted on him the loss of 55,000, thus diminish- 
ing the fully trained men at his disposal. The order 
concluded with the words : 

" Daily we make progress, and whenever the 
reinforcements close at hand begin to put in an 
appearance, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force 
will press forward with a fresh impulse to accomplish 
the greatest Imperial task ever entrusted to an 

The task was indeed great, if not the greatest ; 
but in London and on the fronts of war events com- 
bined to increase its difficulty. So far as the 
expedition was concerned, the collapse of the Russian 

^ Our casualties by the end of May were 38,600. 


armies under General von Hindenburg's violent 
attacks in Courland, Poland, and Galicia was the 
event of most vital importance. In this month of 
May the enemy seized the port of Libau, approached 
Przemysl, threatened Warsaw, and drove the 
Russians back from the Carpathians into the basin 
of the Dniester. In consequence of these successive 
blows, it became certain that the Russian Army 
Corps of 43,000 men under General Istomine, which 
was to advance upon Constantinople from the eastern 
side as soon as our fleet and army dominated the 
Dardanelles, would be withdrawn, and the expecta- 
tion of Russian assistance was abandoned. No 
longer threatened from the Black Sea, Turkey could 
now divert an equivalent force to the defence of the 
Peninsula, and did, in fact, divert four or five Divisions. 
What was worse, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, long hesi- 
tating on which side his interests lay, was encouraged 
by the Russian defeats to put his calculating trust 
upon the German alliance. Yet our diplomatists, 
apparently unpractised in deception and ingratitude, 
had fondly supposed that Bulgaria would never take 
arms against her Russian deliverer, and were even 
counting upon her co-operation in the Near East. 
In spite of such errors, it is currently believed that 
aristocratic diplomatists and Foreign Ministers are 
endowed with an ancestral instinct for diplomacy 
beyond the possible possession of people less nobly 
born, and for this reason, if for no other, we must 
indeed be thankful that our aristocracy has survived 
to protect us from blunders even more disastrous 
than their own. 

In the middle of May the Salandra-Sonnino 


Ministry, urged on by the poet D'Annunzio and the 
Futurist Marinetti, declared war upon Austria ; but 
Italy's intervention had small influence on the position 
in the Dardanelles. Mr. Asquith's deliberate over- 
throw of his own Cabinet, and his attempt to promote 
the national cause by a large Coalition Ministry, in 
which he might well have anticipated a hostility fatal 
to his leadership, had greater effect, and the effect 
was maliorn. Mr. Winston Churchill, who could be 
counted upon to promote the interests of the ex- 
pedition as his own particular child, retired to the 
Duchy of Lancaster, resigning the Admiralty to Mr. 
Balfour's charge. Just before his resignation his 
trusted adviser and opponent, Lord Fisher, had 
himself resigned, and refused to return, though called 
upon by the appeal of the whole nation, outside the 
industrious promoters of panic. His place as First 
Sea Lord was taken by Sir Henry Jackson ; but the 
country deplored the loss to her service of a great 
personality. That element of luck which forms part 
of a successful General's endowment was already 
turning against the expedition, and critics were 
beginning to advise retreat, foretelling disasters which 
the prophecy of evil often contributes to promote.^ 

^ " We went on board the Implacable on the way back, where I met 
Ashmead Bartlett, the official newspaper correspondent, who was most 
pessimistic. ' The best thing we could do was to evacuate the place. 
This was developing into a major operation, and we had not the troops 
for it. Achi Baba was untakable, except after months of siege war- 
fare'" (Diary for May 13, by the Rev. O. Creighton, With the 
Twenty -ninth Division in Gallipoli, p. 90). After his fortunate escape 
from the Majestic as she sank, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett returned to 
London for a short time, and the expression of views similar to the 
above by a man of his ability may have increased the disfavour with 
which many had throughout regarded the expedition. 


THUS, within five or six weeks of the first 
landing, the situation had become serious. 
At home, the originator of the campaign 
had ceased to hold important office ; its opponents 
were encouraged by despondent criticism ; and the 
Government, which had hithterto controlled it, was 
transformed. On the Continent, the retirement of 
the Russian armies in Galicia and Poland cancelled 
the expectation of a Russian force to co-operate from 
the Black Sea, and rendered the position of Bulgaria 
dubious. On the Peninsula, the only lines of com- 
munication were threatened by submarines ; such 
assistance as naval guns could supply to the flanks 
was greatly diminished ; the lack of guns and am- 
munition, specially of howitzers and H.E. shells, was 
severely felt ; the new drafts were unacquainted with 
their officers, and the officers with each other ; at 
Helles and Anzac the positions were fairly secured, 
but the men were much worn by almost continuous 
struggle, and harassed by repeated and random shell- 
ing. From this, indeed, the dead ground below the 
cliffs at Anzac off'ered protection, but hardly any point 
at Helles was safe, or even sheltered, whether the 
enemy's guns fired from Achi Baba or the Asiatic 
coast. As reinforcement. Sir Ian had received the 


42nd Division and already had been promised the 52nd 
(Lowland Territorial) ; but this did not begin to arrive 
till the middle of June, and he was now compelled to 
ask Lord Kitchener for two complete army corps in 
addition. Yet the expedition had justified itself in 
that, but for its presence in the Dardanelles, the 
whole of the Near East would have fallen to the 
enemy's influence, the Russian left flank would have 
hung in air without hope of succour, and an over- 
whelming attack upon the Suez Canal would almost 
certainly have been attempted. 

It was now essential to gain more room at Helles, 
and by repeated assaults to push the enemy's lines 
farther away from the landing beaches. Accordingly, 
Sir Ian issued orders for another general attack on 
June 4. It was a Friday, the day after Przemysl 
had fallen into the enemy's hands once more. At 
early morning Sir Ian and the Headquarter Staff 
crossed to Helles, and were there joined by General 
Gouraud. They stationed themselves on the high 
ground of the command-post above Cape Tekke, 
whence a prospect of the slightly hollow plain and 
opposite slopes of Krithia and Achi Baba could be 
obtained, although, under the northerly breeze, a 
violent dust storm blew. As before, the British VI I Ith 
Corps (consisting of the remains of the 29th Division, 
together with Sikhs and Gurkhas of the Indian 
Brigade, the 42nd Division, and the R. N.D., 
in that order from left to right) held the left and 
centre of the line, while the French and Colonial 
Corps of two Divisions held the right. The yEgean 
and the Straits protected either flank, but, as was 
inevitable on the Peninsula, this very protection 


rendered flank movements in attack impossible, and 
every advance was necessarily made straight against 
the enemy's front. The British front of about three 
and a half miles was occupied by 17,000 infantry, 
with 7000 in reserve. 

The attack was preceded by a longer bombard- 
ment than usual, probably because the French General 
had generously lent the British two groups of " 75's " 
(six batteries of four guns apiece) with H.E. shell. 
The guns from sea and land opened fire at 8 a.m. and 
continued till midday, with short intervals. During 
the latest interval a feint was practised in the hope of 
inducing the Turks to fill up their first line of trenches, 
which were thinly held. Our men fixed bayonets, 
and waved them above the parapets, as though about 
to advance. The Turks swarmed down the com- 
munication trenches to their front line, and were 
caught by a sudden renewal of our bombardment. 
At noon the guns lengthened their range, and, pro- 
tected by their "barrage," as the manoeuvre came to 
be called later in the war, the infantry advanced in 
earnest. For the first half-hour the advance was 
rapid, especially in the centre, and hope of decisive 
victory rose high. 

This success was chiefly due to the extraordinary 
dash of the Manchester (42nd Division) and the 2nd 
Naval (R.N.D.) Brigades. Under young and high- 
spirited leaders such as few troops possessed,^ the so- 
called "amateurs "of the Anson, Hood, and Howe 
Battalions rushed forward through the bushes and 
small ravines of the neutral ground, stormed the first 

^ Such as Col. Crauford Stewart of the Hood (wounded) and Col. 
Roberts, R.A. (Egyptian Army), of the Anson (killed). 


trench, and captured the southern face of a projecting 
Turkish redoubt. It was done in a quarter of an 
hour, and in five-and-twenty minutes their consoHdat- 
ing parties were at work upon the positions gained. 
The Manchester Brigade (always a model of what 
Lord Haldane's Territorials could become) swept 
forward with even greater success. In five minutes 
they were over the first line ; in half an hour they 
had captured the second, and it was believed that no 
defences lay between them and Achi Baba. The 
belief was probably too sanguine, but at all events 
they had won a third of a mile, and the working 
parties began reversing the aspect of the excellently 
constructed Turkish trenches. 

Farther to the left, the 88th Brigade (29th 
Division), though exposed to heavy fire from front 
and left flank, and met with the bayonet by Turks 
who courageously awaited their assault, succeeded in 
capturing the first line of trenches, the Worcesters 
especially distinguishing themselves. But the farther 
advance of the division was checked because the 14th 
Sikhs on their left were held up by barbed wire at 
the first trench, remaining undamaged by the bom- 
bardment. For the same reason, the 6th Gurkhas, 
who had skilfully advanced along the extreme edge 
of the cliffs, were compelled to withdraw, and rein- 
forcements were hurried up from the reserve. But 
even the new battalions were unable to advance 
against the heavy rifle-fire, and the left of the British 
line was thus kept in check, unable to conform with 
the victorious advance in the centre. 

With the French upon our right, all seemed at 
first to go well. The ist Division carried the first 


trenches. The 2nd or new Division, with character- 
istic dan, at last rushed the formidable redoubt which 
commanded the approach to the southern slope leading 
up to the crest above Kereves Dere, and had barred 
the French advance almost since the first advance. 
From its bulging crescent shape, the French called it 
the " Haricot." Unfortunately, here again, as before, 
the Senegalese and Colonial troops were found un- 
able to retain positions which they had won. With- 
in an hour of the first infantry advance, the Turks 
projected an overwhelming counter-attack upon the 
" Haricot," shelling it heavily and pouring masses of 
reinforcements down the deep communication trenches. 
A fatal gap was thus opened between the French 
and British lines. The right flank of the 2nd Naval 
Brigade became dangerously exposed. The fortune 
of the battle turned. 

In less than half an hour from their great success, 
the Howe, Hood, and Anson Battalions were thus 
subjected to intense enfilading fire. The lately 
arrived Collingwood Battalion came to their support, 
but in this their first battle they were almost extermi- 
nated, losing over 600 men and their commanding 
officer. Commander Spearman, R.N., killed.^ Com- 
pelled to retire across the open ground over which they 

^ The original Collingwood, with the Hawke and Benbow Battalions, 
crossed the Dutch frontier in retiring from Antwerp, and were interned. 
The new battalions were left to complete their training in England, 
when the R.N.D. sailed. Thus the Collingwood (Commander Spearman, 
R.N.) was now for the first time under fire. The brother of Lieut.- 
Commander Freyberg (see p. 120) was killed on this occasion. The 
Collingwood relics and the Benbow were incorporated soon after this 
battle with the Hood, Howe, and Anson Battalions as the 2nd Naval 
Brigade — an arrangement resented on both sides, but inevitable owing 
to reduction of men. 


had charged, and exposed to a torrential rain of bullets 
from machine-guns and rifles, this brigade of the 
unfortunate but invariably noble division suffered 
the losses of massacre. Even worse followed. The 
retirement and partial destruction of the Naval 
Brigade left the right flank of the Manchesters " in 
air " upon a very advanced position. Their Brigadier, 
General Noel Lee, an excellent leader of men, and 
in civil life partner in a well-known Lancashire ship- 
ing and cotton firm, was wounded ; many of their 
officers killed. Yet the men declared they would for 
ever hold the ground they had so rapidly won ; they 
only asked for help upon their right. To check the 
enfilading fire their right flank was thrown back to 
face it, and in the midst of tangled scrub and enemy 
trenches the brigade fought on two fronts at right 
angles to each other. It was an impossible position, 
but still the men clung on. Our reinforcements had 
already been almost exhausted in drafts to the extreme 
left, where the advance was held up, as described. 

At 6.30, General Hunter- Weston, commanding 
the Vlllth Corps, after consultation with Sir Ian, was 
constrained to "pull out" the Manchesters from 
their exposed and untenable salient. With almost 
mutinous reluctance the troops withdrew into the 
first line of Turkish trenches, taken in the first rush, 
and the remainder of the Division conformed. In 
spite of an endeavour made by the Royal Fusiliers 
at 4 p.m. to establish themselves beyond this first 
line, the 29th Division and the Indians had been 
unable to advance farther upon the left, and the 
gain so confidently expected, especially in the centre, 
was now reduced to an advance of 200 yards in some 


places and 400 yards in others. The prisoners 
amounted to 400, including 1 1 officers, among whom 
were 5 Germans, the relics of a machine-gun de- 
tachment from the Goeben} 

During the night an excellent piece of work 
was accomplished by the Nelson Battalion, R.N.D. 
(Colonel Evelegh).^ They were sent up to establish 
touch between the right of the 42nd Division and 
the left of the R.N.D. This task involved digging 
forward a "switch trench" under very heavy fire, 
but the connection between the exposed flanks was 
thus made good. 

Late in the afternoon of the battle, Major-General 
De Lisle, famous as a dashing leader of mounted 
troops in the South African War, and now coming 
fresh from command of the ist Cavalry Division in 
France, arrived at Helles to take over the command 
of the 29th Division. The news that met him there, 
illustrated by the streams of wounded passing down 
to W Beach, was not encouraging. As had happened 
before in this campaign, and was to happen more than 
once in the future, the hope of victory had been dashed 
at the moment when victory appeared most certain, and 
it had been frustrated by failure at one single point. 
The losses were unusually heavy — estimated at 5000 
at the time — and large numbers of the best remaining 
officers in the 29th Division and the R.N.D., not to 
mention the Manchester Brigade, had fallen.^ Owing 
to the retirement of the line from the positions they 

^ Notes of the battle from hour to hour were taken by a French 
medical officer {Unce?tsored Letters from the Dardanelles^ pp. 121-125). 
^ This fine officer was killed in the battle of July 13. 
^ One brigade of the R.N.D. alone lost 60 officers. 


had taken, some of the wounded were of necessity 
left on the neutral ground together with the dead, 
and uniforms, hanging loosely upon the shrunken 
corpses, were long visible at exposed points, whence 
nothing could be reclaimed. By Sir lan's personal 
orders attempts were made to recover the dead and 
wounded under the white flag, but they failed/ The 
fact was that when small parties went out under a 
white flag they were fired upon. This frequently 
happened at the termination of a severe battle, 
though the Turks appear to have fired rather as a 
warning than with immediate intent to kill. But for 
this hostile attitude it is possible that a formal armistice 
might have been arranged, such as Sir Ian tacitly 
granted to the Turks at Helles on May 2, and by 
negotiation at Anzac on May 24. 

Heavy fighting was renewed before dawn on 
the 6th, and continued at intervals for two days and 
nights, the Turks repeating their counter-attacks, 
especially down the upper reach of the Gully Ravine. 
Here the Royal Fusiliers (86th Brigade) suffered 
terrible loss. Major Brandreth, a singularly fine 
officer, then in command of the battalion, wounded 
on the day of landing, was now killed. Many of 
the new officers who had lately arrived with the 
drafts were killed also, including Captain Jenkinsbn 

1 " The worst was that the wounded had not been got back, but lay 
between ours and the Turks' firing hne. It was impossible to get at 
some of them. The men said they could see them move. The firing 
went on without ceasing. . . . The General had suggested putting up a 
white flag, and some one going out to the wounded. They tried this 
later, but it failed" {With the Twenty-nirith Divisw?i, pp. 122, 123). 
Who the General was is left uncertain. The passage is from a diary of 
June 5. 


of Oxford, one of the greatest authorities on embry- 
ology. By June 8 only one officer, the former 
Sergeant-Major, was left of those who had originally 
come out, besides the Quartermaster. Of the 
original regiment only 140 remained. All the ten 
officers who had recently joined were lost. Their 
places were taken by a new Captain from the Dublins, 
in command, and about fifteen other officers, collected 
from various regiments, and all strange to each other 
and the men. The Hampshires (88th Brigade) had 
fared still worse, having only about 100 of the 
original men left, and no officers at all.^ Thus, 
under the stress of frontal attacks upon entrenched 
and commanding positions, manned by Turks, and 
assaulted without suitable or adequate artillery, 
battalions dwindled to companies, brigades to 
battalions, divisions to brigades, and an army corps 
to a division. Amid losses so overwhelming it 
seemed impossible to retain a regimental spirit. 
Yet such is the power of a name endowed with 
traditional honour that in a week or two the new 
arrivals, both of officers and men, as they came 
drifting in, became inspired with a resolve to carry 
forward the inherited reputation maintained by so 
many deaths. 

For the next fortnight repeated small assaults and 
counter-attacks continued to reduce the numbers, 
while holding the Turks in check and preserving 
the activity and confidence of the men. On June 
21 the French Divisions captured the "Haricot" 

^ With the Twenty-ninth Division, pp. 122-129. Of original officers 
in this famous division, the South Wales Borderers now had the most left. 
They had eight. 


Redoubt. The attack began at dawn, and by noon 
the 2nd Division had occupied the position. But 
the I St Division, after taking a Hne of trenches, 
was driven out in a counter-attack, and exposed to 
victorious troops on their left, as so often happened 
in the French engagements at Helles. In the after- 
noon General Gouraud called upon his right flank 
for a renewed effort, and at 6 p.m. the lines were 
taken again and held. The possession of these lines 
and the " Haricot " gave the French a partial com- 
mand of the Kereves Dere, reduced the salient of 
our centre by bringing up their forces on the right, 
and generally shortened and straightened out our 
line across the Peninsula. The French loss was 
estimated at 2500,^ the Turkish at nearly three times 
that amount. But this estimate of "over 7000" is 
probably an exaggeration, though one of the Turkish 
trenches, 200 yards long and 10 feet deep, was de- 
scribed as brimming over with the dead,^ and 50 
prisoners were taken. 

By this time two brigades of the 52nd Division 
had arrived, and the third was nearly due. It was 
a Territorial Division (the "Lowland"), commanded 

1 The loss, unhappily, included Colonel Giraudon, Chief of the Staflf, 
who had been rashly put to command the 2nd Colonial Brigade of the 
ist Division on this occasion — a serious, brave, and intellectual soldier. 
He was dangerously wounded, as was Colonel Nogues, commanding the 
6th Colonial Regiment in that brigade, who with his regiment had dis- 
tinguished himself greatly in the attack upon Kum Kali and else- 
where (see Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles, p. 137). Colonel 
Giraudon returned to his position in the Dardanelles, and survived to 
do excellent work in France, where he was, however, ultimately killed 
in action. 

2 Account by Mr. Compton Mackenzie, who acted as authorised 
correspondent for the London papers during Mr. Ashmead Bartlett's 
temporary absence. 


for the first few weeks by Major-General G. G. A. 
Egerton, who collapsed from nervous overstrain in 
the middle of July, and, though reinstated for a time 
by General Hunter- Weston, was ultimately succeeded 
in command by Major-General H. A. Lawrence, son 
of the great Lord Lawrence of the Indian Mutiny.-^ 
It was a fairly homogeneous and steady division, 
and, though rapidly reduced in strength, its improve- 
ment after the first month or six weeks was much 

It was not long before one of the newly arrived 
brigades was called into action. The artillery, even 
with French help, was now insufficient for another 
general advance. The shells were running out ; few 
H.E. shells were left ; the howitzers numbered eight, 
or two to a division (four others which arrived later 
had seen service at Omdurman in 1898); whereas, 
even at the beginning of the war, eighteen howitzers 
went to each division in France. Among the field- 
guns were batteries of old 15-pounders, which had 
established their futility in the Boer War (one 
Vickers gun was reported to have come from a well- 
known museum) ; but such things were thought good 
enough for the Dardanelles. Except the 29th and 
the Anzacs, the Divisions had no other field-guns, 

^ The division consisted of the 155th Brigade (Brig. -General J. F. 
Erskine, succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Pollok-M'Call), containing the 
4th and 5th Battalions Royal Scottish Fusiliers, and the 4th and 5th 
Battalions K.O.S.B.; the 156th Brigade (Brig.-General Scott-Moncrieff, 
killed on June 28 ; then Brig.-General H. G. Casson, succeeded by 
Brig.-General L. C. Koe), containing the 4th and 7th Royal Scots, and 
the 7th and 8th Scottish Rifles ; and the 157th Brigade (Brig.-General 
R. W. Hendry, succeeded by Brig.-General H. G. Casson), containing 
the 5th, 6th, and 7th Highland Light Infantry, and the 5th Argyll and 
Sutherland Highlanders. 


and the R.N.D. had no guns at all. It was, therefore, 
essential to limit the thrust, and General Hunter- 
Weston formed a scheme for pushing forward on the 
left, so as to clear the obstacles which had hitherto 
checked our advance along the coast, and to reduce 
the salient in the centre, as the French had reduced 
it by seizing the " Haricot." While the centre 
remained steady about a mile from the sea, the left 
was to swing forward upon it as upon a pivot, cover- 
ing less ground as the pivotal point was approached. 
Thus five Turkish lines had to be captured by the 
29th Division on the extreme left, and two by the 
156th Brigade (52nd Division), which had been 
inserted on their right. 

The battle began on June 28 with a severe but 
brief bombardment, limited to the Turkish trenches 
on our front nearest the coast. The batteries were 
assisted from the sea by the light cruiser Talbot 
(5600 tons, 1896) and the destroyers Wolverine and 
Scorpion^ which were able to enfilade such positions 
as remained visible. But, for want of ammunition, 
the land bombardment was limited in extent, and 
lasted only twenty minutes. The 87th Brigade 
(Major-General W. R. Marshall),^ supplied with the 
new drafts which had been gradually coming in, at 
once advanced on both sides of the Gully Ravine 
(Saghir Dere). Their part in the attack was to clear 
a further lap of this long and deep ravine or canon, 
which forms one of the most surprising features of 
the southern Peninsula. Advance alone the bottom 

1 Now (spring, 191 8) Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia in suc- 
cession to Sir Stanley Maude, who commanded the 13th Division 
during the later part of the Dardanelles campaign. 


was impossible. Near the entrance from the sea the 
cliffs on both sides rise 200 feet. The slope upwards 
along the Gully is very gradual, and the sides nearly 
up to the very end remain steep, in parts bare sandy 
cliff, in parts covered with bush. The ravine curves 
frequently, twice turning for a short distance almost 
at rio^ht ano-les. Here and there, alons: the middle 
and upper reaches, the bottom was dangerously 
exposed to snipers creeping down and hiding among 
the bushes. Up to the last, even after it became the 
main line of communication with our positions on the 
left, it was constantly shelled, and beyond a point 
about two-thirds up its length no horses were allowed 
to proceed. In spite of screens and sandbag barriers, 
shrapnel and unaimed or dropping rifle-fire frequently 
inflicted loss upon the drafts, reliefs, and supply 
parties continually passing to and fro. There was 
the greater danger because, under the stress of thirst 
and extreme heat, men and animals gathered round 
the water which was in places discovered, especially 
at one clear and cold spring rising from the foot of a 
precipitous cliff upon the right. About half-way up, 
the Turks had barred the valley with a complicated 
entanglement reaching from side to side, and other 
entanglements existed farther on. The only possi- 
bility of clearing such a ravine was to clear the rough 
and bush-covered plateau on both sides. 

Upon the left, after the brief bombardment, three 
battalions of the 87th Brigade (South Wales Borderers, 
K.O.S.B., and Inniskilling Fusiliers) advanced along 
the strip of land between the sea and the ravine, 
already the scene of gallantry and loss. By eleven 
o'clock, forty minutes after the opening of the gun- 


fire, they had rushed the first three trenches. They 
were at once followed by the 86th Brigade, which 
pushed right through them, over the three captured 
trenches. Led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, and 
keeping their formations in spite of the scrub and 
a searching rifle-fire, this renowned Fusilier Brigade 
stormed onward till two more trenches were taken, 
and the task of the 29th Division completed. At the 
same time, the Gurkhas had worked forward along 
the edge of the sea cliffs, and secured a green knoll 
projecting from the end of a spur which marked our 
farthest advance. A few nights after (July 2), the 
Gurkhas were driven out here, but the position was 
retaken by the Inniskilling Fusiliers, though with 
great loss, only two officers being left. On the sea- 
coast west of the ravine our objective was gained, 
and in honour of the achievement the extreme point 
won was always known as Fusilier Bluff 

On the right of the Gully the remaining battalion 
of the 87th Brigade (ist Borderers) within five 
minutes stormed a redoubt overhanging the ravine, 
and called the Boomerang from its curved shape. 
Advancing rapidly, they next carried a stronger re- 
doubt, known as the Turkey Trot, perhaps from the 
speed of the enemy in abandoning it, though the 
trenches right up to the redoubt remained in Turkish 
possession, separated by a sandbag wall. These rapid 
successes were mainly due to two trench-mortars, 
lent by General Gouraud and dropping bombs contain- 
ing some 2,0 lb., some yo lb., of melinite, vertically 
into the trenches at short range. The British force 
at this time possessed a few Japanese trench-mortars 
— very effective, but numbering only six, and these 


short of ammunition. We had no others of any kind. 
Yet, in the scarcity of howitzers, trench-mortars were 
more needed than any gun. Our hand-grenades 
were improvised out of jam-pots. 

To the right of the Borderers, the 156th Brigade 
of the newly arrived 52nd Division came into action 
for the first time. The 4th and 7th Royal Scots 
quickly gained the two trenches allotted to them, but 
the rest of the brigade (7th and 8th Scottish Rifles), 
though nearest to the pivotal point, entirely failed to 
advance, and a later attempt upon the trenches in 
front of Krithia that afternoon also failed. Neverthe- 
less, the morning's work was a victory. It marked 
the most decisive advance upon the Peninsula hitherto. 
Three-quarters of a mile along the coast, and about 
half a mile up the Gully Ravine were won, and the 
Gully's lower reaches and beach rendered more secure. 
Large quantities of stores and ammunition were taken, 
together with about 100 prisoners. The Gully was 
for some distance cleaned of the dangerous filth and 
rubbish characteristic of Turkish lines — the more 
dangerous owing to the unimaginable hosts of flies 
which now added to the discomfort of life on the 
Peninsula, and probably diffused the malignant type 
of diarrhoea with which almost every one was afflicted. 
Our casualties for the day were 1750, the Royal, 
Lancashire, and Dublin Fusiliers suffering most. 
The losses of the 156th Brigade included their 
Brigadier, General Scott-MoncriefT, who was killed 
on "Worcester Flat." 

The Turks lost more heavily, especially in their 
determined counter-attacks during the next few nights, 
when they attempted to recover the lost trenches by 


rushing upon them with bayonet and bombs, their 
supply of which was plentiful. All these attempts 
were vain, and the useless loss of life severe/ They 
seem to have been prompted by Enver Pasha, in 
opposition to his German advisers, and the Turkish 
troops were specially stimulated to the sacrifice by the 
following divisional order, discovered upon a wounded 
officer. The trenches referred to were the five 
captured by the 29th Division on June 28 : 

"There is nothing causes us more sorrow, in- 
creases the courage of the enemy, and encourages him 
to attack more freely, causing us great losses, than 
the losing of these trenches. Henceforth commanders 
who surrender trenches, from whatever side the 
attack may come, before the last man is killed, will 
be punished in the same manner as if they had run 
away. Especially will the commanders of units told 
off to guard a certain front be punished if, instead of 
thinking about their work, supporting their units, and 
giving information to the Higher Command, they only 
take action after a regrettable incident has occurred. 

" I hope that this will not happen again. I give 
notice that if it does I shall carry out the punishment. 
I do not desire to see a blot made on the courage of 

^ " Scenes of desperate fighting are plainly visible all around our 
front line. On a small rise a little to the left {i.e. of our advanced 
position up the Gully) lie half a dozen of our men killed in the final 
advance, whom it had been impossible to get at and bury. Right in 
front a line of khaki figures lie in perfect order only a few yards away, 
yet the sniping is so heavy that even at night it is almost impossible to 
bring them in. Farther up the ravine are heaps of Turkish dead, piled 
together, who have fallen in the big counter-attack. In a gorse patch 
farther to the left lie a further large number of the enemy, mixed up 
with some of our men, for there seems to have been a general melee in 
the open at dawn on the 29th, when our men issued from their trenches 
and hunted the enemy out of the gorse, killing large numbers of them." 
— Dispatches from the Dardanelles^ by E. Ashmead Bartlett, p. 152 

(July 4). 


our men by those who escape from the trenches to 
avoid the rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy. 
Henceforth I shall hold responsible all officers who 
do not shoot with their revolvers all privates trying 
to escape from the trenches on any pretext. 

"Colonel Rifaat, CO., nth Division." 

To this order a regimental commander added the 
following note : 

" To the CO. of ist Battalion. 

" The contents will be communicated to the officers, 
and I promise to carry out the orders till the last drop 
of our blood has been shed. Sign and return. 

" Hassan, CO., 127th Regiment." 

Two days before the battle, a Turkish aeroplane 
scattered copies of a long proclamation intended to 
shake the discipline of the Mohammedan Indian 
troops. It called upon Mussulmans to ask them- 
selves why they were sacrificing their lives for 
English people, who had grabbed their country, 
made them slaves, and now ruled them by tyranny, 
sucking their blood by taxes, taking their wealth to 
London, and regarding them as more contemptible 
than English dogs. It further dwelt upon the 
desperate position of the Allies, the triumphs of 
Germany in Belgium, France, Russia, and by 
submarines on the sea. It said that in Singapore 
and Ceylon the native armies had killed all the 
English and occupied the forts. It asserted that 
many more submarines were coming, and the British 
communications on the Peninsula would be entirely 
cut off. Therefore, it called upon the Indian soldiers 
to slay their tyrant enemies, or at least to join their 


fellow- Moslems in the Turkish army, where they 
would be treated as brothers. It concluded by 
offering a grim dilemma : 

"You are at liberty either to desert to us, and 
save your lives, or to have your heads cut off, to no 
purpose, along with the English." 

The Sikh and Gurkha troops, however, preferred 
to risk the latter alternative.^ 

To both the main battles at Helles during this 
month (June 4 and 28) the Anzac corps rendered 
valuable support. Their task was to retain in 
position the large Turkish forces which hemmed 
them round in their triangle of cliff and ravine. By 
repeated threatenings and attacks they continually 
remained "a thorn in the side" of the enemy's 
defence, always endangering his communications and 
delaying his reinforcement. The chief share of the 
service naturally fell to the troops allotted in " shifts " 
to maintain the apex of the triangle at the farthest 
end of Monash Gully, the continuation of the main 
ravine or valley called "Shrapnel." This position 
was mainly guarded by Pope's Hill, throughout 
commanded by Lieut. -Colonel Harold Pope, i6th 
Battalion (South and Western Australia), and by 
Quinn's, Courtney's, and Steel's Posts, stationed at 
short intervals along the edge of the steep ridge on 
the right, slightly in advance of " Pope's." By the 
digging of narrow and complicated trenches and 
subterranean passages, all these points had been 
converted into small forts ; but the proximity of the 
enemy's counterworks exposed them to continuous 
danger ; for the lines of trench approached each 

^ UnceTtsored Letters, pp. 144-146. 


other in places within 15 yards, and even within 
five. It was easy to lob bombs and grenades over 
from one side to the other, and to converse with 
taunts or ironic compliments in such languages as 
Colonials and Turks could master in common. 

But perilous as the whole position was, "Quinn's," 
hanging on the summit of its almost precipitous 
ascent, was regarded as the point of greatest danger 
and highest honour. Here Major Quinn, 15th 
(Queensland and Tasmania) Battalion, was killed on 
May 29 in repelling a violent and almost successful 
Turkish assault, preceded by a mine explosion, which 
obliterated part of his carefully dug defences. After 
this severe loss, the position was commanded by 
Lieut.-Colonel Malone, Wellington (New Zealand) 
Battalion, for a little over two months, until he fell 
in the great assault upon Sari Bair in August. 
Though not a professional soldier, being a solicitor 
in civil life, he was, none the less, an Irish officer of 
the finest type. Never tired of impressing upon 
myself and other friends the true and serviceable 
paradox that "the whole art of war lies in the 
exercise of the domestic virtues," he maintained his 
exposed position by the unflinching practice of the 
cleanliness, punctuality, courage, and humorous 
endurance of perpetual provocation in which the 
domestic virtues consist. 

From this Post a sortie was made on the night 
of June 4 to destroy an enemy's trench close in front. 
The trench was taken, but the small party was 
bombed out of it in the early morning. Next night 
a somewhat larger party (100 men and 2 officers, 
I St Australian Infantry Brigade) assaulted the strong 


position to the right from Quinn's, known as 
"German Officers' Trenches" from the appearance 
of German officers there during the armistice. 
Here a special party of ten men, under Lieutenant 
E. E. L. Lloyd, ist Battalion (New South Wales), 
was told off to destroy a dangerous machine-gun. It 
was a difficult task, for, like most Turkish trenches in 
this quarter, the trench was protected by heavy 
overhead beams. But one of the ten discharged a 
few rounds into the gun through holes at 5 -foot range, 
and the remainder of the sortie party destroyed some 
of the trench. These sorties cost 116 casualties — a 
heavy loss in proportion to the numbers engaged ; 
but the Turkish loss was reported considerably 

Fighting of some sort was continuous day and 
night along that ridge of Posts. Bombs, rifles, 
machine-guns, and artillery were incessantly at work. 
At night especially the Turks would sometimes be 
seized with a kind of frenzy, and pour out streams of 
bullets, most of which went wailing and whining 
overhead to fall in showers upon the sea. But on the 
29th they made another genuine night attack under 
orders from Enver, who again called upon them to 
chase the Infidel from the soil of Islam. It was 
further provoked by a sortie the previous afternoon 
from the southern end of the Anzac position. About 
half a battalion of Queenslanders (ist Australian 
Light Horse Brigade, of course unmounted) and 
some of the Queensland Infantry (9th Battalion, 3rd 
Australian Brigade), led by Lieut. -Colonel H. Harris, 
rushed from the trenches near the so-called "Wheat 
Field," where the farthest Anzac ridge falls gradually 


towards the coast, and dashed upon a strongly held 
Turkish position opposite. The object seems to 
have been to divert Turkish reinforcements making 
for Krithia, and in this the movement was successful. 
Large numbers of Turks were seen coming up from 
Eski Keui, supposing the Australian outburst to be 
a serious assault, and when they were entangled in 
the scrub and gullies, exposed to various fire from 
Anzac and from destroyers close off shore, the 
Queenslanders withdrew. 

Next day was fairly quiet until afternoon, when 
the Turks were seized by one of the frenzies above 
mentioned. It died away, but at midnight, after 
various feints, they made a violent assault up the 
Nek, or apex of the triangle. It began with heavy 
firing for an hour and a half, and then in the 
moonlight swarms of Turks were seen trotting 
forward across the narrow Nek against our trenches, 
hardly more than 100 yards away, and shouting 
" Allah ! Allah ! " as their religious manner was. 
They were Nizam troops — i8th Regiment, 6th 
Division — fresh arrivals from Asia. As they came on, 
they encountered an overwhelming fire from the New 
Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (Brigadier-General 
Russell, one of the most distinguished of N.Z. officers), 
together with some South Australian Light Horse 
under Brigadier -General F. G. Hughes, destined 
to win still higher reputation upon the same scene. 
These were stationed on Russell Top, commanding 
the Nek and the complicated Turkish position known 
as the Chessboard, close beyond it. Three times 
the Turks ran forward, but rifles and machine-guns 
shattered them as they came, and the shadowy forms 


ceased to move. Others tried to work round the 
Nek on each side, down Monash Gully on their left, 
and by the precipitous front of Walker's Ridge on 
their right. Both attempts failed. Few survived. 
Next morning the Nek and defiles were littered with 
the dead. At least 600 were counted. It was the 
last Turkish attack upon the heights of Anzac.^ 

So the midsummer month drew to an end. There 
was a sense of victory in the air. Officers and men 
grew elated by confidence in superiority. All felt the 
Turks were beaten, if only Helles and Anzac could 
maintain the pressure. Drafts came dribbling in, a 
hundred or so at a time. But, though nominally in 
sufficient numbers to fill up the gaps reported when 
they left England or Egypt, they arrived only to find 
the gaps had meantime increased, and their numbers 
never filled them. Since the landing, two Divisions 
(Territorials) had now arrived. Three more (New 
Army or " Kitchener's ") had been promised, but were 
delayed for another month, and few soldiers can 
retain the elation of victory at high pitch through 
weeks of inaction. " You cannot bottle up enthusiasm 
for future use, as you do pickled herrings," said 
Goethe. Guns were short ; ammunition was worse 
than short ; the lack of it was perilous ; trench- 
mortars and hand-grenades hardly existed. Heat, 
dust, flies, want of water, and the restriction of large 
forces to narrow limits of ground increased sickness 
and wastage in the trenches and dug-outs of both 
Helles and Anzac landings. On the whole, the 
French retained health and vigour best, their rations 
being less monotonous, and themselves more fastidious 

^ Australia in Arms, pp. 205-210. 


in cookery. But on the last day of the month the 
French, and, indeed, the whole army, suffered an 
almost irreparable blow. General Gouraud, command- 
ing the French Army Corps, was visiting the wounded 
on V Beach when an 8-inch shell from Asia 
burst within six yards. As though by miracle, the 
fragments missed him, but the explosive force flung 
him over a six-foot wall and into a fig tree, which 
perhaps lessened the shock. His thigh, ankle, and 
arm were broken, and he was compelled to surrender 
the command, though ultimately he recovered, and 
won further fame at Chalons and in command at 
Rheims. General Bailloud, that volatile and high- 
spirited veteran, succeeded to the command till he was 
transferred to Salonika in October, and was succeeded 
by General Brulard, of the ist Division. 

Upon the Russian front, of which the Dardanelles 
should always have been regarded as an essential 
strategic part, the course of war continued disastrous 
for the Allies. As noticed above, Przemysl was 
retaken by German-Austrian armies on June 3. The 
fall of Lemberg followed on June 22 ; nearly the 
whole of Galicia was reoccupied ; Warsaw was 
threatened ; and at various points, north and south, 
the Russian frontier was crossed. So far as Turkey 
was concerned, the Russian armies were withdrawn 
from the war, and Sir lan's mixed and mainly in- 
experienced forces, insufficient in numbers, ill supplied 
with guns, worse supplied with ammunition, dependent 
upon long and hazardous communications, were left to 
confront the full strength of the Turkish Empire alone.^ 

^ " A rough estimate of their number (Turkish troops) since mobilisa- 
tion is as follows : At the Dardanelles, 130,000; in Thrace, 30,000; at 



During the month, the Italians crossed the Isonzo, 
but against Turkey no declaration of war had yet 
been made. Both sides in the European struggle 
still looked to Bulgaria as a vital point. Each was 
still trying to outbid the other by offers of territorial 
advantage, and both were equally confident of a 
successful bargain with that tough and secretive, but, 
in point of territorial ambitions, typically Balkan race. 

Constantinople and Chitaldja, 20,000 ; on the Bosphorus, 20,000 ; in 
the Caucasus, 60,000 ; at Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, 20,000 ; 
Syria, 30,000 ; Aleppo and Mersine, 30,000 ; Smyrna district, 30,000 ; 
gendarmerie, 30,000 ; at the depots, 50,000 ; scattered, 30,000" {Inside 
Constantinople, p. 125). This makes a total of 480,000, and the writer 
estimates that Turkey had by that time (June 18, 191 5) lost 260,000, 
including 100,000 on Gallipoli, But these statistics are probably of little 
more than Turkish value. 

As to the neglect to supply the Dardanelles Expedition with guns 
and shells, it must, of course, be remembered that they were then short 
on all fronts, and it was only in the beginning of June that Mr. 
Lloyd George was appointed to a Ministry of Munitions. 



UTHILE dwelling upon prominent actions in 
/ our efforts to advance, such as those of 
June 4, June 21, and June 28 and the 
following days, one must always realise that the 
fighting in various parts of the front lines was in fact 
continuous by day and night. On both sides local 
attempts were repeatedly made to capture or destroy 
some section of the opposing trenches. It frequently 
happened that different parts of the same trench 
would be held by the enemy and our companies. At 
the turn of an angle, or the mouth of a communica- 
tion trench, the men on either side would suddenly 
find themselves face to face with the enemy, and a 
combat, waged for bare life with bombs, bayonets, 
and revolvers, ensued. Sandbag barriers were quickly 
erected across entrances, but sometimes, while one 
section was at rest or engaged in cooking, a sentry 
would give warning that a party of about fifty men 
in blue-grey uniforms had crept over the parapets 
to right or left, cleared out the section there, and 
threatened to enfilade. At such moments the safety 
of a line depended upon the alert resource of some 
junior officer and the steady nerves of the platoon 
under his command. No history will ever record the 
deeds of silent self-sacrifice which ennobled these 


daily struggles, and passed almost unnoticed at the 
time, except by the men who witnessed them and 
were themselves too often afterwards obliterated with 
their memories. 

Nor must it be forgotten that the Turkish 
bombardment was daily repeated at intervals in so- 
called "hates." Though the front lines both at 
Helles and Anzac were too close together to be 
shelled with safety to their own men, all the beaches, 
except Gully Beach, were exposed ; and though the 
effect of the fire could not be seen on Anzac Cove 
and Lancashire Landing, the range on both was 
accurately registered, and no one there was safe, 
whether disembarking stores, or dressing wounds, or 
just coming to land, or at rest, or bathing, or engaged 
in workshops and signalling offices, plump into which 
at Helles I saw a large shell fall on August i with 
terrible results in deaths and wounds.^ But, certainly, 
V Beach, beside the River Clyde, was most openly 
exposed. The French depot there constantly suffered, 
especially after the Turks late in June placed four 
heavy batteries on the opposite shore in a hidden 
position between Erenkeui and the Trojan plain. 
Nor were communications safe. On July 4 a large 
transport, the Carthage, a British ship but used by 
the French, was torpedoed by a submarine just off 
W Beach. Fortunately, she was empty. 

^ This destruction of a signal and telegraph station was probably the 
incident referred to at the end of Sir lan's second dispatch. He tells 
how Corporal G. A. Walker, R.E., although much shaken, repaired the 
damage, collected men, and within 39 minutes reopened communi- 
cation by apologising for the incident and saying he required no 
assistance. Twelve were killed or wounded, beside the officer on duty, 


Every day and night at the end of June and 
beginning of July was marked by minor attacks from 
the Turkish Hnes. But the attack on July 2 was 
evidently intended to be more than minor. It began 
with a violent bombardment of our extreme left, to 
which our guns, for mere want of anmiunition, could 
make no efficient reply. At 6 p.m. the Turks came 
swarming down from the upper reaches of the Gully 
Ravine. Checked by machine-guns and the fire of 
the destroyer Scorpion, they renewed the bombard- 
ment, and immediately afterwards two battalions were 
seen advancing^ in re^^ular order, shoulder to shoulder, 
across the open, their officers waving their swords, 
and running bravely forward to encourage their men. 
To machine-guns the shrapnel of the loth Battery, 
R.F.A., was now added, and the Gurkhas were sent 
up to reinforce. No one could stand against our 
fire. The surviving Turks ran back into the ravine 
in disorder. Two clearly marked lines of dead 
showed the limit of the advance. 

A similar attack on a grand scale was tried only 
two days later (the night of July 4-5). Anzac was 
heavily bombarded, a Turkish battleship in the 
Narrows near Chanak throwing at least twenty 
1 1 '2-inch shells into the lines there, right across the 
Peninsula, to say nothing of the guns in the Olive 
Grove and on the Anafarta Hills. At Helles, every 
gun on Achi Baba and the Asiatic shore was brought 
to bear. On W Beach alone, 700 big shells from 
Asia fell. At least 5000 shells exploded on our lines 
and beaches. At 7.30 a.m. the Turkish infantry 
attempted to storm, rightly choosing the junction of 
the Royal Naval Division with the French as our 


weakest point. A few yards of front line were 
entered, but in fifteen minutes cleared again. A 
similar attempt to cut in between the 42nd Division 
and the 29th entirely failed, and again the Turks 
were driven to the shelter of the upper Ravine. The 
General Staff estimated the enemy's losses during 
the preceding week at over 5000 killed and 15,000 
wounded. So encumbered was their position with 
the dead rotting in the intense heat that on July 10 a 
request for five hours' armistice to bury them came 
from the German Commandant, signing himself 
"Weber Pasha." ^ Unwillingly, and only in justice 
to his own men, Sir Ian refused. For it was known 
that Turks, even more than most troops, were re- 
luctant to charge over their dead comrades, whose 
bodies thus became for us an extra barrier of defence, 
equal to a barbed-wire hedge. 

As the enemy's loss was so heavy, the advantage 
in their repeated counter-attacks would have rested 
with us, had it not become evident that they could 
draw upon large reinforcements. Early in July five 
fresh Nizam divisions arrived on the Peninsula. 
They were perhaps partly released by the disappear- 
ance of danger from Russia ; but, as most of them 
came from Adrianople, their presence was more prob- 
ably due to the growing understanding between the 
Central Powers and Bulgaria — an understanding 

^ This was the German General Weber, commanding the " Southern 
Group" on the Peninsula. He was superseded by Vehib Pasha, "a 
grim and fanatical Turk," the change causing great discontent among 
the Germans. " In this case, the Turkish point of view prevailed, 
for General Liman von Sanders, Commander-in-Chief of the Gallipoli 
Army, was determined not to lose his post, and agreed slavishly with all 
that Enver Pasha ordained" (Ta/^? War Years in Constantinople, p. 46). 


believed to have developed into a secret Treaty 
about the middle of July. The arrival of these fresh 
troops rendered the enemy's attacks more serious and 
more frequent. Only by strong counter-attack could 
our position at Helles be maintained and the initia- 
tive remain with us. Accordingly, a formal assault, 
similar to those in June, was ordered for July 12. 
This time the main attack devolved upon our right 
and right-centre, the French and the 52nd (Lowland) 
Division being chiefly engaged. After the customary 
bombardment, supported by heavy naval guns, the 
infantry rushed forward and gained the first two lines, 
but the French and Scots (155th Brigade) lost touch, 
the 4th K.O.S.B., parties of whom actually reached 
the slopes of Achi Baba, came under gun-fire, and 
nothing further was possible till the afternoon. Then, 
after another bombardment, the 157th Brigade pushed 
on and captured a strong redoubt on the edge of the 
Kereves Dere. During the night, however, two 
Scottish brigades in the right-centre came back over 
two lines of trenches. The Royal Naval Division 
was called up (the Nelson Battalion especially 
distinguishing itself), and next afternoon (July 13) 
succeeded in recapturing these trenches. A certain 
advance was also made on their left, while on the 
extreme rio-ht the French succeeded in reachino- the 
mouth of the Kereves Dere itself. Nearly 500 
prisoners were taken, and but for inefficient Staff work, 
considerable advantage might have been secured. 
But little advance was thus effected towards the 
summit of the elaborately entrenched and fortified 
hill, the base of which was protected by great redoubts 
and sprinkled with concealed guns beyond the maze 


of trenches. After this action our supply of shell 
was so much reduced, the reserve so dangerously- 
encroached upon, that further attack became for the 
present impossible without heavy risk. Even such 
bombardment as was sanctioned for those two days 
could only be effected by borrowing French guns — 
about six batteries of " 75's " and a few howitzers. 

Under the strain of these successive days and 
nights of fighting Major- General G. G. A. Egerton, 
as already mentioned, suffered nervous collapse, and 
the command of the 52nd Division was temporarily 
entrusted to Major-General F. C. Shaw, recently 
arrived to command the 13th Division (" Kitchener's " 
or New Army) now coming in. Though General 
Egerton returned to his command for a short time, 
his place was ultimately taken by Major-General 
H. R. Lawrence. But, naturally, a still more serious 
matter was the loss of Major-General Hunter- 
Weston, the tough and experienced Officer Com- 
manding the famous 29th Division in the earlier 
battles, and subsequently commanding the Vlllth 
Army Corps. For three months, without cessation 
by day or night, this General, who certainly never 
spared his troops, had himself endured all the perils, 
anxieties, and sorrows of an officer directing a series 
of desperate actions, or rather one continuous des- 
perate action, which, as the price of an unparalleled 
achievement, had deprived him of nearly all his most 
trusted subordinates, devastated devoted troops with 
irreparable loss, and stretched his mind on the rack 
of ceaseless apprehension how best to encounter 
imminent dangers with insufficient means. Burning 
sun, dust storms, and repeated incalculable crises of 


peril may wear down the bravest physical nature, 
and in high fever he was compelled to seek refuge 
first in the Admiral's Triad, and then in a hospital 
ship leaving the scene of his great exploits. Such 
consolation as is possible for a man so placed he 
might derive from the eulogy justly bestowed upon 
"the incomparable 29th Division" by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief when the brigades were withdrawn 
in turn for a brief rest at Imbros after the battle of 
late June. For, after speaking of their recent deeds, 
Sir Ian concluded : 

"Therefore it is that Sir Ian Hamilton is con- 
fident he carries with him all ranks of his force when 
he congratulates Generals Hunter- Weston and De 
Lisle, the Staff, and each officer, N.C.O., and man in 
this Division, whose sustained efforts have added fresh 
lustre to British arms all the world over." 

The command of the Vlllth Army Corps was 
temporarily taken over by Lieut. -General Sir 
Frederick Stop ford, who had arrived at Imbros with 
his Staff on July 11. He was thus given an oppor- 
tunity of experience in the kind of fighting required 
of his forces when he commanded the IXth Army 
Corps, then gradually concentrating for a new enter- 
prise. Major-General Douglas (42nd Division) next 
took command for a time. For the permanent com- 
mand, perhaps. Sir Bruce Hamilton might have been 
appointed but for his deafness. Ultimately Lieut. - 
General Sir F. J. Davies, who had seen much service 
of every kind since entering the Grenadier Guards in 
1884, was sent out. He arrived from France on 
August 5, took over the command on August 8, and 
commanded the Vlllth Army Corps to the end. 


On the part of the French, the losses during the 
first half of July were also heavy. Of individual 
losses, the most serious were caused in the early 
morning of July 12 by a heavy shell which destroyed 
the ist Division command - post, killing Major 
Romieux, Chief of Staff, and mortally wounding 
General Masnou, commanding the ist Division. He 
was succeeded by General Brulard, who had seen 
much service in Morocco. Lieut.-Colonel Vernhol 
was his Chief of Staff. 

Some idea of the habitual life in the fighting lines 
during the next two or three weeks of comparative 
quiet may be gathered from notes which I wrote 
hurriedly at the time. Towards the end of July I 
was staying on the wreck of the River Clyde, daily 
visiting one section or other of the British lines (the 
French being " out of bounds," though in later months 
I found all French officers and men anxious to wel- 
come us). One day when I had been chiefly with 
the 42nd Division and the 38th Brigade (13th Divi- 
sion) temporarily attached to them for training, 1 
made the following notes among others : 

" Starting from W Beach, you struggle through 
dust clouds, 'left shoulder up,' till you find one of the 
dusty white tracks by which Krithia villagers used to 
visit the town of Seddel Bahr. One passes through 
what was lately a garden of wild flowers, fields, vine- 
yards, and scattered olive trees, but is now the desola- 
tion which people make and call war. It is a wilder- 
ness of mounds and pits and trenches, of heaped-up 
stores and rows of horses stabled in the open, of 
tarpaulin dressing-stations behind embankments, of 
carts and wagons continually on the move, of Indian 
muleteers continually striving to inculcate human 


reason into mules. Except for a few surviving trees, 
hardly a green thing remains. Over all this wilder- 
ness a cloud of dust sweeps perpetually, and on the 
results of war flies multiply with a prosperity unknown 
to them before. 

" Shaded by the largest remaining trees lay the 
headquarters of the Royal Naval Division, always near 
the front, always engaged, and hardly enough recog- 
nised. Being neither army nor navy, they share the 
common danger of nondescripts, and people at home 
do not forget the untrained condition in which they 
were rushed out to Antwerp. Now war has given 
them the sternest training, and here they stand, 
always ready to take a foremost place in the fighting 
line, singularly clean in dug-out and trench, singularly 
free from all the common ailments of a war in sun and 
flying dirt. 

" I went on to the 42nd Division, and passing the 
Divisional Headquarters entered a shallow nullah, 
rather safer than the track ; for the whole of the open 
ground right away from Cape Helles is exposed to 
shell-fire. The peculiarity of this watercourse is that 
there is visible water in it — a trickle of filthy greenish 
water unfit for washing or drinking ; but still the men 
wash where it has settled down in the large holes 
made by 'Jack Johnsons' or 'Black Marias' which 
have pitched in its bed. 

"One point where the watercourse divides is in- 
evitably called ' Clapham Junction.' But Lancashire 
names have been given to the main trenches and 
'dumps.' Burnley, Warrington, and Accrington 
have given names to the narrow clefts which are 
the homes of the Lancashire men, and a long com- 
munication trench, constructed by the Turks with 
extraordinary ingenuity, has now become Wigan 
Road. Like all this part of our position, that trench 
was captured in the fighting of June 4-6, relics of 
which, in the shape of the dead who cannot be reached 


for burial, still lie exposed in certain places among our 
own lines, so keen is the watch of the Turkish 

"The 38th Brigade is all Lancastrian too. In 
its headquarters, General Baldwin was giving a 
discourse to his officers. A young Captain Chad- 
wick, of the machine-guns, showed the way round 
the trenches. Through periscopes, or by raising the 
eyes for a few seconds above the parapet (for I found 
it hard to judge distances through a periscope), one 
could see the Turkish black and white sandbags only 
forty or fifty yards from our front, and follow the long 
lines and mazes of trenchwork round the base of Achi 
Baba. Holes through the tops of the periscopes 
proved the vigilance of the Turkish outlook, and in 
passing certain points everybody has to run. 

" The rifle-fire was not very frequent. Shells 
kept flying over our heads, but only to burst far away 
upon the wilderness, or on W Beach. Except during 
an attack, the firing line is not the most dangerous part 
of the Peninsula. In the midday heat, the men who 
were not 'standing to,' were quietly engaged in cook- 
ing or eating their dinner. They cooked on little 
wood fires lighted in holes scooped out in the trench 
side, and their tin ' canteens ' served for cooking pots 
and plates. 

" So there these sons of Lancashire stood, almost 
naked in the blaze of sun, jammed between high walls 
of white and parching marl ; some were cooking, some 
having their dinner from the pans, some crouching 
in any corner of shade that could be found, some 
engaged upon war's invariable occupation of picking 
lice off the inside of their clothes. I don't know 
what work they had done before — weaving, spinning, 
mining, smelting, I don't know what — but they were 
at an unaccustomed sort of work now, and yet how 
quickly they have adapted themselves to so strange a 
life in so strange a land ! " 


The food thus cooked was abundant but monoton- 
ous. The chief luxury was the ration of apricot jam 
— welcome for a time, but always apricot. Officials 
naturally find monotony the easiest form of supply, 
and forget that variety is essential in human food. 
The case of "bully beef" was worse. Certain kinds 
of it (South American) were so salt that it ought to 
have been stewed or boiled before issued. Salt meat, 
unvaried week after week under a burning sun and in 
stifling trenches where water is limited to teacupfuls, 
is not attractive. To troops afflicted with violent 
diarrhoea it is uneatable and dangerous. When the 
Anzac men threw over tins of meat to the Turks in 
exchange for packets of cigarettes, it was a cheap gift, 
and the enemy returned the message, " Bully Beef 
Non. Envoyez milk." Salt, hard and distasteful 
food, in persistent monotony, increased the prevalent 
disease until the demand for castor oil (which was 
considered the most soothing remedy) far exceeded 
the calculated supply, and at Anzac General Bird- 
wood was obliged to issue orders against excessive 
indulgence, lest castor oil should become Australia's 
national drink. Appeals for a canteen where variety 
could be purchased remained unheeded till much 
later in the campaign. At Imbros, a few Greeks 
were licensed to erect stalls where fruit, cigarettes, 
"Turkish Delight" (lakoumi), candles, and various 
tinned goods could be purchased by the brigades 
mustering there, or withdrawn there for rest. Greek 
sailing-boats anchored along K Beach, the main 
landing-place on that island, also did a similar trade, 
especially in fruit. At Helles, on W Beach, stood a 
canteen shed, nearly always empty. Late in August 


or in September a canteen ship at last reached Anzac, 
but the supply was so small that the representative 
purchaser from each battalion was not allowed more 
than a sixth of what he asked and had money to pay 
for. Yet whenever the simplest alteration in rations 
was possible, such as the issue of rice, cocoa, raisins, or 
even a different jam, the health of the men improved. 
The water supply was a perpetual anxiety, especi- 
ally at Anzac. Water could be found in a few places 
by digging, especially near the shore, where, however, 
it soon became brackish. At Helles there were a few 
springs and a few old wells. At the extreme left or 
north of the Anzac position (near the hill known as 
Fort 3), Colonel Bauchop, then in command there, 
showed me in July an excellent spring of pure water, 
said to have been discovered by a "diviner," Sapper 
Stephen Kelly, of Melbourne, with a hazel twig. As 
it was close to the sea, at the mouth of one of the 
largest watercourses that drain the range of Sari 
Bair, though dry on the surface in summer, it might 
have been possible to divine the presence of water 
beneath the surface without supernatural aid ; but the 
source was soon fitted up with pumps and cisterns, 
supplying that district well. For the centre of Anzac 
and the outlying trenches along the heights, most of 
the water was brought from the Nile in lighters and 
pumped into iron reservoirs upon the Cove beach in 
front of General Headquarters. A larger one con- 
taining 30,000 gallons was also constructed on a plat- 
form up the cliff, but without great success, owing to the 
breakdown of the pumping-engine. The water was 
carefully rationed out into water-bottles or tins — so 
carefully tliat a man was fortunate to get a mugful for 




washing and shaving. " Having a good clean up?" 
said General Birdwood, in his friendly way, to an 
Australian thus engaged. " Yes, sir," the man replied, 
"and I only wish I was a bloody canary ! " 

From notes written down by myself in the middle 
of that July, I take the following description : 

" So here the Anzacs live, practising the whole 
art of war. Amid dust and innumerable flies, from 
the mouths of little caves cut in the face of the cliffs, 
they look over miles of sea to the precipitous peaks of 
Samothrace and the grey mountains of Imbros. Up 
and down the steep and narrow paths, the Colonials 
arduously toil, like ants which bear the burdens of 
their race. Uniforms are seldom of the regulation 
type. Usually they consist of bare skin dyed to a 
deep reddish copper by the sun, tattooed decorations 
(a girl, a ship, a dragon), and a covering that can 
hardly be described even as 'shorts,' being much 
shorter. Every kind of store and arm has to be 
dragged or 'humped' up these ant-hills of cliff, and 
deposited at the proper hole or gallery. Food, water, 
cartridges, shells, building timber, guns, medical stores 
— up the tracks all must go, and down them the 
wounded come. 

" So the practice of the simple life proceeds, with 
greater simplicity than any Garden Suburb can boast, 
and the domestic virtues which constitute the whole 
art of war are exercised with a fortitude rarely main- 
tained upon the domestic hearth." 

July 23 was the anniversary of the "constitution " 
proclaimed by the Young Turks in 1908, and it was 
expected that the enemy would celebrate the dawn by 
another attack. Being then at Anzac, I made the 
following notes, which are here included as giving 
some idea of usual daily life upon the outer lines ; 


** Reinforcements were known to be arriving, or 
perhaps arrived, across the Narrows — 100,000 men, 
as reported. It was Ramazan, and the sacred moon, 
three-quarters full, gave light for climbing the pre- 
cipitous yellow cliffs. By eleven I was at the highest 
point. Through deeply cut saps and ' communica- 
tions,' the work of Australian miners, the way runs in 
winding labyrinth. Though the depth of our three- 
mile position measures no more than three-quarters of 
a mile from the shore to the farthest point inland (not 
counting by the measurement of cliff and valley sur- 
face, but straight through the air), the length of sap 
and trench runs to much over a hundred miles. The 
point I reached had served as a machine-gun emplace- 
ment, but that evening it was watched by a Sikh 
sentry who stood in the shadow, silent as the shadow. 
Mounted on the firing-step I looked over the sandbag 
parapet upon a peculiar scene. 

" Far on my right lay the sea, white with the 
pathway of the setting moon. Up from the shore 
ran the lines of our position. Close outside the lines, 
north, south, and east, the Turks stood hidden in their 
trenches — 25,000 to 35,000 of them, as estimates say. 
All the time they kept up a casual rifle-fire. Some 
six miles away, in the centre of the Peninsula south, I 
could see the long and steep position of Kilid Bahr 
plateau, where the Turks drill new troops daily, and 
three or four miles farther still away rose the danger- 
ously gentle slopes and low, flat summit of Achi Baba. 
Beyond it gleamed the sudden flashes of Turkish and 
British gruns defending or assaulting the sand-blown 
point of land between Krithia and Cape Helles. 
Sometimes, too, a warship's searchlight shot a 
brilliant ray across the view. 

" At one o'clock the moon set in a deep red haze 
over the sea. But nothing happened. The enemy 
merely kept up a casual fire upon our sandbags, 
shaking the sand down upon my face as I lay on a 


kind of shelf beside the parapet. Then suddenly, just 
on the stroke of two (about midnight in London), an 
amazing disturbance arose. 

" Every Turk who held a rifle or commanded a 
machine-gun began to fire as fast as he could. From 
every point in their lines arose such a din of rifle- 
fire as I have seldom heard even at the crisis of a 
great engagement. It was one continuous blaze and 
rattle. From a gap in the parapet I could see the 
sharp tongues of flame flashing all along the edges, 
like a belt of jewels. Minute followed minute, and 
still the incalculable din continued. Now and again 
one of our guns flung up a shell which burst like a 
firework into brilliant stars, as though to ask, * What 
on earth is the matter with you ? ' Now and again 
another gun threw a larger shell which came lumber- 
ing up Shrapnel Gully with a leisurely note, to burst 
crashing among the enemy's trenches. And still the 
roar of rifles and machine-guns went on incessantly, 
and still nothing occurred. Suddenly, after just a 
quarter of an hour, the tumult ceased, with as little 
reason as it had begun. 

" What was the origin of it all, no one who knows 
the Turk would guess. A salutation to the dawn of 
Constitution Day ; panic at the imaginary appear- 
ance of ghostly bayonets fixed for the charge ; the 
instinct which impels a man to fire a rifle when 
another fires ? In lately captured orders, the Turks 
were seriously warned against wasting ammunition, 
and now, in a quarter of an hour, they had expended 
thousands of rounds upon sandbags ; one man killed 
and two slightly wounded. I afterwards learnt that 
the Anzacs fired off only two belts (500 rounds) of 
machine-gun, and 74 rounds of rifle. 

"When the storm subsided, we and the Turkish 

snipers settled down again to normal relations, and 

all was star-lit peace. At half-past three the phantom 

of false dawn died into daylight, and the men who 



had been 'standing to' all night sank to sleep 
at the bottom of the trenches. Picking my way 
over their splendid forms, I climbed down the 
cliffs again to my cavern beside the sea. I was 
told that, as an attack was expected that night 
(spies so reported), not a single man in the Anzac 
force had gone sick." 

That was a special occasion, but no matter where 
one slept at Anzac, the air overhead wailed ceaselessly 
with bullets, and from time to time shrapnel burst or 
heavy shell exploded, especially around headquarters 
close to the beach in the centre of Anzac Cove. 
There, up a short flight of steps, General Birdwood 
had his dug-out, and there during the night of 
July 27, Lieutenant B. W. Onslow (nth K.E.O. 
Lancers), the General's A.D.C., an excellent soldier, 
sleeping on the top of his dug-out owing to the intense 
heat, was killed instantly as he slept. 

At the advanced base in Mudros harbour (the 
third vital point in the expedition at this time), an 
important change in command was effected in the 
middle of this month. Throughout the first weeks 
of fighting and organisation, this base was left 
destitute of an Inspector-General of Communications. 
The heavy and complicated work involved, especially 
in the transhipment of all drafts and supplies and 
ammunition from the ordinary transports to trawlers 
and small craft after the danger of submarines was 
reported, fell upon the Principal Naval Transport 
Officer (Admiral Phillimore) and the Quartermaster- 
General (Brigadier-General S. H. Winter). In June, 
Major- General Wallace was appointed to the office, 
but his long experience as an executive officer in 


India had not specially qualified him for a peculiarly 
difficult piece of administrative work, and complaints 
arose of the confusion and delay on board the s.s. 
Aragon, assigned to him as headquarters. Hitherto 
this liner (hired at great cost from the Royal Mail 
Steam Packet Company) had served as offices for the 
Principal Naval Transport Officer, and as the General 
Post Office. The new Staff of enormous size was 
now added, and the ship also became a kind of 
clearing-house or depot for officers passing to and 
fro. She acquired an evil name owing to frequent loss 
of parcels from home for officers and men upon the 
Peninsula. Unhappily, there was no question about 
the losses ; but this unpardonable crime against the 
fighting men, who were literally dying for want of 
variety and small pleasures in food, may have been 
committed at other points of the postal service. More 
definite, though less serious, was the charge of luxury 
on board. Certainly, to any one coming fresh from 
the dug-outs, dust storms, monotonous rations, and 
perpetual risks of the Peninsula, the Aragon was like 
an Enchanted Isle. All who have campaigned in a 
desert land know the first physical delight of getting 
on board a well-equipped vessel — the plenty and 
variety of food, the clean cooking, the iced drinks, 
tablecloths for dinner, sheets in the bunks, a good 
chance of washing, and baths. To the campaigning 
soldier, those are comforts beyond the dreams of 
luxury, but in ordinary life the most ascetic of saints 
does not renounce them all as necessarily sinful. 
Perhaps it was the arbitrary exclusion of many passing 
officers from the delights of a real dinner and other 
pleasurable contrasts to life at the front which made 


the A r agon a byword, as though she were '*a 
sink of iniquity " ; and from the same contrasts 
arose the report that at the end of the campaign 
she was discovered to be aground upon empty 
bottles, as upon a coral reef. This appears un- 
likely, since the harbour took battleships with ease, 
to say nothing of the Aquitania and the largest 
liners afloat.^ 

In the first half of July, Major-General Altham 
(Royal Scots), a Christ Church, Oxford, man, who 
served as Chief Intelligence Officer under Sir George 
White in Ladysmith, succeeded as Inspector-General 
of Communications, and he also made his head- 
quarters in the Aragon. The expense of maintaining 
the ship was estimated at /300 a day, and proposals 
were made for removing the headquarters to land in 
order to save money. But on the east side of the 
harbour stood the dusty and unwholesome town or 
village of Mudros, together with various camps, and 
the western shore and rising slopes behind it were 
covered with hospitals, Australian, Irish-Canadian 
(run by women), and others, besides rest-camps 
beyond. It was also thought necessary to remain on 
the water in order to keep touch with the naval 
organisation under direction of the flagship Europa 
(Admiral Wemyss), and this, together with the 
absence of deep-water piers and wharves, was prob- 
ably the decisive reason. And as to expense, the 
saving of some ^9000 a month has, unfortunately, 
never been regarded as particularly praiseworthy in 
this war. The Minnetonka (Atlantic Transport 
Company) served as headquarters of the Ordnance 
^ The Aragon was torpedoed in the Mediterranean, January 1918. 


Services and depot for the supply of engineering 
implements, tools, and ammunition, which, however, 
was not usually unloaded from the smaller craft. 
Brigadier-General R. W. M. Jackson, Director of 
Ordnance Services, worked sometimes at Mudros, 
sometimes at the base in Alexandria. Brigadier- 
General F. W. B. Koe, Director of Supplies and 
Transports, did the same. 

In spite of the lamentable experiences at the first 
landings, the arrangements for the removal of the 
wounded from the Peninsula were still inadequate. 
The four original hospital ships were present — two 
military and two lent by the navy — each adapted to 
receive about 500 men. The remainder of the 
wounded had to be put on transports not specially 
prepared, and not protected by The Hague Conven- 
tion from attack. Before new hospital ships arrived 
(about fifty at the end), this lack of accommodation 
caused many deaths and much suffering after a battle 
on the Peninsula. A particular instance, much 
spoken of and strongly condemned at the time, was 
the case of the transport Saturnia, which appeared at 
Mudros after the attack of June 28 with about 700 on 
board, crowded haphazard into any corner, in much 
confusion, and so neglected that their wounds were 
in many cases putrefying and full of maggots. The 
transport, having been used for horses and mules, 
was also in a filthy and stinking condition. Naval 
and military surgeons were ordered to assist. Among 
the foremost was Staff- Surgeon Levick of the cruiser 
Bacchante (Captain Boyle), who had accompanied 
Captain Scott on the Antarctic expedition, and was 
the author of an excellent scientific monograph on 


penguins. Supported by Surgeon Lorrimer of the 
same ship, and a Catholic priest, he remained on 
board four days and nights, constantly operating. 
But, for want of adequate assistance, and owing to 
the lack of bandages, dressings, and instruments, 
comparatively little could be effected, and many died 
who might have recovered with proper care. 

Such incidents were but further evidences of the 
general confusion due to an unexpected war, and of 
the secondary position assigned to the Dardanelles 
in the Cabinet's strategy. Prompted, perhaps, by 
the depressing reports which had lately reached them, 
the "Dardanelles Committee" of the Cabinet, as the 
former " War Council " was called after June,^ resolved 
to institute an inquiry for themselves. On the 
Peninsula it was widely rumoured that Mr. Winston 
Churchill was coming, and variegated opinions were 
expressed. Perhaps it would have been well if he 
had come ; for he, at all events, realised the vital 
importance of the expedition in relation to the war 
as a whole. Ultimately, Colonel Maurice Hankey, 
Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence since 
191 2, came alone — a man of high reputation for 
intelligence and capacity. He arrived in the last 
week of July, and stayed till August 20, but before his 
arrival the Cabinet had already resolved upon sending 
out such reinforcements as they considered sufficient 
to comply with Sir lan's demands. 

On July 13 a new and strange type of warship, 
called a " Monitor," arrived at Kephalos, and next 

^ First Dardanelles Commission Report, par. 14, note. It seems to 
have been a section of the "War Committee" established by the 
Coalition Government of May 19. 



day began bombarding the guns on the Asiatic coast. 
The monitors were originally constructed for opera- 
tions in another sphere. They were, in fact, large 
floating platforms or flat-bottomed forts, supporting, 
some two 12-inch, and others two 14-inch, guns of 
. American make, without further armament. Their 
tonnage was about 6000, and their chief peculiarity 
a broad, flat shelf or platform extending from the 
hull just below the water-line ; so broad and flat that 
numbers of men could walk upon it while bathing, 
so that they appeared to be walking upon the water. 
The shape of the vessels rendered them difficult to 
steer, and so slow in motion that their progress 
against such a current as ran In the Narrows would have 
been very gradual. About the same time, smaller 
"monitors" arrived. They were nicknamed "Whip- 
pets," and were marked by numbers only. Four 
"blister ships" (cruisers protected against torpedoes 
by bulging protuberances along both sides) also came. 
The " blisters " reduced their speed by about three 
knots, but, being safe at anchor, they served especially 
as marking points for survey and "registration." All 
these ships played an important part in the coming 
operations ; and in the later months of the campaign, 
when cross-observation from De Tott's Battery point 
and Cape Helles had been established, the large 
" monitors" stationed off Rabbit Island did invaluable 
service by suppressing the heavy guns on the Asiatic 

Almost equally surprising was the appearance of 
several motor-lighters, Inevitably called " Beetles." 
Originally constructed for the same proposal as the 
monitors, they were long, iron barges moving under 


their own oil power, and built to transport 500 men 
or 50 horses apiece. From the prow projected 
a swinging platform or drawbridge, which, hanging 
elevated as the lighter moved, had the look of a 
beetle's forceps and antennae. The iron deck and 
sides gave absolute protection against rifle-fire or 
shrapnel, and if only the lighters had been sent 
out for the first landings, hundreds of lives might 
have been saved and the history of the war trans- 

As to military reinforcement, its necessity was 
obvious, since by the end of July the casualties 
amounted to nearly 50,000 ; in round numbers, 8000 
killed, 30,000 wounded (many, of course, returned to 
service), and 11,000 missing (many killed).^ The 
29th Division was the best supplied with drafts, but 
on the last day of July it counted only 219 officers 
and 8424 men. As we have seen, the brigades of the 
13th (Western) Division, under Major-General 
F. C. Shaw, began to arrive in the first half of July, 
and were stationed with the divisions at Helles to 
gain experience, which served them well.^ The 

^ This estimate does not include the French casualties, which are 
not published. 

' The 13th Division consisted of the following brigades : 
38th (Brigadier-General Baldwin) — 

6th Royal Lancashire, 6th East Lancashire, 6th South 
Lancashire, and 6th North Lancashire. 

39th (Brigadier-General W. de S. Cayley) — 

9th Royal Warwick, 7th Gloucester, 9th Worcester, and 
7th North Stafford. 

40th (Brigadier-General J. H. du B. Travers) — 

4th South Wales Borderers, 8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 
8th Cheshire, and 5th Wilts. 
The 8th Welsh Regiment were Divisional Pioneers 

THE 10th, 11th, AND 13th DIVISIONS 217 

nth (Northern) Division, under Major-General 
Frederick Hammersley, began to arrive early in the 
second half of July, two brigades being stationed at 
Imbros, and one (the 33rd) sent to Helles for a brief 
experience/ The loth (Irish) Division, under Lieu- 
tenant-General Sir Bryan Mahon, arrived towards the 
end of July, and half of it was stationed at Mitylene 
(Lesbos) on the inlet of lero (about 6 miles from the 
town of Mitylene), guarded by the old battleship 
Canopus (Captain Grant).^ These three Divisions 
belonged to the New (so-called Kitchener's) Army. 

^ The nth Division consisted of the following brigades : 
32nd (Brigadier-General H. Haggard) — 

9th West York, 6th Yorkshire, 8th West Riding, and 6th 
York and Lancaster. 

33rd (Brigadier-General R. P. Maxwell) — 

6th Lincolnshire, 6th Border, 7th South Stafford, and 9th 
Sherwood Foresters. 

34th (Brigadier-General W. H. Sitwell)— 

8th Northumberland Fusiliers, 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, 
5th Dorset, and nth Manchester. 
The 6th East Yorkshire were Divisional Pioneers. 

^ The loth Division consisted of the following brigades : 
29th (Brigadier-General R. J. Cooper) — 

loth Hampshire, 6th Royal Irish Rifles, 5th Connaught 
Rangers, and 6th Leinster. 

30th (Brigadier-General L. L. Nicol) — 

6th and 7th Royal Munster Fusiliers, 6th and 7th Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers. 

31st (Brigadier-General F. F. Hill) — 

5th and 6th Inniskilling Fusiliers, 5th and 6th Royal Irish 

The 5th Royal Irish Regiment were Divisional Pioneers. Only 
about 60 per cent, of the men in these battalions were Irish, the rest 
being chiefly North-country miners and Somerset. For the complete 
list of the battalions in this Division, the Artillery, Engineers, etc., see 
The Tenth {Irish) Division in Gallipoli, by Major Bryan Cooper, pp. 
2 and 3. 


The infantry of two Territorial Divisions were also 
promised— the 53rd (Welsh) and 54th (East Anglian) 
— but they did not begin to arrive till August 10. 
They were about half below their nominal strength, 
and had no guns/ 

As to aeroplanes, compared with subsequent 
developments the service was necessarily rather 
primitive. The six or eight seaplanes attached to 
the Ark Royal were unable to rise to any great 
heigfht — not over 2000 feet. Commander Charles 
Samson established an aerodrome at Tenedos early 
in the campaign for British and French planes,^ and 
there was an emergency landing-place at Helles. In 
June, Tenedos was left to the French, and Colonel 

1 I am unable to give the exact formations of these Divisions. The 
battalions w^ere changed shortly before they left England. From 
dispatches and other sources, however, one can make the following 

lyd {Welsh) Division : 

158th Brigade (Brigadier-General E. A. Cowans) — 
4th, 5th, and 7th Cheshires, and the 4th Welsh. 

159th Brigade (Brigadier-General F. C. Lloyd) — 

5th, 6th, and 7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and the i/ist 

1 60th Brigade (Brigadier-General J. J. F. Hume)— 

4th Queen's (Royal West Surrey), 4th Royal Sussex, a 
composite Kent Battahon, and the loth Middlesex. 

S^fh {East Anglian) Division : 

i6ist Brigade (Brigadier-General C. M. Brunton), and 
162nd Brigade (Brigadier-General C. de Winton). 

The 5th, 6th, and 7th Essex, loth and nth London, 5th 
Suffolk, and 8th Hants are mentioned as belonging to 
these two brigades. 

163rd Brigade (Brigadier-General F. F. W. Daniell)— 
4th and 5th Norfolks, 5th and loth Bedfordshire. 

^ Uncensored Leiiers, p. 170. There were 10 French planes, 


Frederick Sykes, R.N.A.S., took command over the 
two British wings (Commander Samson and Lieut- 
Colonel Gerard) stationed at Imbros. At the end of 
July about 30 planes of different types were in action, 
doing excellent service in observation and photography. 
But none of them were "fighting machines," and, as 
no anti-aircraft guns were supplied till just at the end 
of the campaign, the Turkish " Fokker" planes from 
Chanak were able to continue bombing our lines on 
the Peninsula and the General Headquarters at 
Imbros. On the sandy cliff beside the head- 
quarters a large shed was erected for a few small 
airships, cigar - shaped, with silvery balloons (they 
were known as "Silver Babies"), which were used 
to scout over the channel between Imbros and the 
Peninsula on the watch for submarines. The late 
autumn gales tore the green canvas covering off the 
shed, and ultimately it was removed to Mudros. 

By the beginning of August, Sir Ian Hamilton 
had the following military forces under his command : 
Vlllth Army Corps (29th, 42nd, and 52nd Divisions); 
IXth Army Corps (10th, nth, and 13th Divisions); 
Anzac Army Corps (Australian and New-Zealand- 
and-Australian Divisions) ; French Corps Exp^di- 
tionnaire d'Orient (ist and 2nd Divisions); General 
Headquarter Troops (Royal Naval Division), together 
with the infantry of the 53rd and 54th Divisions then 
on their way out. Eleven divisions present and two 
more coming represented a nominal force of about 
240,000 to 250,000. The actually available forces 
amounted to less than half those numbers (about 
120,000 rifles), always short of howitzers, guns, shells, 
trench-mortars, and bombs. The Turkish forces on 



the Peninsula at the same time were estimated at 
about 61,000, with 39,000 in reserve.^ 

The reinforcements by land and sea rendered a 

change of strategy possible. They were, in fact, 

supplied for this purpose. It had now become 

evident that the Achi Baba lines were too strong 

for direct assault. Its gradual slopes, free from dead 

ground, made the hill an ideal position for defence, 

and this natural advantage had been so increased by 

a complicated system of frontal and communication 

trenches, by barbed wire, machine-guns, scattered 

batteries, and a series of powerful redoubts, that an 

almost impregnable fortress by this time checked 

further advance. In fact, the army at Helles was 

like a besieged garrison, being continually threatened 

with assault from the front, and by the Asiatic guns 

on its right flank and rear. The sea remained open, 

but that outlet for communication, already exposed 

to the enemy's submarines and heavy artillery, would 

soon be imperilled by autumnal storms. The Army 

Corps at Anzac was similarly besieged, except that 

the dead ground sheltered by precipitous cliffs reduced 

^ Our estimates of the enemy's forces for the days of fighting in 
August were : 






August 6-7 





„ 8 . . 




20,000 ^ 

» 9 • • 




20,000 ^ 

„ 10 . 





„ II . 





» 15 • • 





„ 22 . 





^ 11,000 marching south. 

2000 marching south. 


the danger to life in rear of the firing trenches. To 
break down the siege a sortie in force had become 
essential. The only alternative was to cling to the 
positions in the hope of a diversion from Russia or 
Bulgaria. But during July the great Russian retreat 
from Galicia and Poland continued almost uninter- 
rupted, and on August 4, Warsaw fell. As to 
Bulgaria, the Russian disasters confirmed Tsar 
Ferdinand's confidence in the ultimate victory of his 
German compatriots, and a resolute people's ancestral 
detestation of the Serbs gave him the support of their 
passionate desire to recover the lands lost to them 
in the second Balkan War. 

The design of breaking down the siege and freeing 
the Narrows for the fleet, by cutting the neck of the 
Peninsula at Bulair, by a landing at Enos, or by a 
direct attack, was obvious and tempting. As before, 
its weakness was that the occupation of Bulair would 
neither have cut the enemy's communications nor 
freed the Narrows. In spite of the daring resource 
of our submarines in penetrating into the Sea of 
Marmora, and even shelling the trains and destroying 
the culverts on the railway which runs from Scutari 
along the north coast of the Gulf of Ismid, the main 
Turkish supplies and drafts still came to the Peninsula 
by sea. Some crossed to the Asiatic side from Con- 
stantinople ; some came up by train from Smyrna to 
Panderma ; in either case, the transports edged along 
the coast by stages at night till they reached the 
Straits and crossed at Gallipoli, Galata, or Maidos, 
always keeping beyond the range or vision of any 
guns on Bulair. A landing at Enos would have 
lengthened the journey from Mudros by about 


50 miles. An attempt at Bulair would have implied 
a landing against lines long reputed impregnable, 
and lately developed even more carefully than the 
April defences at Helles. The attempt also would 
have contained no element of surprise ; for an attack 
at that point would be the merest amateur's first 

An advance in Asia, as from Adramyti Bay 
opposite Mitylene, with a view to reaching the 
Smyrna- Panderma railway, might have looked more 
promising. It was much favoured by British au- 
thorities in Mitylene. The arrival of half the loth 
Division appeared to point that way, and Mr. Compton 
Mackenzie was sent there to encourage the false 
report, for the benefit of Turkish spies. The French, 
harassed by the Asiatic guns, were probably anxious 
for some movement along that coast. But Sir Ian 
was perhaps still bound by Lord Kitchener's express 
orders not to entangle himself in Asia. At all 
events, he refused to dissipate his comparatively 
small forces at such distances apart. Committed to 
the Peninsula, he felt that there or nowhere lay his 
hope of victory. Already in June, with the full con- 
currence of Generals Gouraud and Birdwood, he 
had laid his plan. Anzac, instead of remaining sub- 
sidiary as "a thorn in the side," was now to become 
the main base of attack. The first objective was 
to be the Sari Bair range ; the ultimate object an 
advance across the five miles to Maidos. A new 
frontal attack was to detain the enemy at Achi Baba. 
A surprise landing at Suvla Bay was to protect the 
Anzac left flank, occupy the heights threatening that 
flank with artillery, and assist the assault upon the 


central mountains of Sari Bair range — Koja Chemen 
Tepe (Hill 971) and Chunuk Bair. When once 
those heights were gained, the Turkish communica- 
tions would indeed be cut in two ; the positions on 
Achi Baba and Kilid Bahr plateau would be turned 
and taken in rear ; the very gate of the Narrows 
would be exposed to our guns. It was a high hope. 
The battle for its realisation is generally known as 
Suvla, but more accurately as Sari Bair. In the 
first week of August it began. 



FRIDAY, August 6, was the day fixed for the 
new attempt. The waning moon was due 
to rise at 2 a.m. of the 7th. To have waited 
longer would have meant a month's delay, until 
moonless nights returned. A month's experience 
would have increased the fighting value of the new 
Divisions, as was seen in the case of the 13th Division 
at Helles; but the collapse of Russia in Poland, and 
the growing danger of Bulgaria's attitude, would have 
given the greater advantage to the enemy ; and 
the approach of autumn had to be considered. 
Accordingly, utterly untried as four of his five new 
Divisions were. Sir Ian resolved to strike at once, 
even before two of them had arrived, chiefly in hope 
of gaining the incalculable advantage of surprise. 
To distract the enemy's attention, he had arranged 
a scare at Mitylene by sending a brigade and a 
half (31st and 30th) of the loth Division there, as 
we have seen ; by visiting the island himself on 
August 2 ; by causing maps of the Asiatic coast to 
be distributed with surreptitious freedom ; and by 
deputing Mr. Compton Mackenzie and others to 
spread indiscreet rumours among the gossips and 
spies there under pledge of deathlike secrecy. 


Beyond the extreme left of his new Hne, of which 
Anzac had now become the centre, he also arranged 
a smaller but more violent scare by dispatching a 
party of about 300 men (chiefly Greek and Cretan 
** Andarti," under command of a Levantine, Captain 
Binns) to Karachali, on the northern shore of the Gulf 
of Xeros, as though an attack on the Bulair lines 
were contemplated/ But the two chief " containing " 
movements to distract the enemy's notice from the 
main attack, and at the same time to make any 
possible local advance, were directed against the 
enemy opposite the centre of our line at Helles, and 
opposite the right at Anzac. 

At noon on August 6 the forces were thus 
situated : At Anzac the Australian and New 
Zealand Army Corps, together with the 13th Division, 
the Indian Brigade, and the 29th Brigade of the 
loth Division, all of which had been secretly and 
with great skill added to the Anzac force in the 
darkness of the two preceding nights, and stowed 
away in prepared dug-outs among the most hidden 
ravines; at Helles, the 29th, the 42nd, the 52nd, 
the R.N.D., and the two French Divisions; at 
Mitylene, the 31st Brigade and half the 30th of the 
loth Division ; at Mudros, the other half of the 
30th Brigade; and at Imbros, the nth Division. 
The infantry of the 53rd and 54th Divisions, to 
be kept as general reserve, were on the sea, approach- 
ing Mudros, whence they were ultimately hurried 
to Suvla without disembarking. 

^ Part of this small and undisciplined body actually landed, but 
meeting with opposition rapidly withdrew to the ship in characteristic 
disorder, assuming their object to be accomplished. 


The day was fine; the water perfectly calm ; and 
at Imbros the nth Division spent the hot and sunny 
hours in practising disembarkation from the unac- 
customed "beetles," or playing in naked crowds 
among the shallows of Kephalos beach. The first 
anniversary of the war had only just passed ; most 
of the men had volunteered at the very beginning ; 
the Division had been organised for nine or ten 
months, and held a high reputation in the New Army. 
Nevertheless, the physique and bearing were not 
exceptionally fine, and, though the men displayed 
the cheerful and ironic stoicism usual among English 
working - people, observers noticed an absence of 
eager enthusiasm — of that excitement straining for 
adventure which had illuminated the departure from 
Mudros three months before. Hope was not so 
high ; knowledge of the enemy's power, or the de- 
pressing criticism which had permeated the nation at 
home, increased the common apprehensions of war ; 
and it may be that the unconscious paralysis of 
cautious and uninspiring age had crept downwards 
from the higher commands, through that infection 
of personality which acts as by magic for good or 

As though perceiving this absence of devoted 
enthusiasm. Sir Ian issued a characteristic Order, 
calculated to stir the spirits of the troops.^ As 

^ " special Order. 

"General Headquarters, 

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 

August 5, 1915. 

"Soldiers of ihe Old Army and the New.— Some of you 
have already won imperishable renown at our first landing, or have since 
built up our footholds upon the Peninsula, yard by yard, with deeds of 


Commander-in-Chief, he was himself compelled to 
remain at Imbros, so as to retain communication 
with the three principal scenes of action, and, in case 
of emergency, to visit one or other point ; Suvla, 
the most distant, being fifty minutes, and Helles, 
the nearest, only forty minutes away by torpedo- 
boat. So narrow is the dividing sea that all that 
afternoon of August 6 the booming of the guns, 
and even the incessant rattle of rifle-fire at Helles 
and Anzac, could be plainly heard in the head- 
quarters at Imbros, and by the newcomers en- 
joying their last security upon the beach. For 
that afternoon the two main blows desig-ned as 
feints to deceive the enemy regarding our real ob- 
jective, and to hold him to his positions, were 
struck, the one at Helles, the other at Anzac, as far 
away as was possible from our intended advance on 
the left. 

At Helles the main attack covered about two- 
thirds of a mile along the right centre of the British 
lines, and was carried out by the 88th Brigade of 
the 29th Division, and the 42nd (East Lancashire) 
Division. The advance across open ground began 
just before 4 p.m., the brigades pushing forward 

heroism and endurance. Others have arrived just in time to take part 
in our next great fight against Germany and Turkey, the would-be 
oppressors of the rest of the human race. 

" You, veterans, are about to add fresh lustre to your arms. Happen 
what may, so much at least is certain. 

" As to you, soldiers of the new formations, you are privileged indeed 
to have the chance vouchsafed you of playing a decisive part in events 
which may herald the birth of a new and happier world. You stand for 
the great cause of freedom. In the hour of trial remember this, and 
the faith that is in you will bring you victoriously through. 

" Ian Hamilton, General." 


resolutely against massed fire from crowded Turkish 
trenches, which our want of howitzers and trench- 
mortars prevented us from suppressing. The Essex 
Battalion of the 88th Brigade especially distinguished 
itself by plunging into a trench crammed with the 
enemy ; but, exposed to rifle-fire on both flanks and 
to showers of bombs, the men were shattered. Nor 
could the 42nd Division make headway against the 
withering fire. It was evident that in the pause of 
the last three weeks the Turks had gained in con- 
fidence owing to the success of their Allies in Galicia 
and Poland, their reinforcement by two fresh Divisions, 
and the fast of Ramazan or its termination. Officers' 
night patrols discovered that they had even designed 
an attack on our lines that very evening, which was 
the reason why their trenches were so crowded with 
men. Better intelligence, either by aeroplane or the 
investigation of spies and prisoners, might have 
warned us of this intention, and our object in holding 
the Turks to their position would in that case have 
been gained with greater loss to them and less terrible 
loss to ourselves. 

Nevertheless, Sir Ian resolved to renew the 
attack the following morning. It was August 7, 
the first and critical day at Anzac and Suvla — the 
day which was expected to be decisive. At all 
costs the Turks at Helles were to be prevented from 
reinforcing their vitally threatened positions, and as 
long as possible to be kept ignorant of the threats. 
In the early morning they appear to have remained 
ignorant, for they were preparing a counter-attack 
upon our centre when they were confronted by our 
renewed onset along a half-mile front. Why an 

/. Russell &' So>is\ 



advance was not then attempted by all the Divisions 
upon our lines from sea to sea has not been stated. 
Guns and gun-ammunition were short, but that was 
an invariable condition on the Peninsula, and biof 
attacks had been made in spite of helpless deficiency. 
Probably the higher command had now concluded 
that frontal attacks against the complicated works on 
Krithia and Achi Baba only implied fruitless loss ; 
but now if ever, when the enemy's rear and com- 
munications were threatened, an opportunity might 
have offered itself. 

Yet the attack was made only in the centre, 
chiefly by two brigades of the 42nd Division (the 
125th and 127th — Lancashire Fusiliers and Man- 
chesters). A few yards of ground were won, but 
lost again. Only exactly in the centre of our lines 
the fighting continued all that day, and indeed, with 
short intervals, for six days longer. Here there 
was an oblong vineyard, running for about 200 yards 
beside the left of the straight Krithia road, about 
250 yards from the junction of the East Krithia 
nullah with the West Krithia nullah still farther to 
the left. The vineyard had hitherto lain just outside 
our firing line, but now the East Lancashire Brigades 
seized and clung to it. All that day and through 
the night they clung to it, in spite of a massed 
counter-attack at night, the 6th and 7th Battalions, 
Lancashire Fusiliers, showing the finest endurance. 
The next day (Sunday, 8th), when the chances of our 
main strategy were just hanging in the balance, two 
more counter-attacks were delivered, before dawn 
and after sunset, but still the Lancastrians held, the 
4th East Lancashire Battalion now coming into 


action,^ On the Monday the position seemed com- 
paratively secure, and these battalions were relieved, 
though fighting continued. But three days later the 
enemy attacked in mass again at night, and captured 
the vineyard. Next day (the 13th) they were bombed 
out of it, and a line across the oblong, nearly up to 
the farther end, was finally wired, loopholed, and 
consolidated. The actual territory gained was not 
much — barely 200 yards — but "The Vineyard" will 
always remain a memory in Lancastrian annals. The 
42nd Division's own CO., Major-General Douglas, 
who had taken over the command of the VII Ith Army 
Corps at Helles after Hunter- Weston's departure, 
shared the almost ruinous honour. For on August 8, 
Lieut. -General Davies had assumed command of the 
Army Corps himself, and Major-General Douglas 
had returned to his Division. 

Though the feint at Helles did not gain much 
local advantage, its service to the general strategic 
plan must not be overlooked ; for the violence and 

^ Here, as in other places, it is impossible to record individual acts 
of courage, but the service of Lieut. W. T. Forshaw (9th Manchesters) 
became almost a legend on the Peninsula. On the night 7th-8th, he 
was holding a northern corner of the vineyard with half a company when 
he was attacked by a swarm of Turks converging down three trenches. 
" He held his own, not only directing his men and encouraging them 
by exposing himself with the utmost disregard of danger, but personally 
throwing bombs continuously for forty-one hours. When his detach- 
ment was relieved, after twenty-four hours, he volunteered to continue 
the direction of operations. Three times during the night of August 
8-9 he was again heavily attacked, and once the Turks got over the 
barricade ; but after shooting three with his revolver he led his men 
forward and recaptured it. When he rejoined his battalion he was 
choked and sickened by bomb fumes, badly bruised by a fragment 
of shrapnel, and could barely lift his arm from continuous bomb 
throwing." — Official Report for his V.C. 


partial success of the attack retained the new Turkish 
divisions, which otherwise would have reinforced the 
enemy on Sari Bair and at Suvla. The second great 
feint, from our right at Anzac, was even more violent 
and more successful. It began about an hour and a half 
later on the same afternoon (August 6), and its scene was 
the section of Turkish trenches known as Lone Pine. 

Just a week before the action (on the night of 
July 31), the extreme right of the Anzac position, 
close to Chatham's Post where that side of the 
triangle ended at the centre of " Brighton Beach," 
was further strengthened by a dashing sortie to de- 
stroy a hundred yards of trench which the Turks, 
working through a tunnel, had constructed within 
bombing distance of the so-called Tasmania Post. 
After two rapidly excavated mines had been ex- 
ploded at the ends of the trench, four parties of 
fifty men each (iith West Australian Battalion, 
3rd Australian Brigade) crossed our wire entangle- 
ments on planks placed in position by the sappers, 
and plunged straight into the midst of the confused 
and chattering Turks, almost before the explosions 
were over. After severe fighting, in which the 
Australians were heavily bombed from the Turkish 
communication trenches, they succeeded in barricad- 
ing the entrances, transferring the Turkish parapets 
to the other sides of the trenches, and including the 
position within the Anzac lines. The Anzac loss 
was comparatively small — 1 1 killed and 74 wounded, 
against 100 Turks killed ; but Major Leane, who com- 
manded the storming party, was mortally wounded, 
and the trenches afterwards bore his name.-^ 

^ Sir lan's Suvla dispatch ; and Australia in Arms, pp. 221-223. 


This enterprise had strengthened the Anzac right 
at the extreme end, securing that flank from attack 
across the comparatively flat and low-lying ground 
between our lines and Gaba Tepe. The "containing 
attack" or feint from Anzac was now to be delivered 
about half a mile farther up the same right flank or 
side of the Anzac triangle. 

From the beach past Chatham's Post and along 
the Tasmanian trenches, the Anzac lines rose steeply 
to a height of some 400 feet until they crossed a 
small plateau, known as Lone Pine. The name 
was due to a solitary tree which the Turks had 
left standing alone out of a small wood or fringe of 
firs lining their side of the ground. They had cut 
down the rest for their dug-outs or head-cover, and 
in fact the solitary pine itself was felled just before 
the attack, or even on the very morning ; but the 
place kept its name, to be remembered in all records 
of the war. Upon the plateau, which measured 
little over 300 yards across and was covered with 
heath and low bushes, our lines bulged slightly into 
a salient, called the Pimple, separated from the 
Turkish lines by an open space, in some points a 
little over 100 yards broad, in others only 60 yards. 
Opposite this slight salient, over the southern portion 
of the plateau, the Turks had been long and busily 
engaged in constructing complicated lines and 
trenches to the streno^th of an undergfround fortress. 
Always apprehensive of attack at this point, as com- 
manding a deep gully (known to Anzac as " Surprise 
Gully "), up which they brought their water and 
supplies for the front in this section, they had 
further covered the position and the open ground 


between the lines by strongly fortifying another 
small plateau across a shallow gully on their right, 
to the north. This fortress was known in Anzac 
as "Johnston's Jolly," and the two fortresses com- 
bined to subject any attack to a cross-fire of field- 
guns, machine-guns, and rifles.^ 

The chief feint from Anzac was directed against 
the Lone Pine fortress ; and it was not merely a 
feint, for the position itself was of value in covering 
the approach of the main army to Maidos. For the 
attack, the ist New South Wales Brigade (Brigadier- 
General N. M. Smyth) of the Australian Division, 
commanded now by that resolute British officer, 
Major-General H. B. Walker, was selected, and it 
was soon to rival the exploits of the 3rd Brigade at 
the landing, and of the 2nd Brigade on May 7 at 
Helles. It numbered barely 2000 strong as it came 
up White Gully and mustered round Brown's Dip, a 
depression behind the firing lines of the Pimple. 
The men wore white armlets and a square white 
patch on the back, to distinguish them from the 
enemy in the dust and confusion of such fighting. 
They carried their packs and full equipment. The 
2nd (Colonel Scobie, killed), the 3rd (Colonel Brown, 
killed), and the 4th (Colonel Macnaghton) Battalions 
were to lead the attack, the ist Battalion (Colonel 
Dobbin) being held in reserve. The three battalions 
took up their positions, crouching below the parapets, 
from which the barbed wire had been cautiously 

^ The name was due to a repeated saying of Colonel J. L. Johnston 
(nth West Australian Battalion), that if only he could bring howitzers 
instead of field-guns to bear on it, he would have " a jolly good time 
there." — Australia in Arms, p. 188. 


removed, A small party was stationed along an 
advanced subterranean trench or corridor, connected 
with the main firing trench by tunnels, which the 
miners had elaborately constructed. Thence it 
was to burst out through the thin coating of earth 
overhead, and join in the charge/ 

The attack was timed for 5.30 in the afternoon. 
A casual bombardment of the Turkish guns in the 
olive grove behind Gaba Tepe had been carried on 
all day by the monitor Humber, but at 4 o'clock 
the cruiser Bacchante appeared, and began shelling 
the Turkish lines in earnest. At 4.30 the land 
batteries joined in, but the bombardment was not 
more severe than usual, so that the Turks continued 
uncertain of the approaching event. Slowly the 
minutes passed, the officers standing watch in hand, 
as time ticked out for so many the remaining seconds 
of life. Only fifty from each of the three battalions 
were to spring over the parapet first, but so thickly 
did the men press up against the fire-step to get a 
good start that there was hardly room along the 200 
yards of front. ^ 

Just before 5.30 the guns suddenly stopped. 
The officers passed the word, " Prepare to go over." 

^ Australia in Arms, p. 225. The author, PhiUip Schuler, was 
present, but it is noticeable that Captain C. E. W. Bean, who was also 
present, does not directly mention this underground line. 

^ Of this eagerness, Capt. Bean, the Australian correspondent, gives 
an example : " ' Is there any room up there ? ' I heard a man in the 
trench ask of those who were crouching under the parapet. One of the 
men on the fire-step looked down. ' I dare say we could make room 
for one,' he said. ' Shift along, you blokes — we can squeeze in a little 
one.' The man in the trench was clearly relieved. ' I want to get up 
here along with Jim,' he said. 'Him and me are mates.'"— See the 
Australian newspapers, October 17, 1915. 


Next second the Brigade-Major blew his whistle. 
Whistles sounded all along the trench. The 150 
clambered over the sandbags without a word. 
There was no cheering. With eyes fixed upon the 
low white line of loopholed parapet in front, the 
heavily laden men trotted and stumbled forward 
across that open patch of heath, rugged with pitfalls, 
fragments of shell, and wire. The Turkish guns, 
sighted for our trenches, could not range upon them, 
and in the first rush few fell. In less than a minute 
from the start, nearly all had reached that white and 
loopholed line, and, with sharpened bayonets raised, 
were prepared to burst through the entanglements 
and leap into the trench below. They burst the 
entanglement, but there was no visible trench below. 
The whole trench was thickly roofed with heavy 
baulks of fir timber, railway sleepers, branches of 
trees, earth, and rocks. The trench was one 
prolonged, impenetrable dug-out, loophooled along 
the front line like a subterranean castle. 

Some of the advanced party ran forward over the 
solid roof, reached the open second line of trenches, 
reached the communication trenches up which the 
Turks were crowding, and fired into the thick of the 
enemy wherever they found them. They sprang 
down separately into the midst of them, and fought 
single-handed with bayonet and bombs, spreading 
terror and confusion before they died. But the 
majority scattered out in line along the face of the 
first parapet, as though along a curb, peering and 
poking for an entrance, while the Turks poured 
bullets upwards upon them through loopholes and 
imperceptible apertures. Some of our men fired 


back through the loopholes ; some, in groups, with 
desperate strength, wrenched up the heavy beams 
and tore the roof open ; some discovered narrow 
man-holes left in the covering for the exit and 
entrance of "listeners" at night. Wherever a 
sufficient opening was made or found, a man 
wriggled feet foremost down through it, helpless 
and exposed until he dropped into the thick of foes 
scarcely visible in the cavernous obscurity. It took 
fifteen minutes for all the men standing exposed in 
the open to get down. 

Close upon the heels of the advanced party, the 
main bodies of the three battalions had followed, 
leaving only their reserves. Before twenty minutes 
had passed, the reserves also went forward. Within 
a few minutes of the start, the Turkish guns had the 
range of the open ground, and swept it from end to 
end with a cross-fire of machine-guns and low-bursting 
shrapnel. At the same time, Turkish 6-in. howitzers 
continued to fling their crunching shells sheer into 
the emplacements of the Anzac guns, drawn right up 
among the parapets of the firing line. So thick was 
the air with shrieking missiles of death that it seemed 
impossible to live unsheltered. Yet as soon as the gun 
parapets were shattered, they were rebuilt, and across 
that deadly open space of heath, now thickly strewn 
with lumps of khaki marked with white, group after 
group of companies steadily ran forward, and the 
wounded — only the wounded — came staggering or 
crawling back. Along the foot of that first white 
parapet the dead lay in line, and here, as at the 
landing on W Beach, eager watchers in our trenches 
asked each other what the men were doing there. 


Fifty minutes from the start, the ist Battalion 
was sent up to reinforce and consolidate, but the 
blind struggle for life or death continued in the 
trenches. No one will ever fully describe what 
happened in those twisting galleries and passages 
and pits, for neither actors nor witnesses of the deeds 
survived. Crowded in places so tightly together that 
they could hardly use their rifles, in other places 
hidden singly in dark corners, or lurking in groups 
behind angles of traverses, the unhappy Anatolians, 
Syrians, and peasants from the Asiatic shores awaited 
and repelled the fiery and tumultuous onset with 
unyielding persistence. Rifles were fired at scorch- 
ing range ; bayonet clashed with bayonet, and 
plunged into the softness of living bodies full of 
blood ; bomb-thrower flung his bomb into the face 
of bomb-thrower flinging at him. It was like a battle 
of infuriated beasts tearing each other to death in the 
narrow confines of a pit. The bottom of the trenches 
was soon so thick with the dead and dying that 
Australians and Turks alike trampled upon bodies 
without discrimination of race, and the sides of the 
trenches no longer sheltered from fire the heads of 
those who still fought on. 

Where all displayed a reckless disregard of life 
beyond the imagination of peace, it is hard to select 
conspicuous courage. But one may mention Major 
Fullerton, an army surgeon, who stumbled through 
the rain of fire across the open ground, and stayed 
for six hours dressing the wounded in the midst of 
the fighting; also Captain J. W. Bean, who went to 
and fro under the terrifying shell-fire which crumbled 
up the parapets of our former line, and attended to 


the wounded till he fell wounded himself. Of the 
calm gallantry of some signallers, his brother, 
Captain C. E. W. Bean, the correspondent, made 
mention in some notes which he jotted down hour by 
hour on that wild evening and night, until he himself 
fell wounded also ; at 7 p.m. he wrote : 

" Presently two men come racing back carrying a 
reel between them. One drops suddenly out of sight 
below the scrub ; the other, who overran him, drops 
in also ; they had hit a concealed pit in our front line 
of trenches. They were signallers, and carried a 
telephone at least five times across that space, but 
the line was generally cut by shrapnel. 

" I can see a few bayonets sticking out from the 
Turkish trench immediately to the north " (probably 
Johnston's Jolly). "A report comes along that 
Turks have been seen massing for a counter-attack. 
. . . Messengers say the head-cover of the Turkish 
trench consisted of beams 9 inches by 4 inches." 

At 7.30. "Messages sent back from all com- 
manders in the captured trenches say the position is 
satisfactory. Seventy Turkish prisoners are awaiting 
an opportunity to be sent across. We have taken 
three trenches, about 200 to 300 yards ahead. Fire 
is quietening, although shells are still falling thick." ^ 

The Turks thus seen were indeed massing for a 
counter-attack. At 6.30 the signal, " Everything 
O.K.," had been passed to the Brigade Headquarters, 

^ As to these seventy prisoners (who were caught and disarmed 
in one tunnel) and the Turkish wounded, Major-General Walker, 
commanding the division, and my old schoolfellow at Shrewsbury, told 
me shortly afterwards as we stood on the spot that, until they could be 
brought safely across the open, they were carefully placed lying down 
in line under the shelter of that white loopholed parapet as the most 
secure place the Australians could find for their comfort. 


but about half an hour later the enemy came swarm- 
ing up the slope through communication trenches, 
bent upon recovering the position with bombs and 
bayonets. The desperate hand-to-hand conflict was 
renewed in the gathering darkness ; but, impeded 
though they were by prisoners, wounded, and the 
numbers of dead bodies (which they attempted to 
arrange in rows along the sides of the trenches so as 
to leave a gangway clear), the Australians held the 
ground already won. Again, at 1.30, in the black- 
ness of night, the Turks in great masses attempted to 
bomb them out with showers of hand missiles, and for 
seven hours the counter-attacks continued. So heavy 
were the losses that the 12th Battalion (South 
Australian, West Australian, and Tasmanian), which 
had been held as reserve for the 3rd Brigade, was 
thrown in to reinforce. At 1.30 p.m. of Saturday the 
7th, the attacks were renewed, and the struggle lasted 
till about 5 p.m. (twenty-four hours after our first 
assault), broke out again at midnight, and was con- 
tinued till dawn on Sunday the 8th. 

Meantime, the peril of crossing the open ground 
had been to some extent averted by parties of sappers 
under Colonel Elliott and Major Martyn. In the 
early afternoon of the 6th, before the attack began, 
three mines had been exploded from tunnels thrown 
forward from the subterranean trench or gallery above 
mentioned. Taking advantage of the craters thus 
made, the sappers hurriedly bored tunnels through 
into the Turkish trenches, so connecting the gallery 
with the Lone Pine position. Down these new 
tunnels the wounded and prisoners could be safely 
conveyed on the 7th, past the craters into the gallery, 


and from the gallery down the old tunnels into our 
original trenches on the Pimple. It was a noble piece 
of engineering, saving many lives, and for the rest of 
the campaign all communication with the Lone Pine 
outpost passed through tunnels. 

Sunday was chiefly spent in barricading the 
entrances of the enemy's communication trenches 
with hundreds of sandbags, and in fortifying the posi- 
tion at other points. As it was impossible to bring 
away all the dead for burial, some of the bodies, both 
Turk and Australian, were buried by being built in 
among the sandbags and other barricades, so that for 
many weeks afterwards the position was haunted by 
the smell of corruption. During this fortification, the 
men were continually exposed to bombing and 
assaults. So heavy had been the 2nd Battalion's loss 
that on Sunday it was relieved by the 7th Battalion 
(Victoria), which had been held in reserve for the 
2nd Brigade. The reinforcement was fortunate, for 
at dawn on Monday the 9th the new battalion was 
called upon to resist the last of the violent counter- 
attacks, when for nearly three hours the Turks 
attempted to recover the position by repeated assaults 
up the southern and eastern slopes. After this re- 
pulse, the enemy continued to attack with bombs and 
guns till Thursday the 12th, but with less determina- 
tion. Thus the conflict lasted for six days and nights 
in all. The position was finally won and held, but 
Lone Pine remained a dangerous or "unhealthy" 
point to the end. Our losses were very heavy. 
After the first counter-attacks, 1000 dead — Anzac 
and Turk — were roughly reckoned in the trenches. 
But the service in gaining the fortress, and in holding 


a large Turkish force in position, was incalculable. 
Praising the resolute tenacity of the Australian men 
and officers, Sir Ian wrote in his dispatch : 

"The stout-heartedness with which they clung to 
the captured ground in spite of fatigue, severe losses, 
and the continual strain of shell-fire and bomb attacks 
may seem less striking to the civilian ; it is even more 
admirable to the soldier." 

In this manner Lone Pine was taken and held. 
But before the sun rose on August 7, the remainder 
of the Australian Division's line from the Pimple 
running left or north to the apex of the triangle at the 
Nek was the scene of contests no less heroic though 
less successful. The whole line was engaged, but the 
points from which our attacks issued were four — 
Steel's Post, Quinn's Post, Pope's Hill, and Russell's 
Top — from right to left. The 2nd Infantry Brigade 
(Victoria) was holding the line at Steel's Post, and 
the 6th Battalion (Colonel Bennett) was chosen for 
an assault upon the opposite Turkish stronghold, 
known as German Officers' Trenches, because at the 
armistice some German officers came out of them. It 
was a position of strength almost equal to Lone Pine, 
and here also tunnels had been dug forward from our 
lines and connected by a gallery at the end. Three 
mines were exploded between eleven and twelve on 
the night of the 6th, and a heavy bombardment was 
concentrated on the Turkish position, but without 
much effect beyond warning the enemy to expect 
attack. On the stroke of midnight, the first line 
struggled out of the gallery through holes in the sur- 
face, but were at once mowed down by concentrated 
machine-gun fire. Few advanced more than 2 yards. 


Most fell back dying or wounded into the gallery. 
A second attempt was made just before 4 a.m. on the 
7th, but failed in like manner. It seems that a third 
attempt was contemplated by General Walker, but 
Brigadier-General Forsyth perceived the uselessness 
of further sacrifice, believing that the object of hold- 
ing the Turks in position had been gained now that 
the main attacks on Sari Bair and at Suvla were in 
full progress.-^ 

Farther to the left, the line was held by the 
ist Light Horse Brigade (Brigadier-General H. G. 
Chauvel), and from Quinn's Post the 2nd Regiment 
(Queensland) was ordered to attack in four lines of 
fifty each, apparently about dawn. The Turkish 
trenches were barely more than 15 yards away, but 
not one of our first line reached them, unless it was 
Major Logan, who led one of the two parties into 
which the line was divided, and is believed to have 
fallen dead over the Turkish parapet. Lieutenant 
Bourne, who led the other party, was killed in the 
first 10 yards. All in the line were killed or wounded, 
except one man, who said he observed where the 
machine-gun bullets were striking our parapet most 
thickly, and leapt clean above them and over the top. 
So terrible was the loss that the order for the other 
three lines to attack was cancelled.^ 

During this brief and deadly attempt, the ist Regi- 
ment (New South Wales) of the same Light Horse 
Brigade made a sortie from Pope's Hill, lying to the 
left of Quinn's but slightly in rear. The object was 
to recover some trenches dug by the 4th Infantry 

^ Australia in Arms, p. 238. 

2 Captain C. E. W. Bean, in the Australian papers, October 4, 191 5. 

THE NEK 243 

Brigade on May 2 upon the farther side of a steep 
cleft in which one of the ravines contributing to 
Monash Gully ends. From these trenches, one above 
the other, the Turks harassed, not only Pope's Hill 
and Monash Gully, but exposed parts of the main 
Shrapnel Gully itself. Soon after dawn Major T. W. 
Glasgow led the attack with two squadrons, and suc- 
ceeded in storming the first three trenches, though 
at one moment the men in the second trench were 
bombing their own comrades in the third, in ignor- 
ance of their rapid advance. It was a fight with 
bombs, and our supply had to be brought from Pope's 
across the open. The Turks, flinging bombs from 
the top edge of the steep gully, which is only 40 or 
50 yards across at this point, had every advantage, 
and after two hours' conflict the survivors of the 
squadrons were withdrawn, but carried in the wounded. 
Major Glasgow, though in the thick of the fighting 
throughout, was almost the only man untouched. 

Even more terrible than these lesser contests 
along the right side of the Anzac triangle was the 
attempt to capture the open Nek, still farther to the 
left, just at the apex of the whole Anzac position, as 
has been before explained. The Nek itself is an 
isthmus of high cliff, flat and open at the top, con- 
necting the main range of Sari Bair with the elevated 
Anzac position known as Russell's Top. It is about 
80 yards long and litde over 100 yards in breadth 
across. On the right or south-east side it falls steeply 
down into Monash Gully, and looks across to Pope's 
Hill and Quinn's. On the left or north-west side it 
falls as a precipitous and almost inaccessible cliff, 
looking over the deep ravines that run to Ocean 


Beach. Since the furious counter-attacks in the days 
following the landing, the Nek had been a vital point 
for both sides, and at their end, to guard against a 
sortie across the isthmus, the Turks had constructed 
a powerful redoubt, known as "The Chessboard" 
from its complicated chequer of trenches. Behind 
this redoubt the ground slopes gradually up to the 
smooth, round knoll, called Baby 700, whence the 
main ridge could be easily ascended to the height of 
Chunuk Bair. But Koja Chemen Tepe(Hill 971), 
the loftiest point of the Sari Bair range, is divided 
from Chunuk Bair by a precipitous ravine visible only 
from the Suvla district. 

The assault from Russell's Top across this terrific 
position was entrusted to the 8th (Victorian) and the 
lOth (West Australian) Regiments of the 3rd Light 
Horse Brigade (Brigadier-General F. G. Hughes). 
Two parties of 1 50 men apiece were selected for the 
charge from each of the two regiments — 600 men in 
all. Just before dawn on Saturday, the 7th, they filed 
into the Russell's Top trenches, all in their shirts and 
"shorts," with sleeves rolled up, but carrying water- 
botdes and their packs containing food, photographs, 
letters, and "souvenirs," such as soldiers like, though 
hardly one of them wanted food or looked at memen- 
toes again. Each man had 200 rounds also, but was 
ordered to trust to the fixed bayonet alone. The 
first line took two scaling-ladders, and the fourth was 
provided with picks and shovels. 

At 4 a.m. a heavy bombardment from all available 
guns was poured upon the carefully registered Chess- 
board, and it * lasted twenty-five minutes. Lieut.- 
Colonel A. H. White, commanding the 8th Regiment, 


said to the Brigade- Major, " Good-bye, Antill ! " and 
with two other officers stood by the parapet watching 
the minute hand move. " Three minutes to go," he 
said, and then simply "Go ! "^ Springing from pegs 
placed in the parapet as foot-rests, the 1 50 leapt into 
the open. They leapt into a blinding storm of 
bullets. Turks, raised tier above tier in the Chess- 
board, poured bullets upon them at 80 yards' dis- 
tance. Machine-CTuns in the Chessboard and in the 
trenches opposite Quinn's pumped bullets upon them 
as from fire-hoses in convergent streams. A French 
"75," captured by the Turks from the Serbians in the 
first Balkan War, burst shrapnel low above their 
heads every ten seconds. Many rolled back from 
the parapet to die in their own trenches. Colonel 
White was killed within the first 10 yards. Not one 
of the 150 got more than half-way across the brief 
space of the Nek. 

Two minutes later, the second line sprang over 
the parapet in like manner, and followed to the same 
destruction. But by some means unknown a few of 
them — probably not more than five or six — actually 
reached an enemy's trench opposite our extreme right ; 
for a small red and yellow flag was seen for about 
two minutes waving over the enemy's parapet, and 
this was the agreed signal for another stage in the 
attack. It disappeared, but none the less a party of 
the 8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers (40th Brigade, 13th 
Division) answered the signal by attempting to force 

1 Captain C. E. W. Bean's account in Australian papers of October 4, 
191 5. Phillip Schuler {Australia in Arms^ p. 241) says his words were : 
" Men, you have ten minutes to live," and " Three minutes, men." But 
this is an unlikely utterance from so good an officer. 


their way up the end of Monash Gully on to the Nek, 
and their first two groups shared the fate of the 
Australians on the open top. Almost at the same 
moment (ten minutes after the second line had gone) 
the third line (Western Australians) followed them. 
But while about forty were still under cover of a 
depression on our left, General Hughes, no doubt 
appalled at the useless slaughter, ordered the attack 
to cease, and a few crawled back into safety. The 
next night a private who had shammed death all day 
at the foot of the Turkish parapet also came in. The 
assault lasted just a quarter of an hour, and so far as 
holding a large force of the enemy went, it was suc- 
cessful. But in that quarter of an hour the loss was 
435, including 20 officers and 232 men killed or 
missing — the words were identical. 

If we seek a parallel to the 600 at Balaclava, it 
was there. But a Turkish schoolmaster, who fought 
in the first trench of the Chessboard that morning and 
was afterwards taken prisoner, said that the Turks did 
not lose a single man.-^ Our two scaling-ladders 
remained abandoned in the open. 

^ Captain C. E. W. Bean in the Australian papers of November 2, 


FROM the Nek, the Chessboard, and Baby 700, 
the main ridge or mountain of Sari Bair rises 
steadily, like a great rounded shoulder, to 
Battleship Hill (so called from an early naval bom- 
bardment), and thence, after a long but slight depres- 
sion, which from the sea looks like a continuous ridge, 
rises again to the broad and massive front of Chunuk 
Bair, about 850 feet in height. Towards the sea, the 
mountain Chunuk shows an apparently precipitous 
face, split in the centre by a cleft too steep to be 
called a watercourse. It is rather what mountaineers 
mean by a "chimney." But except on this actual 
face, the mountain range is not so steep as it appears, 
nor so inaccessible, being of softish sandstone mixed 
with marl, like the whole of the district. Hard lime- 
stones, or the only formations which are called " rock " 
by every one but geologists, are not found till one 
reaches the genuinely rocky hill on the south side of 
Suvla Bay, and the still more rocky edge on the 

From Chunuk Bair the range continues its north- 
easterly trend, the sky-line again showing a slight de- 
pression or dip till it rises to a similar but lesser 
height, which we at first called " Nameless Hill," but 

more generally "Hill Q." Beyond "Hill Q " the 



ridge is again slightly lower and flattish along the 
summit till it is split across unexpectedly by a pre- 
cipitous ravine, which appears to cut sheer down to a 
level of less than half the mountain's heio-ht. Both 
sides of the ravine are unusually steep and jagged, so 
that it would be impossible for troops by continuing 
an advance along the sky-line of the ridge to gain the 
highest summit, which rises steeply from the farther 
side of the ravine. This summit, the crowning-point 
of the range gradually rising, as we have seen, from 
the beach at Chatham Post, is Koja Chemen Tepe, 
generally known as Hill 971 (its height in feet). The 
top, being thrown back to the north-east, is invisible 
from Anzac, but plainly seen from Imbros, the sea, 
and Suvla, dominating the region. The ravine is not 
revealed till Suvla is reached. 

These joint heights of Chunuk and " Hill Q," 
together with the disconnected height of Koja 
Chemen, were the first objectives in the main attack 
of August 6 to 10. The ultimate objective remained 
as before — the clearing of the Narrows by reaching 
Maidos, cutting the Turkish communications with 
Achi Baba and Krithia over the Kilid Bahr plateau, 
and dominating the forts on the Asiatic side. Some 
critics, both at the time and since, have maintained 
that the ultimate objective could better have been 
won by making the main attack from Suvla with all 
available forces. But at the time, when many believed 
this to be Sir lan's design, an advance from Suvla 
into the heart of the Peninsula appeared to me im- 
possible so long as the enemy held the Sari Bair range 
as a perpetual threat to the right flank of our ad- 
vancing columns ; and not merely the heart of the 


Peninsula, but the coast-line of the Straits, would have 
to be reached before the enemy's forces to the south 
could be cut off. It is true that an advance from 
Anzac, or even from Suvla, was partially threatened 
by forces on Kilid Bahr plateau. But from Anzac 
the passage to the Straits was brief, and from Suvla it 
was protected by Sari Bair itself, provided only that 
we held that mountain range. Otherwise it was out 
of the question. 

So the objective of the main attack from Anzac 
was simple ; but the means of approach presented 
extraordinary difficulties. As at Anzac itself, the 
front of the range breaks down to the sea in a 
crumbled and complicated formation of edges, ridges, 
spurs, cliffs, and ravines, the haphazard and perennial 
work of winter storms and rains acting for ages upon 
soft sandstone and sandy deposits mixed with clay 
and a little chalk. This labyrinthine region naturally 
follows the north-easterly course of the hills out of 
which water has carved it, leaving a gradually extend- 
ing plain along the seacoast as far as the low hills 
forming Nibrunesi Point, the southern extremity of 
Suvla Bay. Sometimes at night small parties of 
chosen New Zealand officers stole out to explore the 
labyrinth, and their reconnaissance was of the highest 
value. But the district had never been surveyed, 
and the tortuous watercourses, the unexpected cliffs 
and ravines, complicated by almost impenetrable and 
spiky bush, threatened inextricable error to any 
wanderer there, even by daylight and in peace. 
Imagine, then, the perplexity of threading those 
unknown ways in a total darkness haunted by the 
expectation of deadly fire at every turn in the ravines, 


from the blackness of every thicket, and the edge of 
every cHff! One or two Greek and Turkish guides 
were available, but employed without much confidence. 

For the better understanding of the great assault, 
the following points in the geography might be 
remembered. Proceeding by the Long Sap, then 
lately constructed, parallel with the seashore from 
Ari Burnu northward, soon after passing No. i Post 
one crosses Sazli Beit Dere, a dry watercourse on 
.which the " Fishermen's Huts " of the first landing 
stood. About 600 yards farther on, after passing 
No. 2 and No. 3 Posts, one reaches Chailak Dere, 
close to the mouth of which the "diviner" discovered 
copious subterranean water, as previously described. 
Both these Deres, or dry watercourses, run at right 
angles to the coast, coming down from the fort of 
Chunuk Bair by devious, zigzag courses, but generally 
parallel in direction, though the upper courses tend 
to converge. The steep and lofty ground standing 
between the two Deres is marked by the three points 
of Old No. 3 Post, Table Top, and Rhododendron 
Spur, which runs up to the shoulder of Chunuk Bair 

Emerging from the Long Sap near the mouth of 
Chailak Dere, and proceeding along the flats sheltered 
after this attack by a parapet for about 1000 yards, 
one reaches the Aghyl Dere, which runs fairly parallel 
with the other two in its lower course, but splits into 
two Deres about a mile from the mouth, the right- 
hand tributary converging rapidly with Chailak Dere, 
till they almost meet at the foot of Chunuk Bair, the 
left-hand tributary bearing away north-east towards 
the foot of Hill Q and Koja Chemen Tepe. The 


ground between Chailak Dere and Aghyl Dere is 
chiefly marked by Bauchop's Hill and Little Table 
Top. At the source of Aghyl Dere's southern 
tributary, high up the front of the mountain, and just 
at the foot of Chunuk Bair's precipitous cliff, lies a 
small patch of cultivated ground, in that year yellow 
with corn stubble, conspicuous from Suvla and the 
sea. A few brown sheds and a sort of dwelling stood 
on the farther side. This was the Farm. 

Proceeding northward again along "Ocean Beach " 
from the mouth of Aghyl Dere, one reaches a Dere 
commonly called Asmak, though it has other names 
(Iram Chai or Kasa Dere). This is the main water- 
course draining the broad and open valley in which 
Biyuk (or Greater) Anafarta stands in a beautiful 
grove of cypresses, about three and a half miles from 
the sea. Several other Deres in the district are called 
"Asmak," and it is probable that the name " Asma," 
by which we knew the main tributary to this Dere, is 
really the same word. But, to keep the distinction, 
the Asma Dere runs into the Asmak nearly a mile 
from the mouth, and following its course, instead of 
going straight on to Biyuk Anafarta, one proceeds by 
a wide arc southward till the foot of Koja Chemen 
is reached. There one finds that the source is not 
far removed from the source of the northern branch 
of the Aghyl Dere, since both drain the highest 
section of the main ridge. The large space of ground 
thus almost enclosed between the Aghyl Dere on the 
south and the Asmak and Asma Deres beyond is 
singularly difficult and intricate. The low but steep 
hills and cliffs are sharply intersected by ravines 
running in every direction. The district is a jumble 


of sandy but hard mounds and scarps and fissures, 
with here and there a narrow slip or tongue of level 
ground running up among them. Few distinctive 
features mark locality, but about a mile from the sea 
stands a mass of low hill or broken plateau called 
Damakjelik Bair or Hill 40; and about another two- 
thirds of a mile inland to the north-east, across 
a brief but steep watercourse called Kaiajik Dere 
(another tributary to the Asmak), rises a similar but 
slightly higher mass of low hill or broken plateau 
called Kaiajik Aghala, soon to be famous as Hill 60. 
The Asma Dere runs past the farther side of Hill 60, 
and beyond the Asma rises the steep, long ridge of 
Abdel Rahman Bair, one of the main northern spurs 
or buttresses of Koja Chemen itself. 

This bare analysis of a difficult country covers 
the ground of the main August attack, and the hills 
or watercourses named may serve as guides to the 
comprehension of the obscure and desperate conflicts. 
But no analysis or map or description can adequately 
express the roughness and complexity of that desert 
jungle, the steepness of its cliffs and spurs and edges, 
or the bewilderment of its dry watercourses, creeks, 
fissures, and ravines. Neither in the British island 
nor in Ireland is there a scene to compare with it, 
because in our islands the frequent rain and prevailing 
moisture smooth off the edges, fill the ravines with 
water, and cover even the crags with moss and ferns 
or grasses. The nearest resemblance I have seen 
was in the crinkled hills and cliffs upon the West 
Coast of Africa near Benguela. But there the yellow 
spurs and ravines are absolutely bare. On, the Sari 
Mountains, parts of the lower slopes are concealed 


with the thick, prickly bush so often mentioned ; parts 
with low pines. The summits are coated with thin 
grass and heath, while some of the ravines and 
sheltered spurs were then brilliant with the crimson 
flowering oleander, which our men called rhodo- 
dendron, though it differs from the alien product 
introduced as an embellishment into English parks. 

The design of the main attack was drawn by 
Brigadier-General A, Skeen, the very able Chief 
of Staff at Anzac. It was accepted by Lieut. - 
General Bird wood, and approved by Sir Ian. Its 
execution was entrusted to Major - General Sir 
Alexander J. Godley, commanding the New Zealand 
and Australian Division, It was a complicated 
scheme — perhaps necessarily complicated owing to 
the intricacy of the ground, which prevented the 
united action of large bodies of troops, and rendered 
advance impossible except by thin columns sinuously 
winding up the Deres like snakes. Accordingly, 
General Godley was compelled to divide his troops. 
For the night attack of August 6-7 he divided them 
into two columns — a right and a left — each column 
being subdivided into a covering or advanced force, 
and an assaulting or main force. In Anzac as a 
whole (Sir Ian in his dispatch tells us) the troops 
at General Birdwood's disposal amounted in round 
numbers to 37,000 rifles and 72 guns, with naval 
support from two cruisers, four monitors, and two 
destroyers. Of these military forces the following 
contingents were allotted to Major-General Godley 
for his enterprise : 

His own New Zealand and Australian Division 
(less the ist and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, desperately 


engaged upon the Anzac heights and the Nek, as we 
have seen) ; 

The 13th Division under Major- General Shaw 
(less the 38th Brigade allotted to Army Corps 
Reserve and two battalions of the 40th Brigade at 
Anzac) ; 

The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade (Major- General 
Cox) ; 

The Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade ( Lieut. - 
Colonel Parker, R.A.). 

The Army Corps Reserve was the 29th Brigade, 
loth Division (less one battalion), the 38th Brigade, 
13th Division, and two battalions of the 40th Brigade. 

For the approach and first assault General Godley 
divided this force as follows, assigning to each of 
the four parts the objective mentioned below : 

(i) Right Covering Force — 

Brigadier-General A. H. Russell, New Zealand Mounted Rifles — 
New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (Auckland, Canter- 
bury, and Wellington Regiments) ; 
Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment (Divisional Troops) ; 
New Zealand Engineers Field Troop ; 
The Maori Contingent (about 500 under Lieut. -Colonel 
A. H. Herbert). 

This force was to advance up Sazli Beit and 
Chailak Deres, and seize Old No. 3 Post, Big Table 
Top, and Bauchop Hill. 

(2) Right Assaulting Cohtmn — 

Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, New Zealand Infantry 
Brigade — 
New Zealand Infantry Brigade (Auckland, Canterbury, 

Otago, and Wellington Battalions) ; 
26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section) ; 
No. I Company New Zealand Engineers. 

This assaulting column was to follow the cover- 
ing force up the Sazli Beit and Chailak Deres, and 
push on to the attack of Chunuk Bair. 


(3) Left Covering Force — 

Brigadier-General J. H. du B. Travers, 40th Infantry Brigade — 
Two Battalions of the 40th Infantry Brigade, z>. 4th South 

Wales Borderers and 5th Wiltshire ; 
Half the 72nd Field Company Royal Engineers. 

This force was to occupy Damakjelik Bair so as 
to cover the advance up Aghyl Dere, and to come 
into touch with the troops landing at Suvla. 

(4) Left Assaulting Column — 

Brigadier-General H. V. Cox, 29th Indian Infantry Brigade — 

29th Indian Infantry Brigade (14th Sikhs, 5th, 6th, and 
loth Gurkha Rifles) ; 

4th Australian Infantry Brigade (13th New South Wales, 
14th Victoria, 15th Queensland and Tasmania, i6th 
South and West Australian Battalions) ; 

2ist Indian Mountain Battery (less one section) ; 

No. 2 Company New Zealand Engineers. 

This left assaulting column was to advance up 
the Aghyl Dere to the attack on Koja Chemen 
(Hill 971), and at the same time to protect the 
left flank of the whole force as soon as it had 
cleared its own covering force. 

The Divisional Reserve was made up of remain- 
ing battalions of the 13th Division under Major- 
General F. C. Shaw, two battalions being stationed 
at Chailak Dere, and the 39th Brigade at Aghyl 
Dere, with half the 72nd Field Company R.E. 

The total forces under General Godley's command 
were estimated at about 12,000 men/ 

For the sake of clearness, the ensuing movements 
may be divided into four stages of about twenty-four 
hours each, counting from evening to evening. 

Evening, August 6, to evening, August 7. 
In the gathering darkness, about 9 p.m., on 
Friday, August 6, the whole force mustered between 
No. 2 and No. 3 Posts, having marched out from 

^ The arrangement of these forces is given in Sir lan's dispatch. 


Anzac concealed by the shelter of the Long Sap. 
General Godley fixed his headquarters at No. 2 
Post, and here the main supply of ammunition and 
water-cans was organised. The movements of the 
two covering forces and the two assaulting columns 
may be followed in the order given above, but it 
must be remembered that, in point of time, they 
were frequently simultaneous. The first task of the 
Right Covering Force (Brigadier-General Russell 
with his New Zealanders) was to clear the Turkish 
positions which dominated the lower course of the 
Sazli Beit and Chailak Deres — Old No. 3 Post, 
Big Table Top, between the Deres, and Bauchop's 
Hill on the farther side of Chailak. 

Old No. 3 Post is a steep and prominent hill, 
some 200 feet high, which we occupied as an ex- 
treme outpost soon after the landing, but lost on 
May 30, since when No. 3 Post, a similar but 
lower hill close to the shore, had been held as out- 
post by Lieut. -Colonel Bauchop with his Otago 
Mounted Rifles, other New Zealanders, and Maoris 
in turn. Since the Turks had recovered the Old 
Post they had converted it into a fortress of great 
strength, with entanglements, deep trenches, and 
head cover of solid timber balks. For its recapture 
a successful ruse was practised. For some weeks 
past, the destroyer Colne (Commander Claude 
Seymour) had turned a vivid searchlight on to the 
hill, and bombarded it from 9 p.m. to 9.10 p.m. 
precisely, always repeating both operations from 
9.20 to 9.30. This regularity had persuaded the 
Turks to regard the bombardment as a kind of 
Angelus or signal for a consecrated interval during 

Elliott &^ Fry\ 



which it was permissible to retire from the front 
trenches into the restful seclusion of tunnels and 
dug-outs. When the rite concluded, an old Turk, 
naturally nicknamed Achmet, used to trot round like 
a lamplighter, tying up the broken wires, and in a 
friendly spirit the New Zealanders agreed not to 
shoot him.^ But now there was no more work for 
Achmet. Hidden beneath the blaze of the search- 
light during the second customary bombardment, the 
Auckland Regiment (Lieut. -Colonel Mackesy) stole 
across to the hill and climbed to the very top of the 
trenches. The moment that the light was switched 
off they were in among the Turks with bayonet and 
bomb (no rifle cartridges were issued to the covering 
forces that night). They found many Turks taking 
their ease in the cool of the evening, without coats 
or boots. Seventy were captured. The rest died, 
or scurried away down communication trenches. 
These trenches were not finally cleared till 11 p.m. 

Meanwhile the attack on Big Table Top had far 
advanced. This hill, so conspicuous from northern 
Anzac for its precipitous sides and a flat top which 
appears even to overhang the sides, in reality forms 
part of the same long spur as Old No. 3 Post, and 
is connected with it by a ridge worn to a razor-edge 
by weather. The main hill, which rises to about 
400 feet, was heavily bombarded by howitzers from 
the shore and by the Colne, as she turned her 
guns off the Old Post at 9.30. It appears probable 
that the destroyer Chelmer (Commander Hugh T. 
England) joined in this bombardment ; at all events, 
for this or other service she was coupled with the 

^ Captain Bean, Australian papers, October 14, 1915. 


Colne in dispatches. The bombardment lasted half 
an hour, and at lo p.m. the infantry assault began 
upon a precipice steeper than the angle noted in 
text-books as "impracticable for infantry." The 
Canterbury Regiment led the way. Impeded by 
rifles, fixed bayonets, packs, and other equipment, 
in darkness lit only by stars, they scaled a height 
which appears as precipitous as any overhanging 
English cliff, held by a brave and religiously inspired 
enemy. Of this exploit Sir Ian in his dispatch 
justly observes, "there are moments during battle 
when life becomes intensified." In such a moment 
the New Zealanders, some of whom had practised 
mountain-climbing in the New Zealand Alps under 
such mountaineers as Mr. Malcolm Ross, their 
correspondent, climbed that seemingly inaccessible 
redoubt, more like a huge fortress tower than a hill. 
Pulling themselves up by their arms, while their legs 
hung in air, they stood upon the summit and stormed 
in upon the Turkish defences. The surviving Turks 
escaped up a long communication trench running 
across a narrow dip or Nek to the main Rhododendron 
Ridge, and the second dominating height between 
the Sazli Beit and Chailak Deres was won. The 
time was close upon midnight. 

Whilst part of the covering force was thus 
victorious, the Otago Mounted Rifles, with some 
Maoris, had been for a while checked in attempting 
to penetrate up the Chailak Dere. Not more than 
a few hundred yards up this watercourse (then no 
more watery than those mounted troops were on 
horseback) the Turks had constructed an enormously 
Strong barricade of thick wire and beams, commanded 


by an outpost only a few yards farther up. Right 
aofainst this obstacle the Ota^o men came. A sudden 
outburst of fire from the trench beyond cut many 
down. They were so thick and close that no bullet 
which made its way through the deep network of 
wires could miss. The cutters came forward and 
began snipping the spiky ropes of iron. But many 
fell before a party of New Zealand Engineers (Cap- 
tain Shera) forced a narrow passage. The advance 
up the Dere was thus delayed ; but we who saw 
the remains of that barricade after it was partially 
cleared know there was nothing to choose between 
the heroism of those who cut the way through and 
of those v/ho scaled the Table Top. 

Perhaps owing to this delay, or perhaps by plan, 
the main body of Otago Mounted Rifles did not 
follow up the Chailak Dere, but crossed it near the 
mouth, and turning sharply to the right a little 
farther on, advanced to assault the mass of low and 
complicated hill already known as Bauchop's owing 
to his reconnaissance. Nature and military art had 
entrenched the position throughout, and it was 
intersected criss-cross by deep ravines. But the 
Turks did not hold it strongly. Startled by the 
Otago men, who worked round their right flank 
and attacked from the north side, they began to 
clear out of the bivouacs in which they had long 
lived in fairly comfortable leisure and were now 
surprised. At the first assault, Lieut.-Colonel A, 
Bauchop, while shouting, " Come on, boys ! Charge ! " 
fell mortally wounded by a bullet in the spine. The 
army thus lost one of its most capable officers, and 
a man of exceptionally attractive nature, who for 


months had commanded a position of great risk 
and responsibility. The occupation of the hill or 
system of ravines was completed just after i a.m. 
(August 7). The task set the Right Covering Force 
was accomplished. 

Half an hour after midnight the Right Assaulting 
Column was thus enabled to begin its advance up 
the two Deres. As above mentioned, its main force 
was the New Zealand Infantry Brigade (Brigadier- 
General F. E. Johnston). The Canterbury Battalion 
proceeded alone up the Sazli Beit Dere, and met 
with small difficulty except from the nature of the 
ground, which, indeed, was so intricate that half the 
battalion lost its way and found itself back at the 
starting-point.^ In consequence. Colonel J. G. 
Huo-hes could not muster the battalion for the 
ascent of the main spur (Rhododendron Ridge, at 
first called Canterbury Ridge) till just before dawn. 
The other three battalions (Otago, Auckland, and 
Wellington, in that order) advancing up the Chailak 
Dere were equally hampered by the obscure and 
tangled country. They also encountered violent 
opposition, which compelled the leading battalion to 
deploy in the darkness. Some of the troops were 
told off to assist the covering force on their left in 
finally clearing Bauchop's Hill and another smaller 
eminence known as Little Table Top.^ But pushing 

^ See " From Quinn's to Rhododendron," in the Chronicles of the 
N.Z.E.F., August 8, 1917. 

2 It was either on this position or upon a neighbouring knoll known 
as Destroyer Hill that the following peculiar event occurred, as narrated 
by Captain Bean (Australian papers, October 25, 191 5): " The Otago 
Battalion, which was clearing out the small trenches ahead of it as its 
head wormed up the Chailak Ravine, swung up the slopes of this hill. 




steadily forward, the three battalions succeeded, though 
late, in joining up with the Canterbury Battalion on the 
lower slopes of the main Rhododendron Ridge, which 
ran straight up to the right or southern shoulder of 
Chunuk Bair, now deep purple against the rising sun. 
The attack upon this central height was to have 
been made before dawn. It was late. Under in- 
creasing daylight, shrapnel began to spit and shower 
overhead, striking with cross-fire from Battleship 
Hill and a position on the left crest of Chunuk. The 
men were much exhausted. They had accomplished 
a night march of extreme difficulty, exposed to con- 
tinuous perils and surprises. Nevertheless, the 
united battalions struggled forward up the ridge, 
rough with every obstacle and rising with a steep 
gradient. After a toilsome climb, at 8 a.m. they 
reached a point (almost at once called the Mustard 
Plaster, but afterwards known as the Apex) where 
a depression in the ridge afforded some slight cover 
from the guns, and there they hurriedly entrenched 
a position. On the left it hangs above the Farm, 
upon which the farthest end of it looks steeply down. 
A narrow but uninterrupted Nek of some 400 or 500 
yards (roughly a quarter-mile) extends the ridge to 
the sky-line summit — the right or southern shoulder 
of Chunuk Bair. 

The battalion had just reached the shelf below the Table Top, and was 
pushing up its line for the final rush over the hill when there arose a 
strange uproar on the top above them. There was the sound of the 
piling of arms, followed by vociferous cheering and wild rounds of 
applause and hand-clapping. It was the Turks on the top of the hill 
who had decided to surrender, and who did not want any mistake to be 
made as to their intention." The Otagos alone are said to have taken 
250 prisoners that night {Australia in Arms, p. 253). 


Meantime, on the previous evening, the Left 
Covering Force (Brigadier-General Travers) had 
followed so closely upon the heels of the Right 
Covering Force along the shore that they had to 
pass through them at the mouth of Chailak Dere. 
When clear, they proceeded straight forward along 
the level to Aghyl Dere, though exposed to desultory 
fire from Bauchop's Hill, not yet fully occupied. 
Turning sharply up the Dere, they emerged from it 
to the left and seized the entrenchments on the 
confused heights of Damakjelik Bair with so im- 
petuous a rush that some Turkish officers were caught 
in the unsuspecting security of pyjamas. In this 
attack the 4th South Wales Borderers (under Lieut. - 
Colonel F. M. Gillespie, an exceptionally fine officer) 
especially distinguished themselves, and by 1.30 a.m. 
the position was securely held. The force was thus 
able to cover the advance of the assaulting- column 
up the Aghyl Dere, and to come into touch with the 
Suvla landinor farther north. 

The Left Assaulting Column, consisting, as was 
mentioned, of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade 
(Brigadier-General Monash) and the Indian Brigade, 
the whole under command of Brigadier-General Cox, 
after breaking from their permanent camp at the foot 
of the Sphinx, came at once under a storm of shrapnel. 
They followed the Covering Force almost too closely, 
and found themselves strongly opposed after advanc- 
ing some distance up the Aghyl Dere. General 
Monash threw out one battalion as a screen, and 
progress was very slow, the intersecting ravines 
making the ground almost impenetrable. At the 
confluence of the two tributaries which form the 


main Dere, General Monash moved up the northern 
fork, keeping two battalions well away to his left 
in the hope of co-operating with the Suvla force in 
the projected assault upon Koja Chemen Tepe. 
During this slow and obstructed advance, the Aus- 
tralians discovered the emplacements of two " 75's," 
which had long troubled Anzac, where they were 
called "the Anafartas," but the guns had been hurried 
away. It was not till dawn that the brigade reached 
the ridge above the upper reaches of the Asma Dere. 
There General Monash received the order to con- 
centrate the battalions, leave a guard for his present 
position, and attack the towering height of Koja 
Chemen. The Sikh Battalion of the Indian Brigade 
was sent up from the southern branch of the Aghyl 
Dere in his support. But the enemy in front was 
now strong and fully aroused. The Australians 
were exhausted by their toilsome and hazardous 
march. No farther advance could be made, and 
the ridge overlooking the Asma was hurriedly 

The remaining three Indian Battalions (Gurkha 
Rifles) persistently clambered up the steep course 
of the Aghyl Dere's southern fork, till they reached 
a position facing the Farm. Their right thus came 
into touch with the New Zealanders on Rhododendron 
Ridge, while their centre and left stood ready to 
climb the steep front of the main range and assault 
" Hill Q." By about 9 a.m. (August 7) the whole 
force was thus extended in a broken and irregular 
line from the upper slopes of Rhododendron Ridge, 
past the front of the Farm, down the southern fork 
of the Aghyl Dere, along the northern fork, and 


across the rugged ground above the Asma Dere, 
The right flank rested on Anzac and held the 
important positions of Old No. 3 Post and Table 
Top. The left flank was guarded by Damakjelik 
Bair and by the division now landed at Suvla, whose 
co-operation was counted upon. Except for a delay 
of about three hours, all the movements had been 
carried out as designed. But the Turks could now 
be seen swarming along the summits from Battleship 
Hill. Every hour the heat was increasing to extreme 
intensity. General Birdwood truly said in his report, 
" The troops had performed a feat which is without 
parallel." But by this feat they were now exhausted. 
A general attempt to renew the attack was made 
at 9.30 a.m., but the task was too heavy. About 
II a.m. again, the Auckland Battalion, hitherto in 
reserve, bravely struggled up the narrow Nek (only 
some 40 yards broad), which, as described above, 
forms the end of Rhododendron Ridge, connecting 
it with the summit. But they were swept by Turkish 
guns apparently near " Hill Q," and on reaching a 
Turkish trench only about 200 yards from the top, 
they were driven back.^ Orders were, therefore, 
issued to both columns to strengthen and hold their 
present positions with a view to further advance 
before dawn on the following day. Meantime, 
supplies were sent up, so far as possible, from the 
advanced base at No. 2 Post. As usual throughout 
the campaign, the supply of water was the greatest 
need and the greatest difficulty, fine as was the 

^Captain Bean, Australian papers, October 25. He adds: "I 
believe that fifteen men actually managed to reach the Turkish trench 
on the summit. They never came back." 


conduct of the Indian drivers of water mules. The 
convoys were also continually exposed to shrapnel 
from the heights, and to the rifle-fire of snipers still 
lurking in large numbers invisible among the bushes 
and ravines of the wide stretch of country occupied 
during the night. 

From the evening of August 7 to the evening of 
August 8. 

During the evening both of the Assaulting 
Columns were reinforced. The Right Column 
(Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston) received the 
Auckland Mounted Rifles and the Maori contin- 
gent from the Right Covering Force, together with 
two battalions (8th Welsh Pioneers and 7th Glou- 
cesters) from the 13th Division in reserve. The 
Left Assaulting Column (Brigadier-General H. V. 
Cox) received three battalions from the 39th Brigade, 
13th Division (9th R. Warwicks, 9th Worcesters, 
and 7th North Staffords, the 7th Gloucesters going 
to the Right Column, as above), together with the 
6th South Lancashire (38th Brigade). The Right 
Column was to proceed with the attack on Chunuk 
Bair; the Left Column to assault " Hill Q" in the 
centre, and with its left to work round north-east 
to the steep ridge called Abdel Rahman Bair for 
an assault upon Koja Chemen Tepe. 

Before daylight on Sunday, August 8, the edge 
of the heights from Batdeship Hill to " Hill Q " was 
heavily bombarded by monitors and cruisers, together 
with the batteries on the flats. At the first dawn 
(4.15) a column, led by Lieut. -Colonel W. G. Malone, 


the hero of Quinn's Post, with his accustomed en- 
thusiasm, dashed up the steep and narrow slope 
to the summit of Rhododendron Ridge. Colonel 
Malone's own Wellington Battalion went first. The 
7th Gloucesters closely followed. The Auckland 
Mounted Rifles and Welsh Pioneers came in support. 
The Wellingtons reached the actual top of the ridge. 
They sprang into a long Turkish communication 
trench, which they found empty but for an isolated 
party with a machine-gun just arrived from Achi 
Baba. They spread out towards the right. Immedi- 
ately on their left, two companies of the Gloucesters 
also reached the summit, and sprang into the trench. 
Against the sunrise their figures could be dimly 
discerned from the sea, and the hope of victory 
rose high. Two other Gloucester Companies swung 
slightly to the right and entrenched below the sky-line 
in rear of the Wellingtons. But during the rush 
the Gloucesters had been exposed to a terrible storm 
of shrapnel and rifle-fire coming from the higher 
ground northward on their left, and were already 
much reduced. As often happens in a charge, the 
supports came under a heavier fire than the first lines, 
and though the Auckland Mounted Rifles got through 
and joined the Wellingtons, it was not till the 
afternoon. The remainder appear to have been 

In the meantime the position of the British and 
New Zealanders upon the summit was indeed terrible. 
Perceiving how small their numbers were, the Turks 
turned every kind of fire upon the trench. Large 
parties of them kept creeping up the trench itself 

^ Captain Bean's account in Australian papers, October 25, 1915. 


from the right or southern end, and hurHng bombs. 
So exposed was the position that Colonel Malone 
drew his men out of the trench, and marked out a 
fresh trench 15 yards in rear of it. Here they dug ; 
but tools were short, bombs were short, and water 
had run out. The trench was less than a foot deep. 
On the left, the Gloucester companies were almost 
annihilated. Attack after attack swept up against 
them. Every officer was killed or wounded. In his 
dispatch, Sir Ian says that by midday the battalion 
(apparently the other two companies had by that time 
come into line) consisted of small groups of men 
commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or 

"Chapter and verse," he adds, "maybe quoted 
for the view that the rank and file of an army cannot 
long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting 
unless they are given confidence by the example of 
good officers. Yet here is at least one instance 
where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, 
from midday till sunset, without aiiy officers." 

In a few hours Colonel Malone was compelled to 
withdraw again to a new trench a few yards to the 
rear, because the trench recently dug was too full of 
dead and dying to give the slightest cover. He 
himself, as was told me by one present, carried a 
rifle pierced with bullets, which he said he was 
keeping as a trophy for his home. Whilst he was 
still carefully marking the completion of the new 
trench, sedulously cultivating the domestic virtues to 
the last, a terrific outburst of shrapnel showered down 
upon his devoted party, and he fell. It was about 
4 p.m., just after the Auckland Mounted Rifles had 


succeeded in reaching the position. At 5 o'clock 
he died. Colonel Moore of the Otago Battalion 
succeeded him, but was wounded during the night 
while the dwindling force still clung to the position, 
and the south-west shoulder of Chunuk Bair was 
ours — was uncertainly ours. 

In the centre, around the Farm at the foot of the 
precipitous front of Chunuk Bair, the remaining three 
battalions of the 39th Brigade attempted to advance 
up the mountain side by keeping to the right or 
south of the cultivated yellow patch and empty 
buildings. Similarly, on the left or north-east side, 
the three Gurkha battalions crept some distance up 
the spurs leading to the dip or saddle between 
Chunuk Bair and " Hill Q." This advance served 
them well on the following day, but on the Sunday 
the proposed attack upon this section of the summit 
line came to nothing owing to the murderous fire 
poured upon both attempts. 

On the same Sunday (August 8) the extreme left 
of Brigadier-General Cox's assaulting columns was 
under orders, as mentioned, to attack the dominating 
height of Koja Chemen Tepe itself by way of the 
precipitous northern ridge or spur called Abdel 
Rahman Bair. The advance began in darkness at 
3 a.m. Leaving the 13th (New South Wales) 
Battalion to hold the ridge overlooking Asma Dere 
and now entrenched, Brigadier-General Monash 
placed the 15th (Queensland and Tasmania, under 
Lieut.-Colonel Cannan) Battalion of his 4th Australian 
Brigade in front, the 14th (Victoria, under Major 
Rankine) and the i6th (S. and W. Australia, under 
Lieut-Colonel Pope) following closely. Sliding down 


the steep descent of sandstone rock from the top of 
their ridge, the men formed up into column in the 
valley of Asma Dere below, and cautiously advanced, 
avoiding a field of standing wheat lest the rustle should 
arouse the enemy. They had not gone far over the 
rough and pathless waste when a few shots and dimly 
discerned figures hastening away showed that they 
had struck into the enemy's outposts. The 15th 
Battalion accordingly deployed, and threw a platoon 
forward as a screen. Thus the advance was continued 
for about half a mile, when the dark mass of Abdel 
Rahman was seen against the gradually increasing 
light, running like a vast barrier straight across their 
course. Hardly had their right touched the first 
slopes when an overwhelming machine-gun and rifle- 
fire burst upon them from the whole length of the 
front. All three battalions deployed into platoons, 
and attempted to continue the advance in spite of 
continuous loss. A screen was thrown out to protect 
the left flank, which hung "in air," exposed to attack 
from Biyuk Anafarta valley and any guns there 
chanced to be on Ismail Oglu Tepe ("W Hill") 
beyond it.^ If only the Divisions landed at Suvla 
had seized that vital hill ! Now if ever was their 
support called for. But no help came. The platoons 
struggled up the steep bastions of the ridge in their 
attempt to scale the height. But the fire was 
impenetrable : the deaths too numerous. It appears 
that the brigade had, in fact, fallen up against strong 
Turkish reinforcements coming from Biyuk Anafarta 

^ Fortunately for the brigade, the Turks had withdrawn their guns 
during the night (7th and 8th) owing to the Suvla landing, and had not 
yet brought them back to W Hill. 


to the main range. Sir lan's dispatch describes the 
battalions as "virtually surrounded." Overwhelmed, 
at all events, by numbers and forced into an untenable 
position, they had no choice but to hew their way 
back. Their loss was already looo — more than a 
third of their force. Grimly they retired, bringing 
their wounded in. By 9 a.m. they were back behind 
the ridge they had entrenched the night before. 
There, though exhausted by heat, thirst, and the 
weariness of prolonged effort without sleep, they 
maintained themselves for the rest of the day against 
violent and repeated attacks. 

That Sunday evening the Right Assaulting 
Column lay upon Rhododendron Ridge, the main 
body partially sheltered in the depression afterwards 
called the Apex, and the relics of three battalions 
clinging to the top where it reaches the summit of the 
Chunuk Bair right shoulder. The Left Assaulting 
Column was divided, part round the Farm and high 
upon its north-east ridges, part entrenched but heavily 
attacked upon the ridge overlooking Asma Dere. 

From the evening of August 8 to the evening 
of August 9. 

For the renewed attack next morning, a third 
assaulting column was organised out of the loth and 
13th Divisions in the Army Corps reserve. Brigadier- 
General A. H. Baldwin (38th Brigade) was instructed 
to take two battalions of his own brigade (6th East 
Lancashire and 6th Loyal North Lancashire) together 
with two from the 29th Brigade (loth Hampshire 
and 6th Royal Irish Rifles) and one from the 40th 


Brigade (5th Wiltshire), and assemble in the evening 
of August 8 in the Chailak Dere. Advancing thence 
through the night, he was to follow up Rhododendron 
Ridge, and co-operating with the Right Assaulting 
Column (General Johnston's) was to move in 
successive lines to the summit, and thence to the 
left towards "Hill Q." This was to form the main 
attack of the day. General Baldwin sent the Loyal 
North Lancashires forward in advance, and with the 
remaining four battalions began the long and toilsome 
march upward. The track was by this time fairly 
well trodden, and every precaution was taken to keep 
it clear of wounded and "empties" coming down. 
Guides for the column were also provided. It is 
true, the night was pitch dark, the ascent rough and, 
towards the end, very steep. The column moved 
slowly, and was behind the appointed time ; but it is 
difficult to imagine that, in Sir lan's words, "in plain 
English, Baldwin lost his way — through no fault of 
his own." It was sunrise by the time the main 
ascent was reached. His column would be perfectly 
visible to the enemy's artillery, and the fire was very 
heavy. Perhaps the officers were attracted by the 
Farm as a sheltered place in which to pause and 
reorganise. At all events, the column did not reach 
its appointed destination, but found itself at 5.15 a.m. 
down in the deep hollow of the Farm on the left of 
the ridge which it should have climbed to the Apex. 
The Farm, being a definite point visible for miles 
around owing to its patch of yellow stubble, and 
affording also a certain amount of cover against fire 
from the height, probably tended to attract or mislead 
guides and troops from their proper direction. 


Just at the very time when General Baldwin's 
brigade began at last to emerge upon the Farm, a 
tragic and much disputed scene was being enacted 
upon the summit far above them. On the previous 
day, as we have noticed, part of General Cox's 
column had worked their way up the spurs on the 
left (north-east) of the Farm. During the night they 
pushed still farther up the height, which, as noticed, 
appears almost precipitous. The 6th Gurkhas were 
leading, under command of Major Cecil G. L. 
Allanson. The 6th South Lancashires (38th Brigade) 
were close behind, supported by the 9th Warwicks 
and 7th North Staffords (39th Brigade), sent up to 
reinforce this column on the night of August y-S, 
as above mentioned. The Gurkhas climbed during 
the darkness to a line about 150 yards below the 
crest. Here they dug what trench or shelter was 
possible upon such an angle of slope, and two com- 
panies of the South Lancashires joined them. At 
early dawn, about 4.30, the warships, monitors, and 
guns along the shore began a terrible bombardment 
of the whole crest along Chunuk Bair, " Hill Q," 
and the saddle between. The enormous shells burst 
upon the edge just above the small assaulting party 
which crouched below, almost deafened but unharmed. 
A monitor's shell striking the sky-line flings up a 
spout of black smoke, huge fragments, and dust 
which spreads fan-shape like the explosion of a 
sudden volcano. With such explosions the whole 
mountain edge smoked and shook. All parapets 
and shallow trenches lining the top were torn to 
pieces, uprooted, and flattened out. It seemed im- 
possible for any human being to endure so over- 


whelming a visitation or to remain alive. Yet Turks 

According to orders, this terrific bombardment 
was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse 
slopes at 5.16 a.m.^ The moment came. Suddenly 
the guns were silent. It was the signal for the 
storming party. The little Gurkha mountaineers 
crawled up the precipice like flies. The South 
Lancashire crawled, mixed up among them. They 
reached the topmost edge. Hand to hand the Turks 
rushed upon them as they rose. The struggle was 
for life or death. Major Allanson was wounded. 
Men and officers fell together. But the fight was 
brief. Shaken by the bombardment, overcome in 
daring and activity by some 400 startling Gurkhas 
and solid Lancastrians, the surviving Turks suddenly 
turned and ran for life down the steep slope to the 
refuge of the steeper gullies below. 

For a moment Major Allanson and his men 
paused to draw breath. They were standing on the 
saddle between Chunuk Bair and " Hill Q." The 
dead lay thick around them. But below, straight in 
front, lit by the risen sun, like a white serpent sliding 
between the purple shores, ran the sea, the Narrows, 
the Dardanelles, the aim and object of all these battles 
and sudden deaths. Never since Xenophon's Ten 
Thousand cried " The sea ! the sea ! " had sight been 
more welcome to a soldier's eyes. There went the 
ships. There were the transports bringing new 
troops over from Asia. There ran the road to 
Maidos, though the town of Maidos was just hidden 
by the hill before it. There was the Krithia road. 

^ Sir lan's dispatch quotes the order. 


Motor-lorries moved along it carrying shells and 
supplies to Achi Baba. So Sir Ian had been right. 
General Birdwood had been right. This was the 
path to victory. Only hold that summit and victory 
is ours. The Straits are opened. A conquered 
Turkey and a friendly Bulgaria will bar the German 
path to the East. Peace will come back again, and 
the most brilliant strategic conception in the war 
will be justified. 

In triumphant enthusiasm, Gurkhas and Lan- 
castrians raced and leapt down the reverse slope, 
pursuing the Turks as they scattered and ran. Major 
Allanson, though wounded, himself raced with them. 
They fired as they went. It was a moment of 
supreme exultation. Suddenly, before they had gone 
a hundred yards, crash into the midst of them fell 
five or six large shells and exploded. In the words 
of Sir lan's dispatch : " Instead of Baldwin's support 
came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell." 

Where those fatal shells came from was at the 
time, and still remains, a cause of bitter controversy. 
All on the summit believed them British. This may 
have been a mistake. It is a common error for an 
advance line to suppose it is being shelled by its own 
side. But probably the shells were British. Outside 
the navy, nearly every one at the time believed them 
to be naval, ^ and though the range must have been 

1 Phillip Schuler definitely says : " Mistaking the target, the 
destroyers dropped 6-inch high-explosive shells amongst the Indian 
troops " {Australia in Arms, p. 261). But, accurate though he generally 
was, I believe he is here mistaken. I never heard the destroyers 
mentioned at the time, and I doubt if their guns could have shelled a 
reverse slope. Further on (p. 263) he says that during the Turkish 
counter-attack next day the Anzac guns shelled "the reverse slope." If 


some four or five miles, the accuracy of the naval 
shooting at a visible mark had been proved by that 
morning's bombardment, over the same distance. 
But the general belief may have been founded on 
a mere suspicion constantly repeated. It has long 
appeared to me that two sentences in Sir lan's 
dispatch suggest a more probable explanation. As 
quoted above, he says the orders were for the 
bombardment to be switched on to the flanks and 
reverse slopes of the heights at 5.16 a.m. He further 
says that the Gurkhas and South Lancashires, after 
reaching the crest, "began to attack down the far 
side of it," i.e. down the reverse slopes of the hill. It 
would be natural for our gunners to wait some minutes 
before bombarding the reverse slope, so as to catch 
the enemy retreating or reinforcements coming up. 
In any case, they were under orders to bombard the 
reverse slope, and they obeyed. But what guns 
could bombard a reverse slope } As was proved 
throughout the campaign, the trajectory of naval 
guns was so flat that either they hit the top of the 
mountain (as they almost invariably did) or their 
shells skimmed across the top to burst miles away 
in Asia. A reverse slope would be exactly the thing 
they could never hit. For a reverse slope, mortars 
or howitzers are wanted. There were howitzers 
near No. 2 Post and along the flats beside the shore, 
and their orders were to bombard the reverse slope 
after 5.16 a.m. This explanation is suggested, but 
the controversy will be forgotten before settled. 

Whatever the cause, the effect was disaster irre- 

that was possible, another explanation besides the one I suggest above 
may be considered. 

2/6 SARI BAIll 

trievable — disaster leaving its lamentable mark upon 
the world's history. Amid the scattered limbs and 
shattered bodies of their comrades, the exultant 
pursuers stopped aghast. They began to stumble 
back. They scrambled to the crest and over it. 
Major Allanson with a small group stood firm, taking 
one last look upon that scene of dazzling hope. But 
the Turkish officers with the supports had observed 
the check. Seizing the moment, they urged their 
fresh companies upward, in turn pursuing. Against 
the gathering crowd a handful could not stand. 
Wounded and isolated, Major Allanson withdrew 
the last of his men. Down the face of the mountain 
they came upon the little trench from which they 
had adventurously started less than half an hour 
before. They alone had witnessed and shared the 
crisis. They alone had watched the moment when 
the campaign swung upon the fateful hinge. No 
soldier in our army was ever to behold that triumphant 
prospect again.^ 

Why the troops who were a little lower down the 
slope, in support, did not at once push up to the 
assistance of the Gurkhas and Lancastrians on the 
summit has not been explained. They belonged to 
the New Army, and were rushed into a most difficult 

^ Apparently, it was mainly to this incident that Dr. Stiirmer referred 
in the following passage: "In those September" (he means August) 
" days I had already had some experience of Turkish politics and their 
defiance of the laws of humanity, and my sympathies were all for those 
thousands of fine Colonial troops^such men as one seldom sees— sacri- 
ficing their lives in one last colossal attack, which if it had been pro- 
longed even for another hour might have sealed the fate of the Straits 
and would have meant the first decisive step towards the overthrow 
of our forces ; for the capture of Constantinople would have been the 
beginning of the end." — Tivo War Years in Constatitinople, p. 86. 



and terrible conflict. It was Monday morning, and 
they had been given little sleep since Saturday, and 
little if any food or water except in the rations and 
water-bottles {i^ pint) which they brought with them. 
No doubt they were exhausted. But every one was 
exhausted, and others had been out longer in the 
assaulting column. One might have supposed that 
here their great opportunity had come. Why they 
did not take it, we are not informed. 

It was in vain now that General Baldwin's brigade, 
arriving at the Farm at the very crisis of frustrated 
design, began to push up the steep with the loth 
Hants and two companies of the 6th East Lancashires. 
They appear to have attempted a spur nearer the 
Farm than the point where the Gurkhas climbed, 
which was half a mile away to the left. But they 
made little progress. The Turks, crowding the 
summit, now exultant in their turn, poured down such 
storms of fire that the new advance was checked, and 
General Baldwin was compelled to order re-concentra- 
tion at the Farm, where the brigade remained. 

The Turks in their triumph, though not daring 
as yet to advance far over the crest, turned in exultant 
assault upon the exhausted body of New Zealanders 
and Gloucesters still lying exposed near the summit 
of the Chunuk Bair shoulder, just to the right of the 
Nek on Rhododendron Ridge, up which Baldwin's 
brigade ought to have advanced at dawn. About 
800 men still clung to the shallow and hastily con- 
structed trenches there. They lay unprotected by 
wire, and below the sky-line, so that when the enemy 
came swarming over the summit with bayonet or 
bomb, our rifles had only some twenty or thirty yards' 


interval in which to mow them down. This mistake 
in position was thought at the time to spring from a 
memory of old South African tactics, in which the 
sky-line was always avoided. But we have seen the 
reasons why Colonel Malone had been compelled 
twice to remove the trenches a few yards farther 
from the top. 

Through the heat of the day and afternoon the 
men lay there resisting repeated onset. Late on that 
Monday evening, they were at last withdrawn and 
relieved. The New Zealanders had been fighting 
continuously and under extreme strain since Friday 
night ; the Gloucesters since Saturday. The noblest 
endurance could stand no more. The 6th Loyal 
North Lancashires (38th Brigade) and the 5th Wilts 
(40th Brigade) were sent up to occupy the extreme 
position which had been so steadfastly retained. 

Fro7n the evening of Attgtist 9 to the evening of 
August 10. 

No more than these two battalions were ordered 
because, in Sir lan's words, " General Sir William Bird- 
wood is emphatic on the point that the nature of the 
ground was such that there was no room on the crest 
for more than this body of 800 to 1000 rifles." Had 
Major Allanson been able to hold his splendidly won 
position to the right of " Hill Q," the whole crest of 
Chunuk Bair would have been free for our occupation. 
Had the expected advance from Suvla been pushed 
forward with vigour between August 7 and 9, the 
Turks could not have concentrated forces for the 
fatal counter-attack upon Chunuk Bair on the loth. 


Those two failures combined to frustrate the admirably 
designed movement of August, and ultimately in- 
volved the whole campaign in failure. 

As it was, the 6th Loyal Lancashires passed up 
the Rhododendron Ridge in good time during the 
night, and duly occupied the trenches near the summit 
as the New Zealanders and Gloucesters were with- 
drawn. Their commandant, Lieut-Colonel H.^ G. 
Levinge, even attempted to improve the position by 
throwing out observation posts to the sky-line, so as 
to command the reverse slope. The 5th Wiltshire 
(Lieut.-Colonel J. Garden), delayed by the difficulties 
of the steep and encumbered ascent, did not arrive 
till 4 a.m., just as dawn was breaking, and lay down 
in a position believed to be covered but really 

Hardly had they settled down when every avail- 
able Turkish gun was turned upon the two weak 
and harassed battalions. The bombardment was 
endured for about an hour, and then, at 5.30 a.m., 
the Turks under German leaders directed an over- 
whelming counter-attack upon the devoted New 
Army men. For this attack they were able to 
employ a full Division and three extra battalions, 
certainly not less than 12,000 men, probably more. 
Crouching in their unfortunate positions, our two 
battalions were engulfed or swept away, as by an 
irresistible tide. They were driven from their shallow 
and hurriedly constructed trenches. Both their 
Colonels were killed. The Wiltshires were " literally 
almost annihilated." ^ 

Recognising the significance of the summit's re- 

^ Sir lan's dispatch. 


occupation, and triumphant as never before, the Turks 
swarmed over the edge down into the deep gullies on 
the right or south of Rhododendron Ridge, probably 
with the design of cutting our assaulting columns off 
from the base at Anzac and encircling them to de- 
struction. This threatening movement was checked 
partly by the battalions in support upon the Ridge 
itself, but mainly by the naval guns (now secure of 
a visible target), the New Zealand, Australian, and 
Indian guns, and the 69th Brigade R.F.A. The 
service of a ten machine-gun battery, part of the 
New Zealand Machine-gun Section organised and 
commanded by Major J. Wallingford (Auckland 
Battalion),^ was the subject of great eulogy at the 
time. This battery " played upon their serried ranks 
at close range until the barrels were red-hot. 
Enormous losses were inflicted, especially by these 
ten machine-guns."^ Reinforcements hurrying along 
the sky-line from Battleship Hill were similarly ex- 
posed to the larger guns. Brave as the Turks showed 
themselves in this their hour of apparent triumph, 
they could make no progress against so violent a 
storm of destruction. The attack melted away. Few 
struggled back into safety over the summit, and the 
right flank of our columns was secured. 

Simultaneously with the onset which overwhelmed 
our two battalions on the summit, the Turks appear- 
ing in similar massed lines along the sky-line of 
Chunuk Bair itself and the saddle between that and 
" Hill Q," began to pour down the face of the range. 
They must have swept over the thin defences which 

^ 77/1? Story of the Anzacs (Messrs. Ingram & Son, Melbourne), p. 87. 
* Sir lan's dispatch. 


had sheltered the 6th Gurkhas. They broke through 
the outposts of General Baldwin's central column. 
They broke through our line at various points. They 
reached the Farm. Some of our companies were 
driven in confusion down the tangled spurs and 
ravines. Near the foot of the mountain they were 
finely rallied by Staff-Captain Street, who was look- 
ing after the supply of food and water. By sheer 
force of personality, he led them unhesitatingly back 
into the thick of the intense conflict upon that con- 
spicuous stubble-field. In Sir lan's words : 

" It was a series of struggles in which Generals 
fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific 
weapons and caught one another by the throat. So 
desperate a battle cannot be described. The Turks 
came on again and again, fighting magnificently, 
calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, 
and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the old 
traditions of their race. There was no fiinching. 
They died in the ranks where they stood." 

Here fell General Baldwin, whom I had known first 
as a Captain in the ist Manchesters on Caesar's Hill 
in Ladysmith, and later in the lines at Helles. As 
in some medieval battle, all his Staff fell with him. 
Lieut-Colonel M. H. Nunn, 9th Worcesters, was 
killed. The Worcesters were left that day without 
a single officer. So were the Warwicks. So, as we 
have seen, were the Gloucesters. At the Farm also 
Brigadier-General Cooper (29th Brigade) was severely 
wounded. Brigadier-General Cayley (39th Brigade) 
was mentioned for distinguished courag-e. The 

o o 

Farm, though recovered that day, was ultimately 
abandoned to the Turks, who drove an enormous 


trench across the stubble-field, and entangled the 
whole front with wire. But to the end the shrunken 
relics of the dead who fell that morning remained in 
lines and heaps upon the ground. 

Hearing of the violent and almost successful 
counter-attack, General Birdwood hurried up the 
last two battalions of his Corps Reserve — the 5th 
Connaught Rangers (29th Brigade) being one.^ But 
by 10 a.m. the immediate danger was over. The 
force of the attack was spent. The few surviving 
Turks began to scramble back over the summit. As 
Captain Bean wrote at the time : 

" A few Turks could still be seen at about two 
o'clock, hopping desperately into any cover that sug- 
gested itself. Out of at least three or four thousand 
who came over the ridge only twos and threes got 
back — probably not five hundred in all. But the 
attack had one result. It had driven the garrison 
down from the trenches which Wellington and the 
Gloucesters had won on the summit of Chunuk Bair, 
and back on to the high spur 500 yards distant which 
New Zealand had won the first night. The lines 
were now beginning to coagulate into the two settled 
rows of opposing trenches in which every modern 
battle seems to end." 

The Turks cleared the dead from the summit by 
dropping them over the edge at the highest point 
of Chunuk Bair, and letting them slide down that 

^ For a detailed account of the four battalions in the 29th Brigade 
during this action see The Tenth {Irish) Division i?t Gallipoli, pp. 62- 
120. Two companies of the 5th Connaught Rangers (Colonel Jourdain) 
went up to the Farm on the evening of the loth after the other troops 
had been withdrawn, and brought in many wounded whom they found 
lying there in great need of water and attention. 


precipitous ravine or " chimney " which was mentioned 
above. To the end of the campaign that chimney- 
was black with corpses and uniforms, weathered and 
wasting between the rocky sides. 

Far away to the left, on the low but deeply 
intersected hills and ridges overlooking the Asma 
Dere, General Monash's 4th Australian Brigade and 
the 4th South Wales Borderers were also compelled on 
the morning and afternoon of the same day (August 
10) to resist violent counter-attacks coming across 
from the Abdel Rahman spur. They held their 
position, but the South Wales Borderers lost their 
commandant, the excellent soldier, Lieut.-Colonel 
Gillespie, who left his name on part of the district 
he had helped to win. 

The total casualties in General Birdwood's Army 
Corps from the Friday night to the Tuesday night 
amounted to 12,000,^ by far the greater proportion 
of whom were lost in General Godley's two divisions 
allotted for the main attack on Sari Bair. The 
gallantry and skill of divisions cannot be estimated 
by losses. But still it is noticeable that the New 
Army Division (13th, under Major-General Shaw) 
lost more than 50 per cent. (6000 out of 10,500), and 
10 commanding officers out of 13. The proportion 
of officers killed and wounded was, indeed, unusually 
high in all brigades. As to the troops in general, 
perhaps only those who are well acquainted with the 
extreme complexity of the country, and with the 
strain of night marches into the heart of an enemy's 
positions, followed by assaults upon strongly held 
mountain heights at dawn, can fully appreciate the 

^ Phillip Schuler put them at 18,000 {Australia in Arms, p. 270). 


true significance of the last paragraph in General 
Godley's report, as quoted in Sir lan's dispatch : 

" I cannot close my report without placing on 
record my unbounded admiration of the work 
performed, and the gallantry displayed, by the 
troops and their leaders during the severe fighting 
involved in these operations. Though the Australian, 
New Zealand, and Indian units had been confined to 
trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, 
and though the troops of the New Armies had only 
just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them 
had not been previously under fire, I do not believe 
that any troops in the world could have accomplished 
more. All ranks vied with one another in the 
performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily 
upheld the best traditions of the British Army." 

In his dispatch. Sir Ian mentions that at times 
he thought of throwing his reserves (the 53rd and 
54th Divisions, coming up through Mudros) into this 
central battle. He thinks they probably would have 
turned the scale. The Corps and Divisional Com- 
manders assured him there was no room for additional 
troops. But it was the water difficulty, he says, 
which made him give up the idea. The thirst of the 
troops in this part of the general attack was such that 
when the mules with the water "pakhals" arrived at 
the front, the men rushed up to them just to lick the 
moisture oozing- through the canvas bag's. Thirst is 
the most terrible of physical sufferings, and no one 
who has known it will wonder at Sir lan's decision. 
Still the want of water was almost equally cruel at 
Suvla, whither the Reserve Divisions were ultimately 
sent. There they arrived after the decisive days 
were passed, and fell under the curse of an inert 



spirit, very different from the spirit of the Sari Bair 
assault. If their presence at Anzac would indeed 
have turned the scale, it is part of the Dardanelles 
tragedy that the Commander-in-Chief, unable to 
foresee the Suvla conditions, or still hoping too 
much from the new landing there, did not venture 
upon the risk, however dangerous. 

For in spite of all the gallantry and endurance 
(which Napoleon counted a more essential quality in 
a soldier than courage), and in spite of all the careful 
organisation of supply and medical care, the main 
attack had failed by sunset of Tuesday, August 10. 
A large extent of ground had been occupied. From 
Rhododendron Ridge on the right to Asma Dere on 
the left, and all between those two points and the sea, 
the country was now in our possession. Anzac was 
enlarged from barely 300 acres to about 8 square 
miles.^ It was possible now to walk or ride from 
Anzac to Suvla Bay, though snipers always en- 
dangered the route. Yet the attack had failed. 
The summits of Sari Bair were not held. The 
Straits were still closed ; Constantinople still distant. 
Mistakes, no doubt, had been made, but mistakes 
could have been retrieved. The ultimate cause of 
failure was simply this : our attacking forces were 
outnumbered and checked by an enemy holding 
positions of enormous natural strength, and the task 
of diverting and reducing the enemy's force from 
Suvla, or of actually contributing new troops thence 
to the central movement, was not fulfilled. 

1 Australia in Artns, p. 271, 



EYOND the Asmak Dere, which, as described 
in the last chapter, formed the northern limit 
of the Anzac movement against the Sari 
Bair range, the coast continues its north-westerly 
trend till the sharp and rocky headland of Nibrunesi 
Point is reached. Inland, the plain naturally increases 
in area as the hills diverge towards the north-east. 
It is flat and open land, studded with low trees and 
bushes. Nearly all the surface is waste, but small 
farms, surrounded by larger trees and patches of 
cultivation, occur here and there, as at Kazlar Chair 
close to the Asmak, and Hetman Chair about a mile 
north of it ("Chair" meaning meadow). The soil 
becomes more and more marshy as one proceeds, and 
in winter the region nearest the Salt Lake is water- 
logged. The bush also grows more dense, but is 
crossed by sheep tracks, and is nowhere impenetrable. 
The plain, as we have seen, forms the entrance to 
the broad and open valley of Biyuk (Big) Anafarta, 
the cypress groves of which are clearly visible about 
three and a half miles to the right. 

Nibrunesi Point, or Kuchuk Kemikli, rises with 
steep cliffs on both sides, but steeper on the north, 
where they fall abruptly into Suvla Bay. It is the 
extremity of what was once a high ridge or chain of 


To face p. 286 


reddish conglomerate rock, hard but friable. The 
chain is now marked by a series of isolated knolls — 
first the low knolls upon the Point itself; then the 
broad-based rounded hill of Lala Baba, which rises 
to about 1 50 feet ; then, beyond the southern end of 
the Salt Lake and a stretch of marsh and bushy plain, 
Yilghin Burnu (better known to us as "Chocolate 
Hill," from its reddish-brown colour even before it 
was burnt), which is a similar but larger rounded hill, 
like an inverted bowl, rising about 160 feet; then, 
beyond a brief but steepish dip or saddle. Hill 50 or 
"Green Hill" (so called because the thick bush 
covering it was not burnt), rising to nearly equal 
height, but not so round or definite in shape ; lastly, 
beyond a wide and distinctive break, the formidable 
mass of Ismail Oglu Tepe (known to us as " W Hill" 
from the waving outline of its crest, but more officially 
called "Hill 112" from its approximate height in 
metres). Ismail Oglu, thus rising about 330 feet, 
forms the rectangular corner of the high plateau on 
which Anafarta Sagir (Kuchuk or Little Anafarta) 
stands, and from the southern face it commands the 
Biyuk Anafarta valley and the hills across it at the 
foot of Sari Bair, while from the western face it 
commands Green and Chocolate Hills, almost the 
whole of the plain north of them, the Salt Lake, and 
the northern shores of Suvla Bay. It is, therefore, 
the most vital and dominating position, unless long- 
range guns were placed on the much loftier height of 
Tekke Tepe. 

But of almost equal importance in the campaign 
was a rounded hill which projects sharply from the 
Anafarta ridge or plateau north of Ismail Oglu Tepe. 


Down the western front of this hill, which looks over 
the plain to the very centre of the Salt Lake, and to 
Suvla Bay beyond, runs a broad yellow "blaze" of 
bare ground, showing a marl and soft sandstone 
surface (the formation of this plateau being again of 
the same character as the Sari Bair range). This 
"blaze" appears from the sea to be shaped like a 
Gurkha's "kukri" or an old-fashioned Turkish 
scimitar, and so the hill came to be called " Scimitar 
Hill." But officially it was "Hill jo" from its 
height in metres (say 200 feet), and commonly the 
soldiers called it "Burnt Hill," which was no 
distinction. It was connected, apparently without 
much break or dip, with the plateau behind it bearing 
the general name of Baka Baba, on which the 
windmills, the white minaret, and some of the houses 
of Little Anafarta could be distinctly seen from the 
beach. A naval shell, however, accidentally knocked 
down the minaret about ten days after our landing. 
This description covers the southern and south-east 
positions to be attacked in the Suvla district. 

From Nibrunesi Point the coast-line curves 
sharply into a semicircular bay, the diameter of 
which is close upon two miles. The north side of 
the Point itself falls, as described, in steep cliffs to a 
narrow and rocky beach. The cliff continues till the 
foot of Lala Baba is passed, and then it suddenly 
ends in low dunes of soft and drifting sand. These 
in turn sink into a spit or isthmus, about 700 
yards long, and some 200 yards across at its broadest 
part. It is all of loose sand, very tiring to walk on, 
though bent grass and patches of heath bind it 
together here and there. The shallow bay lies on 


the left ; the large expanse of the Salt Lake on the 
right. The Salt Lake measures about a mile and a 
half at its greatest length and breadth each way, 
forming a kind of square with irregular sides. Its 
surface in summer is thinly crusted with salt deposit 
upon caked and fissured mud, fairly sound for walk- 
ing or riding, though in places the foot sinks above 
the ankle, and on the south side above the knees. 
Consequently, the south side, thickly covered with 
high reeds and ending in the marshy plain, is 
always impassable for troops, though a track not far 
from the edge can be used in summer for carts and 
even guns. 

At the end of the sandy spit is a channel, which in 
winter admits the sea into the lake under a strong 
west wind, and drains it out again. In summer, 
though sticky, it can be crossed on foot, but we 
bridged it. After crossing it, one continues upon 
loose and wearisome sand, the sandhills on the right 
combining to form a low, heathy plateau, hardly 
distinguishable as a hill, but known as "Hill 10" 
from its height in metres (about 30 ft). The beach 
continues sandy, the sea shallow, and walking very 
tedious till nearly half-way round the northern side of 
the semicircle, when one strikes the rocky formation 
of the northern point. The coast-line then rises into 
rocky cliffs of no great height under a low hill called 
Ghazi Baba, and runs into rocky inlets or creeks. The 
sea becomes deeper, the land undulates and is thickly 
covered with heath and prickly bush. So it con- 
tinues up to the final hill, where the bay ends in the 
jagged rocks of the extremity called by us Suvla 
Point, and by the Turks Biyuk Kemikli, 


There the coast turns suddenly north-east, and 
forms the side of the Gulf of Xeros. The land rises 
into a steep razor-edge or whale-back of grey lime- 
stone, looking white in the sun, and bare but for 
shrubs and aromatic plants growing in the crannies 
between the rocks. This razor-edge is really con- 
tinuous except for notches, knolls, and shallow scoops 
along the sky-line. But the Turks have given the 
ridge the separate names of Karakol Dagh (Coast- 
guard Mountain) and Kiretch Tepe Sirt. This Tepe 
Sirt or Hill Summit rises to the height of 600 feet at 
the points which we afterwards called Jephson's Post 
and the Pimple. Thence the ridge runs at a varying 
but lower level till it reaches Ejelmer Bay, where 
there is good anchorage and an opening into a 
central plain of the Peninsula. The distance from 
Suvla Point to Ejelmer Bay is nearly 7 miles. 

The whole of this ridge is steep and rocky on the 
south side overlooking Suvla Bay, but is everywhere 
accessible by climbing, and admits of paths being 
cut obliquely or in zigzag. The northern side falls 
abruptly into the Gulf of Xeros, across which the 
opposite coast of Thrace, from the mouth of the 
Maritza eastward, can be distinctly seen. Near Suvla 
Point the cliffs are precipitous, and leave little or no 
beach. Farther along, the face of the ridge, though 
always very steep, becomes accessible, and spreads 
out at the bottom into a kind of "undercliff" above 
the shore, which is indented by a succession of 
miniature bays, like bathing coves. All this part of 
the slope is deeply scored by ravines, rocky, steep, 
and covered with thick bush. This face was com- 
manded by the enemy's guns only from Kartal Tepe, 


a barren promontory of fantastic cliffs, different in 
formation, and apparently of dark and slaty shale, 
which projects from the coast a mile or so beyond the 
farthest point reached by our lines. 

Farther along the coast towards Ejelmer Bay the 
razor-edge meets almost at right angles with a mass 
of mountain running south towards the Anafarta 
plateau. The range rises rapidly to the conjoined 
heights of Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe (Saint's 
Hill), each about 850 feet. It completely shuts in 
the Suvla region on the north-east side, presenting a 
steep, though not really a precipitous, western face 
towards the bay, and commanding the whole district 
from end to end. It is dark with thick scrub to the 
rounded summits, and always reminded me of the 
Wrekin's western face, looking towards Shrewsbury, 
as seen from the site of Uriconium. At the southern 
end it falls by a similar steep slope to the Anafarta 
plateau, throwing up one little isolated hill above the 
plateau, like the spadeful of rocks which the devil 
dropped in his hurry to pile the Wrekin. 

From these descriptions of the northern, eastern, 
and southern positions around Suvla, it will be seen 
that the heights, starting from Kiretch Tepe and 
running round over Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe to 
the elevated Anafarta plateau, Scimitar Hill, and 
Ismail Oglu Tepe, form an irregular semicircle, 
roughly corresponding to the regular semicircle of 
Suvla Bay, and commanding it from a wide circum- 
ference. This outer semicircle encloses a fairly open 
plain, cultivated in parts by ancient farms, such as 
Anafarta Ova (Plain) and Sulajik. Large trees, so 
rarely seen in the Near East, give that part of the 


plain the appearance of a park in one of the fatted 
counties of England. But most of it is bare except 
for heath and thin grass, until the foot of the hills is 
reached, when the prickly bush becomes thick as usual, 
interrupting any advance in line, effectively concealing 
numberless snipers, and impenetrable except by 
devious and isolating paths. Each farm has a well or 
fountain, and one of the watercourses, running into 
the north-east corner of the Salt Lake, contains water. 
There is a spring at the foot of the Karakol Dagh, 
not far from the bay. Two good running fountains, 
constructed with low bridges, stone spouts, and 
troughs, are to be found on the plain north-east of the 
Salt Lake among the large trees mentioned ; and 
there is a smaller source just south-west of Chocolate 
Hill. But these wells and springs might easily be 
missed by troops advancing under fire across an 
unknown and almost pathless country. 

Such was the district into which the IXth Army 
Corps was launched in the night of August 6-^]. 
As has been mentioned, Lieut. -General Sir Frederick 
Stopford had arrived in the middle of July to take 
command, and for a short time had succeeded 
General Hunter- Weston in command of the VHIth 
Army Corps at Helles, so as to gain experience 
in Peninsula warfare. He had entered the Grenadier 
Guards in the early "Seventies"; had seen the usual 
service of officers at the end of last century, in India, 
West Africa, and Egypt ; during the South African 
War he was Military Secretary to General Buller, 
and entered Ladysmith with him at the relief. Since 
then he had occupied various military positions at 
home, and was still on the Active List though a little 


over sixty. His reputation stood high as a student 
and teacher of military history, and long experience 
had given him an accurate knowledge of army routine. 
But he had never held high command in the field, 
and neither history nor routine in itself inspires to 
action ; still less do years of official duty in the 
Metropolis. Rather they suppress the hopeful 
buoyancy of spirit and rapid fertility of resource 
essential for generalship, while they tend to 
accentuate the hesitating deliberation and cautious 
apprehension of risk which too often develop with 
increasing years. Habits mainly sedentary are also 
likely to reduce the enthusiasm for physical activity 
as middle age is passing. 

At the same time it is fair to remember that the 
force now entrusted to General Stopford for this 
vital enterprise was an Army Corps only in name. 
Nominally it consisted of the loth, nth, and 13th 
Divisions, composed as we have seen. But the 
13th Division (Major-General Shaw) had been 
deflected to Anzac for the assault against Sari Bair, 
together with the 29th Brigade (Brigadier-General 
Cooper) of the loth Division. General Stopford 
was thus left with only the nth (Northern) Division 
under Major-General Hammersley, and two brigades 
of the loth (Irish) Division under Lieut. -General Sir 
Bryan Mahon. All the battalions in these Divisions 
were New Army men, and had never been in action 
before. Normally each Division should have 
possessed sixteen batteries of artillery (including 
the H.Q. Divisional Artillery), so that (allowing 
for the absence of the 13th Division and the 
29th Brigade) the IXth Army Corps should have 


commanded twenty-eight batteries, or 112 guns ; 
whereas, at the time of landing, it had only one 
Field Artillery battery and two Highland Moun- 
tain batteries of small calibre — all excellent in their 
service, but counting only 12 guns.^ It is true 
that General Stopford could also command the 
support of naval guns, but by the nature of the 
case the guns had been unable to register for fear 
of thwarting the surprise, the maps were inaccurate, 
and most of the Suvla plain was invisible from the 
sea owing to its flatness. 

Of the Divisional Generals, Sir Bryan Mahon 
was fifty-three, was a cavalryman (8th Royal Irish 
Hussars), held a long record of service in India and 
Egypt, and had won distinction by the relief of 
Mafeking in 1900. Since then he had been Military 
Governor of Kordofan, and had commanded the 
Lucknow Division till the outbreak of the war. 
Possessing many of the fine Irish qualities, and 
some of the supposed Irish defects, he was regarded 
with patriotic affection by his Division ; but, like 
"most of our Generals, had seen no active service 
for fourteen or fifteen years, and then in wars unlike 
the present. Major-General Frederick Hammersley 
(Lancashire Fusiliers) had also served in India, 
Egypt, and South Africa, and on various Staff 
appointments ; but owing to serious illness had 
recently held no military position. 

As in the last chapter, on Sari Bair, it will be 

^ Sir lan's dispatch twice mentions these batteries as the sole land 
artillery. All three belonged to the nth Division. Other batteries of 
field-guns and howitzers arrived later, but we are speaking of the Suvla 
first landing — the really critical time. 


convenient to divide the Suvla fighting by days and 
nights, counting from evening to evening. 

From the evening of Friday, August 6, to the 
evening of August 7. 

By the time darkness set in, Brigadier-General 
F. F. Hill was making up the Asiatic coast from 
Mitylene (120 miles) v/ith his 31st Brigade and two 
battalions of the 30th (loth Division), which had 
been transhipped from their transports into ten 
trawlers and passeiiger steamers. Brigadier-General 
L. L. Nicol was on his way from Mudros (60 miles) 
with the remaining two battalions of his 30th Brigade 
and the 5th Royal Irish (Pioneers), accompanied by 
Sir Bryan Mahon and his Divisional Staff. At 
Imbros, the three brigades of the nth Division 
(the 32nd, 33rd, and 34th, under Brigadier-Generals 
Haggard, Maxwell, and Sitwell) were embarked in 
destroyers and "beetles" (motor-lighters), about 
500 men being packed in each destroyer and "beetle." 
The "beetles" were under charge of Captain Unwin, 
the hero of the River Clyde. Three of each kind of 
vessel were allotted to each brigade, the destroyers 
towing the " beetles." Two cruisers (" blister ships ") 
also carried 1000 men apiece, to be landed by the 
"beetles" as soon as their own contingents and 
those on the destroyers had been discharged. 
Behind the infantry followed trawlers towing horse- 
boats with horses and guns ; ^ and the sloop Aster with 

^ Sir Ian in his dispatch reckons twelve i8-pounder guns and eight 
mountain-guns as starting. Only the mountain-guns and four of the 
i8-pounders were in action by August 8, but the 59th Brigade, R.F.A,, 


500 men, presumably gunners, towing a lighter with 
eight mountain-guns, and four water-lighters specially 
provided by Brigadier-General Lotbiniere, then 
Director of Works. 

Each of the water-lighters carried about 50 or 
60 tons, and was to be refilled from two water-ships, 
the Krene and Phido, each carrying 250 tons of 
water brought from Alexandria. The men embarked 
with full water-bottles, and each "beetle" and de- 
stroyer was supplied with water for refills on landing, 
and for the wants of beach-parties. It was also 
confidently expected that plentiful water would be 
discovered during the advance. But, though the 
water was there, it was not discovered, or was not 
accessible. Inexperienced soldiers might be expected 
to drain their water-bottles soon, and in the excite- 
ment and confusion of landing to neglect the pre- 
caution of refilling. So it happened, and to this 
natural carelessness must be added the absence of 
the Prah, an Elder Dempster vessel of 3000 tons, 
carefully equipped with water-pumps, hose, tanks, 
troughs, and the implements required for the develop- 
ment of wells or springs — exactly the stores which the 
experience of the April landings had proved essential 
to relieve the torture of thirst among men exhausted 
by the nervous excitement of battle, and by the heat, 
which in August had risen to glaring intensity. The 
danger of thirst had always been present in the minds 
of General Headquarters and the Administrative 

and the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade, R.G.A., were attached to the 
nth Division. On the 9th, two field batteries were on Lala Baba. On 
August 13 to 15 the 58th Brigade also arrived at Suvla, and was attached 
to the loth Division. On the 19th a battery of the 4th Howitzer Low- 
land Brigade, R.F.A., was placed in position on Lala Baba. 


Staff. Petrol tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water-bags, 
and pakhals for mules had been provided in large 
quantities from India and Egypt. More than 4000 
mules for carrying water as well as rations and 
ammunition were by this time collected for Anzac 
and Suvla, about 600 being allotted to Suvla alone 
for the first landing. Critics after the event 
suggested that the men should have carried half a 
dozen water-bottles apiece instead of their packs. 
But, as a matter of fact, the nth Division, at all 
events, carried only their haversacks with two days' 
iron rations, and left their packs at Imbros. As to 
carrying more water-bottles, no one could have 
foreseen the partial failure of the most elaborate 
precautions, partly owing to the inexperience of a 
New Army Staff.' 

The naval side of the whole landing — the organ- 
isation of all transport until each detail came ashore — 
was in charge of Rear-Admiral Arthur Christian, on 
board the sloop Jonquil, together with General 
Stopford and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General 
H. L. Reed, V.C. Vice- Admiral de Robeck, with his 
Chief of Staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, was also 

^ Sir lan's dispatch gives a full account of the warships, lighters, 
and trawlers sent with the landing-force, together with details about the 
water-supply provided. He does not mention the large transport 
Minneapolis, which I think must have taken the place of the sloop 
Asier, for we certainly had batteries of mountain-guns with their teams 
on board. She was a liner, taken over with all her staff ; and as in- 
stances of petrifying routine I remember that, as I hoped to land at 
4 a.m., I asked if one could get a cup of tea then, and was haughtily 
informed, "On this ship breakfast is always at 8.30" ; and later in the 
morning, when the fighting was at crisis, the "stewards" were sweeping 
out the gangways with vacuum-cleaners as they had swept for years. 
Habits of routine were, however, fatally disturbed in the following spring 
when the Minneapolis was torpedoed between Egypt and Salonika. 


present on the light cruiser Chatham, and on the 
Ho;ht cruiser Talbot was Brigadier-General S. C. V, 
Smith, R.A., in command of the guns. Soon after 
8 p.m. the flotilla began to glide northward through 
the winding narrows of the netted and buoyed passage 
from Kephalos Bay. The last of the vessels except 
the Prah and water-lighters cleared about lo p.m. 
We heard the firing round the Vineyard at Helles, 
and the perpetual whisper and rumble of rifles and 
guns at Lone Pine, On our right front as we 
advanced past Anzac the New Zealanders were 
standing mustered for the great assault. The water 
was dead calm, which was a mercy for the soldiers 
crowded on the destroyers and " beetles," No lights 
were shown. There was no lioht but the brilliant 
stars. No one except the Generals and Admirals 
knew our destination. 

Sir lan's original design had been to land the 
whole of the 1 1 th Division at the continuous beach 
just south of Nibrunesi Point. Here the shore is 
"steep to," and the water comes up deep. A large 
part of the force would be concealed or sheltered by 
the cliffs and hills, but the beach itself is level and 
wide enough for mustering. The brigades, after 
capturing the Lala Baba promontory, could then have 
advanced in unison along the marshy but practicable 
ground south of the Salt Lake, or before dawn even 
over the centre of the Lake itself, to the assault upon 
Chocolate and W Hills. Meantime, we must sup- 
pose. Sir Ian had intended the two brigades of the 
loth Division to land on the north side of the bay 
near Suvla Point and occupy the commanding razor- 
edge of Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Most unfortunately, as 


it turned out, against his better judgment he accepted 
General Stopford's desire to land one brigade inside 
the bay itself, apparently with the intention of 
advancing across the plain on the north of the Salt 
Lake. Accordingly, the navy was directed to put 
the 34th Brigade (Sitwell's) ashore on the sands of 
the north-east segment of the bay, while the 32nd 
(Haggard's) and the 33rd (Maxwell's) were to land 
on the beach south of Nibrunesi Point. This beach 
was divided into C (nearer the Point) for the artillery, 
and B for the infantry, but it was one and continuous. 
The navy originally chose the south-east arc of the bay 
for landing, hence called "Old A Beach." Among 
the rocky creeks near Suvia Point, A East and A 
West were found on the 7th, and A West ultimately 
became the main landing-place. But the true A 
Beach on which the 34th Brigade was ordered to land 
was the long and sandy stretch just beside the 
entrance or "cut" into the Salt Lake; and there the 
34th Brigade landed. 

Together with the two brigades of the loth 
Division the total number of all ranks and arms, 
including transport and supply, was from 25,000 to 
27,000 to be landed. There was no wire entangle- 
ment along- the shore; the entrenchments were few 
and slight ; the Turkish force holding the district was 
estimated under 4000, apart from possible reserves 
behind Sari Bair ; and the actual bay was guarded, 
as was believed, only by about 1000 gendarmes — 
700 on Lala Baba, 300 on Suvla Point. Sir Ian 
confidently expected, therefore, that the two Divisions, 
though short in numbers (showing a total of about 
20,000 rifles or rather less), almost destitute of guns 


apart from the fleet, and quite destitute of experience 
in actual war, would certainly be able to occupy the 
inner semicircle of the bay and the outer semicircle 
of the commanding heights, or at all events the vital 
points of Kiretch Tepe and W Hill, by the following 

But, like nearly every movement in war, the land- 
ing took longer than was expected, and the customary 
delay was increased by needless confusion. In the 
darkness of midnight the 32nd and 33rd Brigades 
approached the shore at B Beach south of Nibrunesi 
Point. The destroyers stopped and slipped the 
"beetles," which crept ashore under their own power. 
Driving close in, they dropped their elevated draw- 
bridges right on the beach itself, and the crowded 
men swarmed over them as over a landing-stage. 
The "beetles" then returned to the destroyers for 
their second load, and so the two brigades came to 
shore in good time and without mishap. As soon as 
the battalions were formed up, two from the 32nd 
Brigade (the 6th Yorkshire and the 9th West York- 
shire) were instructed to occupy Lala Baba. Advanc- 
ing in that order along the beach and up the hills 
from the south, they stormed the trenches with the 
bayonet in the darkness, but the 6th Yorks lost 
heavily. Colonel Chapman, in command, was killed 
while cheering on his men. Fifteen officers fell and 
250 men, but apart from that battalion the loss was 
not great, and the occupation of the Hill gave us 
command of the southern side of the bay. 

With the 34th Brigade things did not go so 
smoothly. The navy brought up the destroyers with 
the "beetles" in time with the rest; but after the 


"beetles" had been cast off as they approached the 
shore in the middle of the bay, it was found that they 
could not make A Beach at all, but went aground 
with their weight on the sandy shallows. The 
disaster might have been anticipated from the 
appearance of the sandy and shelving shore, which 
possessed all the familiar features of a children's 
bathing-place. Led by their officers, the men 
plunged into the water, which in places came up to 
their armpits, and struggled ashore. Dripping wet, 
they reached the sands just in the centre of the bay's 
arc, north and south of the entrance to the Salt Lake, 
fairly according to the appointed position. But both in 
the lighters and on shore they were exposed to con- 
siderable fire from Lala Baba (not yet occupied) and 
the rocky promontories towards Suvla Point. Many 
Turks even crept into their midst in the darkness, and 
at close quarters killed them unawares. Nearly the 
whole of the northern shore had also been sown with 
land-mines, exploding on contact and causing many 

The delay and confusion due to the oversight of 
obvious shallows were serious. They were the first 
step in failure. For by the time the brigade got 
ashore and sorted itself out it was useless to think of 
reaching W Hill, or even Chocolate Hill, under cover 
of darkness. In fact, by the time the battalions were 
reorganised it was nearly dawn. To protect the 
left, one battalion (nth Manchester) was now sent up 
the rocky steep of Karakol Dagh, which it succeeded 
in clearing of the concealed parties of gendarmes, but 
after suffering considerable loss. The Colonel was 
wounded, the second in command killed, and nearly 


half the strength put out of action.^ But its service 
in saving the rest of the brigade from enfilading fire 
was inestimable. 

About the same time another of the battalions 
(9th Lancashire Fusiliers) succeeded in the equally 
important task of clearing Hill 10, the low eminence 
of heath-covered sandhill which stood close at hand 
to the left front of the landing beach. The Turks 
had a strong outpost there, and the loss to this 
battalion was also considerable. In fact, the brigade 
stood in an isolated and unsatisfactory position when, 
just as the eastern sky began to show streaks of 
brown among the purple, the 32 nd Brigade 
(Haggard's) began to appear along the sandy spit, 
coming from Lala Baba, which it had seized and 
left in charge of the 33rd Brigade (Maxwell's). As 
it approached it opened fire upon Hill 10, where 
confused fighting was still going on. The 9th West 
Yorks (32nd Brigade) also joined in the attack, and 
suffered considerable loss. 

Brigadier-General Sitwell, as senior in command, 
had now two brigades, half of each still untouched 
by action. It was the moment for him, one would 
have thought, to advance at all hazards upon 
Chocolate and W Hills. Yet he hesitated. Per- 
haps he thought it went beyond his orders to cross 
the open plain now that daylight was increasing 
every minute. Perhaps he was deterred by a brief 
counter-attack which the Turks, noticing the con- 
fusion or supineness of the brigades, attempted 
against Hill 10, though the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers 
again drove them off with the bayonet, compelling 

' The Tenth {Irish) Division in Gallipoli, p. 142. 


them to retreat through the low bushes on the north 
edge of the plain. Now that the sun was rising, 
shrapnel from one or two Turkish batteries posted 
on the hills across the Salt Lake began to burst 
over his position, and the naval guns, attempting to 
harass the groups of enemy as they stole away, set 
fire to a large area of bush straight in his front and 
to the left.^ Perhaps he thought enough had been 
done by battalions already thirsty, tired after a 
sleepless night, and probably shaken by their first 
losses in battle. At all events he allowed the men 
to gather in crowds under the shelter of some high 
sand dunes along the shore north of the spit, and 
there for many hours they lay immovable. The 
second step in failure had been taken. 

The third was already preparing. About an 
hour before dawn, the ten trawlers and steamers 
bringing Brigadier-General Hill's six battalions from 
Mitylene punctually arrived off the bay. As they 
all belonged to Sir Bryan Mahon's loth Division, 
General Stopford had intended them to land near 
A Beach, to seize the whole length of the razor- 
edge on the north of the bay, to occupy the Kiretch 
Tepe Sirt, and advance as far as possible towards 
Ejelmer Bay, whence the great hills of Tekke Tepe 
could be turned. They were, of course, to be joined 
by Sir Bryan Mahon's other three battalions on their 
arrival with their General from Mudros. But the 
General had not yet arrived : the navy had witnessed 

^ Sir Ian in his dispatch says these fires were caused by the enemy's 
shells ; but they arose in positions not yet reached by our troops, and I 
had no doubt, in watching the scene, that they were lighted by the 
naval guns. 


only too plainly the failure of A Beach as a landing- 
place owing to the shallows, and they had not yet 
discovered the practicable creeks among the rocks 
near Suvla Point. Accordingly, General Stopford 
was advised to land them at B Beach, and after 
the delay of more than two hours this was done/ 
That is to say, five of the six battalions were landed 
there with Brigadier-General Hill ; but before the 
5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (of Hill's own 31st 
Brigade) had disembarked. Sir Bryan Mahon put 
into the bay from Mudros with the remaining three, 
and was landed in the creeks which the navy had 
now discovered among the rocks east of Suvla Point. 
Accordingly, the Inniskilling Fusiliers were counter- 
ordered to join him there. Thus the loth Division 
was now divided into three entirely different parts : 
the 29th Brigade was at Anzac ; three battalions of 
the 31st and two of the 30th were with Hill at B 
Beach; two battalions of the 30th, one of the 31st, 
and the 5th Royal Irish (Pioneers) were at Suvla 
Point, where the Divisional General landed with 
nothing" of his Division left under his command 
except these four. Confusion of command and 
position was inevitable.^ 

Confusion immediately resulted. As Hill with 
his five battalions was landed in the sphere of the 
iith Division on the right, instead of being with 
his own loth Division on the extreme left, he was 

^ Sir lan's dispatch says the naval authorities were unwilHng to land 
them at A Beach " for some reason not specified." Considering what 
misfortune had already happened there, the above explanation appears 
to me at least sufficient. But A East and A West had been discovered 
by the navy before the unfortunate landing at B Beach began. 

2 The Tenth {Irish) Division at Gallipoli^ pp. 125 and 140, 


ordered by General Stopford to put himself under 
the command of Major-General Hammersley. His 
battalions did not begin to disembark till 5.30 a.m., 
when it was nearly full daylight. The enemy's 
shrapnel was bursting over his boats and the beach. 
Two of our mountain-guns were hurried up into the 
Turkish trenches on Lala Baba, and the battery of 
Field Artillery soon afterwards came into action 
from behind the cover of that Hill. The ships also 
maintained a heavy but ineffectual fire upon invisible 
or unregistered positions. But the loss at the land- 
ing was considerable while Hill was away looking 
for the Divisional General and new orders. This 
was a long process. Finding at last that his orders 
were to combine with the 32nd and 34th Brigades, 
now under Sitwell's command upon the dunes near 
Hill 10, and then to attack Chocolate Hill and ad- 
vance to W Hill, he mustered the five battalions 
behind the slopes of Lala Baba, and ordered an 
advance along the sandy spit. The march round 
by Hill 10, and then along the north side of the 
Salt Lake, and again south-east to Chocolate Hill, 
would describe three parts of a circle. An advance 
from B Beach along the south side of the Salt Lake 
would have followed an almost straight line to 
Chocolate Hill ; the ground, though marshy in 
places, was everywhere better going than loose 
sand, and was less exposed than the open plain. 
By selecting this route General Hammersley could 
have brought these five battalions into action many 
hours earlier, could have occupied Chocolate Hill 
by noon, and pushed on to W Hill before night. 

It is true they would not then have co-operated with 


the brigades under Sitwell, but the value of that 
co-operation was not great. 

As it was, owing to the delay of changed com- 
mand, and to co-operation with a Brigadier in another 
Division, with whom Hill, having just come from 
Mitylene, was probably unacquainted. Hill's column 
did not begin to leave Lala Baba for the sandy spit 
till noon. The march across that unprotected spit 
was a trying passage. The Irishmen (6th Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, 5th and 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, of the 
31st Brigade, and 6th and 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
of the 30th Brigade) had started closely packed to- 
gether for their long sea voyage on the previous 
afternoon ; except for a cup of tea at 3 a.m. and a 
snatch of their rations after landing, they were empty 
of food ; for some hours they had stood uncertain 
under a blazing sun and exposed for the first time 
to shrapnel, often fatal and continually unnerving. 
The Turkish guns on Chocolate and W Hills had 
carefully registered the sandy spit, and now swept it 
with shrapnel from end to end. For sleepless, hungry, 
and miserably thirsty men, loose sand is the worst 
of trials. They crossed in batches, or " by a section 
at a time rushing over."^ 

^ So Major Bryan Cooper in The Tenth {Irish) Division^ p. 129. My 
impression at the time was of no rush, but a calm though laborious 
trudge. Major Cooper, however, continues : "The 7th Dublins in par- 
ticular were much encouraged by the example of their Colonel. . . . 
While every one else was dashing swiftly across the neck, or keeping 
close under cover, it is recorded that Colonel Downing — a man of un- 
usual height and girth — stood in the centre of the bullet-swept zone, 
quietly twisting his stick." " Dashing swiftly across "that sand would, 
I think, be impossible under any impulse, and cover did not exist ; at 
least I never found it, though I toiled over that spit many dozen times, 
and it always remained exposed to shell-fire from W Hill. 


As each battalion arrived after this ordeal, it 
formed up under the slight cover of the sand dunes 
about Hill 10, but it was 3 p.m. before all the five 
mustered there and Hill could organise the attack 
upon Chocolate Hill, which was to have been com- 
pleted before dawn. Keeping only the 6th Dublin 
Fusiliers in reserve, he pushed the other four bat- 
talions forward across the dry bed of the Asmak 
on the north side of the Salt Lake, and began the 
difficult movement of wheeling the whole force south- 
ward through the open country round the lake shore. 
He was thus marching across the enemy's front — an 
operation of proverbial risk. The farther he ad- 
vanced, the more exposed his left flank became. 
Sitwell, as senior officer, was, as we have seen, in 
command of the 34th and 32nd Brigades, which had 
lain so many hours under the sand dunes. He was 
now, indeed, in sole command, since Haggard had 
been seriously wounded at noon. But he considered 
he was justified in sparing only two battalions in sup- 
port (6th Lincolns and 6th Borderers, which, how- 
ever, belonged to the 33rd Brigade and must have L^cn 
sent over from Lala Baba by their Brigadier-General 
Maxwell under General Hammersley's order). Even 
these two appear to have moved too late to protect 
the left flank, for Hill was compelled to defend it, as 
it was " in air," by deploying the 5th Royal Irish 
Fusiliers (Colonel Pike, an excellent officer, who was 
with the regiment in Ladysmith) and advancing them 
so as to face half-left. An increasing gap was thus 
formed between left and right as the force slowly 
wheeled round the lake, and the 7th Dublins had to be 
brought up to fill it. 


As the rough country in front of Anafarta plateau 
was thus being crossed, the line was continually 
harassed by an enfilading fire from swarms of snipers 
concealed in the bushes on the left, as well as by 
copious shrapnel and high explosives from the hills. 
Contact mines also exploded, and a Taube dropped 
a few bombs. Fortunately, about 4 p.m. a sudden 
squall and shower of rain swept over the bay and 
plain, obscuring the enemy's view, and refreshing the 
troops, who were suffering greatly from the extreme 
heat and from thirst, though they were passing close 
to two excellent water-sources, had they but known 
it. They were much encouraged also by the example 
of their Brigadier Hill, a man of almost excessive 
indifference to personal danger, as I observed on 
several occasions. By 5 p.m. they had reached a line 
within 300 yards of Chocolate Hill, and there they 
lay down while the ships and the few batteries on 
land bombarded.^ 

The moment the bombardment ceased, the men 

^ The movements of Hill's battalions, and their relation to Sitwell's 
are difficult to follow, chiefly owing to the changes of command and in- 
tention. After speaking of these changes, Sir Ian in his dispatch con- 
tinues : " I have failed in my endeavours to get some live human detail 
about the fighting which followed." The detail has now been largely 
supplied by Major Bryan Cooper in The Tenth {Irish) Division in 
Gallipoli, pp. 127-135. In the main, I have followed his account, the 
chief outstanding difficulty being the presence of the 6th Lincoln and 
6th Border Battalions, which did not belong to Sitwell's or Haggard's 
Brigades, but to Maxwell's (the 33rd). Major Cooper says two battalions 
of the nth Division reinforced Hill's column, and Sir Ian mentions 
those two as distinguished at the taking of the hill. But how they came 
to be under Sitwell's command, or under Hill's, is not yet clear. I can 
only suppose that, as Sitwell's force could not or did not move, General 
Hammersley ordered Maxwell to send them over from Lala Baba. 
After Brigadier-General Haggard was wounded, Colonel J. O'B. Minogue 
(9th W. Yorks) took temporary command of the 32nd Brigade. 


rose and charged up the steep and bushy slopes of 
that rounded hill with fixed bayonets. The two 
Royal Irish Fusilier battalions were on the left (the 
side of greatest danger), the Dublins in the centre, 
the Inniskillings on the right. The 6th Lincolns and 
6th Borderers also came up into line, and were among 
the first in the charge. The hill was fortified by an 
old trench which ran completely round the circumfer- 
ence some yards below the summit. One long com- 
munication trench afterwards ran down the saddle or 
neck connecting the hill with "Hill 50" or "Green 
Hill " beyond, and probably followed the line of an 
old excavation. The Turks poured rifle-fire from the 
parapets, and fought gallantly with bayonets. But 
they were at last all killed or chased away. Just as 
the sun set over the distant peaks of Samothrace, the 
summit was gained. If only it had been gained as 
that sun rose ! 

The battalions spent the night in sorting them- 
selves out, burying the dead, trying to collect the 
wounded in the darkness, bringing up what supplies 
they could find on the beach (all of which had to 
be carried on men's backs), and, above all, in the 
endeavour to bring up water. A certain amount was 
being distributed on the beach, more than 2 miles off 
by the nearest way, which probably no one could find 
in the dark. And every drop had to be carried by 
hand in camp kettles or even in ammunition boxes or 
in water-bottles strung by the dozen round one man's 
neck. The night was thus occupied, but thirst was 
not appeased. Before sunrise the 6th Lincolns and 
the 6th Borderers were withdrawn to rejoin their own 


To return to the remaining battalions of the loth 
Division. As we have seen, the Divisional General, 
Sir Bryan Mahon, arrived from Mudros with only 
three battalions — the 6th and 7th Munster Fusiliers 
of the 30th Brigade (Brigadier-General L. L. Nicol), 
and the 5th Royal Irish (Pioneers). In addition he 
was able to retain the 5th Inniskilling Fusiliers (31st 
Brigade) before it disembarked with Hill's force. 
Orderinsr it to follow, he landed soon after 11 a.m. 
with the three battalions among the rocks near Suvla 
Point, where his men suffered much from contact 
mines. He then proceeded to climb Karakol Dagh, 
and passed through the shattered companies of the 
1 1 th Manchesters, who had early occupied this part 
of the rocky razor-edge. Deploying the Munsters in 
two lines, he advanced to the attack on Kiretch Tepe 
Sirt, the more lofty but continuous edge beyond. 
The ground is very difficult, being a steep hillside 
broken into rocks and craggy ravines, the lower 
slopes covered with high bush. The enemy delayed 
the advance along the whole mountain-side by 
accurate and concealed fire, causing many wounds 
and deaths, especially among officers. It was past 
, . - ;et when the attacking force of Munsters, sup- 
ed by the Royal Irish, came within about 
ICO yards of the highest knoll, which the Turks held 
strongly. Here the battalions, wearied and tor- 
mented by thirst, like the whole army corps, lay for 
the night. But early next morning (August 8), if 
we may anticipate, the 6th Munsters under Major 
Jephson took the knoll by assault. It was afterwards 
always known as Jephson's Post, was strongly forti- 
fied, and, but for a few hours in the next week, it 


remained the farthest point in our Hnes along the 
north side of the bay. 

Thus, on the late evening of the 7th, we held the 
bay and both extremities, the Salt Lake, Hill 10, a 
point near Jephson's Post on the north, and Choco- 
late Hill on the south-east. We had not even 
attempted W Hill, or Scimitar Hill, or the Anafarta 
plateau, or the Tekke Tepe mountain, and from all 
those points the bay was commanded. Except along 
the shore we had established no connection w^ith 
Anzac, and could give no support at Sari Bair. Still, 
something had been gained. The landing had been 
effected punctually and with small loss. The 32nd 
and 34th Brigades had certainly lost much time in 
hanging about Hill 10, as though their work was 
done. The 31st Brigade had been hampered and 
delayed by confused commands and the varied posi- 
tions allotted to it apart from its own Division. But 
all seemed ready for the morrow, and with energy and 
organisation all might be retrieved. Some battalions 
had lost heavily, but as a whole the loss was not great 
— for so large a movement. Only a little over 1000 
wounded were taken off to the hospital ships. 

Front the evening of August 7 to the evening of 
August 8. 

So satisfied was General Stopford with the situa- 
tion that he telegraphed to Sir Ian that in his opinion 
Major-General Hammersley and his troops deserved 
great credit for the result attained. Anxiously await- 
ing news in General Headquarters at Imbros, Sir Ian 
replied with congratulations to General Stopford, 


stating also how much was hoped from Hammersley's 
bold and rapid advance. The message must have 
been prompted by Sir lan's inborn optimism or by- 
official courtesy and a desire to encourage action. 
For even before the telegram was sent, tormenting 
doubts intruded. It was Sunday morning. The 
Wellingtons and 7th Gloucesters had climbed 
the shoulder of Chunuk Bair ; the 4th Aus- 
tralian Brigade was advancing to the assault up 
Koja Chemen Tepe by way of Abdel Rahman 
Bair ; at Lone Pine the battle still raged desper- 
ately. If ever help from Suvla was called for, 
it was now. But from Suvla came only silence. 
Hardly a gun could be heard. No further message 

In Suvla Bay itself a Sabbath peace appeared to 
reign. No shells burst; no bullets whined. It was 
evident that the Turks had withdrawn both guns and 
infantry during the night. We could walk at leisure 
round the whole beach from Suvla Point to Lala 
Baba. We could examine the surface of the Salt 
Lake, or climb Karakol Dagh and view the calm 
prospect over the Gulf of Xeros with equal security. 
Men whom good fortune had stationed near the 
beaches enjoyed the enviable refreshment of bathing 
in the sandy shallows. No attempt was being made 
seriously to push forward the advance, although it 
seemed probable that W Hill, the most vital point, 
could have been occupied by little more than march- 
ing, and the distance even from the beach was 4 miles 
at most. 

The Divisional Generals reported to the Corps 
Commander that they were unable to move owing to 


the exhaustion of their men.^ Undoubtedly the men 
were exhausted. The sea journey, the sleepless 
nights, the great heat, the excitement of their first 
battle, the toilsome marching upon loose sand, and 
the rations of hard biscuit and salt "bully" had 
exhausted them. The nth Division from Imbros 
was also infected with the prevailing diarrhoea, and 
in a few cases with dysentery. But the worst 
exhaustion came from thirst. In spite of all those 
elaborate precautions, the water supply broke down. 
Plenty of water was there. The water-lighters had 
arrived on the 7th. One was at A West ; one went 
aground at " Old A," and men swam out to her ; but 
Commodore Keyes towed her near enough ashore for 
the hose to reach the men that afternoon. A third 
was on C Beach, and probably the fourth, for the 
Krene had tugged in two, and was there herself, her 
stem on the shore. What was wanting was not 
water, but the troughs and receptacles for issuing and 
distribution. Men came with nothing but water- 
bottles, sometimes a dozen or more, slung round their 
necks, and went naked with them into the sea in 
hopes of drawing from the tanks. When a hose was 
attached, they pierced holes in the cover, and drank, 
then leaving the water to run waste. By Sunday 
morning a poor and leaking trough was stuck up at 
one point, but it would not hold water, and the men 
and mules crowding round it impeded distribution. 
The P^'ah (containing all the requisites for supply — 
troughs, hose, and implements for well-sinking), owing 
to some over-scrupulous observance of regulations, 
did not issue them till some days later. The anguish 

^ Sir lan's dispatch. 


of thirst was intolerable. Up in the firing lines some 
went almost mad/ The suffering of the men exposed 
to the glaring sun upon the rocks of Kiretch Tepe 
was most severe during Sunday, though it was after- 
wards (perhaps that night) relieved by the kindly 
generosity of a destroyer (the Wolverine, Scori)ion, 
or most probably the Foxhound), which was deputed 
always to patrol that Gulf of Xeros coast, and on this 
occasion cut her own water-tank loose and brought 
it ashore. Even on the beach, where fresh water 
was running to waste, men filled water-bottles from 
the sea. So serious were the reports from the front 
that General Stopford ordered the disembarkation of 
the artillery horses to be delayed till the mules for 
carrying up water had been landed.^ Thus one thing 
acted upon another, for it was want of artillery which 
finally induced the Corps Commander to believe that 
immediate advance was impossible. Brigades and 
even battalions were also much confused and scattered, 
as we have seen. But the ultimate cause of the con- 
fusion, and of the failure in water supply, and so of the 
lack of guns, was the decision to land part of the force 
inside the bay, and at a beach where any observer 
might have suspected shallows fit only for wading.^ 

^ For an account of the thirst, see Sir lan's dispatch and The Tenth 
{Irish) Division, pp. 137, 145, 148, 157-158. Also Sicvla Bay and After, 
by Juvenis, pp. 37, 40-43, where the services of the destroyer to the 
loth Division are mentioned. 

2 Sir lan's dispatch. 

' The water question was much disputed at the time, and many 
contradictory versions were given. I have here followed the account 
given me in recent (1917) conversation by a naval officer who was closely 
connected with the superintendence of the landing. The real causes of 
the thirst, in any case, were the want of receptacles and the distance 
from the firing line. As to the failure at A Beach, it must of course be 


Meantime Sir Ian, growing continually more 
impatient at the silence, resolved about noon to leave 
his central position at Imbros and investigate for 
himself the situation of his northern force. For some 
unexplained reason his destroyer, the Arno, instead 
of keeping steam always up, had just had her fires 
drawn, and could not start till 4 p.m. During those 
hours of maddening delay. Sir lan's worst suspicions 
were confirmed by a telegram from a General Staff 
Officer (Lieut. -Colonel Aspinall, a trustworthy judge 
of military affairs) " drawing attention to the inaction 
of our own troops, and to the fact that golden 
opportunities were being missed." ^ Arriving at Suvla 
at 5 p.m.. Sir Ian at once visited General Stopford on 
board the Jonquil, where he still kept his headquarters 
so as to advise upon any action, if any action seemed 
advisable. There Sir Ian heard, as he dreaded to hear, 
that nothing could be done that day. The exhaustion 
of the men, the confusion of units, and other pleas 
mentioned above were given as reasons. But the 
deeper reason lay in comfortable satisfaction with 
present results, and in the absence of inspiring or 
remorseless energy. It is an old military principle 
that "A General who refuses to pursue a retreating 
enemy on the plea that his troops are tired, should be 
at once relieved of his command." In Sir lan's own 
words : " Driving power was required, and even a 
certain ruthlessness, to brush aside pleas for respite 
for tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia. 
And inertia prevailed." 

remembered that the naval chart was old and useless, and no survey had 
been possible without betraying" the point chosen for landing. 
* Sir lan's dispatch. 


Finding it so, Sir Ian, driven by the extremity of 
the crisis, took a step unusual in a Commander-in- 
Chief. He resolved to try what personal influence 
he could use upon the Divisional Commanders. The 
Corps Commander raised no objection, and, accom- 
panied by Commodore Roger Keyes and Lieut. - 
Colonel Aspinall, Sir Ian hastened to Major-General 
Hammersley's headquarters at the foot of Lala Baba. 
He pointed out that time above all price was slipping 
away unused; that "the sands were running out 
fast " ; that information showed Turkish reinforce- 
ments already approaching. General Hammersley 
replied that his force was much scattered ; it was 
impossible to get orders for a night attack round to 
the battalions ; and that a general attack was arranged 
for the early morning. He admitted, however, that 
the 32nd Brigade (formerly under Haggard, who was 
wounded on the previous day, and now under Colonel 
Minogue) was more or less concentrated and could 
move. His General Staff Officer, Colonel Neil 
Malcolm, an experienced soldier, confirmed this 
opinion, and Sir Ian took the further unusual step of 
directly ordering this brigade or any force, even if it 
were only a company, to advance at once without 
waiting for the morning's general attack. Their 
objective was to be the high ground rising towards 
Tekke Tepe on the north of Anafarta Sagir. They 
were to act as the advance guard to the attack. 

It was now 6 p.m. In ignorance. Sir Ian had 
given an order destined to entail disaster. It appears 
almost certain that neither General Hammersley nor 
his Chief of Staff knew exactly where the battalions 
of the 32nd Brigade stood at the time. Otherwise 


To Jace p. 316 


they must have informed Sir Ian that, as a matter 
of fact, one of the battaHons (the 6th East York 
Pioneers) had advanced that day, had occupied 
Hill 70 (Scimitar Hill), and were at that moment 
in position there — Scimitar Hill, next to W Hill the 
most vital of all the semicircle of heights overlooking 
the bay ! A battalion had occupied it that Sunday 
without a blow, and were there only waiting for the 
brigade's further advance upon W Hill or Anafarta 
Sagir, to both of which it is the key. Lieut. -Colonel 
Moore, in command of that battalion, had even sent 
out three officers' patrols, one of which actually 
reached the top of Tekke Tepe, another the out- 
skirts of Anafarta Sagir, the third a point near 
Abrikja, all without serious opposition. But no one 
in high authority appears to have known of these 
movements. In consequence of this ignorance, the 
Divisional General, instead of leaving the selection of 
battalions to the Brigadier, named the 6th East York 
Pioneers as the battalion to lead the advance, believ- 
ing it to be the freshest and least tried. Colonel 
Minogue obeyed and ordered the battalion to rejoin 
the brigade concentrated at Sulajik. Colonel Moore, 
commanding the 6th East Yorks, obeyed also, but did 
not receive the order till 3 a.m. of the 9th. He then 
withdrew his tired and sleepless battalion to Sulajik. 
Without a blow, Scimitar Hill was abandoned. It 
was one of those apparently casual misfortunes which 
throughout the campaign balked the fairest hopes 
just at the moment of victory, as though an evil and 
ironic destiny mocked at the best-laid schemes. 

Having heard from General Hammersley that the 
water supply was now arranged and the troops rested, 


Sir Ian returned to the Arno and remained on board 
that night in the bay. Hearing no sound of fighting, 
he assumed that the brigade had accompHshed its task 
and estabHshed itself on the slopes of Tekke Tepe 
overlooking Anafarta, without opposition/ 

From the evening of August 8 to the evening of 
the gth. 

Unfortunately, Sir lan's assumption was ground- 
less. The 32nd Brigade was far from being concen- 
trated as was supposed by the Divisional General. 
One battalion, as we have just seen, was actually on 
Scimitar Hill. The 9th West Yorks were half-way 
up the Anafarta Ridge, and they tried to advance 
before dawn, but were driven back by the enemy's 
reinforcements, thus proving that the intended morn- 
ing attack would have been dangerously late in any 
case. The remainder were among the trees near the 
farm Sulajik, where there was water. Verbal orders 
reached them at 7.30 p.m., but no definite written 
orders arrived till nearly 3 a.m. The mistakes ap- 
pear to have been due to bad Staff work. Instead of 
beginning at eight on Sunday evening, as Sir Ian 
intended, the movement did not start till 4 a.m. on 
Monday. Then the brigade attacked the steep slope 

^ So as not to interrupt the narrative, one is obliged to mention only 
in a note the remarkable achievement of our submarines on this critical 
and unfortunate day. In order to help E14, vi^hich was already in the 
Sea of Marmora, Eii had forced her way through the nets in the 
Straits, and on the 8th torpedoed a Turkish warship coming down to- 
wards Maidos with reinforcements. Both submarines joined in shelling 
the road crossing Bulair, while, on the west side of that isthmus, 
destroyers kept a similar check upon the movement of Turkish troops. 


leading up to Anafarta. It is covered with thick and 
high bush, up which men can advance only in single 
file along the cattle-tracks. On their right, Scimitar 
Hill had been abandoned, only to be occupied now by 
swarms of Turkish snipers and troops in formation, 
which were coming up in strong reinforcement. On 
their left, one company of the 6th East Yorks (the 
selfsame battalion which had occupied Scimitar Hill) 
succeeded in reachinof that isolated offshoot from 
Tekke Tepe above mentioned. But the brigade 
retired to the line of Sulajik. The losses were heavy, 
chiefly among the Royal Engineers, one company of 
whom (the 67th) accompanied the brigade. Colonel 
Moore of the 6th East Yorks (Pioneers), who had 
shown such grasp of the situation, was killed. 

As day advanced, the position only grew worse. 
It was the morning when the party of Lancastrians 
and Gurkhas reached the summit near Hill Q and 
stared upon the Dardanelles below. As at Chunuk 
Bair, so at Suvla, the Turks were rushing up reinforce- 
ments. Three Divisions, starting from Bulair, were 
beginning to debouch along the valley between the 
two Anafartas, and to crowd the heights. Perceiving 
our inactivity or hesitation throughout the previous 
day (Sunday), they now brought back the guns they 
had removed on Saturday night, and increased the 
number. Hill's 31st Brigade, and that General him- 
self, were still on Chocolate Hill, but Maxwell's 33rd 
Brigade had now arrived there in full, and the orders 
for the morning attack devolved upon him. On the 
right he pushed forward three battalions of his own 
33rd Brigade, which made fair progress. Some of 
the leading troops were reported as even reaching 


W Hill, but that appeared to me very doubtful, as I 
watched the movements all day from a machine-gun 
emplacement near the top of Chocolate Hill. In the 
centre Brigadier-General Maxwell ordered part of the 
32nd Brigade to advance again, reinforced by two of 
the loth Division battalions under Hill (6th Royal Irish 
Fusiliers and 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers). Their objec- 
tive was Scimitar Hill — that hill which had been quietly 
occupied and quietly abandoned only the day before ! 
On the left the line was extended by the 6th Lincolns 
(33rd Brigade) and the whole of the 34th Brigade, which 
had moved from the sand dunes near Hill 10 at last, and 
arrived in two detachments. Beyond them were two 
battalions from the 53rd (Welsh) Division, which had 
been held by Sir Ian as part of his special reserve, and 
was being thrown into Suvla early that morning. 

Partly owing to the mixture of brigades, the 
attack went to pieces. There was little combination, 
and no cohesion. Battalions advanced separately 
here and there, and separately came back. Two or 
three times one or other of them (especially the two 
battalions of Hill's brigade) came close to the summit 
of Scimitar Hill and seemed likely to hold on. But 
every hour the enemy's fire increased in intensity. 
Shrapnel burst low over us, and with deadly effect. 
The men of the 32nd Brigade were much shaken by 
their experience and heavy losses in the early morn- 
ing. All were much exhausted. Fire broke out on 
the left side of the hill itself, and swept over the front 
and summit, consuming the dry scrub in sheets of 
flame. The wounded, both British and Turk, came 
creeping out on hands and knees to seek safety upon 
that yellow open space or " blaze " which, as I 


mentioned, gave the name of " Scimitar " to the hill. 
But many perished from suffocation and the extreme 
heat. Many also were burnt alive, being unable to 
move. Except a few isolated parties, which bravely 
endeavoured to hold their ground, the firing lines and 
supports came swarming back. It was no wonder. 
The situation was intolerable. The most hardened 
Regulars could not have endured it, and hardly any 
of these officers and men of the New Army had 
known fighting before. At length they were formed 
up into a confused line along the ditches and shallow 
trenches between the Sulajik and Green Hill. It 
was about noon. 

From Chocolate Hill General Maxwell ordered 
the battalions to be reorganised at once for another 
attack, but reorganisation was impossible. One of 
the wells, which in the early morning I had found 
safe, was now exposed to almost continuous rifle-fire. 
The usual scenes of a battlefield added to the distress 
and alarm. The dead were lying about ; the wounded 
crying for help ; the hands and faces of hastily buried 
men protruded from the ground. The 6th Lincolns 
and 6th Borderers, posted on either flank, were men- 
tioned for "steady and gallant behaviour" during this 
ordeal. The i/ist Hereford Battalion of the newly 
landed 53rd Division was also mentioned. But no 
further movement was attempted. Walking back 
to Lala Baba towards evening, I was asked to re- 
port to General Hammersley in his headquarters 
there, but could report little good. I found, however, 
that he had now three R.F.A. batteries in position 
behind the seaward slope of Lala Baba, and three 
batteries of mountain-guns ashore, some of the guns 



beinof dose behind the summit of the hill. The war- 
ships were also firing at intervals upon W Hill and 
the farthest points of Kiretch Tepe Sirt. 

Along that razor-edge or whale-back ridge, Sir 
Bryan Mahon had now firmly established himself 
with the few battalions left to his command out of 
the loth Division. Near the sea-end of the ridge, 
about three-quarters of a mile from Suvla Point, 
General Stopford was engaged upon the construction 
of a permanent Corps Headquarters in a partially 
sheltered depression among the rocks. Having visited 
him there in the morning, Sir Ian climbed along the 
ridge to Mahon's headquarters among the stones close 
behind his firing line. He found that General con- 
fident of carrying the whole summit of Kiretch Tepe, 
and it was probably whilst on that point of widely 
commanding view over the whole plain to Koja 
Chemen Tepe and the Anzac heights that Sir Ian 
resolved to press forward the attack upon the left, 
since the advance upon W Hill and Anafarta Sagir 
was obviously now impeded. If Mahon's Division 
could fight its way along the ridge to Ejelmer Bay, 
and fresh troops could win the line from Ejelmer Bay 
over Kavak and Tekke Tepes to Anafarta Sagir, not 
only would Suvla remain safe from interference on 
that side, but the Turkish reinforcements on W Hill 
and Scimitar Hill would be paralysed by the threat 
from their right, and rendered incapable of advancing 
farther towards the sea. 

In the afternoon Sir Ian went to Anzac with 
Commodore Keyes, and, after consultation with 
Generals Birdwood and Godley, telephoned to General 
Stopford, urging upon him the importance of im- 


mediately seizing Kavak Tepe and the rest of the 
Ejelmer-Anafarta Hne, which an aeroplane reported 
as still unoccupied and unentrenched. At the same 
time he determined to devote to this purpose the 
last of his own reserve — the 54th (East Anglian) 
Division, which, however, like the 53rd, consisted of 
infantry only, and those little over half strength. The 
battle to hold the summit just south of Chunuk Bair 
was raging at the time. It is possible that reinforce- 
ment by a new Division might have made all the 
difference there. But to supply water up those 
heights was difficult, as we noticed in the last chapter, 
and the Generals on the spot considered there was 
scarcely room for more troops in the ravines and up 
the ridges. So to Suvla the 54th Division was 
ordered to follow the 53rd, and Sir Ian was left 
without reserve. The new Division was to arrive on 
the next day but one, the i ith. 

Fi^077t the evening of Attgiist 9 to the evening 
of the loth. 

General Stopford, however, was naturally still 
anxious to retrieve the check suffered by General 
Hammersley's command, and indeed W Hill was still 
the most vital and threatening point upon the encom- 
passing heights. He, therefore, determined to renew 
the attack upon Scimitar Hill and the more open 
field country between it and W Hill, around the 
Abrikja farm. For this task he allotted nine battalions 
of the 53rd Division (Major-General Lindley), sup- 
ported by two battalions of the nth Division on 
each flank. The result was more lamentable even 


than the failure of the previous day. The troops 
of the 53rd Division set off about six a.m. across 
the Salt Lake. The Turkish shrapnel and rifle- 
fire poured upon them as they advanced, and only 
increased at the foot of Scimitar Hill. To watch 
parties of them attempting to steal up sheltered 
portions of the hill was a piteous sight. The cover 
was much reduced, because the ground was now black 
with burning, and most of the bushes gone. Many 
fell on all sides. The corner of a small wheatfield 
near Abrikja was fringed with dead who looked like 
a company lying down in the shade. One saw many 
deeds of courage among officers and men. 

Backwards and forwards, the fighting went on 
all morning, but without result. In the evening the 
battalions were withdrawn to their original lines, only 
more confused, more disheartened, and fewer in 
numbers. Generals Maxwell and Hill remained on 
Chocolate Hill that day. Hill's brigade was chiefly 
occupied in holding Green Hill just in front of the 
other, and we were much exposed to shrapnel there, 
as the trenches were incomplete. That evening, 
however, the withdrawal of Hill's five battalions in 
turn began. They were allowed rest and the joy 
of bathing on the beach till the 13th (Friday), when 
they rejoined their own loth Division upon Kiretch 
Tepe Sirt.^ 

On this day, the 10th, Chunuk Bair was lost, and 
the chance of advance from Suvla was almost orone. 
It was the saddest day in the record of the expedition. 
Sir Ian telegraphed to General Stopford, ordering 
him not to risk the proposed renewal of the attacks 

^ The Tenth {Irish) Division, pp. 1 58-161. 


with tired and disintegrated troops, but to consolidate 
the Hne from the Asmak Dere past the front of 
Chocolate Hill through Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt. 

From the evening of August 10 to the evening 
of the 1 1 th. 

It was indeed time that the line was consolidated. 
During the night and early morning, the 54th (East 
Anglian) Division was being landed on the new A 
Beaches near Suvla Point/ They formed, as has 
been noticed, Sir lan's last reserve, and were com- 
manded by Major-General F. S. Inglefield, a stalwart 
and experienced soldier, who had seen service in 
South Africa and had commanded this Territorial 
Division for two years, but was already sixty. As in 
the case of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, some of the 
best battalions had been taken for France, and others 
suddenly inserted without knowledge of him or of the 
other battalions, so that the essential bond of the 
Territorial spirit was severed. The landing of some 
10,000 or 12,000 inexperienced Territorials ignorant 
of cohesion was inevitably a confused business, though 
only the infantry had been sent. But that would not 
have mattered if the confusion upon the front lines 
had not been far worse. There the condition was 
indeed deplorable. Along the most critical part of 

^ One of these was called A East, the other A West. Between them 
was Kangaroo Beach, where the Australian Bridging Train built a land- 
ing-stage. They also built a very useful little pier close to the " cut " 
into the Salt Lake, chiefly for the service of the wounded being taken 
off" to hospital ships. Of the Suvla beaches A West was the most 
generally used, though a small harbour was afterwards blasted out of 
the rocks at the extreme point. 


the line, between Green Hill and Sulajik, battalions 
and brigades were hopelessly mixed together. The 
men had lost sight of their officers and their units. 
They lay in any ditch or cover they could find. 
Here and there a party dug trenches or improved the 
trenches dug at night. But theirs was not the spirit 
of victory. One of the bridged fountains was now 
almost deserted, as it came under fire from snipers or 
from the troops on Scimitar Hill. But round the 
other, which was concealed among large trees, the 
men still swarmed. In consequence, there was much 
delay and much waste of the plentiful water, nor did 
any attempts to get them into file, so that each might 
take his turn, avail for long. 

There was no help for it. The only thing to be 
done was to pull out the battalions gradually and 
reorganise. It was now Wednesday, and so far as 
action went the day was wasted, as Sunday had been, 
though there was better reason for the waste. 

Fro7n the evening of August 1 1 to the evening 
of the \2th. 

That evening Sir Ian again sailed over to Suvla 
with the object of urging forward his project for the 
occupation of the Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe 
heights before the Turkish reinforcements could 
arrive and entrench there. He had expected the 
54th Division to start at once upon a night march, 
so as to make the ascent at dawn, while the 53rd 
Division stood in reserve. But General Stopford 
raised objections, foresaw difficulties, and asked for 
at least twenty-four hours' delay. He hoped that 


by that time the 53rd Division would have been 
reorganised sufficiently to clear the way for the 
passage of the 54th through the jungly, tree-covered 
ground at the foot of the mountain. 

Unfortunately, even this hope was disappointed. 
Though the 54th Division had not come under fire 
at all, the Brigadiers in both Divisions reported that 
they were not yet ready for the attack. General 
Inglefield, however, was able to send forward one 
brigade in advance. It was the 163rd (Brigadier- 
General F. F. W. Daniell), consisting of the 4th and 
5th Norfolks and the 5th and loth Bedfordshires. 
The advance began in the afternoon, and the brigade 
reached the farm called Anafarta Ova, though the 
enemy's opposition steadily increased as the forest 
and bush became thicker. Then occurred one of the 
minor but startling tragedies of the war. The 5th 
Norfolks, on the right of the brigade, were led by 
Colonel Sir Horace Beauchamp, a bold and self- 
confident cavalry officer, who had commanded the 
20th Hussars, and seen hard service in Egypt, the 
Soudan, and South Africa. In the army he had been 
known as " The Bo'sun " owing to his love and 
knowledge of the sea.^ Perhaps inspired by old 
memories, perhaps hoping to inspire Territorials also 
with the tradition of Regulars, or to show the Generals 
what this Division could do under dashing leadership, 
he led his battalion rapidly forward in advance of 
the brigade. He was last seen among the scattered 
outbuildings of the farm, carrying a cane and en- 
couraging his men to follow. They reached the 
rising ground from which the steep front of Tekke 

^ The " Times^' History of the IVar, chap. cxii. p. 198. 


Tepe springs. Whether Colonel Beauchamp intended 
to carry the mountain unassisted, or to secure the 
edge of the Anafarta plateau to his right front, cannot 
be known. The bush grew thicker ; the battalion 
lost formation ; the enemy's fire increased ; many 
stragglers turned back and reached the Division 
during the night. 

*' But," in Sir lan's words, "the Colonel, with 
1 6 officers and 250 men, still kept pushing on, driv- 
ing the enemy before him. Amongst those ardent 
souls was part of a fine company enlisted from the 
King's Sandringham estates. Nothing more was 
ever seen or heard of any of them. They charged 
into the forest, and were lost to sight or sound. Not 
one of them ever came back." 

One cannot doubt that their bones lie among the 
trees and bushes at the foot of that dark and ominous 
hill and the last real hope of Suvla Bay faded with 
their tragic disappearance. 

In spite of all discouragement. Sir lan's mind was 
still set on securing a further advance by the occupa- 
tion of Kavak and Tekke Tepes. He agreed to the 
postponement of attack for another twenty-four hours, 
and it was arranged for the night and morning of 
August 13-14. But on the afternoon of the 13th 
(Friday), on returning to Suvla with Major-General 
Braithwaite, his Chief of Staff, he found that General 
Stopford still raised objections. Two out of his four 
Divisional Generals despaired of success. The line, 
he considered, was already too long for his troops. 
Some of the brigades were still disorganised and 
shaken. Finding that this temper of uncertainty and 
depression prevailed, Sir Ian could do nothing but 

THE 10th division ON AUGUST 15 329 

cancel the scheme of attack, and order the IXth 
Corps to reorganise and consoHdate a Hne as far 
forward as possible. 

One further effort was, however, made on Sunday, 
August 15, when General Stopford called upon the 
Irish loth Division to advance along the Kiretch 
Tepe Sirt in the direction of Ejelmer Bay. The 
two brigades now under Sir Bryan Mahon advanced 
along the lofty ridge, part along the summit, the rest 
strung out down the steep slope towards the sea. 
The brigades were the 30th (Nicol's) and 31st (Hill's). 
On the reverse or southern slope the 162nd (De 
Winton's) Brigade, 54th Division, advanced through 
thick bushes and deep ravines in support. An 
unusual amount of artillery was employed. The 15th 
Heavy Battery had arrived a few days before. The 
58th Brigade R.F.A. (loth Division) had marched 
along the coast from Anzac with safety, and all these 
guns were engaged, besides a mountain battery, some 
machine-guns, and the guns of the destroyers Gram- 
pus and Foxhound, firing from the Gulf of Xeros. 
But in spite of this support the advance moved very 
slowly. It started about noon, and crept bit by bit 
along the "whale-back," a good line being kept from 
the summit down to the sea, but halts frequent, and 
progress difficult. The ground was all rocky, and 
most of it covered with prickly scrub, burnt in parts. 
The summit was bare rock, and the distance to be 
traversed under fire about a mile and a half. A 
prisoner told us the Turks had six fresh battalions in 
line or in strongly fortified redoubts, each battalion 
provided with twelve machine-guns. That may be 
exaggerated, but the machine-guns were numerous 


and deadly. Soon after the beginning of the general 
advance, Major Jephson was mortally wounded upon 
the Post which he had originally won and which 
always bore his name. 

Meantime, the 5th Inniskilling Fusiliers, supported 
by the 6th, had been extended over the southern slope 
in front of the 162nd Brigade. Here the difficulties 
of advance were even greater, owing to the tangle of 
very thick and lofty bush, the steep gullies, the in- 
ability of the naval guns to afford assistance, and the 
deadly fire from the long Turkish trench running 
down the slope in front, as well as from the guns on 
the Anafarta and W Hills. Having left the summit, 
I happened to be with this part of the attack soon 
after five o'clock, and found the men broken up into 
small groups by the impenetrable bush. Their loss, 
especially in officers, was very heavy. Again and 
again the groups attempted to combine and advance, 
but were driven back by the storm of fire. Progress 
on that side was impossible. Whether the 162nd 
Brigade came up to support the attack one could not 
say, as the view was impeded by the bushes, and the 
men widely scattered. 

Suddenly, hearing a yell of shouting on our left, I 
looked up to the summit, and saw a body of men 
charging along it with flashing bayonets. Others, 
standing up on higher ground behind them, were 
pouring out a rapid magazine fire. Two companies 
of the 6th Munsters and two of the 6th Dublins had 
worked half-way along the edge between Jephson's 
Post and the Pimple. The remaining 250 yards they 
now covered with a charge, cheering as they ran. 
Some Turks met bayonet with bayonet, and died. 


Some threw up their hands. Most ran. One could 
see them scurrying back along the ridge and down 
the southern slope. The Irish pursued them through 
the Pimple redoubt and beyond. It was six o'clock.^ 

In the gathering darkness the men attempted to 
build small sangars of the rocks, but no real trench- 
ing was possible. They lay out in lines along the 
seaward slope just below the summit. Then the 
failure to win the southern slope was bitterly felt. 
Twice in the night the Turks counter-attacked, 
creeping along that landward side, and, for the first 
attack, rushing over the top, only to be cut down 
by rifle and bayonet. In the attack just before dawn 
they trusted chiefly to a deadly form of round bomb, 
which they lobbed over the crest in vast numbers. 
The Irish could only reply with improvised jam-pot 
bombs, and few of those. Sometimes, however, they 
caught the Turkish bombs and flung them back. 
Private Wilkin, of the 7th Dublins, flung back five, 
but was blown to pieces by the sixth. 

So the harassing conflict continued. It continued 
all next day under the burning sun. The loss was 
extreme. Many of the very best officers fell. The 
5th and 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers were almost exter- 
minated. During the night of the 1 6th- 17th the 
shattered brigades were withdrawn from the untenable 
position. It was never recovered. Jephson's Post 
and the steep slopes leading down on either side, 
one to the sea, the other to the plain, remained the 
farthest points held by our lines along the Kiretch 
Tepe Sirt. 

^ A detailed account of this small but gallant action is given in The 
Tenth {Irish) Division in Gallipoli, pp. 1 61- 180. 


This attack of August 15 was General Stopford's 
last order. That evening he gave up the command 
of the IXth Corps, and Major-General De Lisle took 
his place, awaiting the arrival of Major-General 
Julian Byng. Brigadier-General H. L. Reed, how- 
ever, remained as Chief of Staff to the Corps. 
Meantime, in place of De Lisle, Major-General 
W. R. Marshall (87th Brigade) took command of 
the 29th Division. A few days later, Major-General 
Lindley (at his own request) gave up the command 
of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, and was appointed to 
the military command at Mudros. Major-General 
Hammersley retired from command of the nth Divi- 
sion owing to serious illness. The same cause unfor- 
tunately removed Major-General F. C. Shaw from 
the 13th (Western) Division, which he had com- 
manded with such skill and firmness during the 
assault on Sari Bair. Brigadier-General Sitwell 
was succeeded in command of* the 34th Brigade by 
Brigadier-General J. Hill. Soon afterwards the 
command of the 31st Brigade was taken over by 
Lieut.-Colonel J. G. King-King in place of Brigadier- 
General F. F. Hill, who fell seriously ill. It became 
known that, besides General Julian Byng, Major- 
General E. A. Fanshawe and Major-General F. 
Stanley Maude (afterwards the hero of Bagdad) were 
coming out. 


THE great assault of the second week in 
August, extending from Lone Pine to 
Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and having the mountain 
height of Chunuk Bair as the centre of its line, must 
be described as a failure. It failed of its objects — 
the objects of the whole military campaign — to open 
the Straits for the fleet, to secure the possession of 
Constantinople, to hold all the Balkan States steady 
for our Alliance, to complete the blockade of the 
Central Powers by land and sea, to divert any possible 
threat towards Egypt, or towards the Persian Gulf, 
and so to hasten the termination of the war. The 
aim of this fine strategical conception was not accom- 
plished, and the causes of failure have been suggested 
in the narrative of the three preceding chapters. 
Incidents and accidents contributed — the gallant but 
hopeless attempt to cross the Nek in face of the 
Chessboard redoubt, the gallant but unsuccessful 
attempts to hold the summits at Chunuk Bair and 
" Hill Q," the error of Baldwin's brigade, the con- 
fusion of the landing inside Suvla Bay, the separation 
of the units in the loth Division, the immobility of 
the nth Division on August 7 and 8, the break- 
down of the water supply through want of receptacles, 



the unwitting recall of a battalion from Scimitar 
Hill on the evening of Sunday the 8th, and the 
apparent failure of the Higher Command at Suvla 
to realise the vital necessity of speed and energy, 
no matter at what cost, during the four critical days 
from the morning of the 7th to the evening of the 

But at the back of all these causes of failure lay 
the ultimate reason that many of the troops employed, 
especially at Suvla, were not strong or experienced 
enough for the difficult task of attacking an enemy 
posted in the most favourable positions for defence, 
over an unknown, complicated, and deserted country, 
and in unaccustomed conditions of intense heat and 
insatiable thirst. Few in the New Army or Territorial 
Divisions were acquainted with the realities of war ; 
few had been exposed to its sudden and overwhelm- 
ing perils. They had neither the traditions, nor the 
veteran experience, nor the disciplined self-confidence 
of the Regular Army. They had neither the physique, 
nor the adventurous spirit, nor the intense national 
bond of the Anzacs. What they might have done 
under more decisive or youthful or inspiring leader- 
ship we can judge only from their subsequent rapid 
improvement even upon the Peninsula, and from their 
excellent service in later campaigns — such service as 
was performed in Palestine by these Territorial 
Divisions. But in August 19 15 their leadership 
was not conspicuously decisive, youthful, or inspiring. 
And so it came about that General Stopford suffered 
the worst fate which can befall a commanding officer 
in the field. 

On the other hand, the gain had been consider- 


able. The important, though not vital positions of 
the Vineyard at Helles, and Lone Pine on the right 
front at Anzac, had been won. In the centre, the 
Anzac Corps were relieved from an arduous, if not 
untenable, situation. It could now move freely over 
a widely extended ground ; many points formerly 
harassed by the enemy's guns and snipers were now 
secure ; water-springs had been gained ; and the lines 
were drawn three or four miles nearer the summits 
of Sari Bair, On the left, Suvla Bay afforded a 
more sheltered winter roadstead than Kephalos, The 
lofty ridge of Kiretch Tepe Sirt was ours to the 
summit, and the wide plain around the Salt Lake, 
including Chocolate and Green Hills, was ours also. 
We held the entrance of the broad valley leading up 
to Biyuk Anafarta, and, but for the risk from occa- 
sional snipers, communication with Anzac was freely 
open.^ To these great advantages must be added 
the heavy losses inflicted upon the Turks — losses, 
however, which were counterbalanced by our own, 
and could be more speedily replaced. 

The immediate weakness of our position was due 
to the enemy's continued occupation of the heights 
in the range of varied mountain and plateau from 
Ejelmer Bay to W Hill; for guns on those heights 
commanded the greater part of the Salt Lake plain 
and the positions round the bay, especially on the 
north side, where our main landing-places and head- 
quarters were situated. Another weakness was the 

^ The daring of the Turkish snipers, who crept across our lines at 
night and perched in the small trees, was proved when, on September 8, 
General Inglefield's horse was shot under him as he rode along the 
beach from Anzac. 


enemy's occupation of Hill 60 (Kaiajik Aghala), 
which faces W Hill across the Biyuk Anafarta valley 
and commanded the approach to the upper reaches, 
as well as threatening the communication between 
Anzac and Suvla. Reckoning up the advantages 
gained, and refusing to be discouraged by the ill- 
success of his main design. Sir Ian resolved at 
once to remove these causes of weakness by a 
renewal of the combined attack. It was probable 
also that, if the reinforced Turkish Army were 
allowed to remain undisturbed, it would assume 
a violent offensive, especially directed against 

The losses during the second week in August 
had been serious — not less than 30,000 on all three 
fronts together. Sir Ian estimated his total force at 
95,000 in the middle of August (40,000, including 
17,000 French troops, at Helles ; 25,000 at Anzac; 
under 30,000 at Suvla).^ But this was a sanguine 
estimate. The real fighting strength of the British 
and Anzac troops was probably not over 60,000, 
and of the French about 15,000. The British Divi- 
sions alone were short by nearly 1500 officers. On 
August 16 he telegraphed to Lord Kitchener stating 
that 45,000 rifles to fill up gaps in the British Divi- 
sions, and 50,000 rifles as fresh reinforcements, were 
essential for a quick and victorious decision.^ Un- 
fortunately, as it now appears, the great strategic and 
political conception of the Dardanelles had now less 
support than ever in the Cabinet. The fall of 
Warsaw {August 4) had destroyed the last hope 
of Russian co-operation. The influence of the 

^ Sir lan's dispatch. * Ibi4^ 


"Westerners" was supreme. The attempt to break 
through the German line at Loos in September was 
already in preparation, and all available forces were 
concentrated upon that. By various means, an 
increasingly despondent or hostile criticism of the 
Gallipoli campaign was insinuated throughout the 
country, and Sir lan's request for further assistance 
was refused. The hesitating Cabinet may have 
hoped that, if the Western offensive succeeded, the 
Dardanelles campaign, after remaining suspended for 
two or three months, might then be pushed forward 
again without loss of opportunity. If that was their 
expectation, they had forgotten Napoleon's maxim, 
that war is like a woman in that, if once you miss 
your opportunity, you need never expect to find either 
war or woman the same again. 

All the reinforcement allowed for the moment was 
the 2nd Mounted Division from Egypt, where it had 
been in training since April. This Division of four 
brigades, numbering just under 5000 men, was com- 
posed of Yeomanry regiments from the Midland and 
Southern counties. The men were of singularly fine 
physique, accustomed to hunting, and well trained in 
cavalry manoeuvres. But, like all " mounted " forces 
on the Peninsula, they left their horses in Egypt and 
fought on foot. They were under the command of 
Major-General William Peyton, a cavalry officer, who 
had served with distinction in Egypt and South 
Africa, and was now about fifty. ^ His Brigadiers 
and regimental officers were also cavalrymen of dis- 
tinction, and, so far as its numbers allowed, the 

^ In the spring of 1916, General Peyton commanded the successful 
expedition against the Senussi, west of Egypt. 


Division could be counted upon to strengthen any 

But, however excellent in itself, the Mounted 
Division was not numerous enough to give stability 
to the Suvla Divisions, most of which were still 
fatigued and disheartened by the ill success of their 
first attempts at warfare.^ In the hope of affording 
the much-needed stiffening to the IXth Corps, Major- 
General De Lisle, accordingly, was instructed to 
bring the three brigades of his own 29th Division 
round from Helles by night, and land them at Suvla 
for the attack. They were under the command of 
their next senior officer, Major-General W. R. 
Marshall of the 87th Brigade. De Lisle himself, 
being in temporary command of the IXth Corps, 
directed the whole action. His scheme was very 
simple. On his right, the nth Division was to 

1 The brigades were composed as follows : 

(i) IJ/ South Afz(^/a«(^ (Brigadier-General Wiggin) — 

Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanry, Gloucester- 
shire Hussars. 

(2) znd South Midland {?>x\%?idi\^x-Gt.'s\&x'aS. Lord Longford) — 

Bucks Hussars, Berks and Dorset Yeomanry. 

(3) North Midland (Brigadier-General F. A. Kenna, V.C.)— 

Derbyshire Yeomanry, Sherwood Rangers, South Notts 

(4) London Brigade (Brigadier-General Scatters Wilson) — 

City of London Roughriders, ist County of London Middle- 
sex Hussars, 3rd County of London Sharpshooters. 
Divisional Cavalry — 

Westminster Dragoons, Herts Yeomanry. 

2 The two brigades (30th and 31st) of the loth Division, at Suvla, 
having lost nearly three-quarters of their officers and half the men, were 
withdrawn to rest near Suvla Beach on August 17, and on August 22 
General F. F. Hill, the trusted Brigadier of the 31st, was invalided away 
with dysentery. As previously noticed, he was succeeded in command 
by Brigadier-General J. G. King-King, General Staff Officer (i).— r/;^ 
Tenth {Irish) Division, p. 208. 


assault the trenches which the Turks had now dug 
across the Biyuk Anafarta valley or plain, south and 
a little east of Chocolate and Green Hills, and so to 
protect the right flank until the moment came for a 
general attack upon W Hill, the ultimate objective 
of the whole movement. On his centre, the 29th 
Division was to storm Scimitar Hill, the possession 
of which, as before explained, was essential to any 
advance against W Hill itself. To his left, the long 
line from Sulajik Farm across the wooded plain up to 
the summit of Kiretch Tepe was held by the two 
Territorial Divisions, the 53rd and 54th, so as to 
check any attempt to turn the flank on that side by 
getting behind our attacking force. Chocolate Hill, 
1000 yards from the summit of Scimitar Hill, was the 
centre of our advance, and on the night of August 
20-21 the 29th Division entered the trenches close 
to the left of that hill, the nth Division stretching 
down the slope and into the plain on the right. 

The action was to open with the customary bom- 
bardment, intended to shatter the enemy's trenches 
and shake his confidence. For this, three cruisers 
were available, and on land the IXth Corps' artillery 
now counted two R.F.A. Brigades (short of horses), 
two heavy batteries, two mountain batteries, and two 
batteries of 5-inch howitzers.^ For an Army Corps 
of nominally six Divisions the number of guns was 
absurdly small. But as the front to be attacked 
measured only a mile, it was hoped the bombardment 
would be effective. Unfortunately, even this hope 
was frustrated by a condition which could not be fore- 
seen. Usually, in the afternoon, the prospect from 
^ The " Times'''' History of the tVar, Part 84, p. 205. 


Suvla towards the hills is brilliantly clear. The 
whole range stands visible in every detail. The 
westering sun appears to reveal every kink and 
cranny, every tree and mass of bush. Even as far 
away as Sari Bair, the rocks of Koja Chemen ravine, 
the "chimney" down the face of Chunuk Bair, and 
the yellow patch of the Farm are distinct in the clear 
air and sunlight. For this reason the afternoon had 
been chosen for attack, the sun being then behind us, 
but glaring, as might be hoped, in the enemy's eyes. 
But that day it so happened that the whole country 
was covered with a thin grey mist, as on an October 
morning in England. From the sea, the hills were 
dim. From the front, all details were obscured. 
Sir Ian, who had come over from Imbros, wished to 
postpone the attack, and prudence might have been 
wise for once. But he tells us that " various reasons " 
which remain unknown, but were perhaps concerned 
with the presence of the 29th Division in the Suvla 
sphere, made postponement impossible. 

Accordingly, at 2.45 a violent bombardment 
began, directed upon Scimitar and W Hills. It was 
a terrific sight. Our large shells flung up great 
spouts and fountains of earth and stones, so that the 
summits smoked with repeated eruption. At the 
same time, the air was full of the white balls of 
bursting shrapnel. But the Turks could answer now. 
At first they directed their shrapnel and high ex- 
plosives upon Chocolate Hill, where we had twenty- 
eight machine-guns in position. Besides the guns on 
W Hill, the Turks now had guns concealed some- 
where on the Anafarta plateau or on the foot-hills of 
Tekke Tepe, whence they could bring a converging 

500 Yards 

J L 


Yards. W?o 

To face p. 341 

CoKIbliss ia NUtRBS, 


fire to bear. Their bombardment of our position was 
very heavy. The shells tore at our parapets. The 
air above our trenches hissed with bullets and 
fragments. Many of us were struck. But at 3.15 
our infantry began to advance.^ 

On the right the 34th Brigade (now under 
Brigadier-General J. Hill) advanced successfully 
across the narrow front of plain between the small 
farms of Hetman Chair and Aire Kavak (a quarter- 
mile south of Hetman). They took the trenches 
on the plain without great loss. But the 32nd 
Brigade (now under Lieut. -Colonel J. T, R. Wilson), 
which was to have kept in touch with them at 
Hetman Chair, and to have seized a long trench 
running thence towards W Hill, lost direction and 
kept edging off to their left or north-east, instead of 
due east. The plain is open but for a sprinkling of 
small trees, and the mist was not thick enough to 
confuse. They may have been attracted by the 
chance of cover among the slopes leading up to the 
hills on their left, and the fire from the long com- 
munication trench was certainly very severe. It 
was still more unfortunate that when the 33rd Brigade 
(Maxwell's) was sent up to capture the trench at all 
costs, they "fell into precisely the same error," as we 
are told. Some of the brigade followed the 32nd 

^ It was unfortunate that, standing beside a machine-gun at the front 
parapet of Chocolate Hill, I was just at that moment struck on the head 
by shrapnel, and so was unable to witness the confused advance which 
led to the failure. By the time I returned to my position at 4.1^, the 
mistake had been made. It may, perhaps, be medically interesting 
that for the previous forty-eight hours I had been suffering from high 
fever, but the violent rush of blood from the wound appeared to reduce 
the temperature, and at night I walked to the dressing-station at Suvla 
Point in perfect health, except for mere pain and exhaustion. 


to the left ; some edged away to their right in the 
direction of Susuk Kuyu, which must have taken 
them behind the 34th Brigade, almost into the Anzac 
country. But as we are further told that the 32nd, 
though without success, attempted to rectify the error 
by bravely attacking the trench from the north-east, 
the solution remains uncertain/ The attack on that 
side did not develop further. After 4.30 p.m. one 
could perceive that the battalions were confused, and 
still suffering heavily both from that long and loop- 
holed trench which ran across the open almost 
diagonally to their right flank, and from most 
formidable trenches which the Turks had now 
visibly constructed right across the sombre face of 
W Hill, against which they showed up as lines of 
whitish grey, loopholed also and roofed with head- 
cover. Parties tried to press forward here and there, 
and the dead lay scattered. Two stretcher-bearers 
I saw quiedy going up a slope under very heavy 
fire, when both fell dead simultaneously, dropping 
on hands and knees, so that the stretcher remained 
supported on their shoulders after they were dead. 
But no individual courage could retrieve the error 
of direction. On the right we had gained one trench 
and about 300 yards, but we gained no more. 

The attack in the centre suffered from the mistake. 
The 29th Division now contained far less than half of 
the troops who landed in April. Few indeed of their 
original officers were left, few of the trusted sergeants 
and corporals whom they knew. They had been 
brought hurriedly into the midst of an unknown 
scene, and found themselves included between lines 

S'Sir lan's dispatch. 

THE 29th division IN THE CENTRE 343 

of unknown and untried battalions. Their former 
General was gone. His successor was compelled to 
remain in the Corps Headquarters far away on 
Karakol Dagh. The Division was commanded by 
the CO. of a brigade. None the less, this indomi- 
table Division, in this its last battle upon the Peninsula, 
displayed to the last the indomitable spirit habitual to 
its nature, and fought with the same proud self-sacrifice 
and confident enthusiasm as had distinguished it at the 

Between 3.30 and 4, the 87th Brigade (2nd South 
Wales Borderers, istK.O.S.B., ist Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, and ist Border Regiment) advanced from 
our front trenches, and began working up through 
the bush on the left front of Scimitar Hill. At first 
they were partially concealed by the thickets or 
covered by dead ground in ravines. Reaching the 
top of the slope, they charged forward to the summit. 
The Inniskillings, who were leading, actually gained 
it. They drove the Turks back along the communi- 
cation trenches towards Anafarta Sagir. They even 
pursued them down the reverse slope, which is not 
steep but runs without much fall toward the village 
plateau. For a few minutes the Hill was ours. But 
still stronger trenches had been constructed on the 
edge of the plateau beyond. They were invisible 
from the ascent to Scimitar Hill ; but from Chocolate 
Hill we could see fire flashing from them, and Turks 
springing on to the parapets to pour bullets upon our 
scattered line as it advanced. At the same time the 
enemy's guns on W Hill and on the concealed point 
near the foot of Tekke Tepe hurled a storm of in- 
cessant shrapnel over the summit of Scimitar Hill 


and all its slopes. The converging fire was intoler- 
able. Unless help came speedily, the position could 
not be held. It is doubtful whether any help could 
have retained the hold. But none came. 

On the right of the hill the 86th Brigade (2nd 
Royal Fusiliers, ist Lancashire Fusiliers, ist Munster 
Fusiliers, and ist Dublin Fusiliers) was intended to 
storm the position in a similar manner from that side. 
But as they advanced they found their progress 
hindered by battalions of the 32nd and 33rd Brigades, 
which, as narrated above, had edged off to their left 
instead of keeping their direction straight forward 
and working on parallel lines with the 29th Division. 
Battalions in the three brigades thus converged and 
became confused. The men were mixed up in the 
shallow valley beyond Green Hill and upon the south- 
west slopes of Scimitar Hill. Instead of being 
covered by the nth Division as intended, the right 
flank of the 29th Division was hampered and almost 
paralysed. Such battalions as got clear attempted 
to work up that side of the hill, turning north-east. 
But the confusion was increased by a raging fire, 
which with lono- tongfues of flame consumed what was 
left of the bush around the base of the hill already 
called " Burnt," and entirely shut off co-operation 
with the 87th Brigade on the left. Such parties as 
reached the broad bare patch of ravine from which 
the other name of "Scimitar" was derived, became 
at once exposed to the storm of shrapnel and rifle- 
fire. Sir Ian in his dispatch says, "The leading 
troops were simply swept off the top of the spur, and 
had to fall back to a ledge south-west of Scimitar Hill, 
where they found a little cover." If the "top of the 


spur" means the summit of the hill, it is certain that 
none of this brigade ever reached it. The Innis- 
killings were the only men who occupied it even for 
a time. 

About five o'clock the Yeomanry Division was 
ordered to advance from the cover of Lala Baba, 
where it had remained in reserve, and to take up its 
position under the slighter cover of Chocolate Hill. 
In extended order the small brigades, each numbering 
about 350, advanced with the steadiness and regu- 
larity of parade across the bare and fully exposed 
level of the Salt Lake. Some of the enemy's guns 
diverted their fire from Scimitar Hill and showered 
shrapnel over the slowly moving lines. But their 
regularity was exactly maintained, and owing to the 
accurate distance kept in the intervals the loss was 
small. Only too eager to reach the firing line, 
they forced their way through the reserves of the 
nth Division around the slopes on the left side of 
Chocolate Hill, and plunged into the brigades at the 
centre of the lines, already so much confused and 
embarrassed. There was much delay, and in places 
the crowding troops exposed themselves unnecessarily 
to heavy fire. But the 2nd South Midland Brigade 
(Bucks, Berks, and Dorsets) concentrated, as was 
intended, behind Chocolate Hill itself, and was at 
last able to advance with fair cohesion. Very slowly 
the men made their way across our trenches to the 
left front of the hill, and through the difficult and 
intricate ground beyond, still swept by the flames of 
the burning bushes, and encumbered by groups of 
men who had lost leadership. It was past seven by 
the time they reached the foot of the main ascent, 


and began to work their way up through fire and 
smoke and shrapnel. 

At 7.30, through the gathering obscurity of mists 
and evening, we from the parapet in front of Choco- 
late Hill dimly discerned a crowd of khaki figures 
struggling at full speed up that broad, bare patch 
of the " Scimitar." They seemed to gain the summit, 
and then darkness covered them. All thought the 
terrible position was won at last, and though there 
was no cheering, and hardly a word was said, all felt 
the joy of hope renewed. We did not know the hope 
was disappointed as soon as raised. The cross-fire of 
shrapnel, machine-guns, and rifles from the two 
hidden trenches beyond the summit, swept off the 
Yeomanry as it had swept off the 87th Brigade at an 
earlier hour. Hearing that the position was utterly 
untenable, General Marshall was compelled to order 
a withdrawal to the original line, and in the darkness 
the sorely tried and exhausted men came back. One 
regiment, working round the right of the hill later in 
the evening, gained a knoll between Scimitar and 
W Hills, apparently near the Abrikja Farm, and 
reported they had taken W Hill itself. When the 
mistake was discovered, they also were withdrawn, 
for in daylight they would have been exterminated 

This unsuccessful attempt to capture the hill so 
ominously known as "Scimitar," and occupied, it 
may be remembered, without opposition by a single 
battalion on Sunday evening, August 8, cost little 
less than 5000 casualties. Most of the loss fell on 
the 29th Division, but the Yeomanry lost nearly 

^ Sir lan's dispatch. 


1000 of their small force, and among the killed were 
Brigadier-General F. A. Kenna, V.C. (formerly of 
the 2 1 St Lancers), Brigadier-General the Earl of 
Longford (formerly of the 2nd Life Guards), whose 
body was never found, and Sir John Milbanke, V.C. 
(formerly of the loth Hussars), commanding the 
Sherwood Rangers.^ The failure of the attempt had 
proved that even when acting in combination with 
the finest Regulars, inexperienced and untried 
brigades cannot be hurried into the firing lines of 
an important attack without risk of confusion or 
collapse. For neither in officers nor in men had the 
sense of leadership, confidence, or even of direction 
been trained into an instinct strong enough to bear 

^ As usual throughout this history, I have found it impossible to 
record the countless instances of individual bravery, but I may mention 
the case of Captain O'Sullivan (ist Inniskilling Fusiliers). Early in 
July, describing one of the actions at Helles, Sir Ian had written : 
"A young fellow called O'SuUivan, in the Inniskilling Fusiliers, led a 
bombing party into one end of an enemy trench, and cleared it of the 
enemy. The Turks counter-attacked with bombs, and drove him and 
his men out with a good deal of loss. Again he cleared the trench, 
filling his pockets and belt with bombs. Again he was driven back. 
A third time he led the attack, and this time the trench was held and 
remains in our possession. Within an hour of this last feat of arms, a 
trench was lost to the right in prolongation of the Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
This same young fellow, who had already gone through enough to 
shake the nerves of the most veteran soldiers, led his company down 
into the trench himself, running along a few yards ahead of them out 
on the parapet, exposed to a tremendous musketry fire, chucking bombs 
into the trench just in front of the leading files, so as to clear the way 
for them. There is a limit to luck, and this time he was wounded, but 
I hope he may pull through." He pulled through, and on August 21 
twice led his company up against the Turkish trenches on Scimitar Hill, 
and twice was driven back. Collecting the men in a little hollow of the 
ground, he said, " Now I depend on you, my lads, and we'll just have 
one more charge for the honour of the regiment." He led them all by 
a clear 20 yards up the hill, leapt into the trench, and there died. 


the strain of the shocks and confused impressions 
inevitable to a violently opposed advance. 

On the south or Anzac side of the broad valley- 
leading up to Biyuk Anafarta, the action was far 
more successful. The main object in this region was 
to secure complete possession of the Kaiajik Aghala, 
that rough and intersected ridge partly occupied by 
the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade during the 
general attack upon Sari Bair a fortnight earlier. 
That brigade, reduced to some 1500 men, now held 
a position separated by a deep creek from the main 
ridge, the whole of which, and especially the broad 
and flattish eminence at the northern extremity, had 
been occupied by the Turks and strongly fortified. 
The white lines of their trenches were visible from 
Suvla and the whole district, the earth being whitish 
there, as though mixed with chalk. The eminence, 
which we knew as Hill 60, was chequered with these 
lines, and resembled the back of a large tortoise with 
the markings picked out in white. It was, indeed, 
converted into a fortress commanding; the broad and 
flattish valley between it and W Hill about one and a 
half miles away. As before explained, the possession 
of Hill 60 was essential for the security of communi- 
cation between Anzac and Suvla. If W Hill had 
been occupied, Biyuk Anafarta and the northern 
approaches to Koja Chemen Tepe would also have 
lain open. 

Only a short distance west of Hill 60, just where 
the ridge begins to rise from the plain, two wells 
called Kabak (or Kaba) Kuyu are situated, equally 
desirable to the enemy and to ourselves. These also 
the Turks had strongly fortified, and our first stroke 


was to seize them. Major-General Sir Herbert Cox, 
who was in command of the whole movement, had at 
his disposal his own Indian Brigade, two regiments 
(Canterbury and Otago) of New Zealand Mounted 
Rifles, a mixed force of the 4th Australian Infantry 
Brigade, the 4th South Wales Borderers (40th 
Brigade, 13th Division), the 5th Connaught Rangers, 
and the loth Hampshires (both of the 29th Brigade, 
loth Division, now under Lieut.-Colonel Agnew)/ 
His guns were commanded by Brigadier-General 
Napier Johnston. He arranged his line so as to have 
the 5th Gurkhas in the open ground on his extreme 
left, guarding the communication with Suvla, the 
Connaught Rangers in the centre opposite the wells, 
the New Zealanders under Brigadier-General Russell 
to the right of them, the Hampshires in support of 
the Australians who attacked on the right, and the 
remainder in reserve. After a preliminary but in- 
sufficient bombardment, the advance began about 3.30 
p.m. on August 21, almost exactly at the same time as 
the attack upon Scimitar Hill across the broad valley. 
The moment the guns ceased, the Connaught 
Rangers, who were finely commanded throughout by 
Lieut.-Colonel Jourdain, issued from a ravine in the 
maze of Damakjelik Hill, where they had lain 
concealed all day. " With a yell like hounds 
breaking covert," they dashed forward by platoons 
in line. They had nearly 400 yards to run, and the 
ground was open. A terrible fire from the parapets 
around the wells and from the slopes of Hill 60 itself 
met them at once. Without firing a shot in answer, 

^ Brigadier-General R. S. Vandeleur succeeded to the command of 
this brigade on September 22. 


they charged forward with bayonets level. It was a 
race which a young officer won — an International 
football player for Ireland. The Turks stood the 
wild onset, but not for long. In a few minutes 
they had died or escaped ; the wells were ours, the 
communications cleared. A reserve company charged 
still farther forward to assist the New Zealanders at 
the foot of Hill 60, but was almost exterminated.^ 
The remainder became scattered in the confusion of 
the assault, lost direction, and were not re-formed till 

To the right of the Connaught Rangers, the New 
Zealanders issued at the same time from the almost 
inextricable gullies of the Damakjelik, but between 
them and Hill 60 ran a singularly deep ravine, one 
of the branches of the Kaiajik Dere. In climbing 
down the steep side of this ravine, entangled in 
prickly bushes, many fell to the bullets poured from 
the opposite trenches, and the bodies of many who 
fell there could not be recovered for burial. The 
only chance for safety was to rush down to the 
bottom of the ravine and shelter in the dead ground 
against the steep side of the hill itself. The New 
Zealanders made the rush, and some succeeded in 
climbing up the dead ground opposite and driving 
the enemy out from 50 yards of his lowest trench. 
Others remained clinging to the steep side, and there 
a few of the South Wales Borderers, who came 
between the New Zealanders and the Connaught 

1 The Tenth {Irish) Division, pp. 188-192. Until that volume 
appeared, the Connaught Rangers had not received the public credit 
due to this serviceable exploit, though in Gallipoli they were spoken of 
with the highest praise. 


Rangers, succeeded in joining them. Three hundred 
yards farther to their right, a party of the 4th 
AustraHan Brigade rushed across the ravine in the 
same manner, and the hundred who came over 
untouched also clung to the side of the hill just below 
the trench. So the night was passed, our men along 
the steep dead ground just holding their position, but 
exposed to repeated bombing from the trench above 
them. Fortunately, the Australian Brigade dug a 
deep zigzag right across the middle of the ravine as 
a communication trench, thus rendering the approach 
over the upper or southern reach of the Dere fairly 
secure. During the night also many wounded, lying 
on the exposed slope of the ravine, and drawing 
attention by their cries, were brought in. But the 
hours passed in great peril and discomfort.^ 

^ During the night Captain Gilleson, the Anglican chaplain of the 
14th Australian (Victoria) Battalion, worked incessantly at bringing the 
wounded back to safety. After daylight next morning, still hearing 
cries from the exposed slope over the crest of the ridge, he crept out 
and found a British soldier (probably Hants or Connaught Rangers) 
wounded and tormented by ants. With the help of two others (one a 
Presbyterian chaplain) he had dragged the man about a yard when he 
fell mortally wounded. The man, I believe, was also killed ; the 
Presbyterian was wounded. Later on (August 28) Captain Grant, a 
New Zealand padre (the form of religion was not mentioned to me at 
the time) went searching for a wounded friend along a trench filled with 
dead and wounded Turks. To the wounded he attended on his way ; 
but hearing conversation farther on, he thought he recognised his 
friend's voice. Turning a sharp corner of a traverse, he came face to 
face with the Turks, and was instantly killed. 

Both Captain C. E. W. Bean (Australian papers, Oct. 28, 191 5) and 
Phillip Schuler {Australia in Arms, p. 275) mention these incidents, 
which were described to me on the spot a few days after they happened. 
Taken with Sir lan's dispatch, these two authorities give a clear idea 
of the confused fighting around Hill 60. For the action of the 
Connaught Rangers, The Tenth {Irish) Division in Gallipoli should be 
read, as mentioned above. For myself, I had the great advantage of 


Next morning a new battalion (the 1 8th AustraHan) 
appeared. It had arrived at Anzac only the day 
before as the first instalment of the 2nd Australian 
Division, commanded by Major- General J. G. Legge, 
who had occupied various military positions in New 
South Wales, had served in South Africa, and re- 
presented Australia on the Imperial General Staff.^ 
Early on August 22 the i8th Battalion ( Lieut. - 
Colonel A. E. Chapman) passed through the Gurkhas 
on our left, and charging across the open, fought 
their way up the northern end of the hill and 
captured another piece of the outer trench. Bombed 
and enfiladed there, most of them struggled along 
the trench to their right — a difficult task, for the 
Turks had dug it so deep and narrow that only one 
man at a time could squeeze along it. Thus they 
linked up with the New Zealanders, still in the same 
position where they had passed the night. The 
trench, in fact, ran continuously all round the oval 
of the hill, and for the next five days we could but 
cling on to the small segment gained. Meantime 
the Connaught Rangers were withdrawn for four 
days to rest. They had lost 12 officers and over 
250 men.2 After the first attack, the 29th (British) 

going over the ground with General A. H. Russell a day or two after 
the final action of August 29. 

^ Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Gwynn was Chief of Staff. The Division 
consisted of: 

^th Australiatt Brigade (Brigadier-General W. Holmes) — 

17th, 1 8th, 19th, and 20th Battalions. 
dth Australiaft Brigade (Colonel R. S. Browne) — 

2 1 St, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Battalions. 
Tth Australian Brigade (Colonel J. Burston) — 
25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th Battalions. 
2 The Tenth {Irish) Division, p. 197. 


Brigade under Colonel Agnew was employed by 
General Russell to dig a communication trench 
past Kaba Kuyu to Hill 60. They therefore had 
little rest. 

The hill was not taken, but so important was the 
position considered that Major-General Cox was 
instructed to attack once more on August 27, three 
weeks after the beginning of the great battle of 
Suvla-Sari Bair. The fighting round Hill 60 had, 
in fact, been almost continuous since the 21st. The 
battalions were now worn so thin by losses and sick- 
ness (especially by dysentery) that definite numbers 
of men were allotted for action instead of units. 
On the right, 350 men were chosen from the 4th 
Australian Brigade ; in the centre, 100 Maoris and 
300 New Zealanders from the Mounted Rifles Brigade 
(Auckland, Canterbury, Wellington, and Otago), to- 
gether with 100 of the new i8th Australian Battalion ; 
on the left, 250 of the Connaught Rangers — only 1 100 
men in all.^ This attacking party was under the 
direct command of Brigadier- General Russell. 

The action began at 4 p.m. with the usual, as it 
was the last, bombardment. Sir Ian describes it 
as "the heaviest we could afford," and certainly 
it appeared sufficient to flatten out any trenches. 
None the less, as was usual from first to last in 
this campaign, its terrors were deceptive, and the 
moment that the assaulting parties advanced they 
were met by overwhelming fire. The Australians 
on the right were swept back by a whole battery 
of machine-guns. The Connaught Rangers on the 
left, though much enfeebled by dysentery, charged 
^ The Tenth {Irish) Division, p. 199. 



upon the northern trenches with their accustomed 
enthusiasm. Torn by accurate shrapnel as they ran 
forward, they still fought their way into the first 
narrow trench, and occupied it by 6 p.m. But all 
that evening and night, by the light of the crescent 
moon, the Turks stormed down upon them in suc- 
cessive waves, shouting their battle-cry of "Allah! 
Allah!" At 10.30 p.m. they bombed and shot the 
Rangers out of the northern extremity, and drove 
them along the trench upon the centre. It was in 
vain that their own reserves (forty-four sick men !) 
came up to reinforce, and the 9th Light Horse (3rd 
Australian Light Horse Brigade) attempted about 
midnight to recapture the position. Only in the 
centre were the New Zealanders able to cling tight 
to the 1 50 yards they had by this time already won. 

All next day (August 28) the Turkish attacks 
upon that position continued with repeated violence. 
The shattered remnants of the Connaught Rangers 
were withdrawn, but still the New Zealanders held 
on through the long hours and the next night, until 
at I a.m. on the 29th all that remained of the loth 
Light Horse, after their wild assault upon the Nek 
three weeks before, formed up in the trenches 
occupied by the New Zealanders, and stormed 
across the centre of the fortified hill, driving the 
enemy sheer off the circumference of the western 
semicircle. The eastern side of the hill was never 
taken, but our line was advanced till it ran across 
the summit, and there consolidated. Our loss was 
about 1000. The Turkish loss was roughly esti- 
mated at 5000, and we captured 46 prisoners and a 
considerable quantity of rifles and ammunition, besides 


three trench-mortars and three machine-guns. It 
was not a great action judged by the standard of 
the battles in the war elsewhere. But it was an 
action worthy of the persistence, courage, and en- 
durance displayed throughout by Anzacs, Irish, and 
British upon the Peninsula ; and it was the last. 

The whole of the Anzac force, which had never 
left the fighting zone since the landing in April, was 
now gradually withdrawn by battalions (only 200 or 
300 men in each) to rest in Mudros, their places 
being filled in turn by the newly arrived 2nd Australian 
Division, which, however, was not completely settled 
upon that hard-won ground till after the first week 
in September.^ The 54th (East Anglian) Division 
was also brought round from Suvla, Major-General 
Inglefield's headquarters being dug upon the Aghyl 
Dere, and his Division extended north over the 
ravines of Damakjelik up to the confines of Hill 60 
itself But the 13th Division, now under Major- 
General F. Stanley Maude, was returned to the 
IXth Corps at Suvla, so that Anzac did not gain. 

^ One of the transports (the Southland), conveying a battahon of the 
2nd Australian Division, was torpedoed near Mudros, but brought safely 
to port by the soldiers, who stoked and ran the engines themselves. 


UPON the Peninsula, it was difficult to esti- 
mate the general spirit of the army during 
the six weeks which followed the valiant 
but only partially successful efforts of August, They 
were a period of enforced inactivity seldom interrupted, 
and the usual effect of inactivity upon an army, as 
upon civilians, is depression. During the campaign it 
was often observed that in most Divisions the prospect 
of action, however perilous, at once reduced the sick- 
ness, as though to prove tedium more unwholesome 
than death. But in September tedium supervened, 
and the diseases of dysentery and diarrhoea, always 
prevalent since June, spread like a plague. The 
average of serious cases rose to looo a day, and 
though of course by far the greater number of 
the patients returned to duty, the percentage of 
"casualties" from sickness alone was in some weeks 
calculated at 300 per annum, so that very large 
drafts were required to maintain the army even at 
its shrunken strength. It must also be remembered 
that both these diseases have a peculiarly depressing 
effect upon the spirit, weakening the will equally 
with the bodily powers. Certainly it was expected 
that the approach of winter would compel the perilous 

germs to hibernate in torpor, and would reduce the 



multitude of flies which now enjoyed a livehhood so 
rich and unexpected upon that desert land. But in 
other respects the prospect of a winter campaign 
was not exhilarating. 

The Indians stood the climate far better than the 
British or Australians, either as vegetarians or as 
habituated to the sun and protected by their colour, 
whereas the Australians and many of the British 
sought to avoid heat by going naked, and so ex- 
posed their white skins to the unaccustomed and 
baleful rays. Life in the bazaar or jungle had also 
rendered Indians immune to diseases against which 
our civilisation stands unprotected, and flies did not 
pursue the cleanly food of Hindus and Sikhs with 
the same persistent avidity. If some of the British 
troops upon the Peninsula had been exchanged for 
the Indian troops serving in France and Flanders, 
both armies would have gained in health. But 
perhaps a greater cause of disease than sun or flies 
or infection was the monotony of the diet, as 
mentioned before. Sir lan's appeals for canteens 
remained unheard till August 30, when a canteen- 
ship actually appeared at Anzac. Deputed purchasers 
from every unit hurried down to buy. Bursting 
with money, they stood in queues, but none received 
more than one-sixth of what he asked, and, as in 
a starving town, scarcity laughed at cash. None the 
less, after the arrival of that one meagre shipload 
of variety, the numbers on the sick list suddenly 
fell, though only for a time. Allowance must also be 
made for the arrival of the 2nd Australian Division, 
which raised the average of health, until the infection 
spread among its members also ; and that was soon. 


But more disheartening even than inactivity or 
disease was the disappearance of the dead and 
wounded. During August some 40,000 — about one- 
third of the whole force — had gone. Entirely suffi- 
cient provision had now been made for the wounded 
alike in the largely increased number of hospital ships 
running to Alexandria, and in the hospital camps 
established near Suvla A Beach (too near the Hill 10 
batteries) and on two positions along the Suvla pro- 
montory (also disturbed by shells owing to the 
proximity of store depots, landing-places, and Corps 
Headquarters) ; at well-sheltered points along the 
Ocean Beach, near Anzac ; upon the flats at the end 
of Kephalos Bay, in Imbros ; and especially on the 
breezy rising ground overlooking Mudros harbour on 
the opposite side to Mudros town. The dead either 
lay beyond reach, gradually shrinking to dust on 
" No Man's Land," or were buried in carefully 
tended little cemeteries, their graves marked with 
wooden crosses and decorated with shell-cases or 
white stones arranged in patterns. Brief as regret 
and lamentation must be in war, it is melancholy to 
return to familiar dug-outs and find that the familiar 
occupants have gone, leaving possessions which they 
will not need again, and perhaps a written notice to 
warn off intruders from the deserted habitation. The 
sense of loss was especially poignant at Anzac, where, 
united by the bonds of adventure and nationality, 
the men had lived as in a crowded community of 

Drafts came, but though the drafts were small 
they sometimes overwhelmed the original battalions, 
and, partly owing to the unavoidable suspension of 


drill, they were long in imbibing a good battalion's 
spirit.^ Even more serious was the necessity of 
hurrying new drafts at once into advanced positions. 
In a note written at Helles on August 30, after visit- 
ing the lines before Krithia, I observed : 

" A newly arrived draft has usually to join the rest 
of the battalion in the trenches or firing line at once. 
The men know nothing of the realities of war and 
weather. Shells and bullets affect them as they affect 
every one at first, and most people to the end. The 
sun strikes through them like X-rays. Dust fills 
their eyes and mouths. Flies cover their food, and 
keep them irritated and sleepless. In the advanced 
trenches, ten to one they get little beyond biscuit and 
bully beef, with an occasional share in an onion or 
pot of jam. Diarrhoea begins to affect them. They 
grow weak and their spirit sinks. In that condition 
they are probably called upon to resist or deliver an 
attack against a tough race of semi-barbarous soldiers 
famous at trench fighting for generations." 

Interrupted by only few cool and rainy days, the 
heat continued through September, and the victims 
to dysentery increased. The shadow of approaching 
winter also lay upon the army, and its horrors were 
exaggerated, partly through the classic reputation of 
inhospitable Thrace, partly by the inexperience of the 
Anzacs, who had never seen snow or endured cold. 

^ " It was not entirely an easy matter to assimilate these reinforce- 
ments. As a rule, a draft is a comparatively small body of men which 
easily adopts the character of the unit in which it is merged. In Galli- 
poli, however, units had been so much reduced in strength that in some 
cases the draft was stronger than the battalion that it joined, while it 
almost invariably increased the strength of what was left of the original 
unit to half as much again. As a result, after two or three drafts had 
arrived, the old battalions had been swamped." — The Tenth {Irish) 
Division, p. 235. 


More serious than cold was the anticipated downpour 
of rain, which would convert our roads along ravines 
into torrents, and fill the dusty communication trenches 
with mud. Unhappily, owing to the steep ascent to 
such positions as Quinn's Post, and the far longer 
climb to the Apex, where we still clung to a scarcely 
tenable position overhanging the Farm below the 
summit of Chunuk Bair, the chief hardships of winter 
were likely to fall upon Anzac, where the men were 
least accustomed to resist them. In a note during 
the first week of September I observed : 

" If we remain through the winter, Anzac will 
need looking to. Cement, solid iron plates, corru- 
gated iron to support sandbag roofs, timber such as 
the Turks already use for trenches, careful and diffi- 
cult drainage in a country where the dry watercourses 
which become torrents in winter are now used as 
roads, spiked boots to climb the slimy paths now deep 
in dust — all must be prepared. The daily toil, already 
severe, will be much increased, and the fighting force 
can hardly be expected to carry it out. A crowd of 
ordinary labourers will be needed." 

Gangs of Egyptian labourers were, in fact, brought 
to Imbros and set to work upon the main road 
through the camps there. 

As to numbers, at the end of August we had 
83,000, including 15,000 French troops, on the 
Peninsula, as against an estimate of 100,000 Turks 
there, with 25,000 in reserve. During September, a 
few small but serviceable units arrived, such as the 
Scottish Horse (about 3000 men unmounted) under 
their commandant, the Marquis of Tullibardine ; the 
ist and 2nd Regiments of."Lovat's Scouts," under 


Lord Lovat, between whose force and Lord Tullibar- 
dine's a rivalry as of old Highland clans persists ; a 
brigade of East and West Kent and Sussex Yeo- 
manry (Brigadier-General Clifton-Browne); a South- 
western Mounted Brigade of North Devons, Royal 
ist Devons, and West Somersets ; and the ist New- 
foundlanders' Battalion (Colonel Burton) attached to 
the 29th Division. These units, together with drafts, 
brought the forces upon the Peninsula up to about 
half their nominal strength at the end of September. 
In the beginning of that month, two brigades of the 
loth Division's artillery also arrived at last. The 
55th was stationed at Helles, the 56th at Suvla.^ 
But even so, on September 10, there were only 
60 guns at Suvla in place of the full complement 
of 340. 

None the less, in spite of inactivity, sickness, and 
the discouragement of decreasing strength, the Divi- 
sions continued to improve. The improvement was 
most marked in the 53rd Division (now under Major- 
General Marshall), the 54th (still under Major-General 
Inglefield), and the nth (now under Major-General 
E. A. Fanshawe). The 13th Division, which had 
done so well at Anzac under Major-General Shaw, 
was sure only to increase its reputation under so fine 
and ardent a commandant as Major-General Stanley 
Maude. Finally, there was Major-General Sir Julian 
Byng, who arrived from his cavalry command in 
France together with Generals Maude and Fanshawe 
on August 23. He took over the command of the 
IXth Corps at Suvla from Major-General De Lisle, 

^ The Tenth {Irish) Division, p. 229. The 54th Brigade remained in 


who returned to his 29th Division, which was re- 
tained at Suvla, except that the brigades went separ- 
ately to the rest camp on Imbros. 

Every one expected the order for fresh advance so 
soon as the new Generals had thoroughly re-estab- 
lished confidence and the IXth Corps Staff had 
recovered a more sanguine temper. As is usual in 
times of inaction, rumours flew. The French, it was 
stated, were sending out new Divisions under General 
Sarrail. Another landing was to be made on the 
Asiatic coast, perhaps at Kum Kali, perhaps at 
Smyrna, more likely at Adramyti Bay, a scheme 
much favoured by authorities in Mitylene. Another 
very persistent rumour was for sending the fleet up 
the Dardanelles again, and hope rose high in the 
Navy, tired and irritated at their effective but sub- 
sidiary service to the military force. Meantime, the 
actual fighting was limited to the stationary trench 
warfare of bombing, casual bombardments, and local 
assault or defence on either side. It gradually be- 
came evident that the fate of the expedition depended 
no longer upon itself, but upon events and specula- 
tions far removed from the scene.^ 

On the Western Front, the Allied armies were 
occupied through September in preparing for the 
combined effort which culminated during the last 
week of the month in the prolonged battles known by 
the names of Loos and Champagne. As I before 
noticed, it was mainly for fear of weakening this effort 

^ During this period of comparative inaction, it was announced that 
Flight-Lieutenant Edmonds in a seaplane sank a Turkish transport full 
of reinforcements with a heavy bomb, and that a submarine sank a 
transport of ii-inch guns in the Sea of Marmora (September 7). — The 
" Times'''' History of the War, Part 84, p. 211. 


that British reinforcements were refused to Sir Ian, 
and that the scheme of advancing on the Asiatic side 
of the Straits with new French Divisions was aban- 
doned, if ever seriously intended by the High Com- 
mand in France. The efforts so carefully prepared 
and gallantly carried out succeeded in gaining valu- 
able positions for future advance, but were not suffi- 
ciently successful to break through the German line 
or to diminish the increasing peril of Near Eastern 
complications. It would be difficult to compute the 
exact proportion of the men and explosives thus 
expended without definite result in France which 
might have effected a decisive and permanent victory 
in the Dardanelles ; but the proportion would not 
have been high, and how beneficent the issue for 
the world's history ! Successive disasters upon the 
Russian Front continued to encourage the military 
parties in the Balkan States which trusted to German 
victory for the furtherance of their national aggrandise- 
ment. In August the Russian armies were driven 
from Warsaw, Kovno, and Brest- Litovsk ; in Sep- 
tember from Grodno and Vilna. Although their 
skilful retirement won military praise, and although 
the exhausted German forces were unable to break 
the lines beyond their points of advance, or even to 
occupy Riga, it was evident that from Russia neither 
danger to her enemies nor assistance to her friends 
could be expected, even though her unmilitary and 
vacillating Autocrat assumed command. The en- 
couraging effect of such events as the fall of Warsaw 
upon the Turkish moral was distinctly marked. 

In the Balkan Peninsula, fate was supposed still 
to hang upon the decision of Bulgaria — a decision 


secretly taken two months before (July 17), although 
Ferdinand, with lachrymose solicitude, continued to 
profess the neutrality of a fox between two packs of 
hounds. From the first, both belligerents had rightly 
calculated that, in spite of the strong national sym- 
pathy with England and Russia inherited by the 
Bulgarian people, their Tsar, if not their representa- 
tive Government, could be won by the highest bidder 
for alliance, and each side attempted to outbid the 
other with profuse offers of other people's territory. 
But when, in mid-September, England and her Allies 
proposed the cession of Serbian territory at Monastir 
(a mainly Bulgarian district), Doiran and Ghevgheli 
(mainly Turkish in race), and part of the Dobrudja, 
then occupied by Roumania, they had been forestalled 
by more tempting promises from Turkey and the 
Central Powers. To the force of such temptation 
was added the animosity rankling in all Bulgarian 
hearts against the neighbouring states which two years 
before (August 191 3), by the Treaty of Bucharest, had 
torn from their country the reward of her decisive 
victories over the Turk in 191 2. Especially against 
Serbia was this animosity directed, and one might 
have supposed that even a slight acquaintance with 
the Balkan States would have warned the Allied 
Governments of Serbia's extreme and imminent peril. 
Yet up to September 20 they continued to hope. 

On that day, M. Radoslavoff announced that 
Bulgaria had signed a treaty with Turkey, but would 
maintain an armed neutrality for the protection of 
her frontiers. No one, except perhaps the British 
Government, was deceived as to the real intention. 
On September 19 a large German- Austrian army 


under Field-Marshal von Mackensen had renewed 
the attack upon Serbia's capital, and Bulgaria after 
mobilising her 350,000 rifles could strike at Serbia's 
exposed eastern flank almost without opposition from 
the exhausted Serbian army. Serbia's one poor 
chance was to attack her hereditary enemy at once, 
before the Germans had crossed the rivers in the 
north. But from this course England discouraged 
her, and, with unfounded confidence, she awaited the 
assistance due from Greece according to her treaty of 
1913. But Greece, always so justly apprehensive of 
warlike risks, was presented with a passable means 
of escape by her own warrior King, that " Bulgar- 
slayer" and "Napoleon of the East," whose titles 
belied his earlier reputation as a leader of panic- 
stricken flight at Larissa in April 1897. 

As a result of the Greek elections in June, when 
his supporters were returned to power by a two-thirds 
majority, Venizelos had resumed the Premiership 
in the middle of August. Clearly perceiving the 
enemy's intention of overwhelming the relics of the 
Serbian forces by armies converging from the north 
and east, he imagined that Greece was bound by 
honour and treaty to hasten to her ally's protection, 
Greece could nominally mobilise eighteen Divisions, 
but their fighting strength was probably not over 
200,000, for the most part ill-equipped, ill-instructed, 
and averse from war. Of the Serbian army probably 
little over 100,000 organised and disciplined troops 
was left after the struggles of a year. The German- 
Austrian invaders were estimated at 200,000 ; the 
Bulgarians at 300,000, or perhaps not more than 
250,000, since the Roumanian frontier needed watch- 


ing. Attacked on two fronts, Serbia's strategic posi- 
tion, in any case perilous, became desperate with such 
inferior numbers. In his zeal for the Serbian alliance, 
which he recognised as the ultimate defence of Greece 
herself, Venizelos called upon the Entente to furnish 
150,000 men (September 21), and two days later 
induced King Constantine to mobilise. 

On September 28 Sir Edward Grey spoke in the 
House of Commons, the most significant part of his 
speech being the sentence : 

"If the Bulgarian mobilisation were to result in 
Bulgaria assuming an aggressive attitude on the side 
of our enemies, we are prepared to give to our friends 
in the Balkans all the support in our power in the 
manner that would be most welcome to them, in 
concert with our Allies, without reserve and without 

Our friends in the Balkans can only have been 
Serbia and Greece. The support most welcome to 
them was men, but arms, money, and equipment were 
welcome. To provide the men, Lord Kitchener 
asked Sir Ian if he could spare two British Divisions 
and one French for Salonika. Sir Ian replied by 
offering the 53rd (Welsh) and the loth (Irish) Divi- 
sions. The French offered their 2nd Division on the 
Peninsula (156), and the veteran General Bailloud, 
anxious for fresh fields of youthful ambition, claimed 

The loth Division — perhaps the pick of the New 
Army troops on the Peninsula — being ordered to sail 
at once, embarked on September 30, and, though 

* The full speech is quoted in Nelson's History oj the War, by 
Colonel John Buchan, vol. xi. p. 18. 


passing by way of Mudros, was able to land its first 
detachments at Salonika on October 5, finding two 
French Divisions already there.^ General Bailloud's 
Division, leaving on October 3, began to reach the 
rendezvous on the same day. There the whole force 
soon came under the command of General Sarrail, 
who arrived on October 12, and it was shortly after- 
wards augmented by other French and British 
Divisions, two of which were believed to have left 
England as reinforcements for Sir Ian, but to have 
been diverted to the new scene of action upon their 

So far as the immediate protection of Serbia was 
concerned, the Allied force thus hurried over from 
Gallipoli — not more than 15,000 men^ — was almost 
an absurdity, though its arrival caused futile rejoicing 
among the Serbian people. Its only possible service 
was to inspire some sort of confidence in a Greek 
army hastening to save the ally of Greece from de- 
struction. But the Greek army did not hasten. On 
September 28 (the day of Sir Edward Grey's speech) 
Venizelos announced the necessity of mobilisation. 
On October 3 Russia issued an ultimatum to Bul- 
garia warning her to break off relations with the 
Central Powers and dismiss their officers from Sofia. 
Two days later, the Entente withdrew their repre- 
sentatives, and Bulgaria entered the war as an ally 

^ See Sir Charles Monro's dispatch on the Dardanelles evacuation. 

2 The further history of the loth Division (which I visited once more 
among the mountains beyond Lake Doiran), as well as of the whole 
Salonika campaign up to summer 191 7, is told in The Story of the 
Salonika Army, by my colleague, Mr. G. Ward Price. 

3 Colonel John Buchan puts the number at 13,000 {Nehoris History 
of the War, xi. 26). 


of Germany, though England did not actually declare 
war upon her till October 15. But on the very day 
upon which Bulgaria's intentions were declared, an 
unexpected blow, which might have been expected, 
fell. King Constantine informed Venizelos that he 
did not support the policy of intervention. " I do 
not wish to assist Serbia," he said, "because Germany 
will be victorious, and I do not wish to be defeated." 
After pleading the cause of honour and probable ad- 
vantage, not for the first time in vain, Venizelos 
resigned, and M. Zaimis, a peaceful banker, formed 
a Government based on a neutrality of "complete 
and sincere benevolence " toward the Western Allies.^ 
It was in vain that on October 7 England again 
offered to cede Cyprus to Greece as a tempting in- 
ducement to fulfil the claims of honour. The King 
could only repeat his sentiment of "complete and sin- 
cere benevolence," while, as for honour, he maintained 
a benevolent correspondence, at least equally complete 
and sincere, with the Court and General Staff in 
Berlin. He further soothed the conscientious scruples 
of his people — a task well within the limits of his 
capacity — by pointing out that the treaty with Serbia 
did indeed bind them to resist an attack upon her 
by Bulgaria, but not an invasion supported by other 
Powers. Once again the people of Greece had cause 
to congratulate themselves upon possessing a monarch 
resolute enough to resist the popular will, and adroit 
enough to interpret the code of honour in accordance 
with their interests and their conscience. It was true 
that the most complete and sincere benevolence, as 

^ See the speech of Venizelos to the Athenian Chamber, August 26, 


practised by the Greek officers and officials at 
Salonika, was designed to hinder rather than assist 
the small and war-worn body of Allies now landing 
there. So far as saving Serbia went, their landing 
had now become a belated and unserviceable chivalry. 
But a King's function is to further the interests of his 
own people, and Greeks might fairly hope to derive 
material advantage from the presence of a lavishly ex- 
pensive foreign army in their port ; and they derived it.^ 
As any one with some knowledge of Macedonia, 
Drama, and the Bulgarian frontier might have antici- 
pated, the objects of the Salonika adventure were 
frustrated from the outset. Serbia was not saved ; 
Bulgaria was not penetrated ; the enemy's communi- 
cation with Sofia and Constantinople was not 
threatened. Salonika certainly was rescued from 
Austrian or Bulgarian occupation ; the enemy was 
thwarted of its possible use as a submarine base (a 
dubious possibility, as many naval authorities thought) ; 
the Entente retained some hold, however small, upon 
the Balkan Peninsula, and could treat their position 
as a fulcrum for levering the Greek monarch from his 
throne. Those were the only advantages, and one 
may estimate them as considerable. But upon the 
far grander strategic conception of the Dardanelles, 
the Salonika project fell like a headsman's blow. 
Little life was left beyond the subsiding spasms of a 
decapitated man. Balked of reinforcement, deprived 

^ Belgrade fell to Mackensen on October 9 ; the Bulgarians crossed 
the Serbian frontier on the nth, occupied Uskub on the 22nd, and Nish 
on November 5, thus opening direct railway communication between the 
Central Powers and Constantinople through Sofia. Monastir fell on 
December 2, and by the middle of that month the Serbian army and the 
Allies had been entirely driven out of Serbian territory. 


of half the French contingent and one among his 
finest new Divisions, Sir Ian called up all his reserve 
of indomitable hopefulness — a General's finest quality 
— for the support of himself and the army that still 
remained, however diminished. But the powers of 
darkness gathered round. In front lay the Turks, 
soon to be supplied with more German officers, more 
heavy guns, high explosives, and food. Close around 
him, and at the centre in London, unexpected figures 
could be discerned moving in obscurity, whispering 
despair, and suggesting disaster with the malign 
satisfaction of prophets whose gloomy forebodings 
fulfil their prognostications. It became evident that 
a General's essential supports — the confidence and 
zealous co-operation of his own Government, never 
very enthusiastic in Sir lan's case — were melting 
away faster even than his army. 

The Turks, on their side, evidently knew that 
the Irish and French Divisions were going and had 
gone ; for the morning after the departure of the last 
detachments their aeroplanes dropped messages over 
the Indian encampments telling the Indians that 
they were being abandoned only to have their throats 
cut on the Peninsula. Otherwise, except for occasional 
air-raids to drop bombs upon the General Head- 
quarters at Imbros, the impenetrable Turks remained 
quiescent, perhaps . already calculating that the Pen- 
insula would be relieved of invaders without their 
stir, or perhaps merely awaiting the supply of big 
guns and ammunition, soon to be so easily transmitted 
by way of Nish and Sofia. Their very silence was 
ominous ; but more ominous still, for the moment, 
seemed a violent southerly gale which on the night of 


October 8-9 swept away the two landing-piers at 
Anzac, sank the valuable water-lighters there, and 
drove three of the motor-" beetles" ashore at Suvla. 
Happily, the Australians had recently constructed a 
new pier in the bay north of Ari Burnu, sheltered 
from the south wind by that small promontory. 
There supplies could be landed in any weather both 
for Suvla and Anzac, but the storm presaged evil for 
the approaching winter. 

Two days later (on October 11) Lord Kitchener 
telegraphed asking Sir Ian for an estimate of the losses 
which would be involved in an evacuation of the Pen- 
insula. After consultation with Major- General Braith- 
waite, his Chief of Staff, and other members of the Staff, 
Sir Ian replied that the probable loss was estimated at 
50 per cent. No estimate could be anything but a 
guess. All depended upon incalculable weather and 
incalculable Turks. Earlier in the campaign, General 
Gouraud had estimated a loss of two Divisions out of 
six in case of evacuation at Helles. In any case. Sir 
Ian replied on October 12 in terms showing that such 
a step as evacuation was to him unthinkable.^ Apart 
from losses, evacuation would release an army of the 
best Turkish troops for renewed attack in Meso- 
potamia or Egypt, to say nothing of the Caucasus and 
Persia. The risk to our position throughout Asia, 
dependent as it was upon prestige rather than power, 
had in such a case also to be gravely considered. 

On October 16 Lord Kitchener again telegraphed, 
saying that the War Council wished to make a change 
in the command. As he afterwards informed Sir Ian, 
" the Government desired a fresh, unbiased opinion, 

^ Sir lan's dispatch, last section but two. 


from a responsible Commander, upon the question of 
early evacuation."^ To supply this fresh, unbiased 
opinion they had appointed General Sir Charles 
Monro, with Major- General Lynden-Bell as his Chief 
of Staff. Until their arrival, General Birdwood was 
to assume command on the Peninsula. 

During the morning of the 17th General Brulard, 
who had succeeded General Bailloud in command of 
the French contingent, came over to Imbros with his 
Staff to say good-bye. Generals Davies and Byng, 
with the Staffs of the VII I th and IXth Corps, 
followed. To say good-bye to his own Staff, Sir Ian 
rode to the new Headquarters at the entrance of the 
main valley across the bay, whither he was himself to 
have removed that very afternoon. To the army he 
issued the following special order as farewell : 

" On handing over the command of the Mediter- 
ranean Expeditionary Force to General Sir Charles 
Monro, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to say a few 
farewell words to the Allied troops, with many of 
whom he has now for so long been associated. First, 
he would like them to know his deep sense of the 
honour it has been to command so fine an army in 
one of the most arduous and difficult campaigns which 
have ever been undertaken ; secondly, he must ex- 
press to them his admiration of the noble response 
which they have invariably given to the calls he has 
made upon them. No risk has been too desperate ; 
no sacrifice too great. Sir Ian Hamilton thanks all 
ranks, from Generals to private soldiers, for the 
wonderful way they have seconded his efforts to lead 
them towards that decisive victory which, under their 
new Chief, he has the most implicit confidence they 
will achieve." 

^ Sir lan's dispatch. 


On the Triad he said good-bye to Admiral de 
Robeck, and to Commodore Roger Keyes, the 
Admiral's Chief of Staff. He then embarked on 
the cruiser Chatham. As she passed down Kephalos 
Bay, each of the war vessels manned ship in salute. 
Cape Kephalos was rounded ; Suvla, Anzac, and the 
Helles of the landings were seen by their Commander- 
in-Chief for the last time, and the Peninsula, which 
had been the dramatic stage of such high hopes, 
noble achievement, and bitter frustration, faded in 
the distance, as the living events there enacted were 
already fading into a story of the past. 


THE departure of a Commander-in-Chief acts 
upon an army like sudden heart disease in 
a man, or the collapse of a ship's steering- 
gear. All is at once bewilderment and uncertainty. 
A sense of loss and change and failure pervades all 
ranks. The daily routine appears hardly worth the 
trouble of accurate performance, and for enterprise 
no spirit is left. This is so, even when the General 
stands aloof and regards his men with small esteem, 
as was Wellington's way ; but the depression is 
increased when the recall removes one who is by 
nature tempted to companionship in action, and who, 
at the lowest ebb of fortune, stands always ready 
with the encouraging word and the outwardly serene 
aspect of hope. 

In General Birdwood, it is true, such another 
leader was found. His adventurous and sunny spirit, 
always alert, free of intercourse, and incapable of 
depression, made him accepted as Sir lan's natural 
successor by all except the few whose minds were set 
immovably towards despair. Yet, in spite of this 
well-justified confidence, the mere fact of the change 
suggested speculation upon other changes, and the 
pulse of action flagged, as though paralysed by un- 
certainty. In this condition General Sir Charles 



Monro found the army when, after two days spent in 
the Headquarters at Imbros, he visited the Peninsula 
on October 30. He was a man of fifty-five, who 
before the war had performed the services usual to 
an officer of that period in South Africa, India, and at 
home. During the war he had won reputation in high 
command on the Western Front. The Government 
had sent him out with a view to obtaining the report 
of an unbiased opinion, and by appointing a General 
from the Western Front, and a man of opposite 
temperament to his predecessor's, they had ensured 
themselves against any possible bias, at all events in 
one direction. His orders were to report upon the 
military situation ; to give an opinion whether on 
purely military grounds the Peninsula should be 
evacuated ; and, otherwise, to estimate the troops 
required (i) to carry the Peninsula, (2) to keep the 
Straits open, and (3) to take Constantinople.^ 

Upon all these points General Monro formed a 
rapid and decisive opinion. He represented the 
military situation as unique in history, and in every 
respect unfavourable. The Force, he maintained, 
held a line possessing every possible military defect. 
The position was without depth, the communications 
insecure and dependent on weather, the entrench- 
ments dominated almost throughout by the enemy, 
the possible artillery positions insufficient and defec- 
tive, whereas the enemy enjoyed full powers of ob- 
servation, abundant artillery positions and opportunity 
to supplement the natural advantages by all the 
devices of engineering. For the troops, they could 
not be withdrawn to rest out of the shell-swept area, 

^ Sir Charles Monro's dispatch (March 6, 1916). 


because every corner of the Peninsula was exposed ; 
they were much enervated by the endemic diseases 
of the summer ; there was a grave dearth of compet- 
ent officers ; and the Territorial Divisions had been 
augmented by makeshifts in the form of Yeomanry 
and Mounted Brigades. As to military objects, the 
Turks could hold the army in front with a small 
force ; an advance could not be regarded as a reason- 
able operation to expect ; and any idea of capturing 
Constantinople was quite out of the question. These 
considerations, in General Monro's opinion, made it 
urgent to divert the troops locked up on the Peninsula 
to a more useful theatre, and convinced him that a 
complete evacuation was the only wise course to 

About that judgment there was, at all events, no 
hesitating ambiguity. Having condemned the whole 
expedition, root and branch, the General was ob- 
viously not called upon to discuss such minor details 
as reinforcements, or the reports of Turkish exhaustion 
and demoralisation, or the exact " theatre " in which 
the army would be likely to immobilise so large a 
Turkish force (Mr. Asquith estimated it as 200,000),^ 
and restrain them from co-operating in further assaults 
upon Mesopotamia or Egypt. To be sure, there was 
Salonika as a possible alternative ; but Sir Charles 
Monro must have been aware that Serbia was by 
that time past saving, and that the transference of 
the Gallipoli army to Salonika would simply relieve 
Turkey of all anxiety and restraint. The probable 
loss of prestige and of men involved in the 

^ Sir Charles" Monro's dispatch (March 6, 1916). 

* Speech in the House of Commons, November 2, 1915. 


evacuation does not appear to have influenced his 
decision ; and, indeed, as the event afterwards 
proved, the loss in both was vastly overestimated 
by the advocates of evacuation as well as by its 

The report was, naturally, grateful to such of the 
Generals on the spot and such of Sir lan's former 
Staff as had already abandoned hope. Some, indeed, 
were now of opinion that the evacuation should have 
been ordered at midsummer or before. Still more 
welcome was the report to the party in England 
which had always distrusted the Dardanelles adventure, 
and had so largely contributed to its failure both by 
their depreciation and by their encouragement to irre- 
sponsible counsellors of despair. They kept their 
thoughts fixed upon the Western Front, since, by a 
law of human nature, interest varies directly with 
proximity, and some mental or imaginative effort is 
required to realise the importance of distant under- 
takings. Already (on October 14, two days before 
Sir lan's recall) Lord Milner had made the following 
statement in the House of Lords : 

" When I hear that it would be a terrible thing 
to abandon our Dardanelles adventure because this 
would have so bad an effect in Egypt, in India, 
upon our prestige in the East, I cannot help 
asking myself whether it will not have a worse 
effect if we persist in that enterprise and it ends 
in complete disaster." 

Lord Lansdowne, naturally, deprecated so public 
a suggestion ; but Lord Milner found support in Lord 
Ribblesdale, who urged the Government to "get out 


of the unfortunate adventure. " ^ A few days afterwards 
(October i8) Sir Edward Carson, the Attorney- 
General, resigned in protest against the Government's 
hesitation to evacuate the Peninsula and concentrate 
upon Serbia's protection, for which, however, any 
efforts would then have been at least a month too late. 
Thus impelled, Mr. Asquith's Cabinet, in hopes of 
justifying their firm resolution to adopt one course or 
the other, decided upon another preliminary step. 
They commissioned Lord Kitchener to visit the 
Dardanelles in person and assume the responsibility 
of decision. 

Lord Kitchener left England on November 5, 
and on reaching Mudros consulted with Sir Charles 
Monro, who meantime had visited Egypt and now 
returned in company with Sir H. McMahon, the High 
Commissioner, and Sir John Maxwell, Commanding 
the Forces in Egypt. On his part, Lord Kitchener 
was strongly opposed to evacuation. His military 
and political instinct showed him the advantage of 
maintaining this "thorn in the side" of Turkey, even 
if no farther advance were possible during the winter, 
— an advantage illustrated too late when Kut-el- 
Amara fell in the following April. Some of the most 
active spirits in the navy were also continually urging 
a renewed attempt to force the Narrows with the 

1 See The " Titnes " History of the War, Part 84, p. 213. It is worth 
noticing that on November 18, Lord Ribblesdale in the House of Lords 
declared that it was common knowledge that Sir Charles Monro had 
" reported in favour of withdrawal from the Dardanelles, and adversely 
to the continuance of winter operations there." One can only suppose 
that, in saying this. Lord Ribblesdale deliberately intended to mislead 
the enemy, who could hardly believe so rash a betrayal of intention 
could be made with impunity, if the statement were true. 


fleet now that ships were far more numerous, the 
position was better understood, and the army could at 
least effect a strong diversion on the Peninsula and 
protect the communications in case of success. To 
them, as to many of the Generals ashore, it seemed 
still possible to retrieve the situation and terminate 
the war from the Eastern side. But on the Aragon 
at Mudros Lord Kitchener was surrounded by 
advocates of evacuation. We know with what solici- 
tous anxiety he always regarded any possible danger 
that might threaten Egypt, and the highest repre- 
sentatives of our authority there were present, always 
ready to urge the danger of a Turco-German invasion 
from the East, and trouble with the Senussi on the 
West. Sir Charles Monro was also present, and we 
have seen his opinion — an opinion decisively supported 
by his Staff. Support also came from one or two 
recently attached members of Sir lan's old Staff. As 
one among them said, "We brought Lord Kitchener 
round to our way of thinking." ^ 

This congenial task, perhaps less difficult than it 
might have proved ten years before, was no doubt 
rendered easier still by Lord Kitchener's hurried 
visits to the main points on the Peninsula. At Helles 
the visit was little more than a call upon the Head- 
quarters of the VII Ith Corps, and a walk among the 
remnant of the French force at Seddel Bahr. At 

^ Lord Kitchener's original objection to evacuation may perhaps be 
supported by a passage in an article by Dr. E. J. Dillon {Fortnightly 
Review, February 1918) : "The evacuation of Gallipoli was not war- 
ranted in the light of all the elements of the problem, because from the 
point of view of the Coalition it meant the asphyxiation of Russia and 
her ultimate disappearance as a belligerent, and to ward off this calamity 
the sacrifice of several warships would not have been excessive." 


Anzac (November 13), the Australians received Lord 
Kitchener with an enthusiasm due to his massive 
personaHty and his record of service. With resolute 
energy, outdistancing his retinue, he strode up the 
steep ascent of Walker's Ridge to Russell's Top, and 
penetrated the front trenches whence the assault upon 
the Nek had started to destruction. By coincidence, 
it was a day of singular calm, and not a shot or shell 
was fired. At Suvla, in the same way, he climbed up 
Karakol Dagh to a prominent cluster of rocks whence 
a wide view is obtained over the Salt Lake and the 
plain to the encompassing arc of heights still held by 
the enemy, and to the unassailed eminence of Koja 
Chemen Tepe and the fateful bastion of Chunuk Bair 
beyond. At the conclusion of a Special Order issued 
to the Anzac Corps (now under command of General 
Godley), General Bird wood wrote : 

" Lord Kitchener much regretted that time did 
not permit of his seeing the whole corps, but he was 
very pleased to see a considerable proportion of officers 
and men, and to find all in such good heart and so 
confidently imbued with that grand spirit which has 
carried them throug-h all their trials and manv dang-er- 
ous feats of arms — a spirit which he is quite confident 
they will maintain until they have taken their full 
share in completely overthrowing their enemies." 

The passage, though apparently confident, was 
guarded. Upon a sudden and hurried visit to such 
scenes, even the shrewdest and most rapid mind would 
be likely to exaggerate the disadvantages of the 
unusual positions, without taking account of trenches 
and shelters rendered impenetrable, or of supplies 
stored in quantity to defy ihe weather on sea ; and 


Lord Kitchener's mind was deliberative and vasty 
rather than shrewdly alert to the moment. But 
ultimately it was the political situation, and especially 
the deflection of Bulgaria into open hostility, together 
with the stealthy neutrality of King Constantine, 
which compelled Lord Kitchener and even the most 
high-spirited of the Peninsula Generals reluctantly to 
assent to the surrender of hope. 

While at Mudros, Lord Kitchener ordered General 
Monro to assume command of all British forces in 
the Mediterranean east of Malta, excluding Egypt. 
General Monro naturally divided these forces into 
the "Salonika Army," under command of Lieut- 
General Sir Bryan Mahon, and the " Dardanelles 
Army," under command of Lieut. -General Sir William 
Birdwood. Part of the original Headquarters Staff 
of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was now 
transferred from Imbros to the Aragon in Mudros 
harbour, where Sir Charles Monro himself fixed his 
headquarters. For there he could keep closely in 
touch with General Altham, Inspector-General, Line 
of Communications, whose energy and accurate 
organisation continued to confront the perpetual or 
increasing difficulties caused by weather, submarines, 
and the absence of wharves and piers for transferring 
all ordnance and engineering stores from one ship to 
another. General Birdwood henceforward to the last 
retained command upon the Peninsula, and to him 
the main credit for the unexpected issue of the 
following weeks is due. He and his Staff 
occupied the newly constructed headquarters at 
the foot of the hills rather more than a mile from 
the chief landing-stage at Imbros, handing over his 


command at Anzac to General Godley, as has been 

Few events varied the monotony of trench warfare. 
The mine-sweeper Hythe was sunk in collision on 
October 28 and 155 men lost, including two military 
officers. The submarine E20 was sunk in the Sea 
of Marmora early in November, Lieut-Commander 
Clyfford and nine others being rescued and made 
prisoner. On November 15 part of the 156th Brigade 
(52nd Division) captured nearly 300 yards of Turkish 
trench between the Vineyard and the Gully Ravine. 
Once or twice the Turks attempted half-hearted 
attacks both at Helles and Anzac, but were easily 
repulsed. For the rest, little was done, except 
bombing, mining, and preparing for the winter. 
Wooden beams and sheets of plate iron arrived in 
some quantity, and v/ere especially needed at Anzac. 
The beaches were, as far as possible, cleared. Stores 
which had been piled up in the gullies were removed 
to higher positions. On the left, among the Anzac 
foothills, Brigadier-General Monash ordered vast 
caverns to be excavated as sheltered barracks for his 
4th Brigade. Up at the "Apex," long subterranean 
galleries were dug clean through the crest of 
Rhododendron Ridge, so as to command the deep 
ravines between it and Battleship Hill. On one 
occasion the fumes in an exploded mine tunnel 
caused several deaths. On another, an Anzac party 
was cut off in a gallery exploded by a Turkish mine, 
but dug themselves out and reappeared over the 
parapet after three days' burial,^ 

^ See Australia in Arms, pp. 284, 285. The fate of those suffocated 
by fumes perhaps caused the rumour that the Turks used poison gas. 


To the end of November the weather remained 
fairly fine, except for heavy showers and occasional 
mists and frosts. The dust was laid, even at Helles 
and Suvla ; flies almost disappeared, and the prevail- 
ing sickness was much reduced. But on November 27 
and the following four days a natural disaster as 
deadly as a serious engagement befell the Peninsula. 
A heavy south-westerly gale brought with it a 
thunderstorm accompanied with torrents of rain, 
which poured down upon the ^gean and the 
Peninsula for nearly twenty-four hours. In half an 
hour the wind rose to a hurricane, lashing the sea to 
tempest. At Kephalos one of the ships forming a 
breakwater was sunk, and all the craft inside the little 
harbour were driven ashore. At Helles and Suvla 
the light piers and landing-stages were destroyed, 
and the shores strewn with wreck. A destroyer was 
driven ashore in Suvla Bay. At Anzac the trenches 
were filled with water, and streams roared down the 
gullies. The fate of Suvla was more terrible. Across 
a long and deep ravine leading obliquely down from 
the "whale-back" ridge of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, high 
parapets had been constructed by Turks and British 
alike. Against these parapets the water was dammed 
up, as in a reservoir. They gave way, as when a 
reservoir's embankment bursts, and the weight of 
accumulated water swept down the ravine into the 
valley, and from the valley into the Salt Lake and 
the shore, bearing with it stores and equipment, and 
mule-carts and mules and the drowning bodies of 
Turks and Britons, united in vain struggles against 

I never heard an authentic case of this, though at one time we were all 
ordered to carry gas-masks. 


the overwhelming power of nature. Along the other 
sections of the lines, the men stood miserably in the 
trenches, soaked to the skin, and in places up to their 
waists in water. 

Then, of a sudden, the wind swung round to the 

north and fell upon the wrecked and inundated scene 

with icy blast. For nearly two days and nights snow 

descended in whirling blizzards, and two days and 

nights of bitter frost succeeded the snow. The 

surface of the pools and trenches froze thick. The 

men's greatcoats, being soaked through with the rain, 

froze stiff upon them. Men staggered down from 

the lines numbed and bemused with the intensity of 

cold. They could neither hear nor speak, but stared 

about them like bewildered bullocks. The sentries 

and outposts in the advanced trenches could not pull 

the triggers of their rifles for cold. They saw the 

Turks standing up on their firing steps and gazing 

at them over the parapets, and still they did not fire. 

It was reported at the time that the General, knowing 

that the condition of the enemy was probably worse 

than ours, desired a general attack. But movement 

was hardly possible. Overcome by the common 

affliction, our men also stood up and gazed back at 

the Turks. Few can realise the suffering of those 

four days. 

As though to test their power of endurance up to 
the very last, the full weight of misery fell upon the 
29th Division, detained at Suvla since their final 
battle of August 21. Of that Division's celebrated 
battalions, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers (86th Brigade) 
suffered most, their sentries standing immovable at 
their posts until they froze to death, and being found 



afterwards watching from the parapet, rifle in hand. 
The dead in the IXth Army Corps alone numbered 
over 200. From the Peninsula about 10,000 sick 
had to be removed. Many were "frost-bitten"; 
many lost their limbs; some, their reason. It is 
probable that the Turks suffered even worse ; for 
prisoners said their men had no blankets, no covering 
at all except their thin uniforms and frozen great- 
coats. But an enemy's suffering is small consola- 
tion for one's own ; nor throughout the campaign 
was the element of vengeful hatred of the Turk 
ever one of the impelling motives among our 
fighting men, whether British, Irish, Anzac, or 

This disastrous storm, though none raged again 
with such fury, may have hastened the approach- 
ing end ; but the Cabinet's decision was probably 
taken immediately after Lord Kitchener's visit. On 
November 15, Mr. Winston Churchill, in resigning 
his office as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 

^ That little animosity existed on the Turkish side either is shown by 
the following note which I made early in December, though I cannot 
date the incident precisely : " The community of human nature between 
men who are out to kill each other was lately shown here by an interval 
of friendliness, as often in France. It began with the wagging of a 
Turkish periscope over the sandbags. One of the Australians (it was at 
Anzac) wagged his periscope in answer. Then Turkish hands were 
held up, moving the fingers together in the Turkish sign of amity. 
Presently heads appeared on both sides, the few words that could be 
understood were said, cigarettes and fruit were thrown from one side to 
the other, and a note, written in bad French, was thrown to the 
Australians, saying, ' We don't want to fight you. We want to go home. 
But we are driven on by the people you know about.' I presume that 
meant the Germans. Then signs were made that an officer was 
approaching. The heads disappeared, and bombs were thrown from 
trench to trench in place of fruit." 



— an office, it is true, which afforded little 
scope for the activity of his restless interests — 
defended his conception of the Dardanelles Ex- 
pedition in the House of Commons, and expressed 
a judgment which I believe will be the judgment 
of future time until the campaign fades from 
memory : 

" If," he said, "there were any operations in the 
history of the world which, having been begun, it 
was worth while to carry through with the utmost 
vigour and fury, with a consistent flow of reinforce- 
ments, and an utter disregard of life, it was the 
operations so daringly and brilliantly begun by 
Sir Ian Hamilton in the immortal landing of 
April 25." 

That was the natural and just lamentation over 
the decease of the fine conception of whose being 
Mr. Churchill was the author. But now nothing 
remained for it but decent burial. On November 30, 
having visited Salonika and Italy, Lord Kitchener 
returned. On December 8, Sir Charles Monro 
ordered General Birdwood to proceed with the 
evacuation of Suvla and Anzac. By him the 
whole scheme was designed, in co-operation with 
Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, who was in com- 
mand of the naval side owing to the tem- 
porary absence of Vice-Admiral de Robeck through 


To bring away an army from open beaches fully 
exposed to a resolute enemy has always been recog- 
nised as one of the most difficult military operations, 
involving risk of heavy loss if not disaster. On 
principle it is not to be undertaken except after a 


defeat of the enemy's forces. But in this case there 
could be no question of defeat, and the enemy was 
nowhere more than 300 yards distant from our front, 
and at many points no more than 10 or 20 yards. 
At Anzac and Suvla alone, rather more than 83,000 
men had to be embarked, together with nearly 5000 
horses and mules, nearly 2000 carts, about 200 guns, 
and at each place thirty days' supply at an average of 
4 lb. per man, to say nothing of engineering and 
medical stores, and all the baggage of Staffs and 

The highest estimate of the probable loss was 
50 per cent. ; the lowest (and this was the estimate 
I heard most commonly given by Staff officers just 
before the event) was 15 per cent. At Mudros pre- 
paration was made for 6000 to 10,000 wounded, and 
in case of such losses, many of the wounded must have 
been left ashore.^ 

The force of the enemy opposite Suvla and 
Anzac was roughly calculated at about 60,000, 
equally divided between the two positions, and con- 
sisting of Anatolians, Syrians, and Arabs. But, 

^ The figures for Suvla, as given me by the Staff at the time, were 
44,000 men ; 90 guns of all calibre, including one anti-aircraft gun ; 
3000 mules ; 400 horses ; 30 donkeys ; 1800 carts ; 4000 to 5000 cart- 
loads of stores. 

^ The account of the Suvla evacuation is founded on notes I made 
at the time and on an article of mine which passed the Military Censor 
two days after the event, but was not published in full till I received 
General Birdwood's permission in the following spring. It is perhaps 
worth while here contradicting the report that the Turks were bribed 
to allow the army to withdraw without opposition. That malignant 
depreciation of a most skilful enterprise was a libel both on the enemy 
and on our own officers and men. There was not a vestige of truth 
in it. 



including reserves, it was thought there were 120,000 
in all upon the Peninsula.^ 

They were engaged upon constructing new gun- 
positions with cement platforms, especially behind 
Kavak Tepe. It was reported that a battery of 
12-inch howitzers and two or three batteries of 9-inch 
guns were on their way from Germany, and the 

^ The following rough estimate of the Turkish forces was made by 
the General Staff about a week before the evacuation : 




Suvla Lines — 

Kiretch Tepe 



At foot of Kiretch Tepe 



Farther in plain 



Anafarta plain 



Farther south 



Still farther south . 



Near Scimitar Hill 



Foot of W Hill . 



Opposite Hetman Chair 



Anzac Lines — 

Opposite Kabak Kuyu . 



Opposite Hill 60 . 



Upper Asma Dere. 



Abdel Rahman Bair 



Koja Chemen Tepe 



The Farm 



Battleship Hill 



Opposite Russell's Top 



In reserve there 



Opposite Quinn's . 



German Officers' and Johnston'sl 
Jolly J 



Lone Pine 



South of Lone Pine 



Leane's Trench .... 



Extreme south to Gaba Tepe 



Three regiments were in reserve at Suvla, and three at Anzac. 
The Army Headquarters were just south of Koja Dere ; Corps Head- 
quarters in the north behind Anafarta Sagir ; in the south at Koja 
Dere. There were large camps at Ejelmer Bay and Turchen Keui 



violence of the shell-explosions upon our lines proved 
that superior ammunition had already arrived. For 
the rest, the Turks laboured continuously at deepen- 
ing or multiplying their trenches, and up to the 
final evening we watched their spades throwing the 
earth over their parapets. To keep them thus occu- 
pied in improving their time, the army and navy 
employed many ingenious devices. Men who had 
been embarked at night, or under tarpaulins by day, 
were brought back again fully exposed to view, as 
in a stage army. The Indian muleteers were ordered 
to drive their carts continuously to and fro, making 
as much dust as possible. On the final days all ranks 
were ordered to maintain the immemorial British 
custom of showing themselves upon the sky-line and 
serving their country by walking where they could 
best be observed. Both at Anzac and Suvla the 
guns also had during the last few weeks been ordered 

(a few miles inland from the bay) in the north, and at Koja Dere in 
the south. 

At Helles the numbers were then uncertain or not available, but the 
following regiments were posted opposite our lines from our left to right : 



West of Gully Ravine .... 


East of Gully Ravine . 


West of Krithia Nullah . 


East of Krithia Nullah . 


On Achi Baba Nullah . 


Between that and Kerevez Dere 


In Kerevez Dere . 


Opposite Fort Gouez 


Overlooking the Strait . 


Taking an average of 2000 per regiment, this gives a total of 18,000, 
apart from reserves ; but it is a low estimate. The Headquarters were 
at Ali Bey Farm. 


not to fire a shot during certain intervals, which some- 
times lasted three days together. At Anzac on one 
occasion, the Turks came creeping over towards our 
parapets, and even entered the galleries to see if we 
still were there ; but they were so terribly received 
with rifles and bayonets that the question of our 
intentions appeared to them settled. Prisoners and 
deserters (who continued to come in up to the last 
hour) told us that, in consequence of these simple 
artifices, the Turks were even expecting a renewed 
attack. They also spread a persistent rumour that 
the Turks themselves contemplated evacuation. This 
report was probably due to the deserter's natural 
exaggeration of his miseries ; but since the tempest 
and snow the condition of the men in the Turkish 
trenches had, no doubt, been deplorable. 

At Suvla, so soon as the order to evacuate 
arrived, our men began fortifying the points at each 
end of the bay, as positions where a last stand could 
be made. The front line extended for ii,ooo yards, 
running from the shore of the Gulf of Xeros,^ over 
the lofty " whale-back " of Kiretch Tepe Sirt at 
Jephson's Post, down the steep southern slope, across 

^ The nth Division (Major-General Fanshawe) now held the Xeros 
shore and the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. On the broad and deeply ravined 
undercliff below Jephson's Post, and even beyond it, the 32nd Brigade 
(9th West Yorks, 6th Yorkshire, 8th West Riding, and 6th York and 
Lancaster) had elaborately entrenched and fortified positions which they 
called the " Green Knoll " and " The Boot." Brigadier-General Dallas 
was justifiably proud of the work and of his Yorkshire Brigade. After 
going round the complicated trenches with me on December 11, he 
whispered sorrowfully, " Pity to leave them ! Pity to leave them ! " 
And to the last he went from man to man, adjuring one to shave, 
another to wash his shirt, and all to keep smart whatever happened. 
To such temper the difficult operation owed its success. 


the tree- covered and partly cultivated plain through 
the farms of Anafarta Ova and Sulajik, in front of 
Green and Chocolate Hill, and out into the swampy 
level of the Biyuk Anafarta valley, till it joined 
up with the Anzac lines. Fortunately, the recent 
tempest had filled the Salt Lake with water to an 
average depth of 4 feet ; so that in the centre of the 
Suvla position no further defence was required, and, 
on the right, only about 1000 yards of marshy and 
waterlogged plain had to be entrenched or covered 
by wire entanglement. The remaining positions 
were defended by three lines, wired and entrenched, 
barbed-wire gates ready to close being prepared at 
all openings of paths and roads. 

The embarkation was carried out from the north 
and south points of Suvla Bay. At the extreme end 
of the north or Suvla Point a small harbour, capable 
of receiving rafts, "beetles," and even trawlers, had 
been constructed, chiefly by the skill of the 5th 
Anglesey Company R.E. (Captain Glenn), who had 
blasted away the rock and built an oblong of low 
walls to serve as wharves. Near the narrow entrance 
of this small harbour a steamer was also run aground 
as a stage alongside of which larger transports could 
lie. Guns, horses, mules, and stores were taken off 
on rafts and " beetles " in the little harbour. The 
battalions embarked from the sunken steamer, usually 
also on "beetles" or trawlers. The 53rd Division 
went first. Of the old fighting 29th Division, the 
86th Brigade followed, getting away on the night of 
December 14-15. There remained the nth, 13th, 
and Mounted Divisions, together with the 88th 
Brigade of the 29th, and it was arranged that the 


nth Division with the 88th Brigade and one brigade 
of the 13th should leave from the north point, and 
the other two brigades of the 13th, together with 
the " mounted " forces and 500 Gurkhas of the Indian 
Brigade from Anzac, from the south or Nibrunesi 
Point, where they could embark from the C and B 
Beaches of the original landing, under cover of Lala 
Baba and the cliffs. A new pier had also been 
constructed near the point on the inside of Suvla Bay, 
fairly sheltered, though exposed to observation and 
shell-fire from " The Pimple " and that part of Kiretch 
Tape Sirt. In fact, on the very last day (December 
19), while I was at General Maude's 13th Division 
Headquarters overlooking the pier from the cliff, 
a 57-inch shell tore a large gap in the middle of it ; 
but it was rapidly repaired by the Engineers. A 
similar pier had been constructed on the far or Xeros 
side of Suvla Point, below the cliff on which General 
Byng had now fixed the IXth Army Corps Head- 
quarters. This was entirely sheltered and unobserved, 
but was only to be used for the withdrawal of the 
very last detachment. The naval part of the em- 
barkation at Suvla Point was under the direction of 
Captain Unwin, who organised and conducted it 
with the same enthusiastic, not to say explosive, 
energy which he had displayed during the landing on 
V Beach from the River Clyde. 

Night after night, and all night long, the anxious 
labour was resumed. Guns — the "heavies," the 
howitzers, and the field-guns — were drawn down to 
the harbour, and pushed or pulled with ropes upon 
the rafts. Mules and horses were brought down, but 
gradually, lest the enemy should notice the emptiness 


of the horse-lines along the point.^ Stores were 
brought down, all that might have been needed only 
for summer or for a long campaign coming first. Then 
came the men, brigade by brigade, battalion by 
battalion, mustering at definite points about half a 
mile from the harbour, and in turn filing down to the 
transports. There was no confusion, no visible ex- 
citement. Silently the men took their places, and 
moved to quiet orders. Each carried full kit with 
pick and shovel or periscope. 

As each night of the final week passed and the 
defences became weaker, the anxiety increased, 
though none was shown or mentioned. Apart from 
a general attack, danger lay in three points — the 
wind, the moon, and shelling by night. A south- 
west gale, or even a strong breeze arising in the last 
two days, would have stopped embarkation and left 
us almost defenceless. The moon was waxing, but a 
thin mist veiled it almost every night, and the half- 
obscured radiance helped to guide our men down the 
paths, and did not betray the meaning of the thin 
black lines which were just visible upon the twilit sea 
as trawlers, " beetles," and rafts slid away. The 
Turks had the beaches exactly registered. At any 
hour of the night a dozen of their heavy shells would 
have reduced the little harbour to a bloody mash of 
animals and men. On the morning of December 16 
they threw six 47-inch shells of improved bursting 

^ The management of their mules by the Indians was remarkable. 
They controlled those incalculable animals as though they were trained 
dogs. It was pathetic that the Indians mistook the name of their 
destination (Mudros) for Madras. "Do you want to go to India so 
much, then ? " an officer asked. " Does a man want to go to heaven ? " 
was the reply. 


quality right into the middle of the embarkation 
beach, but it was almost empty then, and only one 
man was hurt. In the afternoon of the 17th they 
shelled A West Beach heavily for an hour. Such 
events showed their power for our destruction, but 
the nights remained undisturbed, except by our own 
ceaseless toil. An immense blaze of stores, lighted 
accidentally at Anzac before dawn on December 18, 
increased the peril of discovery, but the Turks re- 
mained indifferent to portents. 

The last day came. It was Sunday, December 19. 
Little by little the forces at Suvla had been reduced 
to 12,000 men and 16 guns, whereas, to hold a front 
line the length of ours, SSyO^'^ ^^^ would be required 
by regulation. The day was passed as usual, each 
man doing his utmost to give a crowded appearance 
to the scene. At sunset, the guns fired their parting 
salute and were withdrawn — the last at 9.30. The 
men were then brought away — rather more than 
6000 to Suvla Point, rather less to Nibrunesi. A 
small party was left to keep up rifle-fire in the front 
trenches. Larger parties were left to hold the second 
and third lines. The rest embarked. Shortly before 
midnight the front line came in, leaving lighted 
candles which at irregular intervals burnt a string 
to discharge a rifle, so that a desultory fusilade was 
maintained for about an hour. The second and third 
lines followed in turn, only sappers remaining behind 
to close up the barbed-wire gates, to cut the tele- 
phone wires, and to set trip- and contact-mines at 
points of likely resort. A party of 200 (I think, 9th 
West Yorks) were to hold the fourth line to the last, 
and sacrifice themselves if the Turks attacked. 



Intermittent outbursts of firing came from the 
Turks, and we could hear the rumbling explosions as 
they toiled at blasting new trenches — an interesting 
example of labour lost. Once an aeroplane whirred 
overhead, invisible until she dropped one green star, 
which blazed for a few seconds just below Saturn 
and showed her to be ours. On the earth a few 
fires burned where camps were once inhabited, but 
gradually they faded out. Two lights glimmered 
from deserted hospital tents along the curving shore ; 
for our doctors had remained to the last in readiness 
for the deaths and wounds of disaster. But now 
even they had gone, leaving notes to thank the Turks 
for their consideration towards the Red Cross. 
Otherwise, only the sea and the moon showed light, 
and over the white surface of the water those thin 
black lines kept moving away. 

From the little harbour arose the varied noise of 
screaming mules, rattling anchor chains, shouting 
megaphones, engines throbbing and steamers hooting 
low. Still the Turks gave no sign of hearing, 
though they lay almost visible in the moonlight across 
that familiar scene. At last the final lines of defenders 
began silently to steal down the paths of Karakol 
Dagh. Sappers began to come in, some having just 
fired vast piles of abandoned stores — biscuits, bully- 
beef, and bacon. Officers of the beach party, which 
had accomplished such excellent and sleepless work, 
collected. At 3.30 a.m. of the 20th the defenders of 
the fourth line — about 200 in all — embarked from 
the concealed pier on the Gulf of Xeros side of the 
cliffs. And at the same time, General Byng, motion- 
ing Brigadier- General Reed, his Chief of Staff, to 


pass in front of him, left Suvla Point, being the last 
to leave. 

From Nibrunesi Point, under the direction of 
General Maude, the evacuation was accomplished in 
the same manner and with the same success. The 
whole movement involved the loss of only two men, 
and those by accident. Hospital tents remained 
standing, and some provisions were burnt. Not a 
man or gun or cart or horse was left behind. 

Those of us who had reached the Cornwallis in 
Captain Unwin's pinnace at three in the morning, 
were roused at six by bugles sounding to action 
quarters. Dawn was just breaking, as on the day 
when we landed upon that shore four and a half 
months earlier. But it was still dark except for the 
glare of flames consuming the piles of stores on Suvla 
Point and Lala Baba, and the lesser flames of a 
wrecked hospital lighter ashore by the "cut" in the 
sandy spit. By seven it was almost daylight, and the 
Turks began pouring shells into the fires to deter us 
from putting them out. With the increasing light, 
they turned all their guns on to the empty beaches, 
trenches, and especially the positions on Hill lo, where 
a battery had stood. Meantime our picket-boats had 
searched the shores, but found no stragglers, not 
even an army medical, left behind. The Turkish 
guns were then directed against the battleships, but 
they fired wildly and without effect. The Cornwallis 
answered, her big guns throwing shells upon the slope 
of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, her lesser armament destroying 
the breakwaters, piers, and little harbour, so indus- 
triously constructed. At nine o'clock she turned and 
left the long-familiar scene, passing westward towards 


the mountains of Imbros over a tranquil and sunlit 
sea. The evacuation had been hurried forward by a 
day, and fortunate indeed was that anticipation. By 
nine o'clock next morning a south-west gale was 
raging, rain fell in deluge, and the sea roared upon the 
coast. What if the movement had been delayed for 
those few hours more ? 

At Anzac the withdrawal was carried out with 
equal daring and skill. The problem was slightly 
different, for the position extended in an irregular 
fan-shape, the centre being very short (only about 
500 yards in direct line from the Nek to the Cove) 
but stretching northward on the left for rather over 
3 miles to Hill 60 and the Biyuk Anafarta plain ; and 
southward on the right for about i| miles to Chatham 
Post. The flanks had therefore to be brought in 
first, and no interior defences were made except a 
strong redoubt as a kind of "keep" within the Cove 
itself. It is probable that the withdrawal of the left 
flank, where the ground is comparatively open, could 
not have escaped observation but for the supposed 
presence of a large force at Suvla, and, in that sense, 
Suvla may be said to have been the salvation of 
Anzac. The embarkation was carried out partly 
from the new pier on Ocean Beach north of Ari 
Burnu, partly from the repaired piers in the Cove. 

Of the 40,000 at Anzac, about 20,000 had been 
gradually taken off to Mudros by December 18. 
That night over 10,000 more were sent away. All 
but nine worn-out guns had gone, two being left close 
up to the firing line, where they had been stationed 
from the first. Aeroplanes kept watch all day, five 
being at times up together — a large number for Galli- 


poll — and no hostile plane was allowed to approach. 
On the morning of Sunday, 19th, the few guns kept 
up a brave show of bombardment, the Turks answer- 
ing with their increased number of guns, no less than 
seventeen of which were now posted in the Olive 
Grove, commanding the main beach of embarkation. 
As at Suvla, the few remaining men (about 10,000 in 
all) were directed to show themselves freely, and 
many spent the morning in tending for the last time 
the graves of the 8000 comrades who there lay 

The 6000 stationed in the afternoon to guard the 
outer lines were divided into three groups — A, B, 
and C — of 2000 each, and there arose a violent com- 
petition to belong to the C group, known as " Die- 
hards," because they were to be the last to leave. 
Group A came from the northern positions and in- 
cluded parties of the ist and 3rd Light Horse 
Brigades, the 4th Australian Brigade, and the New 
Zealand Mounted Rifles with the Maoris (from 
Hill 60). They marched in absolute silence, maga- 
zines empty, no smoking allowed, footsteps deadened 
by sacking spread over the hard patches of ground 
and over the planks. By ten o'clock they had all 
embarked from Ocean Beach. At midnight Group B 
gathered in the Cove. Among them were New 
Zealand Infantry from the heights of Sari Bair, 20th 
Infantry from the Nek, 17th Infantry from Quinn's, 
23rd and 24th from Lone Pine, 6th Light Horse from 
Chatham's Post far on the right. Thus the veteran 
I St Australian Division of the Landing was now 
mingled with the 2nd Division, sent to uphold them 
and give them some opportunity for relief. Descend- 


ing the diverse gullies from the fan-like extremities, 
each position bearing so fine a record during the eight 
months of struggle and endurance, they concentrated 
punctually and without confusion. The Navy held 
the transports ready, and they went. 

Only 2000 men now remained to guard the long 
and devious lines from Chatham's Post to the Apex 
and the Farm. About 1.30 a.m. of Monday the 20th, 
a bomb thrown from the "Apex" marked the aban- 
donment of that hard-won and hard-held position. 
Thence New Zealanders came down : from Courtney's 
and Pope's, i8th and 19th Infantry; from Quinn's, 
the 17th. By 3 a.m. only 800 " Die-hards" were left 
in groups at points where the Turkish lines came 
within a few yards' distance. By 3.30, Lone Pine, 
Quinn's, and Pope's were finally abandoned, and 
Anzacs rushed down White's Valley and Shrapnel 
Gully for the last time. As they reached the Cove, 
a violent explosion, which seemed to shake even the 
ships at Suvla, thundered from the heights. Three 
and a half tons of amenol, laid by the 5th Company 
Australian Engineers, had blown a great chasm across 
the Nek, and that ready entrance to the deserted 
lines was blocked as by a moat and rampart. Rifles 
continued to fire from the old positions — fired by sand 
running from buckets. The Turks burst into one of 
their panic rages of fire against the empty trenches, 
from which they now expected a general assault. 
The naval guns pounded the hills. The last of the 
transports departed, and Anzac shore was nothing but 
a lasting name. 

A few stragglers were taken off by picket-boats in 
the early morning. A few guns — four i8-pounders, 


two 5-inch howitzers, one 47 naval gun (said to have 
been in Lady smith, and, in that case, called the 
"Lady Anne" or the ''Bloody Mary"), one anti- 
aircraft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns had to be 
left, but were disabled. Some carts without wheels, 
and fifty-six mules were also left, and some stores 
burnt. The execution of the whole movement con- 
ferred just honour upon Major-General Sir Alexander 
Godley and Brigadier-General Cyril B. B. White, his 
Chief of Staff, not to mention other names well 
worthy of mention, and now regretfully to be parted 

Even after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac, 
many hoped that Helles at least would be retained as 
a perpetual threat to the heart of the Turkish Empire. 
But being by this time deeply entangled at Salonika, 
where the French and English forces had lately been 
driven back from the edges of Serbia across the Greek 
frontier, the Cabinet resolved to wipe out the Dar- 
danelles Expedition, as a gambler "cuts his losses," 
and leave no trace or profit of all the army's incom- 
parable deeds. Certainly, it would have been difficult 
to remain at Helles now that heavy guns were being 
brought down from Suvla and Anzac ; superior 
German shells had arrived, and German guns were 

^ Beside my personal observation during visits from Suvla in the 
final days, my chief authorities upon the Anzac evacuation are Phillip 
Schuler's Australia in Arms, an officer's diary in the " Majtchester 
Guardian's" History of the War, Part 43, p. 187; Sir Charles 
Monro's dispatch ; and conversation with men who were present. A 
German correspondent with the Turks on the night of the evacuation 
wrote in the Vossische Zeitung of January 21, 1916 : " So long as wars 
exist, the British evacuation of the Ari Burnu and Anafarta fronts will 
stand before the eyes of all strategists of retreat as a hitherto quite 
unattained masterpiece." 


on the way. Throughout the end of December the 
bombardment was at times very violent, reaching 
extreme intensity about i p.m. on December 24, 
when the right and centre of our line, from the front 
trenches to the sea, suffered the severest shelling 
experienced at Helles.^ With the help of the 
Navy, and by the construction of deeper trenches 
and solid shelter, it might have been possible to hold 
the position as a kind of Gibraltar guarding the 
Straits. But Imbros and Tenedos, for a naval Power, 
served that purpose with less risk, and since the 
glorious hope of advancing upon Constantinople was 
definitely abandoned, it was argued best to quit Helles 
and the whole Peninsula. 

On Christmas Eve, General Birdwood was 
directed to prepare a scheme ; four days later to 
complete the evacuation as quickly as possible.^ The 
problem was to bring away unnoticed rather more 
than 35,000 men, about 4000 animals, about no guns, 
and over 1000 tons of stores. Most of the remaining 
French Division had been gradually withdrawn dur- 
ing December, and the 4000 left at the end of the 
year were embarked on French warships during the 
night of January 1-2. By consent of General Brulard, 
however, the French guns were left under command 
of General Davies with the Vlllth Corps. The 
French lines were taken over by the Royal Naval 

^ A dilatory and whispering 6-inch shell, thrown from a black-powder 
battery north of Troy, was called "Creeping Caroline" by our men. 
Similarly the French called one particular shell '• Marie pressee " — no 
doubt a " high velocity." 

2 On December 30 Sir Charles Monro handed over his command to 
General Sir Archibald Murray and left Mudros for Alexandria on his 
way back to France. 


Division — that military maid - of - all - work. Some 
have said that the soldier - sailors were dressed in 
French grey to deceive such of the enemy as could 
not hear or understand their language ; but this 
was untrue. 

The 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, which had 
throughout done such steady and persistent work 
under Major-General Douglas, was withdrawn for a 
much-needed rest,^ and the 13th (Major- General 
Stanley Maude), having been at Imbros since the 
Suvla evacuation, was transferred to Helles. The 
redoubtable 29th Division was also sent back to the 
scene of its early triumphs. The troops to go at the 
last belonged, therefore, to the 13th, 29th, 52nd, and 
Royal Naval Divisions. 

During the days of preparation, little happened to 
break the appearance of routine. Almost the last 
assault from our side had been made on December 1 9, 
when, simply to distract attention from the evacuation 
in the north, parts of the 42nd and 52nd Divisions at- 
tacked beside the Krithia Nullah, and the 5th High- 
land Light Infantry (157th Brigade) especially distin- 
guished themselves. Sir Charles Monro also mentions 
a successful attack by the 52nd Division on Decem- 

^ Shortly before it left, a deed of singular heroism added honour to 
the 42nd Division. On December 22, in front of Krithia, Second Lieut. 
Alfred Victor Smith (5th East Lancashire, 126th Brigade), only son of 
the Chief Constable of Burnley, was throwing a grenade when it slipped 
from his hand and fell to the bottom of the trench, close to several 
officers and men. He shouted a warning, and jumped clear into safety. 
But seeing that the others were unable to get into cover, and knowing 
the grenade was due to explode, he returned without hesitation and 
flung himself down on it. He was instantly killed by the explosion. 
See the London Gazette announcing that the Victoria Cross had been 
conferred on him after death. 


ber 29. But, for the most part, on our side we be- 
guiled the Turk by periods of complete silence, 
especially between 8 p.m. and 2 a.m., so as to 
habituate him to inattentive repose. For the last 
days, one British 6-inch gun and six old-fashioned 
French " heavies " alone were retained, to give a 
semblance of active hostility. On January 7, however, 
the very day before our departure, the enemy, possessed 
by one of his unaccountable moods, directed a 
terrible bombardment against the 13th Division on 
our left from Achi Baba, and a slighter fire against 
the R.N.D. on our right from Asia. It lasted all 
afternoon, and at 3.30 the Turks attempted an attack 
near Fusilier Bluff, between Gully Ravine and the sea. 
Officers were seen urging the men forward as in 
earlier days ; but the men had no longer the spirit of 
earlier days, and since they were disinclined to move, 
the attack faded away. Fortunately, our want of 
artillery was compensated by a naval squadron off 
the west coast. None the less, we lost a hundred 
and six wounded and fifty - eight killed — the last 
to lay their bones upon the earth of that dedicated 
Peninsula. The 7th North Staffords were chiefly 

Next morning (January 8) rose fair, with a light 
southerly breeze. The Turks kept unusually quiet, 
and it was resolved to accomplish the evacuation 
as arranged. Major-General Lawrence (CO. 52nd 
Division) had been put in charge of the embarkation 
on the military side. Positions on all the beaches 
were fortified as redoubts for a small garrison to hold 
to the last. On Gully Beach, Major-General Maude 
selected the position and prepared the evacuation of 


his 13th Division. Specially selected officers super- 
intended the W and V Beaches. The naval arrange- 
ments were carried out by Captain C. M. Staveley, 
R.N., assisted by naval officers at each point of 
embarkation. In addition to the three strongly 
wired lines of defence across the Peninsula, a fourth 
had been constructed from Gully Beach to De 
Tott's Battery. Troops on the left naturally with- 
drew from Gully Beach or W (four piers) ; on the 
right from V Beach (three piers and the River 

On the afternoon of the final day the Divisions 
had only four battalions apiece remaining upon the 
Peninsula. They came away in three groups or trips, 
the first withdrawing soon after 7 p.m. and getting off 
in destroyers and " bettles " without difficulty. But at 
sunset the breeze freshened, and it began to blow 
hard from the south-west, the quarter to which W 
Beach was most exposed. The connecting platform 
between the shore and the hulks which served as 
wharves there was washed away by heavy seas. 
Still, the second group, and even guns, were safely 
taken off about midnight. On V Beach, while the 
second group was waiting at eleven o'clock, the 
Asiatic guns began to bombard, but fortunately all 
but two shells fell short into the sea, and only one 
man was wounded. Hardly, however, had fifty of 
the R.N.D. put off to the Prince George in a 
"beetle" at 11.30 and got under way for Mudros 
with 1500 others, when they felt the dull thud of a 
torpedo against the vessel's side. The torpedo did 
not explode, but the presence of the submarine, 
known to the navy all the evening, added to the 


anxiety of the final hours. Starting from Gully- 
Beach, a lighter also went aground after all had left, 
and the 160 men had to be landed again and 
marched over to W Beach for embarkation. 

At 11.30 the final party or rearguard — about 
sixty men from each Division — withdrew from the 
front lines. With bombs and rifle-fire they had kept 
up as much noise as they could to conceal the move- 
ment of the rest. Now, leaving lights and devices 
by which dropping water filled tins and discharged 
rifles when the tins were full, they crept away under 
cover of officers' patrols, who maintained a desultory 
fire, barred the gates, and connected the mines. 
About 2.30 all arrived at the beaches, to find a 
heavy surf dashing upon the shore. Nevertheless, 
though under great stress and peril, by 3.30 the 
beaches were cleared. The Military Transport 
Officer, coming off the River Clyde, was the last 
man to leave. Time fuses lighted the heaps of aban- 
doned stores, and exploded masses of ammunition. 
In all, fourteen of our well-worn old 15-pounders, a 
6-inch gun, and the six old French "heavies" were 
abandoned and destroyed. Far worse was the fate 
of 508 horses and mules, most of which were killed. 
All animals and stores might have been embarked, 
had it been safe to wait. But the rising storm of 
that night was a warning, and, as at Suvla, only by 
the barest luck in weather was disaster avoided. The 
Turks began shelling the beaches at the first sight of 
the fires, and continued that unprofitable expenditure 
till 6.30 a.m. of January 9. At Helles, as at Suvla 
and Anzac, those incalculable Orientals remained 
ignorant of our departure, though here expecting it. 



No doubt they were glad at our going ; naturally, 
they were glad. And so, by the evacuation, our 
authorities, whether political or military, were 
acting contrary to Napoleon's maxim of war : 
" Never do what you know your enemy wants you 
to do." 

So the episode of the Dardanelles Expedition, 
equal in splendour of conception, heroism, and 
tragedy, came to an end. During the eight and a 
half months of its continuance upon the Peninsula 
itself, the land forces, including the Royal Naval 
Division, but not counting the Navy or the French 
(whose losses are not published), suffered the following 
loss : 





Officers . . . 1,745 
Other ranks . . 26,455 






Totals . 28,200 


A large proportion of the missing must be counted 
as killed. The number of sick admitted to hospital 
between April 25 and December 11, 19 15, was 
96,683, of whom also a considerable proportion died. 
If we may take about one-quarter of the missing as 
killed, and about one-twentieth of the sick as having 
died, the total of lives lost amounts to about 36,000. 
The total losses of the Turks have been variously 
estimated between 400,000 and 500,000, but those 
estimates are conjectural. 

The causes of our failure have been, as I hope. 


reasonably signified in the preceding account of the 
campaign. They may be summarised in relation either 
to the movements on the spot, or to the attitude of 
the home Government. On the spot, we failed chiefly 
owing to the premature naval attacks, which gave 
the enemy warning of our intention, and owing to the 
design of forcing the Straits with the Navy alone, 
which might indeed have been temporarily successful 
if persisted in, but in the end would have given us 
only a dubious advantage ; for a fleet penetrating to 
the Sea of Marmora would have remained danger- 
ously isolated so long as both sides of the Straits 
were strongly held by the enemy. The second initial 
error was the delay in concentrating the military 
forces for the land attack — a delay chiefly due to the 
retention of the 29th Division in England, and to the 
necessity of returning the transports from Mudros to 
Alexandria for the rearrangement of the military 
stores and munitions. As to the actual operations on 
land, it might be argued, in the light of wisdom after 
the event, that the first landing had better have been 
made by a combined force at Suvla Bay and on the 
Ocean Beach at Anzac, though, in that case, larger 
numbers than those allotted to the Expedition at the 
beginning must have been demanded. Again, with 
regard to the failure of the August operations, it 
might now be maintained that the forces at Anzac 
were dissipated by the assaults at Lone Pine and the 
Nek, and by the over-elaborate subdivision of the 
attacking forces upon our left. Even in spite of the 
natural intricacy of the ground, a concentration of all 
available troops into one main body (or at most into 
two) for a grand assault upon the Sari Bair range 


from Chunuk Bair to Koja Chemen Tepe might have 
given better results. As to the " inertia " which 
prevailed at Suvla on the critical day of August 8, 
and the confusion, delay, and fatal mistakes of the 
preceding and following days, thus precluding the 
support to the Anzac movement upon which the 
Commander-in-Chief had fairly calculated, no more 
need be said. Owing partly to the temperament of 
Generals, partly to the inexperience of their Staffs, 
and perhaps chiefly to the want of confidence between 
the poorly trained troops and their senior officers, the 
instrument to which he trusted broke in his hand. 

The ultimate burden of failure, however, lies on 
the authorities at home. The Allies were presented 
with the most brilliant and promising strategical 
conception of the war up to the present time (spring, 
19 1 8). Success would have given them advantages 
already repeatedly enumerated : a passage would 
have been opened for the supply of grain from 
Russia, and a supply of munitions to that country ; 
the enemy's hope of advancing either towards Egypt 
or the Persian Gulf would have been frustrated ; the 
Balkan States would, at worst, have remained neutral, 
or, calculating on future favours, would have joined 
our Alliance in hurried gratitude ; Venizelos would 
have remained in power, and King Constantine's 
military and domestic predilections have been sup- 
pressed ; the belated attempt to rescue Serbia after 
her destruction was assured would not have been 
required ; Tsar Ferdinand would have scented his 
own advantage on the side of Bulgaria's natural 
sympathies ; Roumania, relieved from apprehension 
on her southern frontier, could have watched the 


Transylvanian passes or crossed them at pleasure ; 
Russia might possibly have retained her front lines 
intact, and, at the worst, would have immobilised large 
armies of the enemy. The Central Powers would 
then indeed have been surrounded with an "iron 
ring," and peace secured in the spring of 19 16. 
The main disadvantages of such a peace to the 
world would have been the probable occupation of 
Constantinople by Russia, the fortification of the 
Straits in her interest, and the continuance in 
power of the autocratic Tsardom, surrounded by 
its attendant supporters in bureaucrats, secret police, 
provocative agents, censors of public opinion, and all 
the other instruments of political and religious tyranny. 
At that time the future of Russia could not be 
foretold, any more than it can be foretold now. But 
the advantages here recapitulated should have been 
too obvious even for insular statesmen to overlook. 
Mr. Winston Churchill was justified in the protest 
already quoted, that "if there were any operations 
in the history of the world which, having been begun, 
it was worth while to carry through with the utmost 
vigour and fury," it was those. Far from displaying 
vigour, let alone fury, the Government appears to 
have regarded the Expedition rather as an over- 
burdened father regards an illegitimate child put out 
to nurse in a distant village. It was a "by-blow," 
a " side-show," something apart from the normal and 
recognised order of things. A certain allowance had, 
unfortunately, to be apportioned for it, but if the 
person who superintended its welfare clamoured for 
more, that person must be kept in the proper place, 
or palmed off with gifts that were no gifts. Every 


breath of suspicion or detraction must be listened to, 
every chance of abandonment welcomed, and the 
news of a peaceful ending accepted with a sigh of 

For myself, in coming to the conclusion of this 
account — faithful as far as I could make it, but so 
inadequate to the tragic splendour of the theme — I 
feel again a mingled admiration and poignant sorrow, 
as when for the last time I watched the scene from 
the battered deck of the River Clyde and, under the 
dying brilliance of sunset, looked across the purple 
current of the Dardanelles to those deserted plains 
which long ago also rang with tragic battle. The 
time is fast approaching when the deserted Penin- 
sula of Gallipoli looking across to Troy will be 
haunted by kindred memories. There the many men 
so beautiful had their habitation. There they knew 
the finest human joy — the joy of active companion- 
ship in a cause which they accounted noble. There 
they faced the utmost suffering of hardship and pain, 
the utmost terrors of death, and there they endured 
separation from those whom they most loved. The 
crowded caverns in which they made their dwelling- 
place are already falling in, except where some 
shepherd uses a Headquarters as more weatherproof 
than his hut, or as a sheltered pen for sheep. The 
trenches which they dug and held to the death have 
crumbled into furrows, covered with grass and flowers, 
or with crops more fertile for so deep a ploughing. 
The graves are obliterated, and the scattered bones 
that cost so much in the breeding have returned to 
earth. But in our history the Peninsula of the 
Dardanelles, the Straits, the surrounding seas, and 



the islands set among them will always remain as 
memorials recording, it is true, the disastrous and 
tragic disabilities of our race, but, on the other hand, 
its versatility, its fortitude, and its happy though 
silent welcome to any free sacrifice involving great 
issues for mankind. 


(I ai/i indebted io Mrs. E. 

M. White_/»^ undertaking the difficult task of this 
Index.— Yl. W. N.) 

A Beach (true), 299, 301, 304 and n., 358, 

A East Beach, 299, 304, 325 and n. 

A West Beach, 299, 304, 325 and n. 

Abdel Rahman Bair, 252, 265, 268, 269, 283. 

Abdul Hamid, 2, 144 and n, 

Abrikja, 317, 323-4. 

Achi Baba, situation of, 79; enemy shelHng 

from, 132, 171, 197, 403 ; strength of 

position, 170 «., 220. 
Achmet, 257. 

Adana massacres, 99, 128 n. 
Adramyti Bay, 222, 362. 
Adrianople, 55. 
Aeroplanes — British, 167, 218-19, 397 ; 

enemy, 308. 
African troops, 136, 147, 149, 151, 175. 
Agatnemnon, 48-9, 51-3, 59, 91. 
Aghyl Dere, 250, 251, 255, 262, 263, 355. 
Agnew, Lt.-Col. , 349. 
Aire Kavak, 341. 
Albion, 49, 52, 53, 60, 94, 99. 
Alexandria, transports reloaded at, 69-70, 

Allanson, Maj. Cecil G. L., 272-6. 
Altham, Maj. -Gen., 212, 381. 
Avuthyst, 49, 108, 109. 
Ammunition, shortage of, 133, 148, 171, 

181, 182, 185, 192, 193, 194 «., 200, 

219, 229. 
Anafarta Biyuk, 114, 251, 269, 286, 287, 

335 ; entrenched by Turks, 339. 
Anafarta Hills, shelling from, 197. 
Anafarta Ova, 291, 327. 
Anafarta plateau, Turkish guns on, 340. 
Anafarta Sagir— situation of, 287, 288 ; 

Moore's patrol on outskirts of (8 Aug.), 

317 ; Turkish headquarters at, 388 n. 
" Anafartas, the," 263. 
" Andarti," 225 and n. 
Antwerp, R.N.D. at, 24, 148, 203. 
Anzac Cove — conformation of, 110-12; 

storming of (25 April), iii ff. ; danger 

of, from shelling, 196. 
Anzacs. See Australian and New Zealand 

Army Corps. 
Apex, the, situation of, 261, 360-1 ; 

Anzac occupation of, 261, 270 ; sub- 
terranean galleries made at, 382 ; 

abandonment of (Dec), 399. 

Aragon — reputation of, 211-12 and n, ; 
Kitchener's entourage on, 379 ; 
Monro's H.Q. on, 381. 
Arcadian, 80, 148, 166. 
Ari Burnu, 112, 113, 250; pier at, 371. 
Ark Royal, 49, 218. 
Armstrong, Lt.-Col. J. C, 8r. 
Arno, 315. 
Art of war, 189. 
Artillery : 

Inferiority of, 181. 

Loans from the French, 134, 184, 401. 
Shortage of, 148, 171, 181, 184, 192, 193, 
194 7Z., 219, 228, 229, 339, 361 ; no anti- 
aircraft guns till winter, 219, 400. 
Askold, 88, 120. 

Asma Dere, 251-2, 263-4, 268-70. 
Asmak Dere, 251. 
Aspinall, Lt.-Col, 315, 316. 
Aspinall, Capt. C. F., 81. 
Asquith, Arthur, 149 n. 
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., War Minister, 
16-17 ! agrees to Churchill's plan, 34-5 ; 
encourages Italy's entry, 56 ; the 
Coalition Ministry, 170 ; estimate of, 
19-21 ; quoted on position of experts, 
28 ; cited, 376. 
Aster, 295-6, igjn, 

Athenian expedition to Sicily, 88-9 and n. 
Atrocities, 98. 

Augagneur, M., cited, 35 n. 2. 
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps : 
Casualties of — 25-6 April, 127 ; 2 May, 
139 ; 4-5 June, 190 ; Lone Pine, 240 ; 
6-10 Aug., 283; of 4th Austr. Brig. 
(8 Aug.), 270. 
Characteristics of, 72-3, 
Egypt, in, 70-1. 

Engagements fought by — 2 May, 138 
advance on Krithia (8 May), 155-6 
19 May, 161-2 ; 4 and 28 June, 188 ff. . 
Lone Pine (6-9 Aug.), 231-41 ; Sari 
Bair, 253 ff. 
Evacuation of, 397-400 and n. 
Godlcy's tribute to, 284. 
Kitchener's visit to, 380. 
Landing of (25 April), 113 ff. ; objects, 

79 ; brigades confused, 124, 125. 
Officers of, list of, 82-3. 



Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 
continued — 
Quarters of, 117-18, 125 ; extension of, 

by 7-10 Aug. fighting, 285. 
Turkish troops opposite (Dec), 388 «. 
Units of, 83, 154 n. 2, 352 n. i. 
Withdrawn by battalions to Mudros, 355. 
ist Australian Division : 

ist (N.S. Wales) Infantry Brigade — 
landing of, 116 ; Lone Pine, 233- 
2nd (Victoria) Infantry Brigade — 
units of, 154 n, 2 ; landing of, 116 ; 
at Helles, 147, 153, 233 ; Lone 
Pine (8-9 Aug. ), 240 ; the Nek 
(7 Aug. ), 241. 
3rd (Australia) Infantry Brigade : 
9th (Queensland) Batt., 115, 190-1. 
loth (S. Austr.) Batt., 115. 
nth (W. Austr.) Batt., 231. 
i2th (S. Austr, , W. Austr., and Tas.) 
Batt., 239. 
New Zealand and Australian Division : 
Officers' reconnaissances, 249. 
Reserve (May), 147. 
Sari Bair, 253. 
Machine-Gun Section, 280. 
New Zealand Mounted Infantry 
Brigade — fighting at the Nek 
(30 June), 191 ; Sari Bair, 254 ff. ; 
evacuation, 398. 
Auckland Regiment — Sari Bair, 
257, 265, 266, 277-8 ; Hill 60 
attack (27 Aug.), 353. 
Canterbury Regt. — Sari Bair, 258 ; 
Hill 60 attack (21 Aug.), 349 ; 
(27 Aug.), 353. 
Otago Regt. — Hill 60 attack (21 

Aug.), 349; (27 Aug.), 353. 
WeUington Regt., 353. 
ist Austrahan Lt. Horse Brigade — 
evacuation of, 398. 
ist N.S. Wales Regt., 242-3. 
2nd Queensland Regt., 242. 
New Zealand Infantry Brigade — units 
of, 83, 154 «. I ; landing of, 116; 
at Helles, 147, 153. 
Auckland Batt. — occupies Plugge's 
Plateau, 116 ; Sari Bair, 254, 
260-1 ; on Rhododendron Nek 
(7 Aug.), 264. 
Canterbury Batt., 254, 260-1. 
Otago Batt. — " Baby 700," 139 ; 

Sari Bair, 254, 260 and n. 2, 261. 
Wellington Batt. — Sari Bair, 254, 
260-1, 266, 277-8. 
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade — 
landing of, 116 ; " Baby 700," 139 ; 
Sari Bair, 255, 262, 283 ; Hill 60 
attack (21 Aug.), 348-9, 351 ; 
evacuation of, 398. 
All Battalions of, in Sari Bair assault, 
Otago Mounted Rifles Regt., 254, 256, 

Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 
continued — 
2nd Australian Lt. Horse Brigade, 84 ; 

6th Regt., 398. 
3rd Australian Lt. Horse Brigade, 84 ; 
evacuadon of, 398. 
8th (Victorian) Regt., 244. 
9th Regt., 354. 

loth (W. Australian) Regt., 244, 354. 
2nd Australian Division : 

Arrival of, 355 and n. ; of 18th Batt., 

Composition of, 338 n. i. 
Infection of, with dysentery, 357. 
i8th Batt., 352, 353. 
Australian Engineers — sth Company, 

Bridging Train, 325 n. 
Maori Contingent, 254, 256, 258, 265, 

268, 353, 398. 
New Zealand Engineers, 254, 255, 259. 

B Beach, 299, 304-5, 392. 
" Baby 700," 138, 244. 
Bacchante, in, 116, 125. 213, 234. 
Backhouse, Commodore O., 84, 137. 
Bagdad railway, 3-4, 6. 
Bailloud, G6n., 152-3, 193, 366. 
Baka Baba, 288. 

Baldwin, Brig.-Gen. A. H., blunder of, 

(8-9 Aug.), 270-1 ; belated arrival and 

retreat, 277 ; killed, 281 ; mentioned, 

204, 216 n, 2. 

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., 15, 35, 170 ; 

cited, 28. 
Balkan races, German attitude to, 3. 
Balkan States, forces available in, 365. 
Balloons ("Silver Babies "), 219. 
Barrage, 159, 173. 
Bartlett, Ashmead, 170 «. ; cited, 119; 

quoted, 186 n. 
Basrah, British seizure of, 12. 
Battleship Hill, 247, 261, 264. 
Battles (after the landings phase) — 6 May, 
147 ff. ; 8 May — advance on Krithia, 
155-6 ; ig May, 161 ff. ; 4 June, 172 ff. ; 
28 June, 182 ff. ; 12 July, 199 ff. ; 6 
Aug. — feints at Helles, 227 ff. ; at 
Anzac, 231 ff. ; 6-10 Aug. — Sari Bair, 
253 ff. ; 6-12 Aug. — Suvla Bay, 295 ff, ; 
15 Aug., 329-32 ; 20-21 Aug. — Scimitar 
Hill, 339 ff. ; Kaiajik Aghala, 348 ff. ; 
27-28 Aug., 353-4 ; 19 Dec, — Krithia 
Nullah, 402; 7 Jan., 403. 
Bauchop, Lt.-Col. A., 206, 259. 
Bauchop's Hill, 251, 254, 256, 259, 262. 
Baumann, Gdn., 84. 

Bean, Capt. C. E, W., photographs taken 
by, xiii ; assistance from, 119 w.; 
quoted, 234 «, 2, 238, 264, 282; cited, 
351 n. 
Bean, Capt. J. W., 237. 
Beauchamp, Col. Sir Horace, 327-8. 
" Beetles," 215-16, 295, 300. 
Bennett, Col., 241. 



Besika Bay, French feint at, 120-1. 

Bibliography, xiii-xiv. 

Binns, Capt. , 225. 

Birdwood, Lt.-Gen. Sir W. R. , criticism 
by, of Garden's scheme— telegram of 
5 March, 44, 55 ; advises immediate 
landing (22 March), 63 ; quarters of, 
210 ; eulogy by, of Left Assaulting 
Column at Sari Bair, 264 ; huiries up 
reserves ( 10 Aug. ), 282 ; supersedes 
Hamilton, 372 ; Special Order on 
Kitchener's visit, 380 ; in command of 
"Dardanelles Army" (Nov.), 381; 
ordered to evacuate (8 Dec), 386; 
scheme for Helles evacuation, 401 ; 
estimate of, 374 ; mentioned, xii, 70, 
82, 90, 118, 207, 253, 279, 322. 

Bin-ell, Surgeon-Gen. W. E., 81, 141. 

Biyuk Anafarta. See Anafarta Biyuk. 

Biyuk Kemiklo. See Suvla Point. 

" Blister ships," 215, 295. 

Boghali, 115, 118, 

Bolton, Lt.-Col., 154 n. 2. 

Bolton's Hill, 125. 

Bombardments — of 3 Nov. 1914, i, 29 and 
n. 2 ; of 18 Feb, 1915, 50-1 ; of 25 
Feb., 51-2 ; of 4 March, 52 ; of 6 March, 
53 ; of S and 7 Mar., 53, 54 ; political 
effects of Feb. and March bombard- 
ments, 55-6 ; ineffectiveness of bom- 
bardments throughout the campaign, 

340. 353. 
Boomerang, the, 184. 
Boot, the, 390 n. 
Bordeaux, Lt.-Col., 153 «. 
Bourne, Lt., 242. 
Bouvet, 49, 50, 60-1. 
Bouyssou, Capt., 84. 

Bowman-Manifold, Lt.-Col. M. G. E., 81. 
Boyle, Capt. the Hon. A., xii. 
Braithwaite, Maj.-Gen. W, F., 70, 81, 162, 

328, 371. 
Braithwaite, Lt.-Col. W. G., 83. 
Brand, Major, 115. 
Brandreth, Major, 178. 
Branet, Lt.-Col., 84. 
Breslau, 8-9 and n. 
Bridges, Maj.-Gen. W. T., 70, 71, 83, 138 ; 

death and estimate of, 160. 
Brighton Beach, 231. 
British troops in the campaign : 
Officers, shortage of, 336, 338 «., 376. 
Positions of (6 Aug.), 225. 
Strength of (early Aug.), 219 ; (mid Aug.), 
Vlllth Army Corps {see also, for its com- 
ponents, various Divisions under 
British troops) : 
Composition of, 156, 172, 219. 
French guns left with, 401. 
Hunter-Weston succeeded by Stop- 
ford and later Davies in command 
of, 200-1, 292. 
Organisation of, with French into four 
sections, 159. 

British troops in the campaign, continued — 
IXth Army Corps {see also, for its com- 
ponents, various Divisions under 
British troops) : 

Blizzard casualties (Nov.), 385. 

Composition of, 219, 293. 

De Lisle succeeds Stopford in com- 
mand of (15 Aug.), 332. 

Godley's tribute to, 284. 

Gun shortage of, 294, 339. 

Intelligence and Staff work of, bad, 
316-17, 318. 

Reorganisation of, ordered (13 Aug.), 

loth (Irish) Division : 
Arrival of, from Mitylene and landing 
(7 Aug.), 303-4; split up into 
three, 304 ; only two Brigades 
under Stopford, 293 ; task for, 
Composition of, 217 w. 2. 
Guns attached to, 296 «., 361. 
Quality of, 366. 
Salonika, transfer to, 366-7. 
29th Brigade — at Anzac, 225, 293. 
loth Hampshires — Hill Q, 270 ; on 

21 Aug., 349. 
6th Royal Irish Rifles, 270. 
5th Connaught Rangers — at Saif- 
Bair (10 Aug.), 282 ; fighting or 
21 Aug., 349-50 and «. ; with- 
drawn for rest, 352 ; attack of 27 
Aug., 353-4. 
30th Brigade — arrival of, from Mity- 
lene and Mudros, 295 ; attack 
along Kiretch Tepe Sirt (15-17 
Aug.), 329-31 ; withdrawn to rest, 
338 n. 2. 
6th Munster Fusiliers — capture Jeph 
son's Post (7 Aug.), 310 ; storm 
the Pimple (15 Aug.), 330-1. 
7th Munster Fusiliers, 310. 
6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers — with 
Brig. -Gen. F. F. Hill, 295 ; ad- 
vance on Chocolate Hill (7 Aug.), 
306-9 ; storm the Pimple (15 
Aug.), 330-1. 
7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers — with 
Brig. -Gen. F. F. Hill, 295; ad- 
vance on Chocolate Hill, 306-9. 
31st Brigade — arrival from Mitylene, 
295 ; withdrawn from Green Hill 
(10 Aug. ), 324 ; attack on Kiretch 
Tepe Sirt (15-17 Aug.), 329 ; 
Lt.-Col. King-King in command 
of, 332; withdrawn to rest (17 
Aug.), 338 n. 2. 
5th Inniskilling Fusihers — landed at 
Suvla Point, 304 : with Mahon 
(7 Aug.), 310; on Kiretch Tepe 
Sirt (15-17 Aug.), 330. 
6th Inniskilling Fusiliers — advance 
on Chocolate Hill (7 Aug.), 306-9 ; 
(8 Aug.), 319; on Kiretch Tepe 
Sirt (15-17 Aug.), 330. 



British troops in the campaign, continued — 
ioth( Irish) Division, continued — 
31st Brigade, cotitinued — 
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers — advance 
on Chocolate Hill (7 Aug.), 306-9 ; 
(8 Aug.), 319; almost extermin- 
ated, 331. 
6th Royal Irish Fusiliers — advance 
on Chocolate Hill (7 Aug.), 306-9 ; 
(8 Aug.), 319; almost extermin- 
ated, 331. 
5th Royal Irish Pioneers, 295, 304, 

58th Brigade R.F.A., 296 «., 329. 
nth (Northern) Division : 
Composition of, 217 n. i. 
Evacuation of, 392. 
Guns attached to, 295-6 n. 
Hamilton's design for landing of, 

Imbros, at (6 Aug.), 225-6. 
Improvement of, 361. 
Inexperience of, 293. 
Scimitar Hill attack (21 Aug.), 338 ff. 
Tenth Division battalions mixed up 

with (7 Aug.), 304. 
Xeros shore and Kiretch Tape Sirt 

held by, 390 «. 
32nd Brigade — landing of, at Suvla 
(6 Aug.), 300; inaction of (7 Aug.), 
302-3, 305-6, 308 n. ; Hill to co- 
operate with, 305 ; attack on 
Scimitar Hill (9 Aug.), 320; error 
of 21 Aug., 341, 344; elaborate 
entrenchments of, 390 n. 
9th W. Yorks — occupy Lala Baba 
(6 Aug.), 300; at Hill 10, 302; 
on Anafarta ridge, 318. 
6th Yorks, 300. 
33rd Brigade — landing of, at Suvla 
(6 Aug.), 300; on Lala Baba, 302 ; 
error of 21 Aug., 341-2, 344. 
6th Lincolns and 6th Borderers — 
reinforce Hill's column (7 Aug.), 
307, 308 n. ; storming of Chocolate 
Hill, 309 ; withdrawn, 309 ; attack 
on Scimitar Hill (9 Aug.), 320, 
34th Brigade — landing of, in Suvla 
Bay, 299, 300-1 ; inaction of (7 
Aug.), 302-3, 305-6, 308 71. ; Hill 
to co-operate with, 305 ; attack on 
Scimitar Hill (9 Aug.), 320; Brig.- 
Gen. J. Hill in command of, 332 ; 
attack of 21 Aug., 341. ■ 
9th Lanes. Fusiliers, 302, 
nth Manchesters, 301-2, 310. 
6th E. York Pioneers, 317. 
13th (Western) Division : 
Arrival of, 200, 216. 
Composition of, 216 n. 2. 
Evacuation of, 392, 396. 
Maude, Maj.-Gen. F. Stanley, in com- 
mand of, 355. 
Quality of, 361. 

British troops in the campaign, continued — 
13th (Western) Division, continued — 

Sari Bair, allotted for, 225, 254, 255, 
293 ; casualties (7-10 Aug. ), 283 ; 
returned to IXth Army Corps at 
Suvla, 355. 

Shaw, Maj.-Gen., invalided from, 332. 

38th Brigade — quarters of, 204. 
6th E. Lanes., 270. 
6th S. Lanes.— Sari Bair, 265; Chu- 
nak Bair and the supreme moment, 
272-4 ; disaster and retreat, 275-6. 
6th Loyal N. Lanes. — Hill Q, 270-1 ; 
relieve New Zealanders and Glou- 
cesters on Rhododendron Ridge 
(10 Aug.), 278-9; overwhelmed, 

39th Brigade — Divisional Reserve at 
Sari Bair, 255. 
9th Royal Warwicks, 216 «., 
265, 268 ; left without officers, 
7th Gloucesters — Sari Bair assault, 
265-7 ! attacked by Turks (9 
Aug.), 277-8 ; left without officers 
(10 Aug.), 281. 
9th Worcesters, 216 n. ; in support 
in Sari Bair attack, 265, 268, 
272 ; inactive, 276-7 ; left without 
officers (10 Aug.), 281. 
7th N. Staflbrds — in support in Sari 
Bair assault, 265, 268, 272 ; in- 
active, 276-7 ; attacked near 
Fusilier Bluff (7 Jan.), 403. 

40th Brigade : 

4th S. Wales Borderers — Sari Bair, 
262 ; fighting on 10 Aug., 283 ; 
21 Aug., 349. 
8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 245-6. 
5th Wilts — Hill Q, 271 ; relieve New 
Zealanders and Gloucesters on 
Rhododendron Ridge (10 Aug.), 
278-9 ; " almost annihilated " \io 
Aug.), 279. 

8th Welsh Pioneers, 216 n, 2, 265-6. 
2gth Division : 

Allotted for Dardanelles, 42 ; delays, 
42 ; arrival at Malta, 63. 

Battle of 6-8 May, 148 ff. 

Casualties of, heavy, 147 ; to 9 May, 
157 ; to 8 June, 178-9 and «. 

Composition of, 82. 

Hamilton's tribute to, 201. 

Helles attack (6 Aug.), 225, 227. 

Landing task of, 78-9. 

Quality of, 127, 133, 201, 243 ; of 
Territorial unit, 135. 

Rested in brigades at Imbros, 362, 

Scimitar Hill attack from Suvla (21 
Aug. ), 338 ff. ; back at Helles, 402. 

86th Brigade — battle of 28 April, 133 ; 
broken up among 87th and 88th 
Brigades, 147 ; Scimitar Hill 
attack (21 Aug.), 344; evacuation 
of, 391. 



British troops in the campaign, continued — 
29th Division, continued — 
86th Brigade, continued — 
2nd Royal Fusiliers — at V Beach, 104, 
105-6 ; fighting of 4-6 June, 176, 
178 ; casualties of, 178-9 ; 28 June, 
184 ; sufferings in the blizzard 
(Nov.), 384-5. 
ist Lanes. Fusiliers, 101-4. 
ist Royal Munster Fusiliers — V 
Beach landing, 95-8 ; storm Seddel 
Bahr, 127-8 ; amalgamated into 
the "Dubsters," 151. 
ist Royal Dublin Fusiliers — V Beach 
landing, 94-6, 98 ; storm Seddel 
Bahr, 127-8 ; amalgamated into 
the " Dubsters," 151. 
87th Brigade — in the fight of 28 April, 
133 ; 6-8 May, 150, 153, 154 ; 
Scimitar Hill attack (21 Aug.), 
2nd S. Wales Borderers — at De 
Tott's Battery, 91 ; at Y Beach, 
107-9 1 battle of 8 May, 154 ; 
casualties, 179 n. ; 28 June, 183. 
ist Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers — at 
Implacable Landing, 106 ; in the 
fight of 28 April, 133 ; of 6-8 May, 
150 ; of 28 June, 183 ; take Fusi- 
lier Bluff, 184. 
ist Border Regt. — at Implacable 
Landing, 106 ; in the fight of 28 
April, 133 ; of 28 June, 184. 
88th Brigade — officer losses of, 99 ; 
battles of 28 April, 133 ; of 29 
April, 135-6 ; of 6-8 May, 150, 
153 ; of 4 June, 174 ; Helles 
attack (6 Aug.), 227; evacuation 
of, 392. 
4th Worcester Regt. — W Beach 
landing, 103-4 ; in the fight of 
28 April, 133 ; of i May, 136 ; of 
4 June, 174. 
and Hampshire Regt. — V Beach 
.' landing, 95, 97-8 ; storm Seddel 

Bahr, 127-8 ; casualties of, 179. 
1st Essex Regt. — W Beach landing, 
103 ; in fight of i May, 135 ; of 
6 Aug., 228. 
5th Royal Scots (Territorial) — in fight 
of I May, 135 ; 6-8 May, 150. 
87th and 88th Brigades, 29th Indian 
Infantry Brigade and Lanes. 
Fusiliers added to, 147. 
ist Newfoundlanders' Battalion 
attached to, 361. 
42nd (E. Lanes.) Division : 
^ Brigades of 29th Division made up by, 
Composition of, 137 and n. 
Egypt, in, 70, 137. 
Helles feint (6-7 Aug.), 225, 227-9. 
Heroism of officer of, 402 n. 
Withdrawn for rest, 402. 
125th Lanes. Fusiliers, 151, 153, 229. 


British troops in the cs.m'pTdgn, continued — 
42nd (E. Lanes.) Division, continued — 
126th E. Lanes. — split up among 29th 
Division (May), 159. 
4th E. Lanes. Batt. at the Vineyard, 
127th Manchester Brigade — at Gurkha 
Bluff (12 May), 158 ; battle of 4 
June, 173-4 ; the Vineyard (7 
Aug.), 229 ; quality of, 158, 174, 
52nd (Lowland Territorial) Division : 
Arrival of, 180. 
Composition of, 181 ??. 
Helles, at (6 Aug.), 225. 
Kereves Dere (12 July), 199. 
Quality of, 181. 
155th Brigade, 199. 
156th Brigade — battle of 28 June, 185; 

success of 15 Nov., 382. 
157th Brigade — Kereves Dere (12 
July), 199 ; Krithia Nullah attack 
(19 Dec), 402. 
53rd (Welsh) Division, 225, 284: 
Composition of, 218 n. 
Evacuation of, 391. 
Improvement of, 361. 
Salonika, for, 366. 

Scimitar Hill attack (9 Aug.), 320 ; re- 
newed attack (10 Aug.), 323-4. 
Sulajik-Kiretch Tepe line held by (21 

Aug.), 339. 
i/ist Hereford Batt., 321. 
54th (E. Anglian) Division, 225, 284 : 
Anzac, brought to, 355. 
Composition of, 218. 
Improvement of, 361. 
Sulajik-Kiretch Tepe line held by 

(21 Aug.), 339. 
Suvla, ordered to (9 Aug.), 323 ; 

landed (lo-ii Aug.), 325. 
162nd Brigade, 329-30. 
163rd Brigade, 327-8. 
2nd Mounted Division (Yeomanry) : 
Composition of, 338 n. i. 
Quality of, 337-8. 

Scimitar Hill attack (21 Aug.), 345-6. 
29th Indian Infantry Brigade : 

Anzac, transferred to (4-5 Aug.), 

Arrival of, 134. 
Godley's tribute to, 284. 
Health record of, 357. 
Hill 60 attack (21 Aug.), 349. 
Mule management by, 393 n. 
Reserve in battle of 7 May, 153. 
Sari Bair, 254, 255, 262-3. 
Turkish aeroplane messages to, 187-8, 

5th, 6th, and loth Gurkhas — capture 
of Gurkha Bluff, 158 ; battle of 4 
June, 174 ; of 28 June, 184 ; of 
2 July, 197 ; Koja Chemen 
assault, 263, 268 ; Chunuk Bair 
and the supreme moment, 272-4 ; 



British troops in the campaign, continued — 

29th Indian Infantry Brigade, continued — 

5th, 6th, and loth Gurkhas, continued — 

Disaster and retreat, 275-6 ; battle 

of 21 Aug., 349; evacuation of, 

392, 393 «., 396. 

14th Sikhs — in battle of 4 June, 174 ; 

Koja Chemen assault, 263. 

Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, 254, 

Indian Mountain Battery — at Anzac 

landing, 116 ; at Sari Bair, 254. 
Lovat's Scouts, 360-1. 
Royal Engineers : 
5th Anglesey Company, 391. 
6th Company, 319. 
Royal Field Artillery : 
loth Battery, 197. 
15th Heavy Battery, 329. 
5Sth Brigade, 361. 
56th Brigade, 361. 
58th Brigade, zgSn., 329. 
59th Brigade, 295 «. 
69th Brigade, 280. 

4th Howitzer Lowland Brigade, 296 n. 
Royal Garrison Artillery — 4th Highland 

Mountain Brigade, 296 «. 
Royal Naval Division : 
Antwerp, at, 24, 148, 203. 
Battle of 6-8 May, 149, 151, 153, 

Composition of, 84. 
Feint at Karachali, 119-20. 
French lines taken over by (Dec. -Jan.), 

Guns not with, 182. 
Headquarters of, 131, 203. 
Landing task of, 79. 
Mudros, at, 68. 
Port Said, at, 70. 
Position of, on 6 Aug., 225. 
Quality of, 148, 176, 203. 
I St Naval Brigade : 
Drake Batt., 133, 147, 149. 
Nelson Batt., 138, 177, 199. 
2nd Naval Brigade — part of French 
line taken over by (May), 137 ; 
composite character of, after 4 
June, 175 n. : 
Anson Batt., 89 ; at V Beach land- 
ing, 94-5 ; battle of 4 June, 173, 
17s and n. 
Collingwood Batt. , 175 and n. 
Hood Batt., 149 n. ; reinforce the 
French, 147 ; battle of 4 June, 173, 
175 and n. 
Howe Batt. — reinforce the French, 
147 ; battle of 4 June, 173, 175 
and n, 
3rd Naval Brigade : 

Plymouth Batt., 89, 147; at Y Beach, 
107-8 ; in battle of 6-8 May, 149. 
Portsmouth Batt., 138-9. 
Scottish Horse, 360-1. 
South-Western Mounted Brigade, 361. 

Brodrick, Lt.-Gen. St. John, 81. 

Brooke, Rupert, 86-7. 

Brooks, Mr., pictures by, xiii, 

Bro\4fn, Col., 233. 

Browne, Col. R. S., 352 w. 1. 

Brown's Dip, 233. 

Bruce, Lt.-Col. the Hon. C. G., 158. 

Brulard, G6n. , succeeds G^n. Bailloud, 

i93i 372 ; succeeds Gdn. Masnou, 202 ; 

leaves guns to British Vlllth Corps, 

Buchan, Col. John, 366, 367 «. 
Bulair, Turkish reinforcements from 

(9 Aug.), 319. 
Bulair landing, drawback to, 222. 
Bulair lines, bombardment of (25 April), 119. 
Bulair position, 75-6. 
Bulgaria : 
Central Powers, leaning to (May), 169 ; 

Secret Treaty (July), 199 ; Turkish 

Treaty signed, 364 ; joins Central 

Powers (Oct.), 367-8 ; effect of this 

adhesion, 381. 
Forces of, available, 365. 
Importance of attitude of, 55. 
Overtures to, 194. 

Paget's Report on (17 March 1917), 55. 
Serbia, animosity against, 55, 221, 364. 
Burnt Hill. See Scimitar Hill. 
Burston, Col. J., 352 n. 1. 
Burton, Col., 361. 
Byng, Maj.-Gen. Sir Julian, 332, 361, 372, 


C Beach, 299, 392. 

Callwell, Gen., quoted, 9-10, 41. 

Camber Beach, 98. 

Camouflage, 150. 

Cannon, Lt.-Col., 268, 

Canopus, 49, 119-20, 217. 

Canteen ship (Sept.), 206, 357. 

Garden, Lt.-Col. J., 279. 

Garden, Vice-Adm. Sir Sackville, early 
bombardment by (Nov, 1914), i ; 
views on forcing the Straits, 25 ; 
memorandum on four stages, 32-3 ; 
ships under (Feb. 1915), 48-50 ; bom- 
bardment of the Forts, 51 ; urges 
mihtary co-operation, 58 ; resigns, 58. 

Carey, Lt.-Col. A. B., 84. 

Carruthers, Brig. -Gen. R. A., 82. 

Carson, Sir E., 378. 

Carthage, 196, 

Cass, Major, 154, 156. 

Casson, Col., 91, 92, 133. 

Casson, Brig.-Gen. H. G., 181 ». 

Casualties : 
Anzac. See under Australian and New 

Zealand Army Corps, 
Figures — first ten days, 140 ; end of May, 
168 «. ; 4 June, 177 ; 28 June, 185; to 
end of July, 216 ; August, 358 ; second 
week in August (Helles, Anzac, Suvla), 
336 ; 21 August (Scimitar Hill), 
346-7 ; 27-28 August, 354. 



Casualties, €ontinued — 

French. See under French Expedition- 
ary Corps. 
Inadequate provision for, 118, 140-2, 

Officers (10 Aug.), 281. 
Sickness, 406 ; (Sept.), 356. 
loth Division (15 Aug.), 330, 331. 
29th Division, 157. 
Total, 406. 
Gather, Lt., 164 n. 

Cayley, Brig. -Gen. W. de S., 216 «., 281. 
Chadwick, Capt., 204. 
Chailak Dere, 250, 254-6, 258, 260 n. 2, 

Champagne battle, 362-3. 
Chanak, 52-3, 63 n. 
Chapman, Lt.-Col. A. E., 300, 352. 
Charletnagne, 49, 52, 60. 
Chatham, 298, 373. 
Chatham's Post, 231, 248. 
Chauvel, Brig. -Gen. H. G., 83, 137, 242. 
Chelmer, 256. 

Chessboard, the, 191, 244-5. 
Chocolate Hill (Yilghin Burnu) — descrip- 
tion of, 287 ; Hill's capture of (7 Aug.), 
306-9 ; centre of Scimitar Hill attack 
(21 Aug.), 339 ; shrapnel wound at, 
341 n. ; mentioned, 298, 335. 
Christian, Rear-Adm. Arthur, 297. 
Chunuk Bair : 

"Chimney," 247; dead thrown over, 

Conformation of, 247, 
Nek to southern shoulder of, 261. 
South-west shoulder of, ours, 268. 
Struggle for, defeated, 276-8, 323, 324. 
Turkish attack from (10 Aug.), 280-1. 
mentioned, 244, 254, 265. 
Churchill, Maj. J. S. S., 81, 170. 
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, bombard- 
ment of 3 Nov. 1914 ordered by, i ; 
scheme for Greek seizure of Gallipoli, 
9 ; project for the British expedition, 
12-13 ; position in the War Council, 
21 ; siege gun misconception of, 23-4, 
33) 51 ■> communications with Garden, 
24-5 ; presses his scheme, 35 ; urges 
Garden to press attack, 57-8 ; pro- 
posed visit of, to Dardanelles, 214 ; 
his defence of the expedition, 385-6, 
Clapham Junction, 132, 203. 
Clifton Browne, Maj. -Gen., 361. 
Glyfford, Lt.-Com., 382. 
ColHns, Col., 173 «. 
Colne, 256-7. 

Constantine, King of Greece, disapproves 
Dardanelles campaign, lo-ii ; re- 
ported desirous of war (March 1915), 
56 and n. i ; again opposed to alliance 
with Entente, 56 ;?. 2 ; declines to assist 
Serbia, 365, 368 ; stealthy neutrality 
of, 183 ; mentioned, 11 «.,48. 
Constantinople, dismay in (Feb. 1915), 144. 

Cooper, Major Bryan, 306;/. ; cited, 308 «. 
Cooper, Brig.-Gen. R. J., 217 «. 2, 281. 
Cornwallis, 49, 52, 89, 91, 99, 164, 396. 
Costeker, Capt., 97. 
Costemalle, Comdt. , 152 n. 2. 
Courtney-Boyle, Lt.-Com. Edward, 145. 
Courtney's Post, 161, 188. 
Cox, Maj. -Gen. Sir Herbert, captures 

Gurkha Bluff, 158 ; Hill 60 attacks 

(21 Aug.), 349; (27 Aug.), 353; 

mentioned, 85, 134, 254, 255, 262, 

Creighton, Rev. O., cited, lyon. 
Cretan " Andarti," 225 and n, i. 
Crewe, Lord, 15 ; cited, 28. 
Cribb, Capt., 117. 

d'Adh^mar, Lt.-Col., 153 7z. 

Dallas, Brig.-Gen., 390 w. 

d'Amade, G^n.-de-Div., 70, 84, 120, 159- 

Damakjelik Bair (Hill 40), 255, 264, 349, 
35O' 35S I description of, 252 ; S. W. 
Borderers' storming of, 262. 
Daniell, Brig.-Gen. F. F. W., 327. 
D'Annunzio, 170. 
Dardanelles : 
Character of the Strait, 45-6, 
Current in, 45. 

View of, by Lancashires and Gurkhas 
(9 Aug.), 273. 
Dardanelles campaign : 
Advantages of, if successful, vii-viii, 

22-3, 408-9. 
Amphibious expedition considered, 41 ; 

delays, 42-3, 52, 54, 57, 62-3. 
Conditions of life in, 152. 
Failure of, causes of, 406-8. 
Force required for, early estimates of 
strength of, 10, 23, 40 ; troops not 
available before April, 22, 33, 40 ; 
actual strength in April, 85 ; on 6 
May, 147 ; units engaged, see (i) 
Australian and New Zealand Army 
Corps, (2) British troops, and (3) 
French Expeditionary Corps. 
Justification of, 172. 
Military attitude towards, 64-5. 
Naval expedition alone ordered, 33 ; 

British casualties, 62 «. 
Official attitude towards, 140, 142, 170 «., 

181, 214, 336-7, 370, 377, 408-10. 
Withdrawal from the Peninsula, ease of, 
presupposed, 14, 23, 33. 
" Dardanelles Committee," 214 and n. 
Dardanus, Fort, 52-3, 59. 
Davidson, Capt. A. P., xii, 92 and«. 
Davies, Lt.-Gen. Sir F. J., 201, 230, 372, 

Dawnay, Capt. G. P., 81. 
de Bartolom6, Comdre., z6n,; cited, i, 

de Laborde, Lt., 81. 
De Lisle, Maj. -Gen., takes command of 

29th Division, 177 ; congratulated, 201 ; 



succeeds Stopford in command of IXth 

Corps, 332 ; attack of 21 Aug., 338 ; 

returns to 29th Division, 362. 
de Lotbiniere, Lt.-Col. A. C. Joly, 82, 296. 
de Putron, Capt. C, 81. 
de Robeck, Vice-Adm. , 59, 89, 297, 386. 
de Sauvigny, Com. de Cav, Brev. Berthier, 

De Tott's Battery (Eski Hissarlik), 107, 

121 ; landing at, 91 ; taken over by the 

French, 130. 
De Winton, 329. 
Dead — built into barricades, 240 ; thrown 

down Chunuk Bair "chimney," 282-3. 
Deedes, Capt. W. H., 81. 
Descoins, Lt.-Col., 84. 
Desruelles, Lt.-Col., 84. 
Destroyer Hill, 260 n. 2. 
Diet, monotony of, 205-6, 357. 
Dillon, Dr. E. J., quoted, ■yi'^n. 
Djemel Pasha, 72. 
Dobbin, Col., 233. 
Doris, 49. 
Doughty- Wylie, Lt.-Col., 81, 99, 127-8 

Douglas, Maj.-Gen. Sir W., ii, 9, 70, 137, 

201, 402 ; the Vineyard, 230. 
Downing, Col., 306 «. 
Drafts swamping original units, 358-9 

and n. 
Drewry, Midshipman, 86. 
Dublin, 49, 109, 158. 
Duckworth, Adm. , 31 n. i, 59. 

Edmonds, Flight-Lt., 362 «. 

Egerton, Maj.-Gen. G. G. A., i8i, 200. 

Egypt : 

Anzacs in, 71. 

Defences of, 12. 

Kitchener's concern for, 12, 41, 70-1, 

Egyptian labourers, 360. 
Einstein, Lewis, cited, 147 «. 
Ejelmer-Anafarta line, Hamilton's plan for 

seizing (9 Aug.), 322-3. 
Ejelmer Bay, 290, 335, 388 n. 
Elliot, Brig.-Gen. G. S. M'D., 81. 
Elliott, Lt.-Col. G. C. E., 83. 239. 
Emden, 72. 

England, Com. Hugh T., 257. 
Enos, 76, 221. 
Enver Pasha, 4, 11, 13, 144, 145, 1B6, 190 ; 

von Sanders' subservience to, 198 n, ; 

quoted, 62. 
Erenkeui, 52, 61. 
Erskine, Brig.-Gen. J. F,, 181 m. 
Eski, the, 132. 

Eski Hissarlik. See De Tott's Battery. 
Eski Keui, no. 
Eur op a, 212. 
Euryalus, 89, loi. 
Evacuation of the Peninsula : 
Anzac, at, 397 ff. 
Birdwood's successful accomplishment 

of, 381, 386. 

Evacuation of the Peninsula, continued — 

Devices to conceal, 389, 394, 399, 405. 

German estimate of, 400 «. 

Helles, at, 400 ff. 

Numbers dealt with, 387 and n. i. 

Shell fire danger during, 393-4, 398. 

Suvla, at, 390 ff. 

Turkish bribery story, untruth of, 387 
n. 2. 
Evelegh, Col., 177 and «. 2. 

Fahreddin, Lt.-Col., 163. 

Fanshawe, Maj.-Gen. E. A., 332, 361, 

390 «. 
Farm, the, Baldwin's force deflected to, 
271 ; overwhelmed at (10 Aug.), 281 ; 
Farm abandoned to the Turks, 281 ; 
mentioned, 251, 261, 263, 270, 360. 
Farquharson, Lt.-Col. H. D., 81. 
Ferdinand, Tsar, 364. 
Fisher, Lord, opposed to the naval scheme, 
28-9, 32, 34-7 ; reluctantly agrees, 
36-8 ; reinforces de Robeck, 62 ; re- 
signs, 170 ; estimate of, 25. 
Fisher, Andrew, 27. 
Fishermen's Huts, 114, 117, 250. 
Flies, 192, 357. 

Food, monotony of, 205-6, 357. 
Forces engaged. See (i) Australian and 
New Zealand Army Corps, (2) British 
troops, and (3) French Expeditionary 
Forshaw, Lt. W. T., 230 «. 
Forsyth, Brig.-Gen., 242. 
Fort No. I, 100, 104. 
Fortescue, Martin, cited, 62 n. i. 
Forts on the Dardanelles, 50. 
Foxhound, 314, 329. 
Frankland, Major, 103. 
French Expeditionary Corps : 

African troops of, 136, 147, 149, 151, 175. 
Artillery of, 148, 153 «. ; 75's lent to 
British, 173, 200, 401 ; captured by 
Turks, 245, 263. 
Casualties — (25 April), 121 ; (21 June), 
180 ; in early July, 202 ; figures not 
published, 216 n. i. 
Composition of, 84-5. 
Engagements— feint at Kum Kali and 
Yenishehr, 120-1 ; 8 May (advance on 
Kereves Ridge), 156 ; 4 June, 174-5 ; 
12 July, 199. 
Evacuation of, 401. 
Haricot Redoubt captured by, 179-80. 
Health record of, 192. 
Helles, at (6 Aug.), 225. 
Landing at V Beach, 129 ; task of, 80. 
Position of, 131-2. 

Relations of British with — friendly, 129, 
30 ; out of bounds to British, 129, 


Royal Naval Division reinforcing, 147; 

substituted for, 401. 
Strength of, middle of Aug., 336. 
Tenedos the headquarters of, i66. 



French Expeditionary Corps, continued — 
V Beach depot constantly shelled, 196. 
2nd Division : 
Composition of, 152 n. 2. 
Salonika, Bailloud's contingent at, 
Freyberg, Brig. -Gen., xii. 
Freyberg, Lt.-Coni. Bernard, 120, 122. 
FuUerton, Maj. (Surgeon), 237. 
Fusilier Bluff, 184, 403. 

Gaba Tepe, nature of, 109-10 ; drawbacks 
to landing at, 78 ; enemy guns on, 
116 ; effort to seize (4 May), 139 ; 
mentioned, 53, 77. 
Gain poll : 

Campaign. See Dardanelles campaign. 
Churchill's scheme for Greek seizure of 

(Sept. 14), 9. 
Enemy strength on (March), 68, 
Routes across, no. 
Garside, Lt.-Col., 154 «. 2. 
Gaulois, 49, 50, 52, 61. 
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd, 15, 56, 194 w. ; 

cited, 28. 
Gerard, Lt.-Col., 219. 
German Officers' Trenches, 190, 241. 
Germans : 

Atrocities by, 98. 

Guns and ammunition supplied to Turkey 

by, 388-9, 400-1. 
Turkish relations with. See under 
Ghazi Baba, 289. 
Gilleson, Capt. Rev. — , 351 n. 
Gillespie, Lt.-Col. F. M., 262, 283. 
Giraudon, Col., 180 n. i. 
Glasgow, Maj. T. W., 243 «. 
Glenn, Capt., 391. 
Glossop, Capt., 72. 
Gloucester, 8. 

Godley, Maj. -Gen. Sir Alex. J., xii, xiii, 
70, 83, 138, 253, 256, 322, 380 ; quoted 
on the 7-10 Aug. fighting, 284 ; the 
Anzac evacuation, 400. 
Goeben, S-gandw., 139, 177. 
Goliath, 108, 109, 164. 
Gouraud, Gen., 160, 172, 180, 193, 371. 
Grampus, 329. 
Grant, Capt., 119, 217, 351. 
Grant, Rear-Adm. Heathcote, xii. 
Great Sap, the. See Long Sap. 
Greece : 

British support of, in 1897 campaign, 2. 

Cyprus offered to, 368. 

Dardanelles bombardment as affecting, 

Forces available in, 365, 
Russian jealousy of, 11, 56. 
Salonika. See that heading, 
Greek " Andarti," 225 and n. 
Green Hill (Hill 50), description of, 287 ; 
next to Chocolate Hill, 309 ; held by 
Hill's Brigade (10 Aug.), 324, 335; 
confusion between Sulajik and, 326. 

Green Knoll, 390 «. 

Greene, Sir Graham, 26 «. 

Grey, Sir Edward, 14, 35 ; cited on experts, 

2-8 ; quoted on the Balkan situation, 

Gully Beach — conformation of, 106-7 ; 

deserted by Turks, 130 ; evacuation 

from, 402-5. 
Gully Ravine (Saghir Dere), nature of, 

106-7 ! Turkish snipers in, 149 ; 

counter-attacks down, 178 ; gains in 

(28 June), 185 ; Turkish attack on 

(2 July), 197; success near (15 Nov.), 

382 ; mentioned, 108, 131, 150. 
Gurkha Bluff, 159. 
Gurkhas. See under British troops — 29th 

Indian Infantry Brigade. 
Gwynn, Lt.-Col. C. W., 332 n, i. 

Haggard, Brig.-Gen. H., 217 n. i, 295, 
299 ; seriously wounded, 307, 308 n. i, 

Haldane, Lord, 17 ; cited, 28. 

Hamilton, Sir Bruce, 201. 

Hamilton, Gen. Sir Ian — Kitchener's 
orders to, 63, 64 ; arrives at Tenedos, 
63 ; in Egypt, 69-70 ; address to his 
forces, 85 ; decides against withdrawal, 
124 ; Order of 29 April, 134 ; Admin- 
istrative Staff of, delayed in Egypt, 
141 ; Orders of 9 May, 156 ; of 12 May, 
157 ; headquarters on Imbros, 166-7 ; 
Order of 25 May, 167-8 ; orders assault 
of 4 June, 172 ; vain attempts at white 
flag truce, 178 ; refuses burial arm- 
istice, 198 ; eulogy of 29th Division, 
201 ; Order of 5 Aug., 226 and n. ; 
approves design of Sari Bair attack, 
253 ; scheme for landing at Nibrunesi 
Point, 298 ; congratulates Stopford on 
achievements of 7 Aug., 311 ; visits 
Stopford, 315 ; urges on Hammersley 
the need for prompt action, 316 ; re- 
turns to the Arno, 318 ; plan for seizing 
Ejelmer-Anafarta line (9 Aug.), 322-3 ; 
orders consolidation of existing line 
(10 Aug.), 324-5 ; repeatedly frustrated 
by Corps Commander and Divisional 
Generals, 326-8 ; asks for further rein- 
forcements (r6 Aug.), 336; refused, 
337i 363 ; attitude towards evacuation, 
371 ; superseded by Birdwood, 372 ; 
farewell special Order, 372 ; leaves 
Gallipoli, 373 ; effect of his recall, 374 ; 
career of, 65-6 ; estimate of, 66-7 ; 
troops under, see Australian and New 
Zealand Army Corps, and British 
troops ; acknowledgments to, xii. 

Hammersley, Maj. -Gen. Fred., nth 
(Northern) Division under, 217, 293; 
career of, 294 ; orders Hill to co-oper- 
ate with Sitwell's Brigade, 305 ; inac- 
tion of (8 Aug.), 316 ; orders 6th E. 
York I'ioneers from Scimitar Hill, 317 ; 
retires from command of nth Divi- 
sion, 332 ; mentioned, 321. 



Hankey, Col. Sir Maurice, 214 ; cited, 

Hare, Brig. -Gen. S. W., 82, 89, 102. 
Haricot Redoubt, 175, 179-80. 
Harris, Lt.-Col. H., 190. 
Hautville, Lt -Col., 152 «. 2. 
Headquarter.s — on Queen Elizabeth, 89, 
123 ; on the Arcadian, 142 ; at Ke- 
phalos Bay, 166-7 ; farther inland, 
Hell Spit, U2. 
Helles : 
Aeroplane landing at, 218, 
Evacuation of, 401-5. 
Feint at (6 Aug.), 227-31. 
Shelling of, perpetual, 157, 171. 
Storm havoc at (27 Nov. ), 383. 
Turkish troops opposite (Dec), 389 n, 
Helles, Cape : 

Fort on, bombarded (19 Feb.), 50, 51 ; 
bombardment to cover landing, 91 ; 
the landings, 100, 102, 103 ; French 
railway to, 129. 
Hendry, Brig. -Gen. R. W., 181 w. 
Henri IV., 62. 
Herbert, Lt.-Col. A. H., 254. 
Hetman Chair, 286, 341. 
Higher Commands, influence of, 226. 
Hill, Brig. -Gen. F. F., arrival of, from 
Mitylene and landing (7 Aug.), 295, 
303-4 ; under Hanmiersley's orders, 
305 ; on Chocolate Hill (9-10 Aug.), 
319, 324 ; invalided and succeeded by 
Lt.-Col. J. G. King-King, 332, 338 
n. 2 ; estimate of, 308 ; mentioned, 
217 n. I. 
Hill, Brig. -Gen. J., 332, 341. 
Hill 10, 289, 302. 
Hill 40. See Damakjelik Bair. 
Hill 50. See Green Hill. 
Hill 6o(Kaiajik Aghala) — situation of, 252 ; 
Turkish possession of, 336 ; attacks 
on (21 Aug.), 348 ff. ; (27 Aug. ), 353-4 ; 
importance of, 348. 
Hill 70. See Scimitar Hill. 
Hill 112. See W Hill. 
Hill 114, storming of, 105. 
Hill 138, 102. 

Hill 141, capture of, 103-4. 
Hill 971. See Koja Chemen Tepe. 
Hill 0, 247-8, 263-5. 
Hill W. See W Hill. 
Hobbs, Col. J. J. T., 83. 
Holbrook, Lt., 45. 
Holmes, Brig. -Gen. W., 352 «. 
Hordern, Rev. A. C, 81. 
Hornby, Adm., 31 n. i. 
Hospital camps, 358. 
Hospital ship accommodation inadequate, 

Howse, Col. N. R., 118, 124. 
Hughes, Brig. -Gen. F. G., 84; attack of 

30 June, 191 ; the Nek, 244, 246. 
Hughes, Col. J. G., 260. 
Hiimber, 234. 

Hunter-Weston, Maj.-Gen., 70, 176; 

battle of 28 June, 182 ; breakdown of 

(July), 200-1. 
Hurd, Archibald, cited, 26«., 40 «. 
Hythe, 382, 

lero inlet, 217. 
I mbros : 

Aeroplane camp at, 218-19. 

Birdwood's H.Q. at, 381. 

Greek vendors at, 205. 

Description of, 165-6. 

Strategic value of, 401. 
Implacable, 62, 89 ; at X Beach, 105-6. 
"Implacable Landing," 105, 
hidefatigable, 29. 
Indian Brigade. See under British troops 

— 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. 
Inflexible, 48-9, 59-61. 
Inglefield, Maj.-Gen. F. S., 325, 327, 335 «•. 

355. 361- 
Irani Chai. See Asmak Dere. 
Irresistible, 49, 51, 60-1. 
Irvine, Maj., 126. 
Ismail Oglu Tepe (Hill 112). See W 

Istomine, Gen., 169. 

Italy — declares war on Austria, 56, 170 ; 
Isonzo victories, 194. 

Jackson, Adm. Sir Henry, Memorandum 

of, on proposed naval attack, 30-1; 

memorandum to Garden (Feb.), 42 ; 

succeeds Lord Fisher, 170 ; cited, i ; 

quoted, 31 ; mentioned, 26. 
Jackson, Brig.-Gen. R. W. M., 81, 213. 
Jeanne d Arc, 120. 
Jenkinson, Capt. , 178-9. 
Jephson, Maj., 310, 330. 
Jephson's Post — height of, 290 ; storming 

of, 310 ; farthest point held by British, 

3". 331- 
Jerrold, Lt. Douglas, xii. 
Jewish Refugee Mule Corps. See Zionists. 
Johnston, Brig.-Gen. F. E., 83, 154, 254, 

Johnston, Lt.-Col. G. N., 83. 
Johnston, Brig.-Gen. Napier, 349. 
" Johnston's Jolly," 233 and n., 238. 
Jonquil, 297. 
Jourdain, Lt.-Col., 282 «., 349. 

Kaba Kuyu, 348, 353. 

Kaiajik Aghala. See Hill 60. 

Kaiajik Dere, 252, 350. 

Kangaroo Beach, 325 n. 

Karachali, feint at (25 April), 119 ; (6 

Aug. ), 225. 
Karakol Dagh, 395; description of, 290; 

cleared by nth Manchesters (7 Aug.), 

301-2, 310 ; Corps H.Q. at, 343 ; 

Kitchener's visit to, 380. 
Kartal Tepe, 290-1. 
Kasa Dere. See Asmak Dere. 
Kastro, 166, 




Kavak Tepe — height of, 291 ; Hamilton's 
proposed occupation of, 322, 326, 328; 
Turkish emplacements behind, 388. 

Kazlar Chair, 286. 

Keble, Lt.-Col. A. E. C, 82 ; in charge of 
arrangements for wounded, 141. 

Kelly, Surg. P. B., 97 «. 

Kelly, Sapper Stephen, 206. 

Kenna, Brig. -Gen. F. A., 338 n. i, 347. 

Kephalos Bay : 

Hospital camps at, 358. 
Storm at (27 Nov.), 383. 
Suvla, compared with, 335. 
nth Division at, 226. 

Kephalos, Cape, 165. 

Kephez Point, 52, 86. 

Kereves Dere — effort to reach (28 April), 
'^3^j 133 ; French capture of redoubt 
at (4 June), 175; French gain (21 June), 
180 ; redoubt captured by 157th 
Brigade, 199. 

Kereves Ridge, 156. 

Keshan, 76. 

Keyes, Commodore Roger, xii, 80, 297, 313, 

Kilid Bahr, 52-3; fortifications of, no, 
118 ; Turkish drill ground, 208. 

King-King, Lt.-Col. J. G. , 332, 338 n. 2. 

Kiretch Tepe Sirt — description of, 290 ; 
loth Division on (10 Aug.) 324; their 
advance along (15-17 Aug.), 329-31 ; 
flood water from (27 Nov.), 383 ; 
mentioned, 298, 300, 303, 335. 

Kitchener, Lord, concern of, for Egypt, 
12, 41, 70-1, 379 ; opposed to Gallipoli 
Expedition (Nov. 1914), 13, 14 ; agrees 
to naval attack, 14, 24, 33, 36 ; orders 
to Hamilton, 63, 64, 85, 222 ; tele- 
graphs for estimated loss by evacuation, 
371 ; visits Mudros and Gallipoli, 
378-9 ; opposed to evacuation, 378 ; 
converted to it, 379, 381 ; estimate of, 
15-18 ; his masterful way, 18 and «., 43. 

Koe, Col. (K.O.S.B ), 108. 

Koe, Brig. -Gen. F. W. B., 81, 213. 

Koe, Brig. -Gen. L. C, 181 n. 

Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971), 127; 
situation of, and approach to, 244, 248, 
251-2; assault on, ordered (8 Aug.), 
25s, 263, 265, 268. 

Koja Dere, 115, 118, 388 «. 

Krene, 296, 313. 

Krithia, 108, 185 ; situation of, 131 ; effort 
to reach (28 April), 131, 133. 

Krithia Nullah, 402. 

Kuchuk Anafarta. See Anafarta Sagir. 

Kuchuk Kemikli. See Nibrunesi Point. 

Kum Kali, 50, 51, 54, 180 n. i ; French 
capture of (25 April), 121-2. 

Kut-el-Amara, 378. 

Lala Baba — situation of, 287 ; shelter from, 
for Nibrunesi landing, 298, 392 ; 
Turkish forces on, 299 ; Turkish fire 
from, on Suvla Bay, 301 ; stormed by 

British (6 Aug.), 300 ; British guns on 

and behind (9 Aug.), 296 «., 321. 
Lancashire Landing. See W Beach. 
Lancashire names, 203. 
Land mines, 301, 308, 310. 
Landings of 25 April, results of, 121-2, 
Lansdowne, Lord, cited, 377. 
Larissa (1897), 365. 
Lawrence, Maj.-Gen. H. A., 181 ; succeeds 

Egerton, 200 ; Helles evacuation, 403. 
Leane, Maj., 231, 
Lee, Gen. Noel, 176. 
Legge, Maj.-Gen. J. G., 352. 
Lemberg, fall of, 193. 
Levick, Staff-Surgeon, xii, 213-14. 
Levinge, Lt.-Col. H. G., 279. 
Libau, German seizure of, 169. 
Lindley, Maj.-Gen., 323, 332. 
Lister, Charles, 87. 
Little Anafarta. See Anafarta Sagir. 
Little Table Top, 251, 260. 
Lloyd, Lt. E. E. L., 190, 
Lockyer, Capt., 105. 
Logan, Maj., 242. 
London, 62, 90, in. 
Lone Pine, 232-41. 
Long Sap or Great Sap, The, 117, 250, 

Longford, Brig.-Gen. Lord, 338 n. i, 347. 
Loos, 337, 362-3. 

Lord Nelson, 48-9, 52, 53, 59, 91, 165. 
Lord Raglan, 9 n. 
Lorrimer, Surg.. 214. 
Lotbinifere. See de Lotbini^re, 
Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 26. 
Lovat's Scouts, 360-1. 
"Lowland" Division. See British troops 

— 52nd Division. 
Lula Burgas, 146-7. 
Lynden-Bell, Maj.-Gen., 372. 

M'Cay, Brig.-Gen. J. W., 83, 154. 

M'Donald, Lt.-Col. T. W., 154 n. r. 

M'Grigor, Brig.-Gen. C. R., 8r. 

Mackenzie, Compton, 222, 224 ; cited, 
180 n. 2. 

Mackenzie, Sir Thomas, 27. 

Mackesy, Lt.-Col., 257. 

Maclagan, Col. E. G. Sinclair, 83, 89. 

Maclagan's Ridge, 1 13-14. 

McLaurin, Col. H. N., 83, 116, 126. 

McLaurin's Hill, 116, 117, 125. 

McMahon, Sir H., 378. 

Macnaghton, Col., 233. 

McNicol, 154 n. 2. 

Mahon, Lt.-Gen. Sir Bryan T., career of, 
294; in command of loth (Irish) 
Division, 217 ; landing of, at Suvla 
Point, 304, 310 ; attack on Kiretch 
Tepe Sirt, 310 ; on ridge from W Hill, 
322 ; attack of 15-17 Aug., 329 ; 
mentioned, 293, 303. 

Majestic, 48-9, 53, 86, in ; forcing of the 
Narrows, 60; torpedoed, 164, 170 «. 

Malcolm, Col. Neil, 316. 



Malleson, Midshipman, 96. 

Mallet, Sir Louis, 11. 

Malone, Lt.-Col. W. G., on Rhododendron 

Ridge, 265-8, 278 ; estimate of, 154 

n. I, 189. 
Manitou, 80 n. 
Maps, xiii, iii. 
Margesson, Maj., 92. 
Marinetti, 170. 
Marshall, Maj. -Gen. J. W. R., xii, 82, 

182 and n.\ wounded at the landing, 

106 ; commanding 29th Division, 332, 

338 ; improvement of S3rd Division 

under, 361. 
Martyn, Maj., 239. 
Masefield, John, cited, 152 n, i. 
Masnou, G6n., 84, 202. 
Matthews, Col., 108. 
Maude, Lt.-Gen. Sir F. Stanley, xii, 182 «., 

332, 355 ; directs evacuation at 

Nibrunesi Point, 396 ; evacuation of 

13th Division, 403-4 ; estimate of, 

Maxwell, Maj. -Gen. Sir John, 70, 137, 

Maxwell, Brig.-Gen. R. P., 217 «. i, 295, 

299, 307 ; attack on Scimitar Hill 

(9 Aug.), 319-21; on Chocolate Hill 

(10 Aug. ), 324. 
Maxwell, Capt. William, 81. 
Mehmed v.. Sultan, 6, 144. 
Mercer, Maj. -Gen. SirD. , xii, 84. 
Messoudieh, 45. 
Millbanke, Sir John, 347. 
Milner, Lord, quoted, 377. 
Mine-sweepers, 53. 
Mines in the Dardanelles, 61-2 ; land 

mines, 301, 308, 310. 
Minneapolis, 297 n. 
Minnetonka, 212-13. 
Minnewaska, 90. 
Minogue, Col. J. O'B. , 308;/. 
Mitrofanoff, Prof., quoted, 6. 
Mitylene, half loth Division stationed at, 

215 ; scare at, arranged, 222, 224. 
Monash, Brig.-Gen. J., 83, 138, 262-3; 

Sari Bair, 268 ; orders construction of 

subterranean galleries (Nov.), 382. 
Monash Gully, 117, 138, 188, 243; Turkish 

failure at, 192, 
Monitors, 214-15. 

Monro, Gen. Sir Charles, appointed to 
supersede Hamilton, 372 ; report of, 
on Gallipoli, 375-6; Lord Ribblesdale's 
public disclosure of it, 378 //. ; con- 
sultation with Kitchener, 378 ; H.Q. 
of, on the Aragon, 381 ; hands over 
command to Murray, 401 n. 2. 
Moore, Lt.-Col., 268, 317, 319. 
Morse, Lt. John A. V., 97 «. 
Morto Bay, 78, 79, 91 ; situation of, 92-3. 
Mudros harbour — description of, 47; 
crowding at, 80 ; hospital camps above, 
212, 358. 
Mudros village, 212. 

Murray, Gen. Sir Archibald, 401 n. 2. 
Murray, Sir James Wolfe, 18, 26, 33 

quoted, 18 ». 
Mustard Plaster, the, 261. 

Naismith, Lt. -Com, Eric, 145, 

Nameless Hill. See Hill Q. 

Napier, Brig.-Gen. H. E., 82, 97. 

Narrows, the — description of, 45 ; forcing 
of, attempted, 59 ; capture and loss of 
hill commanding (9 Aug.), 273-6. 

Naval bombardments of Nov, 1914 and 
Feb. 1915, 50 ff. 

Naval guns, flat trajectory of, 51, 275 ; 
bush fire started by, 303 and n. ; help 
from (9 Aug.), 322, 

Nek, the (from Russell's Top), situation of, 
243 ; Shrapnel Gully under fire from, 
126 ; attack of 30 June, 191-2 ; fight- 
ing of 7 Aug. , 243-6 ; blocking of, at 
evacuation, 399. 

Nek of Rhododendron Ridge, See Rhodo- 
dendron Ridge Nek. 

Neuve Chapelle, 23, 33, 43, 87. 

Newenham, Lt.-Col., 105, 106. 

Nibrunesi Point, 249, 286 ; Hamilton's 
scheme for landing Suvla force south 
of, 298-9 ; evacuation from, 392, 

Nicholas, Tsar, 363. 

Nicholson, Rear-Adm, Stuart, 164. 

Nicol, Brig.-Gen, L, L., 217 n. i, 295, 

No. I Post. See Fishermen's Huts. 

No. 2 Post, 250, 255-6, 264 ; howitzers near 
(9 Aug.), 275. 

No. 3 Post, 250, 255. 

Nogucs, Lt.-Col., 85, 120, 180 n. i. 

Notes quoted, 202-4, 207-10, 359, 360, 
385 «. 

Nunn, Lt.-Col. M, H,, 281, 

Ocean, 49, 52, 53, 60, 61, 
Ocean Beach, 117, 243-4, 251 ; hospital 
camps along, 358 ; evacuation from, 

397. 398. 
Officers, shortage of, 336, 338 n. 2, 376, 
Old A Beach, 299. 
Old No, 3 Post, 250, 254 ; capture of (6 

Aug.), 256-7, 264. 
Oliver, Vice-Adm. Sir Henry, 26, 32, 
OUivant, Lt.-Col. A. H., 84, 
Onslow, Lt. B. W., 210, 
Orkhanieh, 50. 
O'Sullivan, Capt., 347 «. 

Paget, Gen., report of, on Bulgarian atti- 
tude, 55. 
Panaghia, 165. 

Paris, Maj. -Gen. A,, 24, 70, 84, 154, 
Parker, I^t.-Col., 254. 
Patterson, Col. J. H., 71 ««. 
Peirse, Vice-Adm., 54. 
Pelliot, Lt., 81. 
Peshall, Rev. C, J. C, xii. 



Peyton, Maj.-Gen. Wm., 337 and «. 

Phido, 296. 

Philippe, Lt.-Col, 84. 

Phillimore, Adm., 210. 

Pike, Col., 307. 

Pimple, the, height of, 290 ; stormed by 
Munsters and Dublins, 330-1 ; Turkish 
entrenchments opposite, 232 ; Suvla 
pier commanded by, 392 «. 

Plugge, Lt.-Col. A., 154 «. I. 

Plugge's Plateau, 112, 117, 

Plunkett, Maj. E. A., 81. 

Poison gas — Germans' earliest use of, 87 ; 
rumours of Turkish use of, not sub- 
stantiated, 382 «. 

Pollen, Capt. S. H., 81. 

Pollok-M'Call, Lt.-Col., 181 «. 

Pope, Lt.-Col. H., 126, 188, 268. 

Pope's Hill, 117, 125, 188; value of, 126 ; 
fighting of 7 Aug., 241-3. 

Prah, 296, 313. 

Price, G. Ward, cited, 367 n. 2. 

Pridham, Lt.-Col. G. R., 83. 

Prince George, 49, 53, 59-60, 404. 

Pritice of VVales, 62, 90, in. 

Przemysl, captured by Russians, 87 ; fall 
of, 169, 172, 193. 

Queen, 62, 90, in. 

Queen Elizabeth, 33 and n. i, 48-49 ; the 
preliminary bombardments, 51-3 ; the 
forcing of the Narrows, 59 ; general 
headquarters, 89, 123 ; assisting at V 
Beach and Anzac Cove, 99, 124-5 '< 
sinks a transport, 139 ; sent home, 

Quilter, Col. Arnold, 86-7. 

Quinn, Maj., 126 and n. 2, 189. 

Quinn's Post, situation of, 189, 360 ; hold- 
ing of, 126 ; danger of, 189 ; assault 
of 19 May, 161 ; fighting of 7 Aug., 
241-3; mentioned, 117, 125, 138, 188. 

Rabbit Island, 61 ; monitors off, 215. 

Radoslavoff, M. , 364. 

Rankine, Maj., 268. 

Reed, Brig. -Gen. H. L., 297, 332, 395, 

Regimental spirit, 179. 

Reinforcements : 
Arrival of — 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 
134 ; 42nd East Lancashire Division, 
137, 172 ; 52nd Division (mid June), 
172; 13th and nth Divisions (July), 
200, 216-17; Yeomanry (Aug.), 337; 
(Sept.), 360-1. 
Denial of, 130, 363 ; 10 per cent, drafts 

refused, 127. 
Insufficiency of, 192. 

Reshadie, 7-8. 

Rhododendron Ridge or Spur (Canterbury 
Ridge), situation of, 250 ; 7 August 
attacks on, 260-1. 263, 266, 270; an- 
nihilation of 5th Wilts on (10 Aug.), 
279-80 ; subterranean galleries made 
through, 382. 

Rhododendron Ridge Nek, 258, 261, 264 ; 
Turkish attack on New Zealanders 
near, 277-8. 

Ribblesdale, Lord, 377-8 and «. 

Richardson, Brig.-Gen., xii ; maps of, 

Rifaat, Col., 187. 

River Clyde at the landings, 94-5, 98-9 ; 
breakwater at V Beach, 129 ; men- 
tioned, 164 n., 404, 405, 410. 

Roberts, Col., 173 «. 

Robertson, Lt.-Com. Eric, 86. 

Romieux, Maj., 84, 202. 

Ross, Malcolm, 119 «., 258, 

Roumania, 408. 

Routine, 297 n. 

Royal Engineers, R.F.A., and R.N.D. See 
under British troops, 

Ruef, Col., 85, 152 n. 2. 

Russell, Maj.-Gen. Sir A. H., xii, 83, 191, 
254, 349, 352 «. ; the Hill 60 attack (27 
Aug.), 353. 

Russell's Top, 191 ; 7 August fighting, 241 
243-4 I Kitchener's visit to, 380. 

Russia : 
British rapprochement with, 2, 
Bulgaria, ultimatum to, 367. 
Difficulties of (Dec. -Jan. 1914-15), 13- 
14 ; reverses of May, 168-9 ; further 
disasters (Aug. and Sept.), 363, 
Failure to support Allies, 171, 193, 198, 
221 ; collapse in Poland, 224 ; co- 
operation of, despaired of, 336, 
Greece, attitude towards, 11, 56. 

Ryan, Col. C. S., 82. 

Ryrie, Col, G, de L., 84. 

Saghir Dere. See Gully Ravine. 
Salonika : 

Dardanelles campaign as affected by, 

367, 369. 
French and British troops in, 367-9. 
Mahon in command at, 381, 
Salt Lake, description of, 289 ; "cut " into, 
325 n. ; plain round, in British posses- 
sion, 335 ; flood of Nov., 383-4 ; men- 
tioned, 286, 288. 
Samson, Com. Ch., 218. 
Samson, Seaman Geo. M'Kenzie, 97 w. 
Sapphire, 49, 108, 109. 
Sari Bair, 77, 79 ; conformation of, 1 10, 

Sari Bair assault : 

Battalions fighting with loss of all officers, 

Failure of, 285 ; causes, 333-4. 
Forces available for, 253-5, 
Gains achieved by, 334-5. 
Geographical points in, 250-2. 
Left assaulting column, 262-4 i rein- 
forced, 265, 272 ; exploits of (8 Aug.), 
268-70 ; triumph and disaster, 272-6 ; 
supports inactive, 272, 276-7. 
Left covering force, 262. 
Nature of the ground, 252. 



Sari Bair assault, continued — 
Naval assistance, 265. 
Right assaulting column, 254, 260-1 ; 
reinforced, 265 ; exploits of (7-8 Aug.), 
265-8 ; third column to co-operate 
with (8 Aug.), 271 ; attacked on 9 Aug., 
Right covering force, 254, 256-60. 
Suvla forces' help relied on, 264 ; not 
forthcoming, 269, 279, 285, 311, 312, 
323. 408. 
Third assaulting column, 270-1. 

Sari Bair Ravine, 244, 248. 

Sarrail, Gen., 362, 367. 

Saiurnia, 213. 

Sazli Beit Dere, 250, 254, 256. 

Schuler, Phillip, 73 n. ; cited, 119 «., 245 «., 
351 n. ; quoted on shelling of Allan- 
son's force, 274 n. 

Scimitar Hill (Burnt Hill, Hill 70), situation 
and importance of, 288 ; occupied by 
6th E. York Pioneers (8 Aug.), 317; 
abandoned (8 Aug.), 317 ; Turkish 
snipers' occupation of, 319 ; Maxwell's 
attack on (9 Aug.), 320-1 ; fire on 
{9 Aug.), 320-1 ; renewed attack (10 
Aug.), 323-4; assault of 21 Aug., 
339 ff. ; captured, 343 ; lost, 346. 

Scobie, Col., 233. 

Scorpion, 182, 197, 314. 

Scott, Lt.-Col. P. C, 8r. 

Scott-Moncrieff, Brig. -Gen., 181 «., 185. 

Scottish Horse, 360-1. 

Sea-planes, 218, 362 «. 

Seddel Bahr, 50, 79, 93, 202 ; capture of, 
127-8 ; Kitchener's visit to, 379. 

Senegalese troops, 136, 147, 149, 151, 

Senussi, 379. 

Senussi expedition, 337 n. 
Serbia : 

Bulgarian animosity against, 55, 221, 

"Corridor" through, 5, 6, 
Forces available in, 365. 
Peril of (Sept.), 364-6. 
Rout of, 369 n. ; hopelessness of position 
(Oct.), 376, 378. 
Seymour, Com. Claude, 256. 
Sexton, Maj. M, J., 81. 
Shaw, Maj-Gen. F, C, 200, 254, 255, 283, 

Shelford, Capt. Thos., 164. 
Shera, Capt., 259. 
Shortage of : 

Artillery, 148, 171, 181, 184, 192, 193, 
194 n., 219, 228, 229, 339, 361 ; anti- 
aircraft shortage, 219. 
Ammunition, 133, 148, 171, 181, 185, 192, 

193, 194 n., 200, 219, 229. 
Officers, 336, 338 n. 2, 376. 
Shrapnel Gully, 114; Anzac position on, 
125 ; sniper danger in, 126 ; dangerous 
apex at, 138, 161, 188 ; mentioned, 
116, 117, 243. 

Sickness : 
Casualties, 406. 
Diarrhcea, 185, 205, 313, 356. 
Dysentery, 313, 353, 356, 359.. 

Signal station destroyed, 196 «. 

Sikhs. See tinder British troops — 29th 
Indian Infantry Brigade. 

" Silver Babies," 219. 

Simonin, G^n., 152 «. 2. 

Sitwell, Brig. -Gen. W. H., commanding 
34th Brigade of nth Division, 217 n. i ; 
misses his opportunity (7 Aug.), 302-3 ; 
Hill ordered to co-operate with, 305 ; 
in sole command of 34th and 32nd 
Brigades, 307 ; succeeded by Brig. -Gen. 
J. Hill, 332 ; mentioned, 295, 299. 

Skeen, Brig. -Gen, A., 82, 253. 

Skouloudis, M., 11 «. 

Smith, 2nd Lt. A. V., 402 «, 

Smith, Col. Carrington, 99. 

Smith, Brig.-Gen. S. C. V., 298. 

Smyrna Forts, 54. 

Smyrna- Panderma Railway, 146, 221, 222. 

Smyth, Brig.-Gen. N. M., 233. 

Soghandere, Fort, 59. 

Sonnino, Baron, 56. 

Southland, 355 «. 

Spearman, Commodore, 175. 

Sphinx, the, 113, 262. 

Stamboul, 146 n, 

Staveley, Capt. C. M., 404. 

Steel's Post, 188, 241. 

Stewart, Col. Crauford, 173 n. 

Stewart, Lt.-Col. D. M., 154 «. i. 

Stopford, Lt.-Gen. Sir Frederick, career and 
reputation of, 292 ; arrival of, 201 ; 
plan for 10th Division, 303 ; satisfied 
with achievements of 7 Aug., 311 ; 
visited by Hamilton (8 Aug.), 315 ; 
constructing Corps H.Q. (9 Aug.), 
322 ; renews attack on Scimitar Hill 
(10 Aug.), 323; ordered to consolidate 
line, 324-5 ; demands 24 hours' delay 
before advance on Kavak and Tekke, 
326 ; still raises objections (13 Aug.), 
328 ; orders advance by loth Division 
(15 Aug.), 329; gives up command 
(15 Aug.), 332 ; leadership of, 226, 
334 ; mentioned, 297, 299. 

Street, Staff-Capt. , 281. 

Striedinger, Maj. O., 81. 

Stiirmer, Dr. H., quoted, 63 m., 276 «. ; 
cited, 147 n. 

Submarines : 

Australian (AE2), 146 w. 
British : 

En, 145-6 and «., 318 «, 
E14, 145-6 and «., 318 «. 
E15, 86. 
E20, 382. 

Marmora Sea invaded, 145-6 and ti. 
Turkish transport sunk (7 Sept.), 362 n. 
Enemy : 
Achievements of, 163-6. 
Carthage torpedoed, 196. 




Submarines, continued — • 

Enemy, continued — 
Evacuation complicated by, 404, 
U51, 164. 
Suez Canal, 41, 72. 
Suffren, 49, 50, 52, 53, 60. 
Sulajik, 291, 318-19, 326. 
Sultan Osman, 7-8. 
Surprise Gully, 232. 
Suvla : 

Kitchener's visit to, 380. 

Land mines in, 301, 308, 310. 

Storm havoc at, 383. 

Turkish troops opposite (Dec), 388 «. 
Suvla Bay : 

Conformation of, 288 ; rocky hills about, 
247, 289. 

Drawbacks to, for April landing, jj. 

Hinterland of, jj, 291-2. 

Roadstead of, better than Kephalos, 

Water supply near, 292. 
Suvla forces ; 

Activities of — 6-7 Aug., 295-311 ; 7-8 

Aug., 311-18; 8-9 Aug., 318-23; 9- 

10 Aug., 323-5; lo-ii Aug., 325-6; 

11-12 Aug., 326-8. 
Confusion among, 300-2, 304, 315, 324, 

325-6, 333, 342, 344-5. 408 ; mixture of 

brigades, 320. 
Co-operation of, relied on for Sari Bair 

assault, 264 ; not forthcoming, 269, 

279. 285, 311, 312, 323, 408. 
Evacuation of, 387 and n, i, 390 ff. 
Landing of (6 Aug.), 299. 
Water supply provision for, 296-7 and 

n., 313 ; thirst torments, 284, 296, 

308-10, 313-14 and ««., 333. 
Suvla Point : 

Distance of, from Ejelmer Bay, 290. 
Mahon's battalions landed at (7 Aug.), 


Pier at, 392, 395. 

Rocks at, 247, 289. 

Turkish force at (6 Aug.), 299. 
Swiffsure, 49, 60. 
Sydney, 72. 
Sykes, Maj.-Gen. F. H., xii, 219. 

Table Top, situation of, 250 ; capture of 

(6 Aug.), 254, 256-8, 264. 
Talbot, 109, 158, 182, 298, 
Talbot, Capt., 164. 
Tasmania Post, 231. 

Tekke Tape, dominating position of, 287 ; 
height and situation of, 291 ; Stopford's 
design against, 303 ; Moore's patrol 
on (8 Aug.), 317, 319; Hamilton's 
proposed occupation of, 322, 326, 328 ; 
5th Norfolks lost on, 327-8. 
Tenedos : 
Aerodrome at, 218. 
French occupation of, 166. 
Situation and character of, 46-7. 
Strategic value of, 401. 

Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli, The, 

cited, 217 n. 2, 350 «., 351 n. 
Territorial Divisions : 
Inexperience of, 325, 334, 347. 
Makeshift drafts for, 376. 
Quality of — in 29th Division, 135 ; in 
42nd Division, 137. 
Theotokis, M., j n. 
Thursby, Adm., 90, iii, 
Travers, Brig.-Gen. J, H. du B,, 216 «. 2, 

255, 262. 
Treaty of Bucharest (1913), 364. 
Treloar, Capt., xiii. 
Triad, 201. 

Triumph, preliminary bombardments, 
48-9, 52, 54 «. 2 ; forcing of the Nar- 
rows, 59-60 ; covering fire from, at the 
landing, iii, 116, 125; exploit by 
picket boat of, 86 ; torpedoed, 164. 
Troops in the campaign. See (i) Aus- 
tralian and New Zealand Army Corps, 
(2) British troops, and (3) French Ex- 
peditionary Corps. 
Trotman, Brig.-Gen. C. N., 84. 
TuUibardine, Marqtiis of, 360, 
Turchen Keui, 388 n. 
Turkey : 

British pre-war relations with, 2-4, 6-7 ; 

declaration of war, 11. 
Capitulations, 9. 
German pre-war relations with, 2-9 ; 

alliance of 4 Aug. 1914, 7 n. 
Revolution in, anticipated, 33, 59. 
Young Turk revolution (1908-9), 4. 
Turkey Trot, the, 184. 
Turks : 
Allied attitude towards, 385 and n. 
Artillery strength, 148, 161. 
Camouflage by, 150. 

Casualties, estimated (early May), 146 ; 
(19-20 May), 162 ; (end of May), 168 ; 
(21 June), 180 ; (first part of August), 
335 ; (27-28 Aug.), 354; total, 406; 
burials under Red Crescent (2 May), 
136 ; (20 May), 162. 
Divisional Order (June), 186, 
Filthy lines of, 185. 
Germans, attitude towards, 385 n. 
Hate frenzies of, 190, 196, 209, 399, 


Headquarters of, 388 «. 

Mussulman appeal of, 187-8. 

Nizam troops, 148, 168, 191, 198. 

Prisoners, 167, 177, 185, 199 ; Australian 
treatment of, 238 ». 

Red Cross respected by, 395. 

Reinforcements of, 145-6, 161, 198, 319; 
routes of, 146, 221. 

Snipers, 125-6, 150, i6c, 335 and n. 

Strength of, estimated — in all quarters, 
193 «.; in Gallipoli Peninsula — (25 
April), III ; (i May), 135 ; (6 May), 
148 ; (25 May), 168 ; (Aug.), 220 and 
n.; (6 Aug. at Suvla), 299; (Dec.), 
387-8 and n. 



Turks, continued — 

Sufferings of, in blizzard of Nov., 

Trenches of, roofed, 235, 256, 342. 

Unwin, Com. Edwin, at V Beach landing, 
95-6 ; rescues the wounded, 99 ; super- 
intends Suvla landing, 295 ; directs the 
evacuation, 392. 

V Beach : 

Evacuation from, 404. 

French landing-place and depot, 129. 

Landing of 25 April, 94-100 ; Seddel 

Bahr secured, 127-8. 
Shelling of, constant, 148, 196. 
Situation and conformation of, 79, 


Vacher, Lt.-Col., 85. 

Valley of the Shadow of Death. See 
Shrapnel Gully. 

Vandeleur, Brig. -Gen. R. S. , 349 «. 

Vandenberg, G^n., 84. 

Vengeance, 49, 52, 53, 60, 165. 

Venizelos, M., military aid offered by (i 
March), 56 ; resignation of (6 March), 
56 «. 2 ; resumes Premiership (Aug.), 
365 ; pro-Serbian policy of, 365-6 ; re- 
signs (Oct.), 368 ; estimate of, 10. 

Vineyard, the : 

British capture of (Aug.), 229-30. 
Success near (15 Nov.), 382. 

von Biberstein, Baron Marschall, 4. 

von der Goltz, Gen. Colman, 6. 

von Hindenburg, 169. 

von Lowenstern, Gen., proclamation by, 


von Mackensen, Field Marshal, 365, 369 «. 

von Miiller, Capt. Karl, 72. 

von Sanders, Gen. Liman, 145, 161 ; 
Turkish army reorganised by, 6, 9 ; 
at the armistice (20 May), 163 ; sub- 
servience of, to Enver, 198 n. 

von Wangenheim, Baron, 144. 

W Beach : 

Conformation of, 100. 

Evacuation from, 404-5. 

Landing of 25 April, 101-4. 

Shelling of, persistent, 129, 148, 196, 
W Hill (Hill 112— Ismail Oglu Tepe): 

Hill ordered to attack (7 Aug.), 305. 

Importance of, 287, 323. 

Turkish entrenchments on, 342. 

Turkish guns withdrawn from (7-8 Aug. ), 
269 and n. 

mentioned, 298, 300, 335. 
Walford, Capt., 128. 
Walker, Corp. G. A., 196 «. 
Walker, Maj.-Gen. H. B., xii, 117, 160, 

233, 242 ; cited, 238 n. 
Walker's Ridge : 

Kitchener's visit to, 380. 

Turkish failure at, 192. 

Wallace, Maj.-Gen., 210-11. 

Wallingford, Maj. J., 280. 

\\'anliss, Lt.-Col., 154 n. 2. 

War Council, the, power and personnel of, 
14-15; experts on, 25-8; meetings 
of 13 Jan. 191S, 33-4; of 28 Jan.. 

War Staff Group, 26 and «. 
Ward, Lt.-Col. M. C. P.. 81, 
Warsaw, falls of, 221, 336 ; effect on Turks, 

Water : 
Shortage of, 130, 192, 264-5 ! (7"^° 

Aug.), 284; at Suvla — thirst torments, 

284, 296, 308-10, 313-14 and nn., 

Springs of, danger spots, 183, 326. 
Supply arrangements, 104, 206 ; at Suvla, 
296-7 and «., 313 ; difficulties, 

Watson's Pier, 163. 

Weber Pasha, 198 and n. 

Wedgwood, Lt.-Com. Josiah, 149 «. 

Wemyss, Rear-Adm., 63, 89, 312 ; bom- 
bards Seddel Bahr, 127 ; in command 
of evacuation, 386. 

Westerners, 64-5, 377. 

Wheat Field, the, 190. 

" Whippets," 215. 

White, Lt.-Col. A. H., 244-5. 

White, Brig.-Gen. Cyril B. B., 83, 400. 

White flag fired on, 178. 

White Gully, 161, 233. 

Wiggin, Brig.-Gen., 338 «. i. 

Wilhelm ir., Kaiser, visit of, to Constantin- 
ople and Jerusalem, 3. 

Wilkin, Pte., 331. 

Williams, Able Seaman Wm., 97 «. 

Williams, Lt.-Col. W. de L., 99, 127. 

Wilson, Adm. Sir Arthur, 33 ; reinforces de 
Robeck, 62 ; estimate of, 25 ; cited, 
32, 35. 

Wilson, Lt.-Col. J. D. R., 135. 

Wilson, Col. Leslie (M.P.), xii. 

Wilson, Brig.-Gen. Scatters, 338 n. i. 

Winter, apprehensions regarding, 359-60 ; 
preparations for, 382 ; storm of 27 
Nov., 383-4. 

Winter, Brig.-Gen. S. H., 81, 210. 

Wire entanglements, loo-i, 104, no, 139, 

174, 183, 258. 
Wolverine, 182, 314. 

"Woodbines." See Askold. 

Woodward, Brig.-Gen. E. M., 81, 141. 

WooUy-Dod, Col., 103, 

Worcester Flat, 185. 

Wounded : 

Inadequate provision for, ii8, 140-2, 213- 

Unreclaimed after 4-5 June battle, 178 
and n. 

X Beach. See Implacable Landing. 
Xeros, Gulf of : 

British warships in, 145. 



Xeros^ Golf o^ 

FoHts air-{26 Af^^ 1x9^ 148 ; f6.A^^^ 

^^ - 

Masai aid fioB^ 32^ 

results ctf 

CImijiIci oC 107. 
T iilkn, aad &3nre at, 107-9 i 
bOme, ISM, isfL 




5^? Gcdly Bead: 

y, 121. 

5«ie- British. Trcicps — 2n>l 
MoiBiBd DtvisaDB. 
Yilt.lwB Bml SaeChoeoiilefflL 
Ypve^ aad hatlip o^ Sj^. 

Z Beach. SeeAmac 

ZioMles, 70-^. 




D Nevinson, Henry Woodd 

568 The Dardanelles campaign